1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 LINANNE MARIE TURNER, Case No. 2:21-cv-02246-JDP 12 Plaintiff, ORDER 13 v. GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL ATTORNEY FEES UNDER

MARTIN O’MALLEY, 406(b) COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 15 SECURITY, ECF No. 15 16 Defendant. 17 18 Plaintiff prevailed in this action after the parties stipulated to voluntary remand and entry 19 of judgment under

(g). ECF Nos. 11 & 12. The Social Security Administration 20 (“SSA”) subsequently determined that plaintiff was disabled and granted her $79,286.00 in past- 21 due benefits. ECF No. 15-2; ECF No. 15-3 at 2. Plaintiff’s counsel filed a motion seeking 22 $9,000.00 in attorney fees under

(b), with a credit to plaintiff for the fees 23 previously awarded under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”),

(d), in the 24 amount of $1,200.00. ECF No. 15; see also ECF No. 14. For the reasons discussed below, I find 25 that counsel’s fee request is reasonable, and grant the motion. 26 An attorney is entitled to reasonable fees for successfully representing social security 27 claimants in district court.

28 1 Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under this subchapter who was represented before the court by an 2 attorney, the court may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent 3 of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment. 4

(b)(1)(A). Rather than being paid by the government, fees under section 406(b) 5 are paid by the claimant from the awarded past-due benefits. Crawford v. Astrue,

, 6 1147 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (citing Gisbrecht v. Barnhart,

(2002)). The 7 twenty-five percent statutory maximum fee is not an automatic entitlement; the court must ensure 8 that the requested fee is reasonable. Gisbrecht,

(“We hold that § 406(b) does 9 not displace contingent-fee agreements within the statutory ceiling; instead, § 406(b) instructs 10 courts to review for reasonableness fees yielded by those agreements.”). In assessing whether a 11 fee is reasonable, the court should consider “the character of the representation and the results the 12 representative achieved.” Id. at 808. A “court may properly reduce the fee for substandard 13 performance, delay, or benefits that are not in proportion to the time spent on the case.” 14 Crawford,

. 15 Plaintiff entered into a contingency-fee agreement with counsel that stated in relevant 16 part: 17 If this matter requires judicial review of any adverse decision of the 18 Social Security Administration, the fee for successful prosecution of this matter is a separate 25% of the past due benefits awarded 19 upon reversal of any unfavorable ALJ decision for work before the court. 20 ECF No. 15-1 at ¶ 4 (emphasis in original). The docket shows that after plaintiff’s counsel filed a 21 complaint challenging the Commissioner’s disability denial, the parties’ stipulated to voluntary 22 remand and entry of judgment. See ECF Nos. 1, 10-12. During remand proceedings, the SSA 23 found that plaintiff is disabled, and granted her $79,286.00 in retroactive benefits.1 See ECF No. 24 15-2; ECF No. 15-3. 25

1 The SSA’s Notice of Award states that plaintiff is entitled to past-due monthly benefits 26 in amounts ranging from $1,548.20 to $1,862.90 during the time period January 2020 through 27 December 2023. ECF No. 15-3 at 1. The Notice also states that the SSA withheld $19,821.50, which was twenty-five percent of past-due benefits, to pay her representative. Id. at 2. Based on 28 these figures, the court accepts $79,286.00 as a reasonable determination of the total amount of 1 Counsel’s billing records reflect that 4.3 hours of attorney time and 2.2 hours of paralegal 2 | time were spent litigating the case. ECF No. 15-4. An award of $9,000.00 for 6.5 combined 3 | hours of attorney and paralegal work translates to an effective hourly rate of approximately 4 | $1,384.62. Other district courts have approved similar or even higher de facto hourly rates under 5 |

(b). See, e.g., Bridget M. v. Kijakazi,

, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 6 13, 2022) (“The Court finds an award of $24,750.00 for 16.5 hours of combined attorney and 7 | paralegal time—yielding a combined effective hourly rate of $1,500—is appropriate.”); Ramon R. v. 8 | Saul,

, at *5 (C.D. Cal. June 3, 2021) (finding reasonable effective hourly rate 9 | of $1,400 for combined attorney and paralegal work); Langston v. Saul,

, at *3 10 | (E.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2020) (approving effective hourly rate of $1,453.42 for combined attorney and 11 || paralegal work). 12 There is no indication that a reduction in fees is warranted because of dilatory conduct or 13 | substandard assistance on counsel’s part. Additionally, the requested award of $9,000.00 only 14 | amounts to 11.4 percent of plaintiff's retroactive benefits—well below the cap of twenty-five 15 | percent that the parties stipulated to in the contingency-fee agreement. Given the result obtained 16 | in this case, and the risk of loss that counsel assumed in representing plaintiff, the court finds the 17 | requested award reasonable. 18 Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that: 19 1. Plaintiff’s counsel’s motion for attorney’s fees, ECF No. 15, is granted. 20 2. Plaintiff’s counsel is awarded $9,000.00 in fees pursuant to

(b). 21 3. Plaintiff’s counsel is directed to reimburse plaintiff the sum of $1,200.00 for 22 previously paid EAJA fees pursuant to

(d). 23 IT IS SO ORDERED. 25 ( q oy — Dated: _ April 25, 2024 26 JEREMY D. PETERSON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

28 | retroactive benefits.