1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 DAVID D., Case No. 3:20-cv-02696-JSC

8 Plaintiff, ORDER RE: MOTION FOR 9 v. ATTORNEY’S FEES

10 MARTIN O’MALLEY, Re: Dkt. No. 25 Defendant. 11

12 13 Plaintiff’s counsel, Katherine Siegfried, moves for attorney’s fees pursuant to

406(b) for representing Plaintiff in his successful appeal of the Commissioner of the Social 15 Security Administration’s denial of social security disability benefits. (Dkt. No. 34.1) After careful 16 consideration of Plaintiff’s motion and the relevant legal authority, the Court determines oral 17 argument is unnecessary, see N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b), and GRANTS the motion for attorney’s 18 fees pursuant to Section 406(b). 19 BACKGROUND 20 This case stems from Plaintiff’s appeal of the Social Security Administration’s denial of 21 social security benefits for a combination of physical impairments, including: back pain, neck 22 pain, and numbness and weakness in his extremities. On June 17, 2021, the Court granted 23 Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, denied Defendant’s motion, and remanded for further 24 proceedings. (Dkt. No. 20.) On August 25, 2021, the Court granted the parties’ stipulation and 25 awarded Plaintiff’s counsel $12,500 in fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28

(d). (Dkt. No. 24.) 27 1 Following remand, the SSA found Plaintiff disabled. (Dkt. No. 25-2.) On November 12, 2 2023, Plaintiff was notified he had been awarded disability benefits as of April 2015 and was 3 being awarded $247,719 for past due benefits. (Id. at 3.) The notice also advised Plaintiff SSA had 4 withheld $61,929.75 from Plaintiff’s award for attorney’s fees as 25 percent of Plaintiff’s past-due 5 benefits. (Dkt. No. 25-2 at 3.) Plaintiff’s counsel thereafter filed the now pending motion for 6 attorney’s fees for work performed in this Court under Section 406(b). (Dkt. No. 25.) Pursuant to 7 Plaintiff and his counsel’s contingency fee agreement for this case, counsel may seek fees up to 25 8 percent of any past-due benefits awarded to Plaintiff. (Dkt. No. 25-4.) Counsel accordingly 9 requests fees in the amount of $50,000. (Dkt. No. 25 at 5-6.) Plaintiff’s counsel served Plaintiff 10 with a copy of the motion. (Dkt. No. 25-1 ¶¶ 9-10.) The Commissioner filed a response in which 11 he took no position on Plaintiff’s motion. (Dkt. No. 27.) 12 LEGAL STANDARD 13 Section 406(b) provides “[w]henever a court renders a judgment favorable to a [social 14 security] claimant under this subchapter who was represented before the court by an attorney, the 15 court may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee” to claimant’s attorney; 16 such a fee can be no more than 25 percent of the total of past-due benefits awarded to the claimant. 17

(b)(1)(A). A court may award such a fee even if the court’s judgment did not 18 immediately result in an award of past-due benefits; where the court, for instance, remands for 19 further consideration, the court may calculate the 25 percent fee based upon any past-due benefits 20 awarded on remand. See, e.g., Crawford v. Astrue,

(9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). 21 Under Section 406(b), a court must serve “as an independent check” of contingency fee 22 agreements “to assure that they yield reasonable results.” Gisbrecht v. Barnhart,

, 23 807 (2002). Section 406(b) “does not displace contingent-fee agreements within the statutory 24 ceiling; instead, [Section] 406(b) instructs courts to review for reasonableness fees yielded by 25 those agreements.”

. The court’s review of a fee agreement is based on the character 26 of the representation and the results achieved, see Gisbrecht,

, and can include 27 analyzing: whether counsel provided substandard representation; any dilatory conduct by counsel 1 benefits achieved; and the risk counsel assumed by accepting the case. See Crawford,

1151-52. 3 A court must offset an award of Section 406(b) attorneys’ fees by any award of fees 4 granted under the EAJA. See Gisbrecht,

; Parrish v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 5

(9th Cir. 2012). 6 DISCUSSION 7 Plaintiff’s counsel has demonstrated the amount of fees requested is reasonable for the 8 services rendered. See Gisbrecht,

. 9 First, while not dispositive, Plaintiff’s and counsel’s contingency fee agreement is within 10 the 25 percent threshold permitted under Section 406(b), as the agreement provides counsel will 11 not ask for a fee of more than 25 percent of the total past-due benefits awarded. (Dkt. No. 25-4.) 12 Second, there is no indication a reduction in fees is warranted due to any substandard 13 performance by counsel or counsel delayed these proceedings in an effort to increase the amount 14 of fees awarded. To the contrary, counsel provided substantial work and achieved favorable results 15 for Plaintiff as she succeeded in having the Court remand this matter for further proceedings. (Dkt. 16 No. 20.) 17 Nor is the amount of fees, $50,000, excessive; indeed, it represents less than 25 percent of 18 Plaintiff’s past-due benefits. See, e.g., Ciletti v. Berryhill, No. 17-CV-05646-EMC,

144584, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2019) (awarding $35,442.00 in fees following an award of 20 $150,993 in past-due benefits); G.S. v. Kijakazi, No. 19-CV-07543-JSC,

, at *2 21 (N.D. Cal. May 9, 2022) (awarding fees in the amount of $30,233 following a past-due benefit 3 22 award of $120,932); Eckert v. Berryhill, No. 15-CV-04461-JCS,

, at *3 (N.D. 23 Cal. Sept. 11, 2017) (awarding $16,566.25 in fees following an award of $66,265 in retroactive 24 benefits); Devigili v. Berryhill, No. 15-CV-02237-SI,

, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 7, 25 2017) (awarding $15,278.00 in fees following an award of $76,391.00 in retroactive benefits). 26 Lastly, the Court finds Plaintiff’s counsel assumed a substantial risk of not recovering fees 27 when she accepted this case. Plaintiff and his counsel entered into the contingency fee agreement 1 Plaintiff any requested benefits, and counsel could not know the court would grant her motion for 2 summary judgment and remand the matter to SSA. Accordingly, the Court finds the amount of 3 requested fees is reasonable. 4 CONCLUSION 5 For the reasons described above, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s counsel’s motion for fees. 6 The Commissioner is directed to certify fees under

(b) in the amount of $50,000 7 payable to the Law Offices of Katherine Siegfried. Plaintiff’s counsel is ordered to refund the 8 previously awarded EAJA fees, in the amount of $12,500 to Plaintiff. 9 This Order disposes of Docket No. 25. 10 11 IT IS SO ORDERED. e 12 Dated: February 20, 2024

= 14 ne J&CQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY 15 United States District Judge 16

= 17

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