(PC) Hobaugh v. Amador County Sheriff Department

8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA TREVOR ALLEN HOBAUGH, No. 2:24-CV-1078-DMC-P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER AMADOR COUNTY SHERIFF DEPARTMENT, et al., Defendants.

18 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s original complaint, ECF No. 1.

20 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). This provision also applies if the plaintiff was incarcerated at the time the action was initiated even if the litigant was subsequently released from custody. See Olivas v. Nevada ex rel.

24 Dep’t of Corr., 856 F.3d 1281, 1282 (9th Cir. 2017). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is impossible for the Court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague and conclusory.

10 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS 11 Plaintiff names the following as defendants: (1) Amador County Sheriff’s Department; and (2) Deputy Sheriff Jennifer Trantham. See ECF No. 1, pg. 2. In his first claim, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Trantham made “slanderous statements” to Plaintiff’s “peers” in jail, which resulted in Plaintiff being assaulted on several occasions, both in and out of custody.

15 See id. at 3.

17 II. DISCUSSION 18 Plaintiff’s complaint suffers two key defects. First, as to Defendant Trantham, Plaintiff has not alleged the nature of the statements made and, as a result, the Court cannot determine whether they establish an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim based on disregard for inmate safety. Second, as to Defendant Amador County Sheriff’s Department, Plaintiff has not alleged any custom or policy which caused the violation of Plaintiff’s rights by Defendant Trantham.

24 A. Deliberate Indifference to Safety 25 The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which the prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment “. . . embodies broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976). Conditions of confinement may, however, be harsh and restrictive. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Nonetheless, prison officials must provide prisoners with “food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the official’s act or omission must be so serious such that it results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities; and (2) subjectively, the prison official must have acted unnecessarily and wantonly for the purpose of inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison official must have a “sufficiently culpable mind.” See id. 11 Under these principles, prison officials have a duty to take reasonable steps to protect inmates from physical abuse. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1250-51 (9th Cir. 1982); Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833. Liability exists only when two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the prisoner was incarcerated under conditions presenting a substantial risk of serious harm; and (2) subjectively, prison officials knew of and disregarded the risk. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. The very obviousness of the risk may suffice to establish the knowledge element.

17 See Wallis v. Baldwin, 70 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1995). Prison officials are not liable, however, if evidence is presented that they lacked knowledge of a safety risk. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844. The knowledge element does not require that the plaintiff prove that prison officials know for a certainty that the inmate’s safety is in danger, but it requires proof of more than a mere suspicion of danger. See Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986). Finally, the plaintiff must show that prison officials disregarded a risk. Thus, where prison officials actually knew of a substantial risk, they are not liable if they took reasonable steps to respond to the risk, even if harm ultimately was not averted. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844.

25 Here, without knowing what statements were allegedly made by Defendant Trantham, the Court cannot determine whether Plaintiff’s claim establishes either element outlined above. Objectively, it is impossible to determine whether Defendant Trantham’s unknown statements created a substantial risk of harm. Subjectively, it is impossible to determine whether the unknown statements demonstrated knowledge of and disregard for a risk to Plaintiff’s safety. Plaintiff will be provided an opportunity to amend the complaint to set for the statements allegedly made by Defendant Trantham.

4 B. Municipal Liability 5 Municipalities and other local government units are among those “persons” to whom § 1983 liability applies. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).

7 Counties and municipal government officials are also “persons” for purposes of § 1983. See id. at 691; see also Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir. 1989). A local government unit, however, may not be held responsible for the acts of its employees or officials under a respondeat superior theory of liability. See Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 11 397, 403 (1997). Thus, municipal liability must rest on the actions of the municipality, and not of the actions of its employees or officers. See id. To assert municipal liability, therefore, the plaintiff must allege that the constitutional deprivation complained of resulted from a policy or custom of the municipality. See id. 15 Plaintiff has alleged a disregard for a safety risk by Defendant Trantham. Plaintiff has not, however, alleged the existence or implementation of any municipal custom of policy which caused this violation. Absent such a connection, Defendant Amador County Sheriff’s Department cannot be liable. Plaintiff will be provided an opportunity to amend.

20 III. CONCLUSION 21 Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by amending the complaint, Plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of the entire action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is informed that, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, following dismissal with leave to amend, all claims alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged in the amended complaint are waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, if Plaintiff amends the complaint, the Court cannot refer to the prior pleading in order to make || Plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An amended complaint must be || complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id. 3 If Plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, Plaintiff must demonstrate how the || conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. See || Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how || each named defendant is involved and must set forth some affirmative link or connection between || each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 | (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

9 Finally, Plaintiff is warned that failure to file an amended complaint within the || time provided in this order may be grounds for dismissal of this action. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 11 | 1260-61; see also Local Rule 110. Plaintiff is also warned that a complaint which fails to comply || with Rule 8 may, in the Court’s discretion, be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b).

13 || See Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981).

14 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 15 1. Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed with leave to amend; and 16 2. Plaintiff shall file a first amended complaint within 30 days of the date of || service of this order.

19 | Dated: May 21, 2024 Co 20 DENNIS M. COTA 7] UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE