1 2 3 4 5 6 JS-6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ROE AH 71, ) Case No. CV 24-9544 FMO (JCx) 12 Plaintiff, 13 V. ORDER REMANDING ACTION 14| 1E, etal., 15 Defendants.

17 On August 23, 2024, plaintiff Jane Roe (“plaintiff’), filed a complaint in Ventura County Superior Court (“state court”) against defendants Does 1 through 3, (see Dkt. 1, Notice of Removal 19|| (“NOR’) at 2), asserting state law claims for: (1) negligence; (2) negligent supervision of a minor; 20 || (3) sexual abuse of a minor; (4) negligent hiring, supervision, and retention; (5) negligent failure to warn, train, or educate; and (6) breach of mandatory duty. (See Dkt. 1-1, Complaint at J] 57- 22 || 99). On November 4, 2024, defendants Does 1 and 2 (collectively, “the removing defendants”) 23 || removed the action to this court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction,

. (See Dkt. 24] 1, NOR at J 3). 25 LEGAL STANDARD 26 “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized 27 || by Constitution and statute[.]” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,

, 114 28 || S.Ct. 1673, 1675 (1994). The courts are presumed to lack jurisdiction unless the contrary appears

1| affirmatively from the record. See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno,

, 342 n. 3, 126 2| S.Ct. 1854, 1861 (2006). Federal courts have a duty to examine jurisdiction sua sponte before 3|| proceeding to the merits of a case, see Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co.,

, 119 4] S.Ct. 1563, 1569 (1999), “even in the absence of a challenge from any party.” Arbaugh v. Y &H Corp.,

,

(2006). Indeed, “[i]f the court determines at any 6] time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); see Snell v. Cleveland, Inc.,

(9th Cir. 2002) (“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3) provides that a court may raise the question of subject matter jurisdiction, sua 9] sponte, at any time during the pendency of the action, even on appeal.”) (footnote omitted). 10 In general, “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the 12 || district court[.]”

(a). Aremoving defendant bears the burden of establishing that removal is proper. See Gaus v. Miles, Inc.,

(9th Cir. 1992) (“The strong presumption against removal jurisdiction means that the defendant always has the burden of 15|| establishing that removal is proper.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Abrego Abrego v. The 16 || Dow Chem. Co.,

(9th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (noting the “longstanding, near- 17 || canonical rule that the burden on removal rests with the removing defendant”). Moreover, if there is any doubt regarding the existence of subject matter jurisdiction, the court must resolve those doubts in favor of remanding the action to state court. See Gaus,

(“Federal 20 || jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.”). Indeed, “[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”

(c); see Kelton Arms Condo. Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Homestead Ins. Co.,

(9th Cir. 2003) (“Subject matter 24 || jurisdiction may not be waived, and, indeed, we have held that the district court must remand if 25 || it lacks jurisdiction.”); Washington v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.,

, *1 (C.D. Cal. 26 | 2009) (a district court may remand an action where the court finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction either by motion or sua sponte). 28 95

1 DISCUSSION 2 When federal subject matter jurisdiction is predicated on diversity of citizenship, see 28 3|| U.S.C. § 1332(a),' complete diversity must exist between the opposing parties, see Caterpillar Inc. 4] v. Lewis,

,

(1996) (stating that the diversity jurisdiction statute “applies only to cases in which the citizenship of each plaintiff is diverse from the citizenship of 6 || each defendant’), and the amount in controversy must exceed $75,000. See

(a). Here, the court’s review of the NOR and the attached state court Complaint makes clear that this court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the instant matter. See

(a); 9| Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams,

,

(1987) (“Only state-court actions that originally could have been filed in federal court may be removed to federal court by the defendant.”) (footnote omitted). In other words, plaintiff could not have originally brought this 12 || action in federal court, as plaintiff does not competently allege facts supplying diversity jurisdiction. See

(a). Removal at this stage, i.e., on the basis of the “initial pleading,” must be ascertainable from an examination of the four corners of the Complaint. See Harris v. Bankers 15|| Life and Casualty Company,

(9th Cir. 2005) (Notice of removal under the first paragraph of § 1446(b) “is determined through examination of the four corners of the applicable 17 || pleadings, not through subjective knowledge or a duty to make further inquiry. ... If no ground for removal is evident in [the Complaint], the case is ‘not removable’ at that stage.”). 19 Defendants’ NOR in this case is nearly identical to the Notice of Removal defendants filed in asimilar case in this District, John Roe BV 73 v. Doe 1, et al., Case No. CV 24-9545. (Compare 21] Case No. CV 24-9544, Dkt. 1, NOR at If] 7-32 with Case No. CV 24-9545, Dkt. 1, NOR at If 7- 22 || 32). Indeed, the NORs in both cases were filed on the same day. In John Roe, the court issued an order remanding the action for lack of diversity jurisdiction due to insufficient allegations 24 || regarding the plaintiff's citizenship and the amount in controversy. (See Case No. CV 24-9545, 25 | ——_____ 26 In relevant part,

(a) provides that “district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of 27 || $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between . . . citizens of different States[.]’ 28 * Defendants only invoke the court’s diversity jurisdiction. (See, generally, Dkt. 1, NOR).

Dkt. 10, Court’s Order of November 7, 2024 at 2-4). For the same reasons detailed in that order, 2|| (see id.), the court finds it prudent to remand this action.° 3 Given that any doubt regarding the existence of subject matter jurisdiction must be resolved 4|| in favor of remanding the action to state court, see Gaus,

, the court is not persuaded, under the circumstances here, that defendants have met their burden of proving that diversity of citizenship exists. Therefore, there is no basis for diversity jurisdiction. 7 This order is not intended for publication. Nor is it intended to be included in or submitted to any online service such as Westlaw or Lexis. 9 CONCLUSION 10 Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that: 11 1. The above-captioned action shall be remanded to the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Ventura, 800 South Victoria Avenue Ventura, California 93009, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to

(c). 14 2. The Clerk shall send a certified copy of this Order to the state court. 15 3. Any pending motion is denied as moot. Dated this 27th day of December, 2024. 17 18 /s/ Fernando M. Olguin 19 United States District Judge 20 21 22 23 24 ° Here, defendants’ allegations regarding plaintiff's citizenship are even more deficient than 25 in John Roe. Defendants allege only that “[p]ublicly available information indicates that Plaintiff now lives in Umatilla County, Oregon” — they do not allege plaintiff's citizenship at the time the 26 | complaint was filed and removal effected. See Farrell by & Through Tr. of Farrell Living Tr. v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.,

, *2 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (“To remove an action based 27 || on diversity jurisdiction under

, complete diversity of citizenship ‘is determined (and must exist) as of the time the complaint is filed and removal is effected.””) (citing Strotek 28 || Corp. v. Air Transp. Ass’n. of Am.,

(9th Cir. 2002)).