Harper v. Charter Communications, LLC

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ----oo0oo---- LIONEL HARPER, DANIEL SINCLAIR, No. 2:19-cv-00902 WBS DMC HASSAN TURNER, LUIS VAZQUEZ, and PEDRO ABASCAL, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated and all ORDER aggrieved employees, Plaintiffs, v. CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, LLC, Defendant.

----oo0oo---- Plaintiffs Lionel Harper and Daniel Sinclair move for partial summary judgment on various alleged violations of the California Labor Code. (Mot. (Docket No. 360).) The violations relate to plaintiffs’ claim for unlawful calculation, deduction, and payment of commission wages (Claim 5); and claim for failure to provide timely and complete copies of employment records (Claim 8). Harper also requests that the court determine that he is an “aggrieved employee” pursuant to his Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”) claim (Claim 10).

3 A. Unlawful Calculation, Deduction, and Payment of Commission Wages (Claim 5) 5 Harper alleges that defendant violated Labor Code Sections 2751, 204, 221, 223, and 224 by improperly calculating, documenting, deducting, and withholding payment of his commission wages. (See Mot. at 15-27.)

9 Defendant previously moved for partial summary judgment on this claim, requesting that the court find that defendant did not violate any of the above Labor Code provisions. (See generally Order (Docket No. 111).) The court denied that motion as to every one of these alleged violations because “the testimony and declarations of the parties are in direct conflict” regarding whether Harper knowingly agreed to the terms of defendant’s commission plan in the first place. (See Order at 26-27 (§ 2751(b)); 29-30 (§ 204); 32-33 (§§ 221, 224); 34 (§ 223).) The court concluded that this direct conflict in the evidence precluded summary judgment for defendant on alleged violations of Sections 2751, 204, 221, 223, and 224. (See id.) 21 Notwithstanding the three years that have passed since the court’s initial summary judgment order, neither party brings any materially new evidence on this threshold issue. Even though the court now views the record in the light most favorable to defendant, the same conflict remains, and the same conclusion results: there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Harper knowingly agreed to the terms of defendant’s commission plan in the first place. Accordingly, the court cannot conclude as a matter of law that plaintiff prevails on any of the alleged violations of Sections 27511, 204, 221, 223, and 224.

4 B. Failure to Provide Timely and Complete Copies of Employment Records (Claim 8) 6 Harper also alleges that defendant failed to timely provide wage statements and personnel files in violation of Labor Code §§ 226(b)-(c) and 1198.5(a)-(c). (See Mot. at 11-15.)

9 Sinclair joins as to alleged violations under Section 1198.5.

10 1. Section 226(b)-(c): Timely Production of Wage Statements 12 The court previously denied defendant’s request for summary judgment on Section 226(b)-(c) because there were genuine issues of material fact on whether (1) plaintiffs’ requests to inspect and receive copies of their wage statements were reasonable, and (2) the timing of defendant’s production of Harper’s wage statements fully satisfied § 226(b). (See Order at 50-51.)

19 Neither party provides any new material facts to augment the record. Viewing the record now in the light most favorable to defendant, the court still concludes that genuine issues of material fact remain regarding when plaintiff first made a “reasonable request” due to (1) the form of Mr. Harper moves for summary judgment on violations of both subsections (a) and (b) of Section 2751. Previously, the court only considered violations of subsection (b). However the predicate issue of whether plaintiffs knowingly entered into the commission agreement at issue applies squarely to alleged violations of Section 2751(a) as well.

1 Soderstrom’s initial June 4, 2018 request, and (2) Harper’s and Mr. Soderstrom’s conflicting representations to defendant on whether Mr. Soderstrom was in fact Harper’s representative.

4 2. Section 1198.5(a)-(c): Timely and Complete Production of Personnel Records 6 The court previously denied summary judgment for defendant regarding Section 1198.5 because “personnel records” are expansively defined to encompass things such as corrective action reports, letters related to termination, and commission plan documents, which defendant produced after the statutory deadline to do so had passed. (See Order at 49.)

12 However, on February 26, 2024, defendant paid Harper and Sinclair $750 each as statutory penalties owed under Labor Code Section 1198.5(a)-(c). (Docket No. 377-3 ¶ 3.) Defendant argues that this moots plaintiffs’ individual claim. (See Opp’n (Docket No. 377) at 2 n.1.) The court agrees. While plaintiffs argue otherwise because they have not received costs and fees (see Reply (Docket No. 381) at 9), Section 1198.5(k) identifies $750 in statutory penalties as the sole remedy available to plaintiffs.2 See Chen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 819 F.3d 1136, 1145 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[A] claim becomes moot once the plaintiff actually receives all of the relief to which he or she is entitled on the claim.”).

24 Accordingly, the court will not grant summary judgment to plaintiff on this claim.

2 Compare Lab. Code § 1198.5(l), which provides for costs and reasonable attorney’s fees were plaintiffs to instead bring an injunctive action seeking compliance with the Labor Code. nee nnn en nn OE IN EIEIO IED OE 1 Cc. PAGA Aggrieved Employee 2 Harper also requests that the court confirm his standing to sue under PAGA by declaring him an “aggrieved employee” pursuant to the statute. (See generally Mot.)

5 Pursuant to its discretion, the court declines to do so at this time. See West v. Circle K Stores, Inc., No. CIS040438 WBS GGH, 2006 WL 355214, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2006) (district courts have discretion on considering summary judgment motions pre-class certification; motion addressing only scope of damages found 10 “premature” (citing Wright v. Schock, 742 F.2d 541, 544-45 (9th 11 Cir. 1984))). Harper identifies no binding authority compelling 12 the court to do otherwise. Neither does he offer good reasons | why “it will be prudent to decide a PAGA plaintiff’s aggrieved 14 status first” in this present case, at summary judgment. (See | Reply at 7.) Neither can the court discern any.

16 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motion for | partial summary judgment (Docket No. 360) be, and the same hereby 18 is, DENIED.

19 Dated: March 19, 2024 . « blew A bh be WILLIAM B. SHUBB 21 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE