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5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

6 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

7 Case No.: 2:24-cv-00355-MEMF-E 8 THERESA BROOKE, a married woman

dealing with her sole and separate claim, 9 ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY THE Plaintiff, COURT SHOULD NOT DECLINE TO 10 EXERCISE SUPPLEMENTAL v. JURISDICTION OVER PLAINTIFF’S 11 STATE LAW CLAIMS

12 NARS INC., a California corporation,

13 Defendant.

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17 On January 13, 2024, Plaintiff Theresa Brooke, a married woman dealing with her sole and

18 separate claim, filed a Complaint against Defendant Nars inc., a California corporation, asserting: (1)

19 a claim for injunctive relief arising out of an alleged violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act

20 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182–12188; (2) a claim for damages pursuant to California’s Unruh Civil

21 Rights Act (“Unruh Act”),

, et seq.; ECF No. 1. The Complaint alleges that this 22 Court has jurisdiction over the ADA claim pursuant to

and

, and 23 that the state law claims are brought pursuant to supplemental jurisdiction.

. The 24 Complaint also alleges that supplemental jurisdiction is appropriate over the Unruh Act claim 25 pursuant to Arroyo v. Rosas.1 26 27 1 Although no citation is included for this case, the Court interprets this to be referencing Arroyo v. Rosas,

(9th Cir. 2021). However, the Court notes that Arroyo actually stands for the proposition that it is 28 1 Principles of pendent jurisdiction have been codified in the supplemental jurisdiction statute,

2

. The supplemental jurisdiction statute “reflects the understanding that, when

3 deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, ‘a federal court should consider and weigh in

4 each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness,

5 and comity.’” City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons,

(1997) (emphasis added)

6 (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill,

(1988)).

7 California law sets forth a heightened pleading standard for a limited group of lawsuits

8 brought under the Unruh Act. See

(a)(2) & (3). The stricter pleading

9 standard requires certain plaintiffs bringing construction-access claims like the one in the instant

10 case to file a verified complaint alleging specific facts concerning the plaintiff’s claim, including the

11 specific barriers encountered or how the plaintiff was deterred and each date on which the plaintiff

12 encountered each barrier or was deterred. See

(a). A “high-frequency

13 litigant fee” is also imposed on certain plaintiffs and law firms bringing these claims. See Cal. Gov’t

14 Code § 70616.5. A “high-frequency litigant” is “a plaintiff who has filed 10 or more complaints

15 alleging a construction-related accessibility violation within the 12-month period immediately

16 preceding the filing of the current complaint alleging a construction-related accessibility violation”

17 and “an attorney who has represented as attorney of record 10 or more high-frequency litigant

18 plaintiffs in actions that were resolved within the 12-month period immediately preceding the filing

19 of the current complaint alleging a construction-related accessibility violation.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code

20 §§ 425.55(b)(1) & (2). High frequency litigants are also required to state: (1) whether the complaint

21 is filed by, or on behalf of, a high-frequency litigant; (2) in the case of a high-frequency litigant who 22 is a plaintiff, the number of complaints alleging construction-related accessibility claim filed by the 23 high-frequency litigant during the 12 months prior to filing the instant complaint; (3) the reason the 24

25 proper for a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim. Id.at 1213 (“The 26 district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that this extraordinary situation threatens unusually significant damage to federal-state comity and presents ‘exceptional circumstances’ within the meaning of 27 §1367(c)(4).”). Rather, the Ninth Circuit only held that the district court abused its discretion in denying supplemental jurisdiction after summary judgment, when it had “effectively completed its adjudication of 28 1 individual was in the geographic area of the defendant’s business; and (4) the reason why the

2 individual desired to access the defendant’s business.” See id. § 425.50(a)(4)(A).

3 In light of the foregoing, the Court orders Brooke to show cause in writing why the Court

4 should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim. See

(c). In

5 responding to this Order to Show Cause:

6 1. Brooke and Brooke’s counsel shall also support their responses to the Order to Show Cause

7 with declarations, signed under penalty of perjury, providing all facts necessary for the Court

8 to determine if they satisfy the definition of a “high-frequency litigant” as provided by

9 California Code of Civil Procedure §§ 425.55(b)(1) & (2). This includes, but is not limited

10 to:

11 a. the number of construction-related accessibility claims filed by Brooke in the twelve

12 months preceding the filing of the present claim; and

13 b. the number of construction-related accessibility claims in which Brooke’s counsel has

14 represented high-frequency litigant plaintiffs in the twelve months preceding the

15 filing of the present claim.

16 Brooke shall file a Response to this Order to Show Cause by no later than fourteen days from

17 the date of this order. The failure to timely or adequately respond to this Order to Show Cause may,

18 without further warning, result in the Court declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the

19 Unruh Act claim pursuant to

(c).

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21 IT IS SO ORDERED. 22 23 24 Dated: February 23, 2024 ___________________________________ 25 MAAME EWUSI-MENSAH FRIMPONG 26 United States District Judge 27 28