Ahmad Raheem Price v. Robert Gell

United States District Court for the Central District of California

Ahmad Raheem Price v. Robert Gell

Trial Court Opinion

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10

11 AHMAD RAHEEM PRICE, Case No. 5:23-cv-00671-JLS (GJS) 12 Plaintiff ORDER DISMISSING ACTION 13 v. WITHOUT PREJUDICE

14 ROBERT GELL, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 On October 27, 2022, Plaintiff filed a civil complaint in Riverside County 19 Superior Court Case No. CVSW2207120 against Ruslan Yeramishyn, Robert Gell, 20 David Holm (“Defendants”), and various “Doe” defendants. [Dkt. 1, Ex. 1.] On 21 March 22, 2023, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint against the Defendants 22 and eight “Does.” On April 7, 2023, Defendants removed Riverside County 23 Superior Court Case No. CVSW2207120 to this District Court and it was assigned 24 Case No. 5:23-00608-JLS (GJS) (the “23-608 Action”).1 After motion proceedings, 25 on November 20, 2023, Plaintiff was granted leave to file a Second Amended 26 Complaint in the 23-608 Action, and Defendants have been ordered to file a 27 response to the amended pleading. 28 1 On April 13, 2023, six days after the 23-608 Action commenced in this Court, 2 Plaintiff initiated this case by filing a civil rights Complaint and a request to proceed 3 without prepayment of the full filing fee. [Dkts. 1-2.] The Complaint filed in this 4 case was substantially identical to the First Amended Complaint that was then 5 pending in the 23-608 Action: both pleadings sued the three above-noted named 6 Defendants and eight Does and rested on the same factual allegations; and both 7 pleadings alleged the same First Amendment-based claims brought under 42 U.S.C. 8 § 1983. The two pleadings, however, alleged some varying claims: the 23-608 9 Action First Amended Complaint included state law claims not brought in this case; 10 and the Complaint in this case included an equal protection/Section 1983 claim and 11

42 U.S.C. §§ 1981

and 1985(3) claims not alleged in the 23-608 Action First 12 Amended Complaint. 13 On May 31, 2023, in this case, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to 14 proceed without prepayment of the full filing fee. [Dkt. 10.] On June 2, 2023, 15 Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint in this case and another request to 16 proceed without prepayment of the full filing fee. [Dkts. 11-12.] On June 12, 2023, 17 the Court granted the second request to proceed without prepayment of the full 18 filing fee. [Dkt. 13.] 19 On September 5, 2023, in this case, Plaintiff filed a motion seeking leave to 20 file a Second Amended Complaint and lodged a proposed Second Amended 21 Complaint. [Dkt. 15.] On September 11, 2023, United States Magistrate Judge Gail 22 J. Standish granted the motion and directed that the proposed Second Amended 23 Complaint be filed. [Dkts. 17-18.] 24 The Second Amended Complaint now pending in this action is virtually 25 identical to that now pending in the first-filed 23-608 Action. Both sue the three 26 named Defendants and eight Does and rest on identically-pleaded factual 27 allegations. Both raise the same three claims: (1) a Section 1983 claim brought 28 under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, resting on asserted freedom of speech 1 and equal protection violations; (2) a Section 1983 claim brought under the Sixth 2 and Fourteenth Amendments, resting on asserted right to counsel/attorney-client 3 privilege/attorney-client relationship and equal protection violations; and (3) a 4 Section 1983 claim brought under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, resting on 5 asserted retaliation and equal protection violations, along with claims brought under 6

42 U.S.C. §§ 1981

and 1985(3) resting on the same allegations. Both seek the exact 7 same damages remedies. The sole difference in the two pleadings is that the Second 8 Amended Complaint in this action contains a single page of an exhibit [C-5] that is 9 not included in the Second Amended Complaint in the 23-608 Action. [Compare 10 the Second Amended Complaint in this action [Dkt. 18] with the Second Amended 11 Complaint in the 23-608 Action [Dkt. 29.] In all other respects, the two pleadings 12 are identical. 13 Thus, as of the present date, Petitioner has two identical civil rights actions 14 pending in this District. In one – the first-filed 23-608 Action – the Defendants have 15 been served with process, have appeared, and have been ordered to respond to the 16 pending Second Amended Complaint. In this second-filed action, service of process 17 had not yet occurred; if it were to be ordered, this would require the efforts of the 18 United States Marshals Service and attendant taxpayer-funded costs. There is no 19 tenable reason to order service of process in this case and thereby force the 20 Defendants to submit filings in two separate, but duplicative, cases (with an 21 attendant cost and duplication of effort for them and Court staff), especially given 22 that Plaintiff’s claims are being litigated in the 23-608 Action. There also is no 23 tenable reason for the Court to consider and rule on the same claims through two 24 separate actions. The resources of the Court and the litigants before it are not 25 endless and should not be expended in a duplicative manner for no good reason. 26 There simply is no legitimate reason for parallel, identical cases to proceed in this 27 District. 28 Federal courts “retain broad powers to prevent duplicative or unnecessary 1 litigation.” Slack v. McDaniel,

529 U.S. 473, 478

(2000); see also Landis v. N. Am. 2 Co.,

299 U.S. 248, 254

(1936) (every federal court has the inherent power “to 3 control disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for 4 itself, for counsel, and for litigants”). “Plaintiffs generally have ‘no right to 5 maintain two separate actions involving the same subject matter at the same time in 6 the same court and against the same defendant.’” Adams v. Calif. Dep’t of Health 7 Services,

487 F.3d 684

, 688 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted) (affirming the 8 dismissal of a later-filed duplicative lawsuit). A plaintiff must bring one action 9 against a party or privies relating to the same transaction or event. Id. at 693. 10 “District courts retain broad discretion to control their dockets and ‘[i]n the exercise 11 of that power they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate, . . . 12 dismissal.’” Id. at 688 (citation omitted). “After weighing the equities of the case, 13 the district court may exercise its discretion to dismiss a duplicative later-filed 14 action.” Id.; see also M.M. v. Lafayette Sch. Dist.,

681 F.3d 1082, 1091

(9th Cir. 15 2012) (“a district court has broad discretion to control its own docket, and that 16 includes the power to dismiss duplicative claims”); Shappell v. Sun Life Assur. Co., 17 No. 10-cv-03020-MCE-EFB,

2011 WL 2070405

, at *2 (E.D. Cal. May 23, 2011) 18 (dismissing second of two separate, but identical, actions, observing that “[t]he 19 inherent power to manage the Court’s own docket permits it to order dismissal of 20 duplicative claims in order to foster judicial economy and the ‘comprehensive 21 disposal of litigation’”) (citation omitted). 22 There is no justification for allowing two separate, but identical, cases to 23 proceed based on what plainly is a single set of civil rights claims stemming from 24 certain legal mail-related incidents during Plaintiff’s incarceration. In the interests 25 of judicial economy, this action will be dismissed on the ground that it is duplicative 26 of the parties and claims and matters at issue in the pending 23-608 Action.2 27

28 2 The Court concludes that dismissal of this duplicative case is more appropriate than joinder or consolidation of the two actions. Having two actions I Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that: this action is dismissed, without 2 prejudice, on the ground that it is duplicative of a pending action; and Judgment 3 || shall be entered dismissing this action without prejudice. 4 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 7 || DATED: January 4, 2024 i a7 a 8 tf C th ~ JOSEPHINE L. STATON ? UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 10 11 PRESENTED BY: 12 13 Ly , ~ | GAIL J. STANDISH || UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 pending when one will suffice is not only unnecessary, but creates the possibility of 2g || confusion and unwarranted additional work and cost both for the Court and its staff and the parties. ;

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