1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 STEVEN WAYNE BONILLA, Case No. 24-cv-02087 BAS-JLB CDCR # J-48500, 12 ORDER DISMISSING PETITION Petitioner, 13 FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS FOR v. FAILURE TO PAY FILING FEE 14 REQUIRED BY

(a) IMPERIAL COUNTY SUPERIOR 15 COURT JUDGES, 16 Respondents. 17 18 Petitioner Steven Wayne Bonilla, proceeding pro se and currently incarcerated at the 19 California Medical Facility, has filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus pursuant to 28

. (ECF No. 1.) Petitioner seeks to “compel the Judges to perform their duty,” 21 obtain a declaration that his judgment from the Alameda County Superior Court is void, 22 and recover compensatory damages. (Id. at 1–2.) Petitioner has not paid the filing fee 23 required by

(a) to commence a civil action nor has he filed a Motion to 24 Proceed in Forma Pauperis [“IFP”] pursuant to

(a). For the reasons 25 discussed below, the Court DISMISSES the Petition. 26 I. Failure to Pay Filing Fee or Request IFP Status 27 All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 28 United States, except an application for a writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 1 $405, consisting of a $350 statutory fee plus an additional administrative fee of $55, 2 although the administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to proceed IFP. 3 See

(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee 4 Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2023). The action may proceed despite a failure to prepay the 5 entire fee only if leave to proceed IFP is granted pursuant to

(a). See 6 Andrews v. Cervantes,

(9th Cir. 2007). 7 While “the previous version of the IFP statute granted courts the authority to waive 8 fees for any person ‘unable to pay[,]’ . . . the PLRA [Prison Litigation Reform Act] 9 amended the IFP statute to include a carve-out for prisoners: under the current version of 10 the IFP statute, ‘if a prisoner brings a civil action or files an appeal in forma pauperis, the 11 prisoner shall be required to pay the full amount of a filing fee’” and section 1915(b) 12 “provides a structured timeline for collecting this fee.” Hymas v. U.S. Department of the 13 Interior,

(9th Cir. 2007) (quoting

(b)(1) and citing 28

(b)(1)-(2)). Prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP are required to submit 15 both “an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such prisoner possesses” and a 16 “certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for . . . the 17 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. 18 § 1915(a)(1)-(2); Andrews v. King,

(9th Cir. 2005); see also S.D. Cal. 19 CivLR 3.2(a)-(b). 20 Using this information, the court “shall assess and when funds exist, collect, . . . an 21 initial partial filing fee,” which is “calculated based on ‘the average monthly deposits to 22 the prisoner’s account’ or ‘the average monthly balance in the prisoner’s account’ over a 23 6-month term; the remainder of the fee is to be paid in ‘monthly payments of 20 percent of 24 the preceding month’s income credited to the prisoner’s account.’” Hymas,

25 (quoting

(b)(1)-(2)). Thus, while a prisoner may qualify to proceed IFP 26 without being required to pay the full statutory filing fee upfront, they remain obligated to 27 pay the full amount due in monthly installments irrespective of whether the action is later 28 dismissed. See Bruce v. Samuels,

(2016);

(b)(1)-(2). 1 Here, because Petitioner has neither paid the $405 filing and administrative fee 2 pursuant to

(a) nor has he filed a properly supported Motion to Proceed 3 IFP pursuant to

(a), his case cannot proceed. See Andrews,

1051; Hymas,

. 5 II. Leave to Proceed IFP 6 Although the Court would typically grant a prisoner leave to file an IFP motion, as 7 relevant to Petitioner, the PLRA also amended

(g) to preclude the 8 privilege to proceed IFP: 9 . . . if [a] prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United 10 States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails 11 to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. 12

13

(g). 14 “Strikes are prior cases or appeals, brought while the [petitioner] was a prisoner, 15 which were dismissed on the ground that they were frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a 16 claim.” Andrews,

n.1 (internal quotations and brackets omitted). “[S]uch 17 a complaint is ‘dismissed’ for purposes of § 1915(g) even if the district court styles such 18 dismissal as a denial of the prisoner’s application to file the action without prepayment of 19 the full filing fee.” O’Neal v. Price,

(9th Cir. 2008). When courts 20 “review a dismissal to determine whether it counts as a strike, the style of the dismissal or 21 the procedural posture is immaterial. Instead, the central question is whether the dismissal 22 ‘rang the PLRA bells of frivolous, malicious, or failure to state a claim.’” El-Shaddai v. 23 Zamora,

(9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Blakely v. Wards,

, 24 615 (4th Cir. 2013)). 25 Once a prisoner has accumulated three strikes, he is prohibited by Section 1915(g) 26 from pursuing any other IFP action in federal court unless he can show he is facing 27 “imminent danger of serious physical injury.” See

(g); Cervantes, 493 28 F.3d at 1055 (noting Section 1915(g)’s exception for IFP complaints which “make[] a 1 plausible allegation that the prisoner faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at 2 the time of filing.”). 3 While Petitioner has not moved to proceed IFP in this case, the Court nevertheless 4 finds it would be futile for him to do so. While defendants typically carry the burden to 5 produce evidence demonstrating a prisoner is not entitled to proceed IFP, “in some 6 instances, the district court docket records may be sufficient to show that a prior dismissal 7 satisfies at least one of the criteria under § 1915(g) and therefore counts as a strike.” 8 Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119–20. That is true here. 9 Based on the dockets of many court proceedings available on PACER,1 this Court 10 finds that Petitioner Steven Wayne Bonilla, identified as CDCR #J-48500, while 11 incarcerated, has had dozens of prisoner civil actions or appeals dismissed on the grounds 12 that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which relief may be 13 granted. See In re Steven Bonilla,

, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2012) (noting 14 Petitioner’s litigation history in the Northern District of California, including the dismissal 15 of 34 pro se civil rights actions between June 1 and October 31, 2011 alone, which were 16 dismissed “because the allegations in [his] complaints d[id] not state a claim for relief 17 under § 1983.”); id. at *3 (“The following five actions are DISMISSED without prejudice 18 and without leave to amend for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted: 19 Bonilla v. Superior Court of Alameda County, C 11-6306; Bonilla v. Alameda County 20 District Attorney’s Office, C 11-6307; Bonilla v. California Supreme Court, C 12-0026; 21 Bonilla v. Cullen, C 12-0027; Bonilla v. California Supreme Court, C 12-0206.”); id. at *3 22 n.1 (“The Court recently informed Plaintiff that, in accordance with

(g), 23 24 25 26 1 A court “may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the 27 federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.” Bias v. Moynihan,

(9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 28 1 he no longer qualifies to proceed in forma pauperis in any civil rights action.” (citing In re 2 Steven Bonilla, Nos. C 11-3180, et seq. CW (PR), Order of Dismissal at 6:23–7:19)). 3 The Court has reviewed the Petition and finds that it does not contain any “plausible 4 allegations” to suggest that Petitioner “faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ 5 at the time of filing.” Cervantes,

(quoting

(g)) (see 6 generally ECF No. 1.) Instead, Petitioner contends that he was the victim of “malicious 7 prosecution,” asserting that the arrest warrant in his case was invalid, no federal grand jury 8 subpoena was issued, his prosecution lacked probable cause, and the resulting judgment is 9 therefore “void.” (See ECF No. 1 at 1–2.) He seeks a declaration to this effect from the 10 Respondent Judges, whom he claims have failed to address these issues. (Id.) 11 Accordingly, because Petitioner, while incarcerated, has accumulated far more than 12 the three “strikes” permitted by Section 1915(g), and fails to plausibly allege that he faced 13 imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time of filing, he is not entitled to the 14 privilege of proceeding IFP. See Cervantes,

; see also Rodriguez v. Cook, 15

(9th Cir. 1999) (noting that “§ 1915(g) does not prevent all prisoners 16 from accessing the courts; it only precludes prisoners with a history of abusing the legal 17 system from continuing to abuse it while enjoying IFP status.”) 18 III. Conclusion and Order 19 For the reasons discussed above, the Court DISMISSES this Petition based on 20 Petitioner’s failure to pay the civil filing fee required by

(a). The Clerk 21 is DIRECTED to close the case and accept no further documents for filing, except a timely 22 Notice of Appeal, which the Court CERTIFIES would not be taken in good faith pursuant 23 to

(a)(3). 24 IT IS SO ORDERED. 25 26 Dated: December 12, 2024 ______________________________ 27 Hon. Cynthia Bashant United States District Judge 28