1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 CARLOS GARCIA, Case No. 1:20-cv-00924-CDB 12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 13 v. REVERSING THE COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY’S DECISION 14 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,1 (Doc. 16) 15 Defendant. 16 17 18 Carlos Garcia (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner 19 of Social Security (“Commissioner” or “Defendant”) denying his application for disability 20 insurance and supplemental security income benefits under the Social Security Act. (Doc. 1). 21 The matter currently is before the Court on the certified administrative record (Doc. 13) and the 22 parties’ briefs, which were submitted without oral argument. (Docs. 16, 19, 25).2 Plaintiff asserts 23

24 1 On December 20, 2023, Martin O’Malley was named Commissioner of the Social Security Administration. See https://www.ssa.gov/history/commissioners.html. He therefore is 25 substituted as the defendant in this action. See

(g) (referring to the “Commissioner’s Answer”);

(d) (“the person holding the Office of the 26 Commissioner shall, in [their] official capacity, be the proper defendant.”). 27 2 Both parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge for all proceedings 28 in this action, in accordance with

(c)(1). (Doc. 11). 1 the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred in his analysis of two issues and requests the 2 decision of the Commissioner be vacated and the case be remanded for the payment of benefits 3 based on the credit-as-true rule. (Doc. 16 at 2, 7-16). 4 I. BACKGROUND 5 A. Administrative Proceedings 6 On September 14, 2016, Plaintiff protectively filed an application for benefits pursuant to 7 Title II and Part A of Title XVIII of the Social Security Act (the “Act”),

et seq., 8 alleging a period of disability beginning on February 24, 2016. (Administrative Record (“AR”) at 9 186-201). Plaintiff was 33 years old on the alleged disability onset date.

. The 10 Commissioner denied Plaintiff’s application initially and again on reconsideration.

, 11 118-24. Plaintiff submitted a written request for a hearing by an Administrative Law Judge 12 (“ALJ”) on June 22, 2017.

. 13 On January 22, 2019, Plaintiff, represented by counsel, appeared for a hearing before ALJ 14 Arthur Zeidman via video.

. Vocational Expert (“VE”) Bonnie J. Drumwright, 15 PhD,) also testified at the hearing.

. 16 B. Medical Record 17 The relevant medical record was reviewed by the Court and will be referenced below as 18 necessary to this Court’s decision. 19 C. Hearing Testimony 20 Plaintiff testified he was involved in a family car accident on February 16, 2016, and 21 began having problems with his back.

. Plaintiff noted he saw his doctor and 22 participated in pain management for his back.

Plaintiff initially saw a chiropractor for his 23 back but was sent to another doctor.

. Plaintiff testified he was prescribed and took 24 medicine for his back.

. Plaintiff stated he took “Norco” three times a day.”

. 25 Plaintiff also claimed he took muscle relaxers, Flexeril, and Gabapentin for nerve pain.

. 26 Plaintiff asserted he has bad anxiety and “emotional” issues because of his medication.

. 27 Plaintiff asserted his back constantly bothered him and that his pain was concentrated in 28 his lower back and ran down his leg.

. Plaintiff described the pain as stabbing, 1 shooting down his right leg, with a lot of spasms.

. Plaintiff claimed he has spasms 2 every day and has to lie down right away.

Plaintiff asserted he discussed but did not undergo 3 back surgery.

. Plaintiff testified he constantly must use a heating pad, for half the 4 day, to relieve his pain.

. Plaintiff reported he has difficulty concentrating and sweats a 5 lot, has difficulty getting, and that he cannot bend and that his back often locks up because of the 6 pain.

. 7 Plaintiff testified he is not able to drive and that his parents take him places.

. 8 Plaintiff also reported he began experiencing mental health problems after the accident occurred. 9

Plaintiff testified he saw Dr. Angela Grasser for his physical concerns but that he had not seen 10 a psychiatrist or a psychologist.

. Plaintiff believed seeing a psychiatrist or psychologist 11 would be helpful and that his health insurance covered it.

12 Plaintiff reported he took his daughter to school in the mornings and would come back 13 home and lie down.

Plaintiff testified he doesn’t do chores and his mother cooks him food. 14

. Plaintiff noted he tries to go shopping with his family, but his mother usually 15 gets his groceries or clothing for him.

. Plaintiff testified he spends most of the day lying 16 down and he does not leave his house besides going to the doctor.

. 17 Plaintiff claimed, before his accident, he worked at Baker Commodities as a maintenance 18 mechanic for industrial equipment between 2004 and 2011.

. Plaintiff’s 19 responsibilities included welding and fabricating equipment.

. Plaintiff estimated the 20 heaviest objects he would have to lift were up to 100 pounds.

. Plaintiff reported he 21 was “laid off” from Baker Commodities.

. Thereafter, Plaintiff did part-time work and 22 was looking for full-time work.

. 23 The VE summarized Plaintiff’s work for the last 15 years as a maintenance mechanic.

24 at 59. The ALJ proffered a hypothetical to the VE of an individual with the same age, education, 25 and past job as Plaintiff who was limited to less than the full range of light work, including lifting 26 and carrying 20 pounds only occasionally, ten pounds frequently, sitting for six hours, standing 27 for six hours, walking for six hours, and pushing and pulling as much as he can lift and carry.

28 at 59-60. Further, this proposed individual could climb ramps and stairs frequently, climb 1 ladders, ropes, or scaffolds occasionally, balance frequently, stoop occasionally, kneel frequently, 2 crouch occasionally, crawl frequently, and operate a motor vehicle occasionally.

. The 3 VE assessed this person would not be able to perform any of Plaintiff’s past work.

However, 4 the VE determined that the person could still perform work in a variety of other fields, including 5 as a cashier II (DOT #211.462-010), fast food worker (DOT #311.472-010), and marker (DOT 6 #209.587-034).

7 The ALJ proffered a second hypothetical of an individual similar to the first but, for a 8 variety of reasons, would be off task 25% of the day.

. The VE assessed this person 9 would not be able to perform any of the jobs mentioned.

Plaintiff’s Counsel proffered a 10 hypothetical of an individual who could rarely lift less than five pounds, could sit only about an 11 hour, and stand and walk for an hour.

The VE testified this person would be unable to work. 12 See

. (“No, there wouldn’t be any jobs that would meet the definition of competitive 13 gainful employment at two hours.”). Thereafter, the ALJ decided a post-hearing orthopedic 14 consultative examination should occur and concluded the hearing.

. 15 On February 10, 2019, a post-hearing orthopedic consultative examination took place.

16 at 516-36. On April 18, 2019, the evidence was provided to Plaintiff.

. On May 17 8, 2019, Plaintiff submitted a response to the examination.

. The ALJ deemed the 18 response to be an objection to the post-hearing orthopedic consultative examination and was 19 overruled as being both vague and failing to state any basis for the objection.

. 20 D. The ALJ’s Decision 21 On June 5, 2019, the ALJ issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled.

at 22 20-30. The ALJ conducted the five-step disability analysis set forth in

(a). 23

. The ALJ found Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since 24 February 24, 2016, the alleged onset date (step one).

. The ALJ held Plaintiff possessed 25 the following severe impairment: degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine (step two).

at 26 23. The ALJ recognized that the record indicated that Plaintiff suffered from depression since the 27 latter part of 2016.

However, the ALJ determined Plaintiff’s depression did not cause more 28 than minimal limitation in Plaintiff’s ability to perform basic mental work activities and was 1 therefore nonsevere.

2 Next, the ALJ determined Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of 3 impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 4 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (“the Listings”) (step three).

. The ALJ then 5 assessed Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”).

. The ALJ found that Plaintiff 6 retained the RFC:

7 “to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except lift/carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; sit for 6 hours, stand for 6 8 hours, and walk for 6 hours; push/pull as much as can lift/carry; frequently climb 9 ramps and stairs and occasionally climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; frequently balance, kneel, or crawl and occasionally stoop or crouch; and can operate a motor 10 v ehicle occasionally.” 11

12 The ALJ acknowledged that while Plaintiff’s impairments could reasonably be 13 expected to cause his alleged symptoms, Plaintiff’s statements concerning the intensity, 14 persistence and limiting effects of his symptoms were not entirely consistent with the 15 medical evidence and other evidence in the record.

. 16 Thereafter, the ALJ reviewed Plaintiff’s treatment record from 2016 through 2019. 17

. The ALJ found that Plaintiff was involved in a car accident on February 24, 18 2016, but did not receive medical attention after the accident.

. The ALJ noted 19 Plaintiff’s treatment records indicated no mention of any back-related symptoms or 20 impairment until July 2016.

. The ALJ reviewed a July 26, 2016, MRI of 21 Plaintiff’s spine.

. The MRI revealed a “L4-L5 disc protrusion effacing the thecal 22 sac combined with facet hypertrophy resulting in encroachment of the transiting nerve 23 roots; L5-S1 disc protrusion that abuts the thecal sac; mild discogenic spondylosis at L4- 24 L5; and mild facet arthrosis at L4-S1.”

25 The ALJ reviewed treatment notes from Dr. Angela Grasser on August 16, 2016. 26

Plaintiff was noted to have tenderness in his lower back and decreased range of motion 27 but otherwise had a normal examination and that his chiropractic treatment was helping. 28 1

Plaintiff was prescribed Norco, Flexeril, and ibuprofen.

The ALJ determined 2 Plaintiff underwent a consultation conducted by neurosurgeon Dr. Al. Najafi on September 3 13, 2016.

Dr. Najafi’s examination of Plaintiff was normal except for lumbar 4 tenderness in the midlumbar spine, positive straight leg raise on the right, and diminished 5 perception of light touch in the lateral shin and anterior foot of the right lower extremity. 6

Dr. Najafi diagnosed Plaintiff with lumbar disc herniation with radiculopathy and 7 scheduled him for a transforaminal root block at L4-L5 and a facet injection at the same 8 level, which took place on September 19, 2016.

9 The ALJ noted “[s]ubsequent records indicated Plaintiff continued to complain of 10 low back, pain, tenderness and decreased range of motion of the lumbar spine.”

11 Plaintiff was provided a positive slump test, Patrick test, with facet loading, occasional 12 positive straight leg raise tests, and occasional evidence of limping.

Plaintiff’s 13 December 29, 2016, EMG/nerve conduction study was normal.

The ALJ noted 14 Plaintiff “did undergo a skin biopsy for epiderma nerve fiber density, which was abnormal 15 for low nerve fiber density consistent with small fiber neuropathy of the right thigh and 16 calf.”

17 Next, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s treatment records from 2017.

The 18 treatment notes continued to reveal similar findings with minimal change in treatment.

19 The ALJ determined Plaintiff “reported he was able to clean his home, drive, cook, and 20 care for his personal hygiene.”

The ALJ found by October and December 2017, Dr. 21 Grasser noted Plaintiff’s condition was stable.

The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s 2018 22 treatment notes were similar to 2016 and 2017 with evidence of limited range of motion of 23 the lumbar spine and occasional positive straight leg raise tests due to lumbar 24 radiculopathy.

25 The ALJ considered a post-hearing February 2019 internal medicine consultative 26 examination conducted by Dr. Roger Wagner.

. Dr. Wagner observed and 27 examined Plaintiff but did not have the opportunity to review any records except for an 28 MRI Plaintiff brought to the examination.

Dr. Wagner “observed [Plaintiff] walking a 1 half block, briskly, from the parking lot to the building.”

Dr. Wagner noted Plaintiff 2 was able to sit 45 minutes at a time, cook, clean, drive, shop, perform his activities of daily 3 living, and walk his child to school despite testifying at the January 2019 hearing that he 4 was unable to perform a majority of these activities.

Dr. Wagner found Plaintiff’s 5 “examination was relatively normal except for some decreased range of motion of the 6 lumbar spine, positive straight leg raise test in the supine position on the right side with 7 evidence of some pulling in the low back without obvious radiculopathy.”

8 The ALJ considered a post-hearing April 2019 orthopedic consultative examination 9 conducted by Dr. Kale H. Van Kirk.

Dr. Van Kirk noted Plaintiff claimed he was able 10 to take care of his personal hygiene, eat, watch television, and read but was unable to cook 11 and perform heavy yard work, or household chores.

Dr. Van Kirk found Plaintiff did 12 have pain in the mid-lumbar spine area that radiated to the waist area and into the buttocks 13 bilaterally along with decreased range of motion and decreased reflexes.

Dr. Van Kirk 14 determined Plaintiff was able to sit comfortably at the examination table, get up and out of 15 the chair, and walk around the exam room without difficulty, and exhibited no limp.

16 Dr. Van Kirk noted Plaintiff had a normal Romberg test, his tandem walking was 17 satisfactory, he was able to get on his toes and heels had a normal heel/toe gait pattern and 18 was able to squat down and take a few steps without difficulty.

Dr. Van Kirk 19 diagnosed Plaintiff with chronic lumbosacral musculoligamentous strain/sprain.

20 The ALJ gave “greatest weight” to the opinions of Dr. Van Kirk and nonexamining 21 medical consultants, Drs. E. Wong and K. Mohan.

The ALJ found these opinions 22 showed Plaintiff was capable of less than light exertion.

The ALJ asserted these 23 opinions were supported by Plaintiff’s “continued abnormal clinical findings of decreased 24 range of motion and tenderness; however, the record also exhibited evidence of normal 25 gait, ability to sit comfortably and move about without difficulty, and perform his daily 26 activities.”

27 The ALJ gave “[s]ignificant weight to the opinions of consultative examiner Dr. 28 Richard Engeln and medical consultants Drs. E. Aquino-Caro and R. Adamo.

The ALJ 1 found these opinions showed Plaintiff’s mental impairments caused no more than mild 2 limitations.

The ALJ determined these opinions were supported by the overall medical 3 evidence of record indicating that Plaintiff’s mental impairment would not prevent job 4 adjustment.

5 The ALJ gave little weight to the opinion of a non-acceptable medical source, 6 physical therapist Daniel Alfaro.

Mr. Alfaro opined Plaintiff was functionally limited 7 in bending, lifting, walking, and sitting.

The ALJ acknowledged that the opinion was 8 supported by findings of limitations in those areas.

However, the ALJ determined Mr. 9 Alfaro did not provide the level of limitation.

10 The ALJ gave little weight to the opinion of Dr. Grasser.

. Dr. Grasser 11 opined Plaintiff is limited to a restrictive range of sedentary exertion.

The ALJ held 12 Dr. Grasser’s opinion was not supported by the clinical findings along with Plaintiff’s 13 reports in January and February 2017 and February 2019 that he can cook, clean, drive, 14 shop, and walk his child to school.

15 The ALJ gave little weight to the opinion of Dr. Wagner.

Dr. Wagner opined 16 Plaintiff is capable of less than medium exertion.

The ALJ determined Dr. Wagner’s 17 opinion was not supported by the overall medical evidence of record, including an 18 abnormal 2016 MRI, continued abnormal clinical findings, and Plaintiff’s continued back 19 pain management indicating Plaintiff’s condition is more limiting.

Further, the ALJ 20 noted Dr. Wagner did not have access to any evidence of record other than the MRI.

21 The ALJ concluded Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and alleged limitations were 22 not entirely consistent with the medical evidence of record.

Instead, the ALJ found 23 Plaintiff retained the capacity to perform less than the full range of light work described in 24 the RFC provided.

25 The ALJ determined that Plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant work 26 (step four) but could perform a significant number of other jobs in the national economy, 27 including cashier II, fast food worker, and marker, (step five).

. The ALJ 28 concluded Plaintiff has not been under a disability as defined in the Act.

. 1 E. The Appeals Council’s Decision 2 On May 1, 2020, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, making the 3 ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner.

. Plaintiff filed this action on 4 July 2, 2020, seeking judicial review of the denial of his application for benefits. (Doc. 1). The 5 Commissioner lodged the administrative record on July 30, 2021. (Doc. 13). Plaintiff filed an 6 opening brief on September 17, 2021. (Doc. 16). On November 30, 2021, Defendant filed a 7 responsive brief and Plaintiff filed a reply on February 14, 2022. (Docs. 19, 25). 8 II. LEGAL STANDARD 9 A. The Disability Standard 10 Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income are available for every 11 eligible individual who is “disabled.”

(d)(1)(B)(ii) and 1381(a). An individual 12 is “disabled” if unable to “engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically 13 determinable physical or mental impairment …”3 Bowen v. Yuckert,

(1987) 14 (quoting identically worded provisions of

(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A)). To 15 achieve uniformity in the decision-making process, the Social Security regulations set out a five- 16 step sequential evaluation process to be used in determining if an individual is disabled. See 20

; Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,

(9th Cir. 2004). 18 Specifically, the ALJ is required to determine:

19 (1) whether a claimant engaged in substantial gainful activity during the period of 20 alleged disability, (2) whether the claimant had medically determinable “severe” impairments, (3) whether these impairments meet or are medically equivalent to one 21 of the listed impairments set forth in

, Subpart P, Appendix 1, (4) whether the claimant retained the RFC to perform past relevant work and (5) 22 whether the claimant had the ability to perform other jobs existing in significant numbers at the national and regional level. 23 24 Stout v. Comm’r. Soc. Sec. Admin.,

(9th Cir. 2006). The burden of proof is 25 on a claimant at steps one through four. Ford v. Saul,

(9th Cir. 2020) (citing 26 3 A “physical or mental impairment” is one resulting from anatomical, physiological, or 27 psychological abnormalities that are demonstrated by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.

(d)(3). 28 1 Valentine v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin,

(9th Cir. 2009)). 2 Before making the step four determinations, the ALJ first must determine the claimant’s 3 RFC.

(e). The RFC is the most a claimant can still do despite their 4 limitations and represents an assessment based on all relevant evidence.

404.1545(a)(1); 416.945(a)(1)). The RFC must consider all of the claimant’s impairments, 6 including those that are not severe.

(e); § 416.945(a)(2). E.g., Wells v. 7 Colvin,

(10th Cir. 2013) (“These regulations inform us, first, that in 8 assessing the claimant’s RFC, the ALJ must consider the combined effect of all of the claimant’s 9 medically determinable impairments, whether severe or not severe.”). The RFC is not a medical 10 opinion.

(d)(2). Rather, it is a legal decision that is expressly reserved to 11 the Commissioner.

(c); see Vertigan v. Halter,

(9th 12 Cir. 2001) (“[I]t is the responsibility of the ALJ, not the claimant’s physician, to determine 13 residual functional capacity.”). 14 At step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove that Plaintiff can perform 15 other work in the national economy given the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work 16 experience. Garrison v. Colvin,

(9th Cir. 2014). To do this, the ALJ can use 17 either the Medical-Vocational Guidelines or rely upon the testimony of a VE. Lounsburry v. 18 Barnhart,

(9th Cir. 2006); Osenbrock v. Apfel,

(9th 19 Cir. 2001). “Throughout the five-step evaluation, the ALJ ‘is responsible for determining 20 credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony and for resolving ambiguities.’” Ford, 950 21 F.3d at 1149 (quoting Andrews v. Shalala,

(9th Cir. 1995)). 22 B. Standard of Review 23 Congress has provided that an individual may obtain judicial review of any final decision 24 of the Commissioner of Social Security regarding entitlement to benefits.

(g). In 25 determining whether to reverse an ALJ’s decision, a court reviews only those issues raised by the 26 party challenging the decision. See Lewis v. Apfel,

, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). A 27 court may set aside the Commissioner’s denial of benefits when the ALJ’s findings are based on 28 legal error or are not supported by substantial evidence. Tackett v. Apfel,

, 1097 1 (9th Cir. 1999). 2 “Substantial evidence is relevant evidence which, considering the record as a whole, a 3 reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278

, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Flaten v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs.,

, 5 1457 (9th Cir, 1995)). “[T]he threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high.” Biestek v. 6 Berryhill,

(2019). Rather, “[s]ubstantial evidence means more than a 7 scintilla, but less than a preponderance; it is an extremely deferential standard.” Thomas v. 8 CalPortland Co.,

(9th Cir. 2021) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 9 “[A] reviewing court must consider the entire record as a whole and may not affirm 10 simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Hill v. Astrue,

, 11 1159 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotations and citations omitted). “If the evidence ‘is susceptible 12 to more than one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ’s conclusion that must be upheld.’” Ford, 13

(quoting Burch v. Barnhart,

(9th Cir. 2005)). Even if the 14 ALJ has erred, the Court may not reverse the ALJ’s decision where the error is harmless. Stout, 15

. An error is harmless where it is “inconsequential to the [ALJ’s] ultimate 16 nondisability determinations.” Tommasetti v. Astrue,

(9th Cir. 2008) 17 (quotation and citation omitted). The burden of showing that an error is not harmless “normally 18 falls upon the party attacking the agency’s determination.” Shinseki v. Sanders,

, 19 409 (2009). 20 III. LEGAL ISSUES 21 Plaintiff asserts the ALJ committed harmful error by failing to defer and afford “greatest 22 weight” to the medical source statements of treating physician Dr. Grasser “absent the requisite 23 ‘specific and legitimate’ reasons.” (Doc. 16 at 2, 7-12). Plaintiff also argues the ALJ committed 24 harmful error by failing to provide “clear and convincing” reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s 25 symptomology evidence. Id. at 2, 12-15. 26 / / / 27 / / /

28 1 IV. DISCUSSION 2 A. Whether the ALJ Provided Specific and Legitimate Reasons to Assign 3 Reduced Weight to the Opinion of Dr. Grasser. 4 For Social Security disability cases filed before March 27, 2017, the weight to be given to 5 medical opinions depends in part on whether the opinions are proffered by treating, examining, or 6 nonexamining health professionals.4 Lester v. Chater,

(9th Cir. 1995); Fair v. 7 Bowen,

(9th Cir. 1989). “As a general rule, more weight should be given to 8 the opinion of a treating source than to the opinion of doctors who do not treat the claimant…” as 9 a treating doctor is employed to cure and has a greater opportunity to know and observe the 10 patient as an individual. Lester,

; Smolen v. Chater,

(9th Cir. 11 1996); Bates v. Sullivan,

(9th Cir. 1990); Cf. Pitzer v. Sullivan,

(9th Cir. 1990) (the least weight is given to the opinion of a non-examining 13 professional). 14 The uncontradicted opinion of a treating or examining physician may be rejected only for 15 clear and convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record. Lester,

831. The opinion of a treating or examining physician that is controverted by another doctor may 17 be rejected only for specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in the 18 record.

Specific and legitimate reasons require the ALJ to set out a detailed and thorough 19 summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, state his/her interpretation of the evidence, 20 and make a finding. Magallanes v. Bowen,

(9th Cir. 1989); see Reddick v. 21 Chater,

(9th Cir. 1998) (“The ALJ must do more than offer his conclusions. 22 He must set forth his own interpretations and explain why they, rather than the doctors’, are 23 correct.”). Absent specific and legitimate reasons, the ALJ must defer to the opinion of a treating 24 or examining physician. See Lester,

. 25

4 Effective March 27, 2017, Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical 26 Evidence went into effect. Plaintiff’s application was filed prior to March 27, 2017 (AR at 186- 27 201). “For claims filed before March 27, 2017, but not decided until after that date…the rules listed in

(c), 416.927(c) apply.” Edinger v. Saul,

, 530 28 (E.D. Pa. 2020). 1 Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Grasser on August 19, 2016. AR at 290-93. Dr. Grasser noted 2 Plaintiff was in a motor vehicle accident and was going to a chiropractor for treatment.

. 3 Dr. Grasser documented Plaintiff’s chiropractic treatment was “helping” but that his pain was not 4 improving and that an MRI identified a bulging disc with nerve involvement.

Dr. Grasser 5 performed a physical examination that showed Plaintiff had normal range of motion, normal 6 strength, and a tender lower back with a decreased range of motion.

. Dr. Grasser 7 diagnosed Plaintiff with lower back pain, prescribed him Norco, Flexeril, and ibuprofen, and 8 referred him for a neurological surgery consultation and to a pain specialist.

. 9 Plaintiff saw Dr. Grasser again on November 23, 2016.

. Dr. Grasser again 10 noted Plaintiff’s pain was not improving and medication was not helping much.

. Dr. 11 Grasser noted Plaintiff’s chiropractic treatment was still helping, but he still had a tender lower 12 back with a decreased range of motion.

. 13 On December 21, 2016, Dr. Grasser completed a physical residual functional capacity 14 medical source statement for Plaintiff.

. Dr. Grasser diagnosed Plaintiff with a 15 “herniated disc L4. L5 effaces thecal sac [and] nerve roots.”

. Dr. Grasser’s prognosis 16 of Plaintiff’s condition was “fair.”

Dr. Grasser identified Plaintiff had back pain and leg 17 numbness.

Dr. Grasser described the pain as “9-10/10 lower back [radiating] to leg[, sharp, 18 [with Plaintiff] unable to walk/lift.”

Dr. Grasser noted Plaintiff had a tender lower back and 19 issues with his sciatic nerve.

20 Dr. Grasser determined Plaintiff’s condition had lasted since February 2016 and he could 21 no longer work.

Dr. Grasser opined Plaintiff “rarely” would be able to lift and carry less than 22 five pounds in a competitive work environment.

. Dr. Grasser found Plaintiff would 23 have problems walking, climbing stairs, stooping, crouching, and bending.

. Dr. 24 Grasser estimated Plaintiff must lie down/recline for 30 minutes before he could sit up, stand up, 25 or walk around.

Dr. Grasser determined Plaintiff would need to lie down/recline for an hour 26 during an 8-hour workday.

Dr. Grasser noted Plaintiff could only sit, stand, and/or walk for 27 about an hour before he needed to take an unscheduled break.

. Next, Dr. Grasser 28 found Plaintiff was limited in his ability to reach overhead, push, and pull, and he could not use 1 stairs, ladders, scaffolds, ropes, and ramps.

. Dr. Grasser identified Plaintiff’s pain and 2 mental condition could frequently affect his ability to work.

. 3 On December 27, 2016, Plaintiff again saw Dr. Grasser.

. Dr. Grasser’s 4 notes reflect similar findings to Plaintiff’s August and November visits.

On December 11, 5 2018, Dr. Grasser completed a second physical residual functional capacity medical source 6 statement for Plaintiff.

. Dr. Grasser’s second statement largely mirrored her first. 7

8 As discussed above, the ALJ gave little weight to the opinion of Dr. Grasser because it 9 was not supported by the clinical findings. AR at 28. Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred by failing to 10 detail what “clinical findings” of record did not support Dr. Grasser’s RFC. (Doc. 16 at 9-10). 11 Plaintiff argues the record is replete with extensive objective examinations that support Dr. 12 Grasser’s opinion.

. Plaintiff acknowledges the ALJ “briefly ‘summarizes’ the medical 13 evidence of record on one page of the unfavorable decision (AR at 26)” but asserts “there is no 14 discussion by the ALJ how this considerable objective evidence of limitation does not support the 15 long-term treating physician’s less than sedentary RFC[.]”

16 Defendant contends the ALJ properly assigned “little weight” to Dr. Grasser’s opinion 17 because her opinion was inconsistent with her treatment notes and objective findings, the medical 18 evidence as a whole, and other evidence in the record. (Doc. 19 at 6). Thereafter, Defendant 19 posits treatment records that undermine Dr. Grasser’s opinion.

. In reply, Plaintiff avers 20 Defendant “cannot remedy the ALJ’s harmful error of failing to provide the requisite ‘specific 21 and legitimate’ reasons to reject the well-supported treating physician opinion, with post hoc 22 citations to the record.” (Doc. 25 at 3). 23 An ALJ may reject the opinions of a physician when they are inconsistent with the overall 24 record. Morgan v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin.,

(9th Cir. 1999); see 20

(c)(4) (“Generally, the more consistent an opinion is with the record as a whole, 26 the more weight we will give to that opinion.”). However, to do so, “[t]he ALJ must do more 27 than offer his conclusions.” Embrey v. Bowen,

(9th Cir. 1988). The ALJ 28 must set out in the record his reasoning and the evidentiary support for his interpretation of the 1 medical evidence. Tackett,

; Cotton v. Bowen,

(9th Cir. 2 1986). 3 Here, the ALJ does not identify what “clinical findings” undermined Dr. Grasser’s 4 opinions. While the ALJ summarized Plaintiff’s clinical findings (AR at 25-26), he did not point 5 to any specific record that served to invalidate Dr. Grasser’s opinions. See Jones v. Saul, No. 6 2:18-cv-1094-EFB,

, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2019) (finding the ALJ erred 7 when he “merely offered his conclusions” that the physician’s opinion was inconsistent with other 8 evidence and failed to either identify specific objective findings from his summary of the medical 9 record or provide “an explanation of how such evidence undermines [the physician's] opinion”); 10 cf. Martinez v. Kijakazi, No. 1:21-cv-0160-JLT-HBK,

, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 11 20, 2023) (“Although the ALJ thoroughly summarized the medical record…the ALJ did not link 12 this summary of the medical record to the rejected limitations”). 13 Although Defendant offers a summary of the medical record and identifies certain 14 conflicts in the record (Doc. 19 at 6-7), the burden was on the ALJ to specifically identify the 15 evidence that conflicted with Dr. Grasser’s opinion. See Allen v. Heckler,

(9th 16 Cir. 1984) (“it is the ALJ’s role to…resolve the conflict”); Gray v. Comm’r of SSA,

App’x 60, 62 (9th Cir. 2010) (“When medical records are at odds with each other or in any way 18 conflict, it is the ALJ’s role to assess and resolve conflicting medical evidence”). The Court 19 declines to speculate as to what “clinical findings” the ALJ held undermined Dr. Grasser’s 20 proposed limitations. The Court “is neither required nor inclined to scour the record in an attempt 21 to divine the specific basis for an ALJ’s opinion.” Lara v. O’Malley, No. 2:22-cv-1553 DB, 2024

, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2024) (quoting Romo v. Colvin,

, 1121 23 n.4 (D. Colo. 2015)). 24 The ALJ also gave little weight to Dr. Grasser’s opinion because of Plaintiff’s reports in 25 January and February of 2017 and February 2019 that he can cook, clean, drive, shop, and walk 26 his child to school. (AR at 28) (citing Exhibits 18F at 2; 12F at 104; 5F at 1). Plaintiff contends 27 the ALJ is “significantly mischaracterizing” his reported activities of daily living (“ADLs”). 28 (Doc. 16 at 11). Specifically, Plaintiff argues the evidence proffered by the ALJ does not 1 adequately address his ADLs and the ALJ fails to address his hearing testimony concerning said 2 ADLs. Id. at 11-12. In contrast, Defendant asserts Plaintiff’s reports in January and February 3 2017, and February 2019 show that he is able to cook, clean, drive, shop, and walk his child to 4 school and do not support the limitations placed on him by Dr. Grasser. (Doc. 19 at 7). 5 Defendant also argues “from September 2016 through October 2018, Plaintiff consistently 6 reported he was able to clean his home, drive, cook, bathe, and dress.” Id. at 7-8. 7 An ALJ may reject an opinion when the physician identifies restrictions that “appear to be 8 inconsistent with the level of activity that [the claimant] engaged in.” Rollins v. Massanari, 261

(9th Cir. 2001); see Fisher v. Astrue, 429 Fed. App’x 649, 652 (9th Cir. 2011) 10 (concluding the ALJ set forth specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting a physician’s opinion 11 where the assessment was based upon the subjective complaints and limitations identified by the 12 doctor that conflicted with the claimant’s daily activities). 13 Here, the ALJ first cities to Exhibit 18F. (AR at 28). This exhibit does not exist within 14 the record. See generally AR. Further, Exhibit 5F page 1, Dr. Grasser’s December 2016 physical 15 residual functional capacity medical source statement, does not discuss Plaintiff’s ADLs.

at 16 331. Finally, Exhibit 12F page 104, is a February 2017 report from Nurse Practitioner (“NP”) 17 Hector Sanchez at LAGS Spine and Sportcare notes Plaintiff can clean his home, drive, cook, and 18 was able to bathe/dress himself. Id. at 499. 19 The January 2017 report referenced, but not accurately cited, by the ALJ is an evaluation 20 by NP Sanchez noting Plaintiff can clean his home, drive, cook, and was able to bathe/dress 21 himself. Id. at 356. The February 2018 report referenced, but not accurately cited, by the ALJ is 22 an evaluation by Dr. Wagner. Id. at 516. Dr. Wagner found Plaintiff cooks, cleans, shops, walks 23 his children to school for exercise, and “perform[s] his own activities of daily living without 24 assistance.” Id. 25 The ALJ’s references and citations to Plaintiff’s ADLs fails to meet the specific and 26 legitimate reasons standard. The Ninth Circuit requires the ALJ to describe the daily activities, 27 note whether the claimant performs them alone or with assistance, and evaluate whether the 28 nature of each activity “comprise[s] a ‘substantial’ portion of [the claimant’s] day, or [is] 1 ‘transferable’ to a work environment.” Ghanim v. Colvin,

(9th Cir. 2013). 2 Without such description and analysis, it is impossible to ascertain whether a claimant’s ability to 3 “carry out ADLs” contradicts his testimony. Id.; see Trevizo v. Berryhill,

(9th 4 Cir. 2017) (finding error where the ALJ failed to develop a record regarding the extent to which 5 and the frequency with which claimant engaged in specified ADLs, identify any other tasks that 6 might undermine her claimed limitations, or inquire into whether claimant completed activities 7 alone or with the help of others). 8 Here, the ALJ did not discuss, in any detail, Plaintiff’s ADLs when he discounted Dr. 9 Grasser’s opinion. See AR at 28. The ALJ failed to explain how Plaintiff’s ability to cook, clean, 10 drive, shop, and walk his child to school, invalidated the limitations proposed by Dr. Grasser. 11 Under these circumstances, the Court cannot find that the ALJ provided specific and legitimate 12 reasons supported by substantial evidence to discount Dr. Grasser’s opinion. 13 B. Whether the ALJ Erred by Failing to Provide “Clear and Convincing 14 Reasons for Rejecting Plaintiff’s Symptomology Evidence. 15 The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility,5 resolving conflicts in medical 16 testimony, and resolving ambiguities. Andrews,

. A claimant’s statements of pain 17 or other symptoms are not conclusive evidence of a physical or mental impairment or disability. 18

(d)(5)(A); see SSR 16-3p,

, at *2 (“an individual’s statements 19 of symptoms alone are not enough to establish the existence of a physical or mental impairment 20 or disability”); see also Orn v. Astrue,

(9th Cir. 2007) (“An ALJ is not required 21 to believe every allegation of disabling pain or other non-exertional impairment.”) (internal 22 quotation marks and citation omitted). Determining whether a claimant’s testimony regarding 23 subjective pain or symptoms is credible requires the ALJ to engage in a two-step analysis. 24 Molina v. Astrue,

(9th Cir. 2012). The ALJ must first determine if “the 25

26 5 Social Security Ruling (SSR) 16-3p applies to disability applications heard by the agency on or after March 28, 2016. Ruling 16-3p eliminated the use of the term “credibility” to 27 emphasize that subjective symptom evaluation is not “an examination of an individual’s character but an endeavor to “determine how symptoms limit [the] ability to perform work-related 28 activities.” SSR 16-3p,

, at *3. 1 claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment which could 2 reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.” Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 3

(9th Cir. 2007) (internal punctuation and citations omitted). This does not 4 require the claimant to show that his impairment could be expected to cause the severity of the 5 symptoms that are alleged, but only that it reasonably could have caused some degree of 6 symptoms. Smolen,

. 7 If the first step is met and there is no evidence of malingering, “the ALJ must provide 8 ‘specific, clear and convincing reasons for’ rejecting the claimant’s testimony.” Treichler v. 9 Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

(9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Smolen,

). 10 See Carmickle v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

(9th Cir. 2008) (noting an adverse 11 credibility finding must be based on “clear and convincing reasons”). The ALJ must make 12 findings that support this conclusion, and the findings must be sufficiently specific to allow a 13 reviewing court to conclude the ALJ rejected the claimant’s testimony on permissible grounds 14 and did not arbitrarily discredit the claimant’s testimony. Moisa v. Barnhart,

, 885 15 (9th Cir. 2004). 16 The Ninth Circuit does “not require ALJs to perform a line-by-line exegesis of the 17 claimant’s testimony, nor do they require ALJs to draft dissertations when denying benefits.” 18 Stewart v. Kijakazi, No. 1:22-cv-00189-ADA-HBK,

, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Jun. 22, 19 2023), F&R adopted,

(E.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2023); see Record v. Kijakazi, No. 20 1:22-cv-00495-BAM,

, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2023) (“Even if the ALJ’s 21 decision is not a model of clarity, where the ALJ’s ‘path may reasonably be discerned,’ the Court 22 will still defer to the ALJ’s decision.”) (quoting Wilson v. Berryhill,

, 597 (9th 23 Cir. 2019)). “The standard isn’t whether our court is convinced, but instead, whether the ALJ’s 24 rationale is clear enough that it has the power to convince.” Smartt v. Kijakazi,

, 494 25 (9th Cir. 2022) (the clear and convincing standard requires an ALJ to show his work). 26 The ALJ may consider numerous factors in weighing a claimant’s credibility, including 27 “(1) ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation, such as the claimant’s reputation for lying, 28 prior inconsistent statements concerning the symptoms, and other testimony by the claimant that 1 appears less than candid; (2) unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to 2 follow a prescribed course of treatment; and (3) the claimant’s daily activities.” Smolen,

. In evaluating the credibility of symptom testimony, the ALJ must also consider the 4 factors identified in SSR 16-3P.

6 (citing Bunnell v. Sullivan,

(9th Cir. 5 1991)). Accord Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,

(9th Cir. 2009). These 6 factors include: 7 (1) Daily activities; (2) The location, duration, frequency, and intensity of pain or other symptoms; (3) Factors that precipitate and aggravate the 8 symptoms; (4) The type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication an individual takes or has taken to alleviate pain or other 9 symptoms; (5) Treatment, other than medication, an individual receives or has received for relief of pain or other symptoms; (6) Any measures 10 other than treatment an individual uses or has used to relieve pain or other symptoms (e.g., lying flat on his or her back, standing for 15 to 20 minutes 11 every hour, or sleeping on a board); and (7) Any other factors concerning an individual’s functional limitations and restrictions due to pain or other 12 symptoms. 13 SSR 16-3P,

, at *7. See

(c)(3). If the ALJ’s finding is 14 supported by substantial evidence, the court may not engage in second-guessing. Tommasetti, 15 533 F.3d at 1039 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 16 The clear and convincing standard is “not an easy requirement to meet,” as it is “‘the most 17 demanding requirement in Social Security cases.’” Garrison,

(quoting Moore v. 18 Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,

(9th Cir. 2002)). “A finding that a claimant’s 19 testimony is not credible must be sufficiently specific to allow a reviewing court to conclude the 20 adjudicator rejected the claimant’s testimony on permissible grounds and did not arbitrarily 21 discredit a claimant’s testimony regarding pain.” Brown-Hunter v. Colvin,

(9th 22 Cir. 2015) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 23 “The fact that a claimant’s testimony is not fully corroborated by the objective medical 24 findings, in and of itself, is not a clear and convincing reason for rejecting it.” Vertigan,

. See

(c)(2) (“[W]e will not reject your statements about the intensity 26

27 6 Smolen cites to SSR 88-13, which has since been superseded by SSR 16-3P (available at

). See Amy E.S. v. Commissioner,

, at *9 n.4 (D. Or. Jan. 10, 28 2022). 1 and persistence of your pain or other symptoms or about the effect your symptoms have on your 2 ability solely because the objective medical evidence does not substantiate your statements.”). 3 Rather, where a claimant’s symptom testimony is not fully substantiated by the objective medical 4 record, the ALJ must provide additional reasons for discounting the testimony. Burch,

. “The ALJ must specify what testimony is not credible and identify the evidence that 6 undermines the claimant’s complaints – ‘[g]eneral findings are insufficient.’”

(quoting 7 Reddick v. Chater,

, 722 (9th Cir. 1988)). 8 However, the medical evidence “is still a relevant factor in determining the severity of the 9 claimant’s pain and its disabling effects.” Rollins v. Massanari,

(9th Cir. 10 2001). The Court of Appeals has distinguished testimony that is “uncorroborated” by the medical 11 evidence from testimony that is “contradicted” by the medical records and concluded that 12 contradictions with the medical records, by themselves, are enough to meet the clear and 13 convincing standard. Hairston v. Saul,

, 773 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting 14 Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1161). The Court of Appeals has also acknowledged that the ALJ is not 15 “required to believe every allegation of disabling pain, or else disability benefits would be 16 available for the asking, a result plainly contrary to” the Social Security Act. Molina,

1104. 18 Here, the ALJ acknowledged Plaintiff’s subjective complaints but found his statements 19 about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of his symptoms were inconsistent with the 20 evidence of record. AR at 25, 28. The ALJ noted that in February 2017, Plaintiff reported he was 21 able to clean his home, drive, cook, and care for his personal hygiene. Id. at 26, 499. This 22 treatment record contradicts Plaintiff’s hearing testimony that he was unable to drive, do chores, 23 cook, and/or shop. Id. at 48-50. Likewise, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s testimony was contradicted 24 by Plaintiff’s statements in the February 2019 internal medicine consultative examination 25 conducted by Dr. Wagner. Id. at 27. Dr. Wagner noted Plaintiff “does cook and clean…does 26 drive, but his car is currently broken…does shop and perform his own activities of daily living 27 without assistance” despite testifying, a month earlier, that he was unable to perform a majority of 28 these activities. Id. at 27, 516. 1 Moreover, the ALJ did not merely cite inconsistencies in the record, but effectively 2 signaled that his discounting of Plaintiff’s testimony was because of these inconsistencies. For 3 example, the ALJ highlighted the significance of Dr. Wagner’s documentation that Plaintiff could 4 sit for 45 minutes at a time, cook, clean, drive, shop, perform his activities of daily living, and 5 walk his child to school, by observing “despite [Plaintiff’s] testifying” to the contrary. (AR 27 6 citing Ex. 15F). The ALJ’s use of signaling language like this enables this Court to conclude the 7 ALJ rejected Plaintiff’s testimony on permissible grounds and did not arbitrarily discredit the 8 testimony. Moisa,

. 9 An ALJ is “permitted to consider daily living activities” in addressing a Plaintiff’s 10 subjective statements. Burch,

. Daily activities “form the basis for an adverse 11 credibility determination” when: (1) the daily activities contradict the claimant’s other testimony 12 or (2) the daily activities meet the threshold for transferable works skills. Orn,

; 13 see Molina,

(factors to consider in evaluating a claimant’s statements include 14 “whether the claimant engages in daily activities inconsistent with the alleged symptoms” and 15 whether “the claimant reports participation in everyday activities indicating capacities that are 16 transferable to a work setting”). The record demonstrates Plaintiff’s reported daily activities 17 directly contradict his hearing testimony. The ALJ recognized this discrepancy in Plaintiff’s 18 testimony, and thus provided clear and convincing reasons to discount Plaintiff’s “symptomology 19 evidence.” C.f. Sharp v. Colvin, No. 1:13-cv-02028-BAM,

, at *5 (E.D. Cal.

, 2015) (finding that the ALJ properly discounted plaintiff’s testimony as inconsistent 21 with his daily activities). 22 V. REMEDY 23 The decision whether to remand a matter pursuant to sentence four of

(g) 24 or to order immediate payment of benefits is within the discretion of the district court. Harman v. 25 Apfel,

(9th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff requests the Court remand this case for 26 payment of benefits based on the credit-as-true rule. (Doc. 16 at 15-16). Generally, an award of 27 benefits is directed when: 28 1 (1) the ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting such evidence, (2) there are no outstanding issues that must be resolved before a determination of 2 disability can be made, and (3) it is clear from the record that the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled were such evidence credited. 3 4 Smolen,

. In addition, an award of benefits is directed where no useful purpose 5 would be served by further administrative proceedings, or where the record is fully developed. 6 Varney v. Sec’y of Health & Human Serv.,

(9th Cir. 1998). Even if all the 7 conditions for an award of benefits are met, the Court nevertheless retains “flexibility to remand 8 for further proceedings when the record as a whole creates serious doubt as to whether the 9 claimant is, in fact, disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act.” Garrison,

; see also Dominguez v. Colvin,

(9th Cir. 2015). 11 Here, the record has been fully developed and further administrative proceedings would 12 serve no useful purpose. The record includes multiple medical opinions, medical evidence, 13 Plaintiff’s testimony, and the testimony of the VE. As discussed above, the ALJ has failed to 14 provide legally sufficient reasons for discounting the opinion of treating physician Dr. Grasser. 15 And, if Dr. Grasser’s opinion were credited-as-true, the ALJ would be required to find Plaintiff 16 disabled on remand. 17 Dr. Grasser, Plaintiff’s treating physician, opined Plaintiff could no longer work. AR at 18 328. Dr. Grasser determined Plaintiff could only sit for about 1 hour and stand and walk for 19 about 1 hour in an 8-hour workday.

When the opinion of Dr. Grasser is credited as true, the 20 testimony of the VE makes clear that Plaintiff could not maintain any employment in the general 21 economy given the limitations outlined by Dr. Grasser. Id. at 62. 22 Defendant asserts “additional development of the record would be necessary in order to 23 find Plaintiff disabled based on the issues raised in Plaintiff’s appeal.” (Doc. 19 at 13). However, 24 the issue raised by Plaintiff, Dr. Grasser’s opinion, was already before the ALJ. See Varney v. 25 Sec. of Health & Hum. Servs.,

(9th Cir. 1988) (“Delaying the payment of 26 benefits by requiring multiple administrative proceedings that are duplicative and unnecessary 27 only serves to cause the applicant further damage—financial, medical, and emotional.”). 28 Defendant claims the Social Security Act “does not allow a court to find disability under the 1 | complex statutory scheme merely because an ALJ erred in explaining why she rejected certain 2 | pieces of evidence.” /d. at 14. Defendant’s argument is unpersuasive. Allowing the ALJ a 3 | redo” would only grant the ALJ an unwarranted do over and punish the plaintiff. See Benecke v. 4 | Barnhart,

(9th Cir. 2004) (“Allowing the Commissioner to decide the issue 5 | again would create an unfair ‘heads we win; tails, let’s play again’ system of disability benefits 6 | adjudication.”); Moisa,

(“The Commissioner, having lost this appeal, should not 7 | have another opportunity to show that Moisa is not credible any more than Moisa, had he lost, 8 | should have an opportunity for remand and further proceedings to establish his credibility.”). 9 | Accordingly, this action will be remanded for payment of benefits. 10 VI. CONCLUSION 11 Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 12 1. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 16) is GRANTED; 13 2. That the decision of the Commissioner is reversed, and this matter is remanded for 14 payment of benefits; and 15 3. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff Carlos 16 Garcia and against Defendant Martin O’Malley, Commissioner of the Social 17 Security Administration. 18 | IT IS SO ORDERED. | Dated: _ April 29, 2024 | br Pr 20 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 23