1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 RHONDA FITZGERALD, an individual Case No.: 20cv848 JM(MSB) and on behalf of all persons similarly 11 situated, FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS 12 ACTION SETTLEMENT AND Plaintiff, GRANTING OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES, 13 v. REIMBURSEMENT OF COSTS, AND 14 REPRESENTATIVE SERVICE MARCUS POLLARD, et al., AWARD 15 Defendants. 16 17 Presently before the court is the Parties’ Joint Motion for Final Approval of Class 18 Action Settlement and Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Litigation Costs. (Doc. 19 Nos. 168, 160.) A hearing on the motions was held on October 7, 2024. For the reasons 20 set forth on the record and as explained in more detail below, the motions are granted. 21 I. BACKGROUND 22 A. Factual and Procedural Background 23 This federal civil rights action (

) with pendant state claims arises 24 out of an unclothed body search (intermittently referred to herein as a “strip search”) of 25 Plaintiff Rhonda Fitzgerald that occurred on September 28, 2019, when she visited the 26 Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”) to see her friend, inmate Christopher 27 Roberts. (Doc. No. 1, ¶¶ 2, 13.) 28 1 On May 5, 2020, Ms. Fitzgerald filed this suit in district court, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2 section 1983, alleging that Defendants Marcus Pollard, Lieutenant C. Moore, Sergeant H. 3 Cruz, Officer Jackson and Officer Mann-Little (collectively “Defendants”) violated her 4 civil rights and committed torts against her. (Doc. No. 1.) 5 In the Complaint, Plaintiff asserted: (1) a claim for violation of her Fourth 6 Amendment right - search without reasonable suspicion against all Defendants; (2) a claim 7 for violation of her Fourth Amendment right - search without reasonable suspicion against 8 Defendant Pollard and Doe 1; and (3) a claim for violation of the Fourth Amendment - 9 failure to train and supervise, against Defendant Pollard and Doe 1. (Doc. No. 1 at 8-161.) 10 Plaintiff also brought state law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and 11 negligence, against all Defendants. (Id. at 16-19.) 12 In the Complaint Plaintiff sought to represent a class consisting of: 13 those visitors to the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility in the Class Period2 who were required to submit to an unclothed search as a condition to 14 visiting an inmate and whose Notice of Request for Search Form states no 15 specific objective facts and rational inferences establishing individualized reasonable suspicion to believe that the person targeted for the search had an 16 intention of smuggling contraband into the Prison. 17

. 18 Plaintiff sought injunctive relief barring Defendants from performing further random 19 unclothed searches of visitors at the prison, money damages, and attorney fees and costs. 20 (Id. at 20-21.) 21 On June 1, 2021, Defendants filed an early Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 22 No. 41) that was denied by the court (Doc. No. 55). 23 24

25 1 Document numbers and page references are to those assigned by CM/ECF for the docket 26 entry. 27 2 The Complaint defines the class period as running “from two years prior to the filing date 28 1 On July 21, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Class Certification. (Doc. No. 66.) On 2 October 17, 2022 the court held oral argument on Plaintiff’s class certification motion. 3 Subsequently, this court issued an Order on November 3, 2022, certifying the following 4 class: 5 Those visitors, from May 5, 2018 to the present, to the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility who were required to submit to an unclothed search as 6 a condition to visiting an inmate and were so searched in the absence of 7 individualized reasonable suspicion to believe that the visitor intended to smuggle contraband into the Prison, as evidenced by a failure to provide the 8 basis for the search on a Form 888 – Notice of Request For Search. 9 10 Doc. No. 82 at 53. The Parties agree that over 300 individuals received the Notice of Class 11 Action (“Publication Notice”). (Doc. No. 116-3 at 388-397; see also Doc. No. 131-1 at 3- 12 105.) 13 On January 15, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, (Doc. 14 No. 116) that was granted-in-part and denied-in-part by the court (Doc. No. 137). 15 On February 14, 2024, Defendants filed a Motion to Decertify the Class (Doc. No. 16 132) that the court denied (Doc. No. 142). 17 The Parties exchanged numerous settlement proposals in an attempt to resolve this 18 matter, without success. On April 19, 2024, the Parties participated in a Settlement 19 Conference before Magistrate Judge Michael Berg. (Doc. No. 149.) This conference and 20 subsequent arms-length negotiations resulted in the proposed settlement currently before 21 the court. 22 23

24 25 3 On November 17, 2022, Defendants filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Order on Motion for Class Certification (Doc. No. 85) that was subsequently denied by the court 26 (Doc. No. 91). Defendants’ petition for permission to appeal this court’s November 3, 27 2022 order granting class certification was denied by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on March 29, 2023 (Doc. No. 97). 28 1 On June 17, 2024, the court held a hearing on the Parties’ Joint Motion for 2 Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement (Doc. No. 156). The court subsequently 3 granted the motion and preliminarily approved the settlement on July 1, 2024. (Doc. No. 4 159.) 5 B. Settlement Agreement Terms 6 The settlement agreement (“Agreement”/“Settlement”) (see Doc. No. 168-2 at 2-22) 7 defines the class as: 8 The three hundred and thirty-three visitors to Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility, from May 5, 2018 to November 3, 2022, [], who 9 underwent a search of their person as a condition to visiting an incarcerated 10 person at RJD during that time period. Defendants’ agents and representatives, the judge presiding over the Action, and members of their 11 immediate respective families are excluded from the Class. 12 13 Doc. No. 168-2 at 2, ¶ I.G. Additionally, the Parties estimate that approximately 622 14 searches are at issue in this case.

, ¶ IV.G. 15 Under the Agreement, class members’ damages will be determined based upon a 16 point system, defined as follows: 17 1. A Group 1 Class Member will be allocated 5 POINTS for each search where the Class Member was escorted to a room by the visiting officers 18 and asked to remove all of his/her clothing and became completely naked 19 so that their body could be inspected by the visiting officers before being allowed to visit an inmate. 20 2. A Group 2 Class Member will be allocated 3 POINTS for each search 21 where the Class Member was escorted to a room by the visiting officers and asked to completely remove either his/her pants, including a[sic] 22 underwear, or his/her blouse or top, including a bra, exposing their breast 23 or the lower part of his/her body, so that your [sic] body could be inspected by the visiting officers before being allowed to visit an inmate. 24 3. A Group 3 Class Member will be allocated 1 POINTS [sic] for each 25 search where the Class Member was escorted to a room by the visiting officers and asked to move an article of clothing so that the visiting officer 26 27 28 1 could inspect that area of their body, for example , where the Class Member was asked to pull down their pants or move their top so that a 2 surgery scar or something else at that body location, could be viewed 3 before being allowed to visit an inmate. 4

, ¶ IV.G 5 The Agreement requires Defendants pay a gross settlement amount of $3,500,000, 6 allocated as follows: $25,000 as an incentive award for Plaintiff; no greater than 40%, 7 $1,400,000, of the Settlement Fund anticipated to be attorneys’ fees; and reimbursement 8 of litigation costs not to exceed $55,000.

¶¶ I.T, IV.A, D-F. Under the terms of the 9 Settlement, Simpluris will be used as the Settlement Administrator and will be paid 10 $30,000 from the Settlement Fund.

¶¶ I.GG, VI.A. 11 Settlement class members have one-hundred-and-eighty (180) days after their 12 checks are issued to cash them.

, ¶ V.H. Any remaining amounts left in the 13 Settlement Fund, including those resulting from uncashed or returned checks, shall be 14 redistributed on a pro rata basis to all class members who properly and timely made claims 15 for money damages.

¶ V.I. 16 In exchange for their share of the Settlement Fund, all class members are deemed to 17 release Defendants, or Released Parties5, from claims relating to the subject matter of this 18 action, arising under federal, state and/or local law, statute, ordinance, regulation, common 19

20 21 4 To avoid a fragmented sentence, the court altered the punctuation in this paragraph from how it appears in the Agreement. 22

23 5 Per the Agreement: “‘Released Parties’ or ‘Released Persons’ means California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), Defendants and its respective 24 predecessors, successors, assigns, parents, subsidiaries, divisions, affiliates, departments, 25 related or affiliated entities and agencies, whether named or unnamed and whether served or unserved, and any and all of their past and present employees, executives, officers, 26 directors, agents, representatives, and attorneys. The term ‘Released Parties’ or ‘Related 27 Persons’ expressly includes, but is not limited to, the State of California and its departments, divisions and agencies and the named Defendants, C. Moore, M. Pollard, A. 28 1 law, or other source of law, arising out of, or related to any allegations in the Complaint. 2

, ¶ VIII.A. 3 II. FINAL APPROVAL OF SETTLEMENT 4 A. Approval of Settlement and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) 5 Having previously certified the class (see generally, Doc. No. 82), the court need 6 only determine whether the proposed settlement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate” 7 pursuant to Rule 23(e)(2). 8 As explained in the Preliminary Approval Order (Doc. No. 159), when reviewing a 9 proposed settlement, the court’s primary concern “is the protection of those class members, 10 including the named plaintiff, whose rights may not have been given due regard by the 11 negotiating parties.” Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of City & Cnty. of S.F., 12

(9th Cir 1982). Ultimately, “[i]n most situations, unless the settlement 13 is clearly inadequate, its acceptance and approval are preferable to lengthy and expensive 14 litigation with uncertain results.” Nat’l Rural Telecomms. Coop. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 221

, 526 (C.D. Cal. 2004). 16 In making the determination of whether the proposed settlement is fundamentally 17 “fair, adequate and reasonable,” the court is required to “evaluate the fairness of a 18 settlement as a whole, rather than assessing its individual components.” Lane v. Facebook, 19 Inc.

(9th Cir. 2012). Because a “settlement is the offspring of 20 compromise, the question we address is not whether the final product could be prettier, 21 smarter or snazzier, but whether it is fair, adequate and free from collusion.” Hanlon v. 22 Chrysler Corp.,

(9th Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds by Wal- 23 Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,

(2011). 24 Traditionally, district courts within the Ninth Circuit balance several factors when 25 assessing a settlement proposal, namely: 26 the strength of the plaintiff’s case; the risk, expense, complexity, and likely duration of further litigation; the risk of maintaining class action status 27 throughout trial; the amount offered in settlement; the extent of discovery 28 completed and the stage of the proceedings; the experience and views of 1 counsel; the presence of a governmental participant; and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement. 2 3 Id. at 1026. 4 As amended, Rule 23(e) provides that a court may approve a proposed class action 5 settlement after considering whether: 6 (A) the class representatives and class counsel have adequately represented the class; 7 (B) the proposal was negotiated at arm's length; 8 (C) the relief provided for the class is adequate, taking into account: (i) the costs, risks, and delay of trial and appeal; 9 (ii) the effectiveness of any proposed method of distributing relief to 10 the class, including the method of processing class-member claims; (iii) the terms of any proposed award of attorney's fees, including 11 timing of payment; and 12 (iv) any agreement required to be identified under Rule 23(e)(3); and (D) the proposal treats class members equitably relative to each other. 13 14 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2). 15 1. Rule 23(e)(2) Factors 16 In its Preliminary Approval Order, this court found that the applicable Rule 23(e)(2) 17 factors weighed in favor of approving the Settlement. (See Doc. No. 159 at 8-19.) No 18 pertinent facts have changed since the court reached its earlier conclusion. Thus, the court 19 reaffirms and incorporates by reference its analysis of the Rule 23(e)(2) requirements as 20 set forth in its Preliminary Approval Order. (See id.) Accordingly, the court finds the 21 Settlement meets the requirements of Rule 23(e)(2). 22 2. Adequacy of Notice 23 “Adequate notice is critical to court approval of a class settlement under Rule 23(e).” 24 Hanlon,

. For the court to approve a settlement, “[t]he class must be 25 notified of a proposed settlement in a manner that does not systematically leave any group 26 without notice.” Officers for Justice,

(citation omitted). 27 A court approved Publication Notice was originally mailed to putative class 28 members informing them that they could opt out of the class by submitting an Exclusion 1 Request Form (attached to the Publication Notice). The Publication Notice also advised: 2 “[i]f you do nothing, you will stay in this lawsuit and be bound by the outcome. You will 3 also give up your right to sue on your own behalf.” The Publication Notice explicitly 4 notified class members that they had the opportunity to remain part of the litigation or seek 5 exclusion, meaning no “second change” opt-out opportunity was required. 6 The court also approved the Notice of Settlement and accompanying claim form in 7 the July 1, 2024, Preliminary Approval Order. The Agreement called for sending the 8 Notice of Settlement directly to class members via First Class U.S. Mail, postage prepaid. 9 In support of her Motions, Plaintiff has filed the Declaration of Shelby Alvey, a project 10 manager at Simpluris, the Settlement Administrator retained in this matter. See generally, 11 Doc. No. 169. The declaration details the actions taken by the Administrator including the 12 implementation of a Settlement website and toll-free hotline dedicated to informing class 13 members of their rights and options under the Settlement. (Id.) The Settlement 14 Administrator declares that the Settlement Notices were mailed directly to 313 class 15 members, eighteen (18) class members did not have valid mailing addresses. (Id. ¶¶ 8, 9.) 16 Sixteen (16) notices were determined to be undeliverable, two (2) class members are 17 deceased, resulting in 297 class members having been contacted to participate in the 18 settlement. (Id. ¶¶ 10-13.) The Administrator reports that, to date, the Settlement website, 19 has been visited by 165 unique users, with 828 page views, since it was established on July 20 15, 2024. (Id. at ¶ 15.) Additionally, the toll-free number, which opened on July 15, 2024, 21 has received sixty-five (65) calls. (Id. ¶ 16.) 22 The Notices advised the class of the terms of the Settlement, of their rights: (1) to 23 participate and how to receive payment of their share of the Settlement; (2) to object to the 24 Settlement and to appear at the Final Approval Hearing; (3) to request exclusion from the 25 Settlement; (4) the manner and timing for doing any of these acts; and (5) the date and time 26 set for the Final Approval Hearing. Included on the Notices was adequate information 27 regarding the class period. The Notices also displayed the Settlement’s website: 28 1 www.rjdstripsearch-claim.com and the toll-free number 1-888-804-1915. (Doc. No. 169 ¶ 2 3.) 3 As of the date of this order, no class member has objected to the Settlement. 4 Accordingly, the court determines that the Notices in the case were the best 5 “practicable under the circumstances,” giving the settlement class members adequate 6 notice of the Settlement. 7 3. Additional Ninth Circuit Factors 8 According to the advisory committee’s note to the 2018 amendment to Federal Rule 9 Civil Procedure 23(e)(2), the goal of the revised factors was “not to displace any factor 10 [developed by a circuit], but rather to focus the court and the lawyers on the core concerns 11 of procedure and substance that should guide the decision whether to approve the 12 proposal.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2). The court will, therefore, now turn to the various 13 Ninth Circuit factors as enumerated in Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.,

(9th 14 Cir. 1998). 15 i. Strength of Plaintiff’s Case; Risk of Further Litigation; and Risk of Maintaining Class Action Status 16

17 The preferable nature of settlement over the uncertainties, expense, and length of 18 litigation, means “when assessing the strength of plaintiff’s case, the court does not reach 19 any ultimate conclusions regarding the contested issues of fact and the law that underlie 20 the merits of this litigation.” Four in One Co. v. S.K. Foods, L.P., No. 2:08-CV-3017 KJM 21 EFB,

(E.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2014) (internal quotations omitted). 22 Similarly, “a proposed settlement is not to be judged against a speculative measure of what 23 might have been awarded in a judgment in favor of the class.” Nat’l Rural Telecomms. 24 Coop, 221 F.R.D. at 526. 25 Here, the Settlement was reached approximately four years after this case was filed, 26 following the dedication of significant time and resources during litigation. The issues of 27 class certification and summary judgment have been briefed multiple times and ruled on 28 by the court, with the case settling only two months before trial was set to begin. See Low 1 v. Trump Univ., LLC,

(S.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2017) (“Where a 2 case is near trial, and the parties have conducted extensive discovery and thoroughly 3 litigated the issues, the extent of discovery and the stage of proceedings weigh in favor of 4 settlement.”) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Indeed, Class Counsel has 5 expended approximately $38,000 in litigation expenses. And, throughout this litigation, 6 Defendants have vigorously defended against Plaintiff’s claims, with no guarantee that 7 Plaintiff will prevail. In sum, the risks of continuing this litigation are known to all 8 involved. The court finds these risks weigh in favor of settlement. 9 ii. The Amount Offered in Settlement 10 “Basic to [the process of deciding whether a proposed settlement is fair, reasonable 11 and adequate] * * * is the need to compare the terms of the compromise with the likely 12 rewards of litigation.” In re TD Ameritrade Accountholder Litig.,

, 422 13 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (quoting Protective Comm. for Indep. Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry 14 Inc. v. Anderson,

(1968)). “The fact that a proposed settlement may 15 only amount to a fraction of the potential recovery does not, in and of itself, mean that the 16 proposed settlement is grossly inadequate and should be disapproved.” Linney v. Cellular 17 Alaska P’ship,

, 1242 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). 18 Here, the amount offered in settlement is more than adequate and supports final 19 approval. The Settlement authorizes a recovery of $3,500,000.00, less court-awarded fees 20 and expenses and the costs of administering the settlement. After all the proposed 21 payments are deducted from the Settlement Fund, the remaining amount is approximately 22 $2,000,000. 23 Each class member will receive a payout based on the number of alleged 24 unconstitutional searches they were subjected to and the level of intrusiveness of each 25 search. Each of the three search types, Groups 1-3, have been allocated points: 5 points 26 for a Group 1 search, 3 points for a Group 2 search and 1 point for a Group 3 search. 27 Originally, it was determined that 500 Group 1 type searches occurred, 31 searches fell 28 into the Group 2 category and 91 Group 3 type searches were identified. Class members 1 in Group 1 were originally projected to receive $3,500 per search. Class members 2 subjected to a Group 2 search were expected to receive $2,150 per search. And it was 3 estimated that class members in Group 3 would receive approximately $750 per search. In 4 other words, each point earned equated to at least $700. However, at the Final Approval 5 Hearing, Class Counsel clarified that the approximately 40% Claim Form Submission rate, 6 lower attorney costs, and under budget Settlement Administrator fees has resulted in a 7 larger net Settlement Fund than previously anticipated. This larger net Settlement amount 8 requires recalculating the monetary award each search point earns and will, in turn, increase 9 the pay-out amount per search. Class Counsel reports that settlement class members will 10 receive “an average payment of $3,600, with the highest payment being $109,440.00.” 11 Doc. No. 168-1 at ¶12. Without question, this provides meaningful and direct recovery to 12 class members. 13 In light of the risks associated with continuing this litigation, the court finds the 14 proposed payouts to be fair, reasonable and adequate and the total to be in favor of approval 15 of the settlement. The relief is also adequate under Rule 23(e)(2) considering the 16 effectiveness of the method of distributing the funds directly to the class members in the 17 form of paper checks, the non-revisionary nature of the settlement, the terms of the 18 proposed award of attorneys’ fees, and the fact that any delay of trial and appeal may result 19 in zero recovery. 20 iii. Extent of Discovery and Stage of Proceedings 21 A court should focus on whether the “parties have sufficient information to make an 22 informed decision about settlement.” In re Mego, 213 F.3d at 459 (quoting Linney, 151 23 F.3d at 1239). See also Onitverso v. Zamora,

(E.D. Cal. 2014) (“A 24 settlement that occurs in an advanced stage of the proceedings indicates the parties 25 carefully investigated the claims before reaching a resolution.”). 26 Here, the Parties have litigated this case for approximately four years, with Plaintiff 27 filing an original complaint, First Amended Complaint, motion for class certification, 28 motion for summary judgment and defending motions to dismiss, reconsider, decertify and 1 summary judgment. The Settlement was reached two months before trial was set to begin. 2 Both Parties have been engaged in formal and informal discovery and document exchange. 3 Class Counsel was involved in approximately twenty-three (23) depositions. The Parties 4 exchanged numerous fruitless settlement proposals before reaching an agreement 5 following the Settlement Conference held by Magistrate Judge Berg. Thus, the court is 6 comfortable concluding that the Parties have “sufficient information to make an informed 7 decision about settlement.” Linney, 151 F.3d at 1239. Accordingly, this factor weighs in 8 favor of approval of the settlement. 9 iv. Experience of Counsel 10 “The recommendations of plaintiffs’ counsel should be given a presumption of 11 reasonableness.” In re Omnivision Techs., Inc.,

(N.D. Cal. 12 2008) (citing Boyd v. Bechtel Corp.,

(N.D. Cal. 1979)). Here, Class 13 Counsel has provided a declaration detailing their experience in prosecuting complex 14 cases, civil rights and class actions similar to this one. Class Counsel, through Ms. Skapik’s 15 declaration, attest that “[t]he Settlement Amount provides a substantial benefit to all Class 16 Members and should be approved as fair, reasonable, and adequate.” Doc. No. 163 at ¶ 13; 17 see also id. ¶ 5. In light of the foregoing, and affording proper weight to the judgment of 18 counsel, the court finds this factor weighs in favor of the settlement. 19 v. Government Actor 20 The presence of a governmental participant in the class action settlement generally 21 weighs in favor of approving the settlement. See J.L. v. Cuccinelli, No. 18-cv-04914-NC, 22

, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2019). 23 Here, Defendants are various agents of the State of California and its corrections 24 department who support the Settlement. This factor, therefore, weighs in favor of 25 settlement. 26 vi. Reaction of Class Members 27 “It is established that the absence of a large number of objections to a proposed class 28 action settlement raises a strong presumption that the terms of a proposed class settlement 1 are favorable to the class members.” Nat’l Rural Telecomm. Coop., Inc., 221 F.R.D. at 529 2 (citations omitted). 3 Here, no objections to the settlement have been received. (Doc. No. 168 at 11; Doc. 4 No. 168-1 ¶ 29.) As to the number of class members that have opted out of the settlement, 5 at the Final Approval Hearing Class Counsel informed the court that no putative class 6 members have opted out of the settlement. However, by way of declaration submitted by 7 Class Counsel in support of the Motion for Preliminary Approval on June 3, 2024, it was 8 attested that “four putative class members had submitted Exclusion Request Forms.” Doc. 9 No. 156-2, ¶ 44. Notwithstanding the confusion regarding whether four requests for 10 exclusion have been received, such a small number of opt outs and the absence of any 11 objections weigh in favor of settlement. See Nat’l Rural Telecomm. Coop., Inc.,

(the absence of a single objection “is compelling evidence that the Proposed 13 Settlement is fair, just, reasonable, and adequate.”). 14 vii. Other Factors 15 In looking at the fairness of the settlement, the court considers two additional factors: 16 the process by which the settlement was reached and the involvement of the named plaintiff 17 in the process. See Young v. Polo Retail, LLC, No. C-02-4546 VRW,

, 18 *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2007) (adding factors “(9) the procedure by which the settlements 19 were arrived at, see MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITITGATION (FOURTH) § 21.6 (2004), and 20 (10) the role taken by the plaintiff in that process.”). Here, the Parties reached agreement 21 after attending a Mandatory Settlement Conference with Magistrate Judge Berg. The court 22 can put “a good deal of stock in the product of an arms-length, non-collusive negotiated 23 resolution.” Rodriguez v. West Publ’g Grp.,

(9th Cir. 2009). See also 24 Todd v. STARR Surgical Co., No. CV 14-5263 MWF (GJSx),

, at *2 25 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2017) (“The assistance of an experienced mediator in the settlement 26 process confirms that the settlement is non-collusive.”) (internal citation omitted). 27 Class Counsel also declares that Plaintiff sat for a deposition, attended multiple 28 settlement conferences, responded to discovery, submitted multiple declarations in support 1 of, or in opposition to, various motions, and attended court hearings. (Doc. No. 168-1, 2 ¶ 35.) Further, there is no evidence of preferential treatment for certain class members 3 because final approval is not contingent upon the court’s determination of the class 4 representative incentive award. Accordingly, the court finds these factors weigh in favor 5 of settlement. 6 viii. Balancing of the Factors 7 “Ultimately, the district court’s determination is nothing more than an amalgam of 8 delicate balancing, gross approximations and rough justice.” Officers for Justice,

(citation omitted). “[I]t must not be overlooked that voluntary conciliation and 10 settlement are the preferred means of dispute resolution. This is especially true in complex 11 class action litigation.”

Having considered the relevant factors, the court finds they all 12 weigh heavily in favor of settlement of the Rule 23 Class claims. Consequently, the court 13 finds the settlement fundamentally fair, adequate, and reasonable. 14 III. MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES, COSTS AND CLASS REPRESENTATIVE PAYMENTS 15 16 A. Attorneys’ Fees 17 In, In re Mercury Interactive Corp. Sec. Litig.,

, (9th Cir. 18 2010), the Ninth Circuit held that the “plain text of [Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h)] requires that any 19 class member be allowed an opportunity to object to the fee ‘motion’ itself, not merely to 20 the preliminary notice that such a motion will be filed.” Here, Plaintiff timely filed her fee 21 motion on August 19, 2024, seeking $1,400,000 or 40% of the Settlement Fund be awarded 22 to Class Counsel. No class member has filed an objection to the request in the time allotted 23 to file objections. 24 “In a certified class action, the court may award reasonable attorney’s fees and 25 nontaxable costs that are authorized by law or by the parties’ agreement.” Fed. R. Civ.

(h). However, “courts have an independent obligation to ensure that the award, like 27 the settlement itself, is reasonable, even if the parties have already agreed to the amount.” 28 In re Bluetooth Headset Products Liab. Litig.,

(9th Cir. 2011). That 1 Defendant has agreed in the Settlement not to oppose Counsel’s request for $1,400,000 2 “does not detract from the need carefully to scrutinize the fee award.” Staton v. Boeing 3 Co.,

(9th Cir. 2003). 4 Additionally, a prevailing party may be awarded reasonable fees in relation to the 5 prosecution of a federal civil rights claim. Thomas v. City of Tacoma,

, 647 6 (9th Cir. 2005). For a plaintiff that prevails on a § 1983 claim, fees may be awarded fees 7 pursuant to

.

(b) (“In any action or proceeding to enforce 8 a provision of section[ ] ... 1983 ... of this title, ... the court, in its discretion, may allow the 9 prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee....”). “[A] 10 prevailing plaintiff ‘should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special 11 circumstances would render such an award unjust.’” Hensley v. Eckerhart,

, 12 429, (1983) (quoting S. Rep. No. 94–1011, p. 4 (1976)). Generally, once a party is found 13 eligible for fees under § 1988, a district court may apply the loadstar method to determine 14 if the request is reasonable. Id.

. See also Gonzalez v. City of Maywood, 15

(9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Ballen v. City of Redmond,

, 16 746 (9th Cir. 2006)). The district court “may then adjust [the lodestar] upward or 17 downward based on” twelve factors identified in Hensley.

(quoting Moreno v. City of 18 Sacramento,

(9th Cir. 2008)); see Hensley,

n. 3. 19 In a common fund case such as this one, the court has discretion to choose either the 20 lodestar method or the percentage-of-the-fund method when calculating reasonable 21 attorneys’ fees. See Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp.,

(9th Cir. 2002). 22 When employing their discretion and utilizing the percentage-of-recovery method, federal 23 “courts typically calculate 25% of the [common settlement] fund as the ‘benchmark’ for a 24 reasonable fee award, providing adequate explanation in the record of any ‘special 25 circumstances’ justifying a departure.” In re Bluetooth Headset Products Liab.,

at 942 (citation omitted). The lodestar method, “requires multiplying a reasonable hourly 27 rate by the number of hours reasonably expended on the case.” Shirrod v. Dir., Office of 28 Workers’ Comp. Programs,

(9th Cir. 2015). 1 1. Percentage of the Fund 2 In assessing the reasonableness of the award in common fund percentage award 3 cases, the Ninth Circuit has provided a non-exhaustive list of factors to be used, including: 4 the extent to which class counsel achieved exceptional results for the class, whether the case was risky for class counsel, whether counsel’s performance 5 generated benefits beyond the cash settlement fund, the market rate for the 6 particular field of law (in some circumstances), the burdens class counsel experienced while litigating the case (e.g., cost, duration, foregoing other 7 work), and whether the case was handled on a contingency basis. 8 9 In re Online DVD-Rental Antitrust Litig.,

(9th Cir. 2015). 10 Here, Class Counsel submits that awarding $1,400,000 or 40% of the Settlement 11 Fund is reasonable because “the results achieved in this extremely high-risk litigation are 12 excellent. . . .[] [and] [a]s a result of this litigation, the 888 search forms utilized for a 13 search, as well as the methodology employed regarding visitor strip search[es] ha[ve] now 14 been forever changed in order to ensure that searches of visitors will comply with the law 15 and not violate the visitor’s constitutional rights.” Doc. No. 160 at 16. 16 First, the class action achieved exceptional results. As the court has acknowledged 17 above, the settlement amount of $3,500,000 confers substantial benefits upon the 18 settlement class, with the estimated payout per partially unclothed search originally thought 19 to be approximately $750 and $3500 per fully unclothed search – amounts that cannot be 20 considered nominal or trivial. The smaller number of claim forms submitted, roughly 120 21 out of the possible 297 class members notified, will result in a higher payout per search6. 22 For example, certain class members who were unconstitutionally strip searched over 23 24 25 26 6 The approximately 40% claim form submission rate has resulted in the Parties’ decision 27 to recalculate the actual payout amount per search class members will receive before mailing any checks. By doing so, the Parties hope to avoid the necessity of a secondary 28 1 twenty times are projected to receive settlement compensation in the range of $70,000. 2 (See Doc. No. 163, ¶ 15.) 3 Second, the Settlement generated benefits beyond the cash settlement itself. Not 4 only does the settlement here provide substantial monetary relief to members of the class, 5 it also directly addresses the claims at issue in this case by providing substantive non- 6 monetary relief to the public. Visiting Officers at RJD will no longer use pre-printed and 7 pre-signed Form 888 search forms. Any unclothed search of a prison visitor will now have 8 to be approved by the visiting sergeant or visiting lieutenant prior to the search being 9 performed and the reason for the search must be documented at the time of the search. 10 Even though this priceless injunctive relief is difficult to ascertain and is not included as 11 part of the value of the common fund, “courts should consider the value of the injunctive 12 relief obtained as a ‘relevant circumstance’ in determining what percentage of the common 13 fund class counsel should receive as attorneys’ fees, rather than as part of the fund itself.” 14 Staton,

(specifically holding that “only in the unusual instance where the 15 value to individual class members of benefits deriving from injunctive relief can be 16 accurately ascertained may courts include such relief as part of the value of a common fund 17 for purposes of applying the percentage method of determining fees.”). All told, the results 18 achieved weigh in favor of granting Class Counsel’s requested fee award. 19 Third, Class Counsel undertook a somewhat uncertain representation. The 20 continued risk of litigation, the challenge of overcoming the hurdle of qualified immunity 21 as part of Defendants’ defenses, the possibility of not recovering any monetary award 22 particularly in light of evolving law and facing the vigorous defense of the case put forth 23 by opposing counsel from the State of California’s Attorney General’s, are all factors that 24 support Class Counsel’s request. See McGrath v. Wyndham Resort Dev. Corp., No. 25 15cv1631 JM (KSC),

, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2018) (finding request of 26 one-third of $7.25 million common fund reasonable where continued litigation posed 27 “significant risk of no recovery”); In re Heritage Bond Litig., No. 02-ML-1475 DT, 2005 28

, at *20 (C.D. Cal. June 10, 2005) (“the novelty, difficulty and complexity of 2 the issues involved are significant factors in determining a fee award.”). 3 Fourth, the experience of Class Counsel in litigating complex cases, civil rights and 4 class actions of this type provide further support for the request. Class Counsel: (1) were 5 successful in defending against a motion to dismiss, motion for summary judgment, motion 6 for reconsideration of class certification, and motion for decertification; (2) were involved 7 in vexing and challenging discovery – often contentious; (3) compiled and analyzed 8 numerous strip search authorization forms produced by Defendants; and (4) participated in 9 settlement negotiations that were ultimately successful. All of this was done against 10 experienced defense counsel from California’s Attorney General’s Office. See In re 11 Heritage Bond Litig.,

, at *20 (noting “the quality of opposing counsel 12 is important in evaluating the quality of Plaintiff’s counsel’s work.”). 13 Fifth, Class Counsel took this case on a contingency fee basis and assumed the risk 14 of non-payment which weighs in favor of the award. Indeed, Class Counsel declares that 15 firm expended $36,205.09 in out-of-pocket costs and worked 1,845.40 hours pursuing this 16 litigation, maintaining that “[i]n order to devote the necessary time and resources [to 17 vigorously prosecute this action], [the Skapik Law Group] had to forego other compensable 18 work.” Doc. No. 163 at ¶ 17. See In re Quantum Health Res., Inc. Sec. Litig.,

(C.D. Cal. 1997) (“Because payment is contingent upon receiving a favorable 20 result for the class, an attorney should be compensated both for services rendered and for 21 the risk of loss or nonpayment assumed by accepting and prosecuting the case.”). 22 Finally, the reaction of the class to the Settlement supports the fee application as no 23 class member has objected and as few as four out of the 333 class members may have 24 requested exclusion. See In re Heritage Bond,

, at *21 (“The existence 25 or absence of objectors to the attorneys’ fee award is a factor in determining the appropriate 26 fee award”) (citation omitted). 27 In sum, all of the factors support Class Counsel’s request for an award of 40% of the 28 Settlement Fund. 1 2. Lodestar Method 2 While the court need not engage in a full-blown lodestar analysis when the primary 3 basis remains the percentage method, the calculation is meant to provide a “useful 4 perspective on the reasonableness of a given percentage award.” Vizcaino,

1050. 6 “In determining a reasonable hourly rate, the district court should be guided by the 7 rate prevailing in the community for similar work performed by attorneys of comparable 8 skill, experience, and reputation.” Chalmers City of L.A,

(9th Cir. 9 1986), amended on denial of reh’g,

(9th Cir. 1987). The number of hours 10 billed must equal the number of hours that can reasonably be billed to a private client. 11 Gonzalez,

. 12 Class Counsel have submitted a lodestar calculation with their request. (Doc. No. 13 160 at 22-24.) Class Counsel declare a total of 1,845.40 hours have been worked on this 14 case.7 The calculated lodestar for these hours is $1,325,092.00. Class Counsel’s loadstar 15 calculation results in a multiplier of 1.06. Counsel calculates the lodestar with hourly rates 16 for attorneys ranging from $525 to $825 an hour, with paralegals being billed at $195 an 17 hour. 18 In support, Class Counsel have submitted a declaration from Ms. Skapik attesting to 19 the hours worked and billing rates. Doc. No. 163 ¶¶ 19, 20.) Ms. Skapik declares her 20 hourly rate is $825 an hour and the work performed by the individuals at the Skapik Law 21 Group and co-counsel is summarized on a chart, along with each person’s hourly rate, 22 hours worked, lodestar, and their varying years of experience. (Id. at ¶ 19.) The chart 23 identifies 2 partners, 1 senior associate, 1 counsel, 1 attorney, and 1 paralegal as being on 24 25 7 This figure does not account for the work Class Counsel will do in connection with work 26 related to final approval, court appearances, and implementation of the settlement. (Doc. 27 No. 163 at ¶ 21.)

28 1 the case team. At the request of the court, the underlying billing entries for each individual 2 timekeeper, along with a brief description of the task being performed, was also provided. 3 (See Doc. No. 166.) 4 i. Reasonableness of Rates 5 “[C]ourts are required to evaluate the reasonableness of counsel’s fees, regardless of 6 a challenge by opposing counsel.” Kries v. City of San Diego, No. 17-cv-1464-GPC-BGS, 7

, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2021) (citation omitted). As an initial matter, 8 the court notes that Class Counsel provided no case citations reflecting what reasonable 9 rates are for federal civil rights class actions in the Southern District of California. So, 10 with little evidence, aside from Class Counsel’s declaration to support the fee request 11 before the court, the court may “rely on its own familiarity with the legal market” to 12 determine the reasonable rates of members of the Berger Montague firm. Ingram v. 13 Oroudjian,

(9th Cir. 2011). 14 Here, Class Counsel is seeking approval of hourly rates ranging from $525 - $825 15 for attorneys working on this matter. It seeks $825 for partner, Geralyn Skapik, who has 16 35 years of experience as a lawyer. (Doc. No. 163 ¶ 19.) $825/hour is requested for 17 partner, Mark Skapik, who was 31 years of experience. (Id.) Relatedly, $775/hour is being 18 requested for senior associate, Blair J. Berkely, who has 22 years of experience. Similarly, 19 Co-counsel Eric Morris, with 19 years of experience, has a proposed market rate of 20 $775/hour. (Id.) Class Counsel states the hourly rate for 4-year attorney Matthew 21 Falkenstein is $525/hour. 22 In this case, the court takes no issue with the rates being requested by the Skapik 23 Law Group. The hourly rates are within the range normally charged within this legal 24 community. See e.g., Soler v. Cnty. of San Diego, No. 14cv2470-MMA (RBB),

2515236, at *5 (S.D. Cal. June 18, 2021) (

civil rights litigation where 26 court determined that $650 per hour was a reasonable rate for an extremely experienced 27 civil rights trial attorney with 25 years’ experience, noting that “courts in this District have 28 awarded hourly rates for work performed in civil cases by attorneys with significant 1 experience anywhere in the range of $550 per hour to more than $1000 per hour”) 2 (collecting cases).8 3 Regarding the paralegal rates, Class Counsel fails to provide any case law to support 4 the rates of its paralegals. Despite this omission, the court may consider Ms. Skapik’s 5 declaration, similar cases, and its own knowledge and familiarity with the Southern District 6 of California’s legal market in setting a reasonable hourly rate for paralegal services. See 7 Ingram,

. Generally, reasonable rates for paralegals in this district have 8 ranged from $125 to $250. See, e.g., Martinez v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. 19-CV- 9 1195-WVG,

, at *10, (S.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2023) (adopting as reasonable 10 paralegal hourly rate of $250); Durruthy v. Charter Commc’n, LLC, No. 20-cv-1374-W- 11 MSB,

, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Sep. 30, 2021) (“This district has awarded 12 paralegal fees in line with the $175 to $250 requested[.]”); San Diego Comic Convention 13 v. Dan Farr Prods., No. 14-cv-1865-AJB-JMA,

, at *15 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 14 15, 2019) (“Reasonable rates for paralegals in this district have ranged from $125 to $225,” 15

16 17 8 See also Ziegler v. GW Pharmaceuticals, PLC, No. 21-cv-1019-BAS-MSB,

, at * (S.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2024) (finding $975 an appropriate hourly rate for a 18 managing partner, $850 for a senior associate, $750 for “of counsels,” and $475-575 for 19 associates in Private Securities Litigation Reform Act action); Nguyen v. BMW of N. Am., No. 3:20-CV- 2432 JLS (BLM),

, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2023 20 (approving attorneys’ fees of $525/hour for law firm principal with 16 years of consumer 21 law experience, $375/hour for senior litigation attorney with 6 years of experience, $325/hour for associate attorney with 3 years of experience; $140/hour for a post-bar 22 clerk); Herring Networks, Inc. v. Maddow, No. 3:19-cv-1713-BAS-AHG,

409724 at *5, (S.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2021) (finding $1050-$1150 to be reasonable rates for partners with more than 30 years of experience from a Top 100 law firm); Kries,

120830, at *7-8 (approving following 2019-2020 rates for labor and employment attorneys: 25 30+ years of experience at $650/hour; 14 years of experience at $500/hour; 6 years of experience at $400/hour; 4 years of experience at $295/hour; 3 years of experience at 26 $225/hour); Lopez v. Mgmt. & Training Corp., Case No. 17cv1624 JM(RBM),

1911571, at *8-9 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2020) (approving attorneys’ fee request with rates ranging from $500 to $900 per hour in wage and hour class action); 28 1 noting $290 as being the highest paralegal rate this district has approved) (collecting cases), 2 attorneys fees aff’d by

(9th Cir. 2020). Additionally, the most recently 3 published United States Consumer Law Attorney Fee Survey Report in 2017-2018 4 announces $147 as the average paralegal billing in rate in San Diego at that time. United 5 States Consumer Law Attorney Fee Survey Report 2017-2018, available at 6 https://burdgelaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/US-Consumer-Law-Attorney-Fee- 7 Survey-Report-w-Table-of-Cases-091119.pdf (last visited June 17, 2024). 8 Accounting for inflation over the past five years, the court finds that the proffered 9 hourly paralegal rates being requested by Class Counsel are justifiable and supported by 10 the paralegal rate structure of the community. Accordingly, the court determines the 11 Skapik Law Group paralegal rate of $195/hour reasonable. 12 ii. Reasonableness of the Hours Expended 13 Even though the court need not closely scrutinize each claimed attorney-hour, some 14 review is required. As the moving party, Class Counsel “bears the burden of documenting 15 the appropriate hours spent in litigation and submitting evidence in support of the hours 16 worked.” Hensley,

. Hours should not be counted if they are excessive, 17 redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.

. 18 Here, Class Counsel assert 1,845 hours have been worked on this case and a copy of 19 the underlying entries was provided. (Doc. No. 160 at 23; Doc. No. 166.) A review of the 20 chart illustrates that it contains some entries that do not furnish detailed descriptions of the 21 work performed e.g., “prepared complaint,” (see, e.g., Doc. No 166 at 26), and “team 22 meeting regarding strategy,” (id., at 8). Additionally, some of the work performed by a 23 paralegal could have been assigned to a legal secretary and billed at a much lower rate than 24 the requested $195/hour, (see, e.g., “sending out class notices,” Doc. No. 166 at 17, “get 25 envelopes ready to send out to class members,” id. at 19). And, “[p]urely clerical tasks are 26 generally not recoverable on motion for attorney’s fees as they should be considered a part 27 of the firm’s overhead rather than billed to a client.” Kries,

at *11. 28 1 Nevertheless, at bottom, the work entries generally appear reasonable and necessary under 2 the circumstances. 3 iii. Lodestar conclusion 4 As multipliers of 1 to 4 are commonly awarded, the submitted lodestar of 1.06 is not 5 unreasonable and is well within the range commonly awarded in complex class action cases 6 in the Ninth Circuit. See Figueroa v. Cap. One, N.A., No. 18cv692 JM(BGS),

211551, at *10 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2021) (approving lodestar multiplier of 3.35); Patel v. 8 Axesstel, No. 3:14-CV-103-CAB-BGS,

, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2015) 9 (“Class counsel also points out that the Court could arrive at this total using the lodestar 10 method with a 1.38 multiplier, which is well within the range of 1.0 to 4.0 often used by 11 district courts in common fund case.”) (citing Kakani v. Oracle Corp., No. 12 06- 06493WHAT,

, at *2(N.D. Cal. Dec 21, 2007) (“Although the range 13 of multipliers used by district courts in common-fund cases varies widely, an 14 overwhelming majority of district courts have used between 1.0-4.0 as the multiplier.”)). 15 See also Vizcaino,

(upholding a 28% fee award that constituted a 3.65 16 lodestar multiplier). The lodestar, therefore, supports the 40% fee award. 17 iv. Conclusion Regarding Attorneys’ Fees Request 18 Thus, guided by the principle that it is incumbent upon it to award fees for work that 19 was reasonable and necessary under the circumstances, the court finds the full 40% 20 benchmark award requested is appropriate in the context of this case. At first blush, this 21 award may appear on the high end, but courts have awarded fees in the range of 30-50% 22 of the funds where, as here, the gross settlement amount is less than $10 million. See Craft 23 v. Cty. Of San Bernardino,

(C.D. Cal. 2008) (citing Von Vranken 24 v. Atl. Richfield Co.,

(N.D. Cal. 1995)). Moreover, this upward 25 departure from the 25% benchmark reflects the outstanding result achieved for the class, 26 the novel legal issue litigated, the contingent nature of the litigation, and the significant, 27 meaningful changes Defendants have made to the unclothed search practices at RJD. Class 28 Counsel’s achievement of litigating to the hilt and vindicating the fundamental right to visit 1 a family member, friend, or other incarcerated individual without fear of being subjected 2 to an unwarranted strip search is to be commended and warrants this award. See Spann v. 3 J.C. Penny Corp.,

(C.D. Cal. 2016) (“As always, when 4 determining attorneys’ fees the district court [is] guided by the fundamental principle that 5 fee awards out of common funds be reasonable under the circumstances.”) (quoting Glass 6 v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc.,

, at *14 (N.D. Cal. 2007) aff’d

(9th Cir. 2009)). Accordingly, the court awards Class Counsel attorneys’ fees in the 8 amount of $1,400,000. 9 B. Settlement Administration Costs 10 Per the terms of the Settlement and Preliminary Approval Order, Simpluris, was 11 approved as the Settlement Administrator and is to be paid from the Settlement Fund. 12 Originally, Simpluris anticipated its costs would be approximately $30,000 based on a 13 much higher claims rate. (Doc. No. 156 at 37). 14 Class Counsel now request the court to approve reimbursement to Simpluris for the 15 costs associated with notice and claims administration, in the amount of $19,454.00. (Doc. 16 No. 169, ¶ 24.) Shelby Alvey, a Project Manager for Simpluris, submitted a declaration 17 regarding the implementation of the Notice, and other administrative services performed. 18 See generally, Doc. No. 169. Although an actual breakdown of the monies spent or hours 19 worked has not been provided by the Administrator, the court’s own familiarity and 20 knowledge regarding the costs of administrating class action settlements indicates that the 21 requested is reasonable. Accordingly, the court awards class administrator fees in the 22 amount of $19,454.00. 23 C. Costs 24 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 permits a court to “award reasonable attorney’s 25 fees and nontaxable costs that are authorized by law or by the parties’ agreement.” Fed. R. 26 Civ. P. 23(h). Under the “common fund doctrine,” “a private plaintiff, or his attorney, 27 whose efforts create, discover, increase or preserve a fund to which others also have a claim 28 is entitled to recover from the fund the costs of his litigation, including attorneys’ fees.” In 1 re Apple Inc., Device Performance Litig.,

, 785 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting 2 Vincent v. Hughes Air W., Inc.,

, 769 (9th Cir. 1977)). The fundamental 3 purpose of the doctrine “is to spread the burden of a party’s litigation expenses among 4 those who are benefitted.” Paul, Johnson, Alston & Hunt v. Graulty,

, 271 5 (9th Cir. 1989). In sum, Class Counsel are entitled to reimbursement of the out-of-pocket 6 costs they reasonably incurred investigating and prosecuting this case. See In re Media 7 Vision Tech. Sec. Litig.,

(N.D. Cal. 1996) (citing Mills v. Electric 8 Auto-Lite Co.,

(1970)); Staton,

. 9 Regarding the approximately $37,500 sought in costs, the bulk of these costs 10 encompass deposition related costs (e.g., court reporters, videographers, and transcripts), 11 filing and service fees, legal research, travel related charges, and expenses related to 12 photocopying costs and postage. (Doc. No. 160 at 24.) A report summarizing the 13 categories of costs was also provided. (See Doc. No. 168-2 at 157-59.) A review of the 14 report indicates that the requested fees are reasonable. Accordingly, the court awards class 15 administrator fees in the amount of $37,500.00. 16 D. Class Representative Payments 17 Although “incentive awards are fairly typical in class action cases,” they are 18 discretionary. Rodriguez,

. “Generally, when a person joins in bringing an 19 action as a class action he has disclaimed any right to a preferred position in the settlement.” 20 Staton,

. (internal ellipses, quotations, and citation omitted). The purpose 21 of incentive awards, therefore, is “to compensate class representatives for work done on 22 behalf of the class, to make up for financial or reputational risk undertaken in bringing the 23 action, and, sometimes, to recognize their willingness to act as a private attorney general.” 24 Rodriguez,

. However, “district courts must be vigilant in scrutinizing 25 all incentive awards to determine whether they destroy the adequacy of the class 26 representatives.” Radcliffe v. Experian Info. Solutions Inc.,

(9th Cir. 27 2013). 28 1 In the Settlement papers, the named Plaintiff asks for an incentive award of $25,000. 2 Ms. Skapik, on behalf of Class Counsel, declares that named Plaintiff “performed her duty 3 to the Class admirably and without exception.” Doc. No. 168-2 at ¶ 35. Further, Class 4 Counsel represents Plaintiff worked extensively by responding to multiple discovery 5 requests, attending meetings, and participating in multiple settlement conferences. (See 6 id.) Ms. Skapik also attests that Plaintiff “experienced hardship” as after filing the lawsuit 7 she was in essence, ‘blacklisted’ and was unable to see her inmate friend until [Ms. Skapik] 8 intervened and addressed the issue with defense counsel.” (Id.) Ms. Fitzgerald submitted 9 a declaration in support of the request, (Doc. No. 168-2 at 161-65) estimating that she has 10 spent over 100 hours devoted to this lawsuit (id., ¶ 8). 11 Given Plaintiff’s level of involvement in the case, the undertaking of the risk in 12 bringing this action, and the fact the amount of the request is consistent with those typically 13 awarded as incentive payments, the court determines that Plaintiff’s request is reasonable. 14 See, e.g., In re BofI Holding, Inc. Sec. Litig., Nos: 3:15-CV-02324-GPC-KSC, 3:15-CV- 15 02486-GPC-KSC,

, at *8, 11 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2022) (finding a 16 “$15,000 service award constitutes only .1% of the total $14,100,000 recovery” and was 17 therefore “fair and reasonable.”); McGrath,

, at *11 (awarding $10,000 18 to class representative); Beaver v. Tarsadia Hotels, No. 11-cv-01842-GPC-KSC,

4310707, at *7-8 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2017) (approving four class representative awards of 20 $50,000) (collecting cases).9 There are no circumstances indicating that the award would 21 create a conflict between the named Plaintiff and class members. Accordingly, Plaintiff 22 Fitzgerald is awarded $25,000 as a service award. 23 /// 24 25 26 9 See also Bova v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 07cv3410 AJB (JMA),

13176812, (S.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2011) ($20,000 class representative award); Singer v. Becton Dickinson & Co., No. 08-CV-821-IEG (BLM),

, at *9 (S.D. Cal. June 28 1 IV. CONCLUSION 2 In accordance with the foregoing, the court ORDERS as follows: 3 1. The court GRANTS final approval of the proposed Settlement Agreement (Doc. 4 No. 168-2 at 2-22); 5 2. Class Members are defined as: 6 The three hundred and thirty-three visitors to Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility, from May 5, 2018 to November 3, 2022, [], who 7 underwent a search of their person as a condition to visiting an 8 incarcerated person at RJD during that time period. Defendants’ agents and representatives, the judge presiding over the Action, and members 9 of their immediate respective families are excluded from the Class; 10 3. This order applies to all claims or causes of action settled under the Settlement 11 Agreement and binds all Class Members who did not affirmatively opt-out of the 12 Settlement Agreement by submitting a timely and valid Request for Exclusion. 13 This order does not bind persons who filed timely and valid Requests for 14 Exclusion; 15 4. Plaintiffs and all Class Members who did not timely submit a valid Request for 16 Exclusion are: (1) deemed to have released and discharged Defendants from any 17 and all Released Claims accruing during the Class Period; and (2) barred and 18 permanently enjoined from prosecuting any and all Released Claims against the 19 Released Parties. The full terms of the releases described in this paragraph are set 20 forth in section V.III of the Settlement Agreement and are specifically 21 incorporated herein by this reference; 22 5. The Settlement Administrator will issue individual settlement payments to 23 participating Class Members according to the terms and timeline stated in the 24 Settlement Agreement; 25 6. The court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Litigation Costs 26 (Doc. No. 160). The court GRANTS Class Counsel attorneys’ fees in the amount 27 of $1,400,000 and $37,500 in costs from the Settlement Fund. The Settlement 28 1 (10) days of Final Approval of the Settlement, as set forth in Paragraph IV.F. of 2 the Settlement Agreement; 3 7. The court GRANTS a class representative award of $25,000 to Plaintiff Rhonda 4 R. Fitzgerald to be paid from the Settlement Fund. The Settlement Administrator 5 shall pay Plaintiff from the Settlement Fund within ten (10) days of the Final 6 Approval of the Settlement, as set forth in Paragraph IV.E. of the Settlement 7 Agreement; 8 8. The court APPROVES settlement administrator costs of $19,454. Payment 9 shall be made from the Settlement Fund to Simpluris pursuant to the timeline 10 stated in the Settlement; 11 9. The court retains continuing jurisdiction over this Settlement solely for the 12 purposes of enforcing the agreement, addressing settlement administration 13 matters and addressing such post-judgment matters as may be appropriate under 14 court rules and applicable law; 15 10. On or before January 7, 2025, the Class Administrator shall provide a 16 declaration advising the court on the status of the distribution of the Settlement 17 Funds; and 18 11. Judgment is entered on the terms set forth above. The Clerk of the Court shall 19 CLOSE the case. 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. 21 || Dated: October 28, 2024 Piel 22 ff pray 3 n. Jeffrey. Miller nited States District Judge 24 25 26 27 28