1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 SAN JOSE DIVISION 7 8 ALINE ALVAREZ-MUNGUIA, Case No. 23-cv-02751-BLF

9 Plaintiff, ORDER VACATING MOTION 10 v. HEARING AND DENYING MOTION TO REMAND 11 FORD MOTOR COMPANY, [Re: ECF 6] 12 Defendant.

13 14 Plaintiff Aline Alvarez-Munguia (“Alvarez-Munguia”) filed this suit against Defendant 15 Ford Motor Company (“Ford”) in the Monterey County Superior Court, asserting state law claims 16 arising from the purchase of an allegedly defective vehicle. See Not. of Removal Ex. A (Compl.), 17 ECF 1-2. Ford removed the case to federal district court based on diversity jurisdiction. See Not. 18 of Removal ¶ 11, ECF 1. 19 Alvarez-Munguia moves to remand the case to state court, arguing that the notice of 20 removal was untimely because it was filed more than thirty days after service of the summons and 21 complaint. See Pl.’s Mot., ECF 6. Alvarez-Munguia does not dispute the existence of diversity 22 jurisdiction; the motion to remand is based solely on procedural grounds. Ford contends that 23 removal was timely, because the complaint does not disclose that the amount in controversy 24 exceeds $75,000 and the notice of removal was filed within thirty days after Ford obtained the 25 vehicle sale contract showing that the amount in controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction 26 is satisfied. See Def.’s Opp., ECF 8. 27 The Court finds the motion to be suitable for decision without oral argument and therefore 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 Alvarez-Munguia filed this action in the Monterey County Superior Court on February 21, 3 2023, alleging that Ford failed to meet its warranty and repair obligations with respect to a 2018 4 Ford Focus vehicle that Alvarez-Munguia purchased on April 13, 2021. See Compl. ¶ 8. The 5 complaint asserts three claims for violation of California’s Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, 6

et seq. Alvarez-Munguia seeks damages in an unspecified amount, 7 recission of the vehicle sale contract and restitution of all monies expended, a civil penalty in the 8 amount of twice actual damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, and other appropriate relief. 9 See Compl. Prayer. The complaint does not allege the sale price of the Ford Focus vehicle or the 10 amount of damages sought, nor does it allege the amount of attorneys’ fees and costs incurred. 11 See generally Compl. 12 Ford was served with the complaint on February 22, 2023. See Rexit Decl. ISO Not. of 13 Removal ¶ 4 ECF 1-1. Ford filed an answer to the complaint in the state court on March 24, 2023. 14 See Not. of Removal Ex. B (Answer), ECF 1-3. 15 On June 2, 2023, Ford removed the case to federal district court on the basis of diversity 16 jurisdiction. See Not. of Removal ¶ 11. The notice of removal states that the two requirements for 17 diversity jurisdiction are (1) complete diversity of citizenship between the plaintiff and defendant 18 and (2) an amount in controversy exceeding $75,000. See

. Ford alleges that the first 19 requirement is met because Alvarez-Munguia is a citizen of California and Ford is a citizen of 20 Delaware and Michigan. See

. Ford also alleges that the complaint is silent as to the 21 amount in controversy, but that Ford obtained the vehicle sale contract on May 29, 2023, and 22 thereby learned that the sale price of the Ford Focus vehicle was $24,596.48. See

. 23 Based on that figure, along with the complaint’s request for restitution, a civil penalty, and 24 reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, Ford alleges that the $75,000 amount in controversy 25 requirement is satisfied. See

. Ford alleges that it filed the notice of removal within thirty 26 days after receipt of the vehicle sale contract, and that removal therefore was timely. See

. 27 Alvarez-Munguia filed the present motion to remand on June 30, 2023. See Pl.’s Mot., 1 II. LEGAL STANDARD 2 “A defendant may remove an action to federal court based on federal question jurisdiction 3 or diversity jurisdiction.” Hunter v. Philip Morris USA,

(9th Cir. 2009) 4 (citing

). 5 “The mechanics and requirements for removal are governed by

.” 6 Kuxhausen v. BMW Fin. Servs. NA LLC,

(9th Cir. 2013). “Section 1446(b) 7 identifies two thirty-day periods for removing a case.”

(internal quotation marks and citation 8 omitted). “The first thirty-day removal period is triggered if the case stated by the initial pleading 9 is removable on its face.”

(internal quotation marks omitted). The Ninth Circuit has held that 10 for the first thirty-day removal period to apply, “the ground for removal must be revealed 11 affirmatively in the initial pleading.”

(internal quotation marks omitted). If the ground for 12 removal does not appear from the face of the initial pleading, the second thirty-day removal period 13 is triggered when “the defendant receives a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other 14 paper from which removability may first be ascertained.”

(internal quotation marks omitted). 15 A party who contests removal may file a motion to remand. See

(c). “A 16 motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction 17 must be made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal[.]”

18 III. DISCUSSION 19 Alvarez-Munguia timely filed this motion to remand within thirty days after Ford filed the 20 notice of removal. Alvarez-Munguia contends that the notice of removal was untimely because it 21 was filed more than thirty days after service of the summons and complaint. In opposition, Ford 22 contends that service of the summons and complaint did not trigger the first thirty-day removal 23 period identified in § 1446(b) because the ground for removal – diversity jurisdiction – does not 24 appear on the face of the complaint. Specifically, Ford argues that the complaint does not allege 25 facts showing that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Ford argues that the second thirty- 26 day removal period identified in § 1446(b) was triggered when Ford received a copy of the vehicle 27 sale contract on May 29, 2023, disclosing the purchase price of $24,596.48. The notice of 1 The Court finds that service of the summons and complaint did not trigger the first thirty- 2 day removal period, because the complaint does not allege facts showing that the amount in 3 controversy exceeds $75,000. As noted above, the complaint indicates that Alvarez-Munguia 4 seeks damages, recission of the vehicle sale contract and restitution of all monies expended, a civil 5 penalty in the amount of twice actual damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, and other 6 appropriate relief. However, the complaint does not allege the sale price of the Ford Focus vehicle 7 or any other specific measure of damages, nor does it allege the amount of attorneys’ fees and 8 costs incurred. Without that information, the existence of diversity jurisdiction is not “revealed 9 affirmatively in the initial pleading” as required to trigger the first thirty-day removal period. 10 Kuxhausen,

. 11 Alvarez-Munguia argues that given Ford’s sophistication and knowledge of the motor 12 vehicle industry, Ford could have estimated the value of the vehicle in question based on the 13 make, model, year, and VIN alleged in the complaint. See Def.’s Opp. at 8. That argument is 14 foreclosed by Ninth Circuit cases holding that the first thirty-day period is triggered only where 15 the initial pleading itself contains the facts giving rise to removability, without reference to any 16 information or knowledge in the possession of the defendant. See Kuxhausen,

; 17 Harris v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co.,

(9th Cir. 2005). In Harris, the Ninth Circuit 18 held that “notice of removability under § 1446(b) is determined through examination of the four 19 corners of the applicable pleadings, not through subjective knowledge or a duty to make further 20 inquiry.” Harris,

. The Harris court explained that this rule avoids “the spectre of 21 inevitable collateral litigation over whether the pleadings contained a sufficient ‘clue,’ whether 22 defendant had subjective knowledge, or whether defendant conducted sufficient inquiry.” Harris, 23

. In Kuxhausen, the Ninth Circuit reiterated that “defendants need not make 24 extrapolations or engage in guesswork” to determine whether the amount in controversy 25 requirement is satisfied. Kuxhausen,

. 26 District courts in this circuit have applied Kuxhausen and Harris to deny nearly identical 27 motions to remand brought by the same firm that represents Alvarez-Munguia in the present case. 1 8234641, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2023) (“Defendant’s subjective knowledge about the value of 2 the Vehicle is irrelevant, nor was it required to investigate whether the damages sought exceeded 3 the amount-in-controversy requirement under § 1332.”); Alcazar v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., No. 23- 4 CV-01951-JD,

, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2023) (“Alcazar argues that Nissan’s 5 ‘sophistication and knowledge of the motor vehicle industry’ should have put it on notice that the 6 amount-in-controversy requirement was met, see Dkt. No. 15 at 8, but removability is determined 7 from the pleadings and not the defendant’s subjective knowledge, see Harris,

.”); 8 Moran v. Ford Motor Co., No. 23CV845 JM (BLM),

, at *3 (S.D. Cal. July 13, 9 2023) (“[W]hile Defendant could have made a plausible guess that the amount in controversy in 10 this case exceeded $75,000, Defendant was under no obligation to do so.” (internal quotation 11 marks and citation omitted)). For the same reasons articulated in those cases, this Court finds that 12 Alvarez-Munguia’s motion to remand must be denied under controlling Ninth Circuit authority. 13 Alvarez-Munguia argues that Ford should have understood that the amount in controversy 14 exceeds $75,000 based on the fact that the case was originally brought under the state court’s 15 unlimited jurisdiction, which applies only when the demand amount exceeds $25,000.1 As Ford 16 points out, however, nothing in the complaint indicates whether the threshold demand amount of 17 $25,000 is the amount of actual damages (which may be tripled if the requested civil penalty is 18 awarded) or the total amount of relief sought (including the requested civil penalty and attorneys’ 19 fees and costs). Under these circumstances, the Court concludes that it is impossible to tell solely 20 from the invocation of the state court’s unlimited jurisdiction whether the amount in controversy 21 exceeds $75,000. This ruling is consistent with the decisions of other district courts in the Ninth 22 Circuit denying motions to remand on similar facts. See, e.g., Agasang,

, at *2 23 (“Courts have rejected identical arguments that bringing a lemon law case under the state court’s 24 unlimited jurisdiction is sufficient to show that the $75,000 threshold for diversity jurisdiction is 25 met.”); Moran,

, at *3 (“The mere fact that Plaintiff originally brought this case 26

27 1 As of January 1, 2024, the state court’s unlimited jurisdiction is restricted to civil cases in which 1 under the state court’s unlimited jurisdiction did not conclusively establish Plaintiff was seeking 2 || damages meeting the jurisdictional threshold.”). 3 Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Dart, Alvarez-Munguia argues that Ford 4 || plausibly could have alleged satisfaction of the $75,000 amount in controversy requirement based 5 || on reasonable estimates regarding vehicle purchase price and attorneys’ fees. See Dart Cherokee 6 Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens,

(2014). In particular, Alvarez-Munguia points 7 || to language in the decision stating that “a defendant’s notice of removal need include only a 8 || plausible allegation that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold,” and that 9 || evidence establishing the amount in controversy is required only when the defendant’s allegations 10 are questioned. /d. at 89. This argument misses the mark. “[W]hether a defendant can establish 11 that federal jurisdiction exists and the question of when the thirty-day time period begins are not 12 two sides of the same coin.” Kuxhausen,

n.3. The fact that Ford could have 5 13 gone beyond the pleadings to demonstrate removability does not mean that it was obligated to do 14 so. See id.; see also Moran,

, at *2 (“The fact that Defendant could have made 3 15 a further inquiry to estimate the subject vehicle’s purchase price is insufficient to trigger the thirty- 16 || day clock.”). The only question presented by Alvarez-Munguia’s motion is whether removability 3 17 was ascertainable from the four corners of the complaint. It was not. 18 Accordingly, the motion to remand is DENIED. 19 IV. ORDER 20 (1) The January 11, 2024 hearing on Alvarez-Munguia’s motion to remand is 21 VACATED. 22 (2) Alvarez-Munguia’s motion to remand is DENIED. 23 (3) The Initial Case Management Conference set for January 11, 2024 at 11:00 a.m. 24 REMAINS ON CALENDAR. 25 (4) This order terminates ECF 6. 26 27 Dated: January 5, 2024 AO ] Wy t AMG BETH LABSON FREEMAN 28 United States District Judge