1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 8 ROWENA ESTILLORE, Case No. 23-cv-05816-JD

9 Plaintiff, ORDER RE ARBITRATION v. 10

11 CAPGEMINI AMERICA, INC., Defendant. 12

13 14 Pro se plaintiff Rowena Estillore has filed a complaint against her former employer, 15 defendant Capgemini America, Inc. Dkt. No. 1-1. Capgemini asks to send the case to arbitration 16 pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and a binding arbitration clause in Estillore’s 17 employment agreement. Dkt. No. 11. Estillore did not file an opposition, which was due by 18 January 5, 2024 (see Civ. L. R. 7-3(a)), or otherwise communicate with the Court. The motion is 19 suitable for decision without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), and arbitration is 20 granted. 21 The Court has detailed the standards governing a motion to compel arbitration under the 22 FAA in several prior orders, which are incorporated here. See Louis v. Healthsource Glob. 23 Staffing, Inc., No. 22-cv-02436-JD,

(N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2022); Williams v. Eaze 24 Sols., Inc.,

(N.D. Cal. 2019). In pertinent part, the Court’s role under 25 Section 4 of the FAA “‘is limited to determining whether a valid arbitration agreement exists and, 26 if so, whether the agreement encompasses the dispute at issue.’” Cornet v. Twitter, Inc., No. 22- 27 cv-06857-JD,

, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2023) (quoting Lifescan, Inc. v. Premier 1 The record establishes that Estillore accepted an employment contract that contained a 2 || binding arbitration clause requiring arbitration of “any dispute ... arising out of or relating to or 3 || concerning the provisions of this [employment] Agreement ... or otherwise concerning any 4 || rights[,] obligations or other aspects of the employment relationship, including, without limitation, 5 discrimination or retaliation claims....” Dkt. No. 11-7 at ECF p. 5. See Dkt. No. 11-3 4 16. 6 Estillore has not apprised the Court of any basis to deny arbitration, but she responded to 7 Capgemini’s pre-motion demand letter by stating: “The offer letter does not account for all 8 || charges. Iam saying NO to ARBITRATION.” Dkt. No.11-2 at 1. Read with the liberality 9 || afforded pro se litigants, this statement indicates that Estillore believes her claims (i.e., “charges”) 10 || fall outside the scope of the arbitration agreement that she accepted. But the arbitration agreement 11 incorporates the Employment Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association, Dkt. 12 || No. 11-7 at ECF p. 5, which means that any disputes about its scope were delegated to the 5 13 arbitrator and may not be decided at this time by the Court. See McLellan v. Fitbit, Inc., No. 16- 14 || cv-00036-JD,

, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2017) (citing Brennan v. Opus Bank, 3 15 ||

(9th Cir. 2015)). 16 Consequently, the motion to compel arbitration is granted, and this case is dismissed. IT IS SO ORDERED. || Datea: January 26, 2024 19 20 JAMES ATO. United fftates District Judge 22 23 24 25 26 27 28