1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 DAVID L., Case No.: 20-cv-01396-AGS 4 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR

(b) FEES (ECF 19) 5 v. 6 Carolyn COLVIN,1 Defendant. 7

8 Plaintiff’s counsel moves for $27,733.00 in attorney’s fees, in addition to “credit to 9 [reimburse] plaintiff for the EAJA fees to be paid in the amount of $6,512.84.” (ECF 19, 10 at 1); see

(b). This request represents just under 25% of plaintiff’s “past 11 due benefits[,]” which total $110,932.00. (ECF 19-1, at 9.) Plaintiff has not objected. (See 12

.) 13 “Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant,” the court may allow 14 “a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the 15 past-due benefits . . . .”

(b). In evaluating an attorney-fee application, courts 16 “must respect the primacy of lawful attorney-client fee arrangements,” “looking first to the 17 contingent-fee agreement, then testing for reasonableness.” Crawford v. Astrue,

(9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “Within the 25 percent boundary, . . . the 19 attorney for the successful claimant must show that the fee sought is reasonable for the 20 services rendered.” Gisbrecht v. Barnhart,

(2002). Factors the court may 21 consider in evaluating the reasonableness of the attorney-fee award are: “(1) the character 22 of the representation; (2) the results achieved; (3) whether the attorney engaged in dilatory 23 conduct; (4) whether the benefits are large in comparison to the amount of time counsel 24 spent on the case; and (5) the attorney’s record of hours worked and counsel’s regular 25 26 27 1 Carolyn Colvin, the current Acting Commissioner of the Social Security 28 1 hourly billing charge for non-contingent cases.” Avina v. Saul, No. 18-CV-1728-W-MSB, 2

, at *1 (S.D. Cal. June 29, 2021). 3 Plaintiff assented in his contingency agreement to “25% of the past due benefits 4 awarded upon reversal of any unfavorable ALJ decision for work before the court.” (ECF 5 19-2, at 1.) This bargained-for percentage is presumptively valid and may be reduced only 6 if warranted by the character and results of the representation. See Gisbrecht,

807–08. Here, counsel invested his resources on contingency, successfully negotiated 8 remand, and fully litigated this matter in administrative proceedings. (See ECF 19-1, at 4.) 9 On remand, plaintiff secured a “fully favorable” decision (ECF 19-5, at 3) and was granted 10 past-due benefits of $110,932.00 (ECF 19-1, at 13). There is no evidence of dilatory 11 conduct or undue delay. Counsel expended 40.6 hours to achieve these results, which is 12 eminently reasonable. (See ECF 19-1, at 4); Costa v. Commissioner,

, 1136 13 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Many district courts have noted that twenty to forty hours is the range 14 most often requested and granted in social security cases.”); Dana F. v. Kijakazi, No. 3:20- 15 CV-01548-AHG,

(S.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2022) (finding 40 hours reasonable 16 when “the parties filed a joint motion for voluntary remand” and a “final judgment 17 reversing the final decision of the Commissioner” was entered); Guzman v. Commissioner, 18 No. 2:20–CV–0468–KJN,

(E.D. Cal. June 21, 2021) (granting fees for 19 38 hours of work after “the parties stipulated to voluntarily remand for further 20 proceedings”). 21 In the present case, the effective hourly rate amounted to $638.08 which is 22 reasonable compared to fees that courts have routinely approved. See Sproul v. Astrue, 23 No.11-CV-1000-IEG DHB,

, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2013) (finding the 24 “seemingly exorbitant de facto hourly rate of just under $800 per hour” reasonable and 25 “but a by-product of counsel’s efficiency in prosecuting the case”); Hearn v. Barnhart, 26

(N.D. Cal. 2003) (collecting cases from two decades ago that 27 approved fees between roughly $200 and $700 an hour); Palos v. Colvin, No. CV 15- 28 1 ||04261-DTB,

, at *2 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (finding an effective hourly rate 2 || of $1,546.39 reasonable for an attorney-fee award of $15,000 in a similar case). 3 Counsel’s unopposed request for fees under

(b) is GRANTED. 4 ||Counsel is entitled to $27,733.00 out of plaintiff's past-due benefits in accordance with 5 ||agency policy. Counsel must reimburse plaintiff the $6,512.84 EAJA fee. (See ECF 19-1, 6 ||at 4); see also Gisbrecht,

(noting that, when section 406(b) fees are 7 || awarded, “the claimant’s attorney must refund to the claimant the amount of the smaller 8 || [EAJA] fee’’). 9 || Dated: December 10, 2024 10 A f. 11 Andrew G. Schopler United States District Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28