1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 San Francisco Division 11 YOLANDA MUNOZ, Case No. 3:20-cv-04954-LB

12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 13 v. COUNSEL’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES 14 ANDREW M. SAUL, Re: ECF No. 28 15 Defendant. 16 17 INTRODUCTION 18 In this Social Security appeal, the parties stipulated to, and the court approved, voluntary 19 remand for further agency proceedings.1 On remand, the plaintiff received past-due disability 20 benefits.2 The parties previously stipulated that the plaintiff be awarded attorney fees in the 21 amount of $4,000.00 under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA),

(d).3 The 22 plaintiff’s counsel now seeks fees of $36,000.00, which is within the 25-percent limit allowed 23 24 25

26 1 Order – ECF No. 23. Citations refer to material in the Electronic Case File (“ECF”); pinpoint citations are to the ECF-generated page numbers at the top of documents. 27 2 Notice of Benefits – ECF No. 28-3 at 3. 1 under

(b) and the representation agreement with his client.4 The court can decide 2 this matter without oral argument. See N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). The court grants the motion.5 3 STATEMENT 4 The Commissioner withheld 25-percent of the retroactive benefits, or $38,644.75.6 The 5 plaintiff has a fee agreement with her lawyer that provides for a 25-percent contingency fee of the 6 past-due benefits owed “at any time following an unfavorable or partially favorable administrative 7 law judge decision.”7 The plaintiff’s attorney has already received $4,000.00 in attorneys’ fees 8 under the EAJA.8 He agreed to refund the EAJA fees.9 9 The Commissioner filed a response to the plaintiff’s motion stating that he “neither supports 10 nor opposes Counsel’s request for attorneys’ fees.”10 11 ANALYSIS 12 Under

(b), “[w]henever a court renders a judgment favorable to a [social 13 security] claimant …, the court may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee” 14 for the claimant’s counsel, which can be no more than 25 percent of the total of the past-due 15 benefits awarded to the claimant.

(b)(1)(A). a court may award such a fee even if 16 the court’s judgment did not immediately result in an award of past-due benefits; where the court 17 has rendered judgment favorable to a claimant by reversing an earlier determination by an ALJ 18 and remanding for further consideration, the court may calculate the 25-percent fee based upon 19 any past-due benefits awarded on remand. See, e.g., Crawford v. Astrue,

(9th 20 Cir. 2009) (en banc). 21 22 23 4 Mot. – ECF No. 28. 24 5 The court declines the plaintiff’s counsel’s request to apply a 3.27 multiplier. See

at 4–5. 25 6 Notice of Benefits – ECF No. 28-3 at 3. 26 7 Free Agreement – ECF No. 28-4 at 1. 8 Order – ECF No. 27 at 2. 27 9 Mot. – ECF No. 28-1 at 12. ] In considering a motion for attorney’s fees under § 406(b), the court must review counsel’s 2 || request “‘as an independent check” to ensure that the contingency fee agreement “yield[s] 3 || reasonable results.” See Gisbrecht v. Barnhart,

(2002). Section 406(b) “does 4 || not displace contingent-fee agreements within the statutory ceiling; instead § 406(b) instructs 5 courts to review for reasonableness fees yielded by those agreements.” /d. at 808—09. To evaluate 6 || the reasonableness of a fee request under § 406(b), the court considers the character of the 7 || representation and the results achieved. /d. at 808; see Crawford,

. This includes 8 analyzing whether substandard representation justifies awarding less than 25 percent in fees; any 9 || delay in the proceedings attributable to the attorney requesting the fee; whether the benefits of the 10 || representation are out of proportion to time spent on the case; and the risk counsel assumed by 11 accepting the case. See Crawford,

-52 (citing Gisbrecht,

). If an 12 || attorney “is responsible for delay ... a reduction [of fees] is in order so that the attorney will not 13 || profit from the accumulation of benefits during the pendency of the case in court.” Gisbrecht, 535 14 || US. at 808 (cleaned up); see also Crawford,

. 3 15 The court must offset an award of § 406(b) attorney’s fees by any award of fees granted under 2 16 the EAJA. Gisbrecht,

; Parrish v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,

, i 17 1218 (9th Cir. 2012). Z 18 The 25-percent contingency fee agreement is within § 406(b)(1)(A)’s ceiling, and the amount 19 || is reasonable. 20 CONCLUSION 21 The court finds that a fee award of $36,000.00 is reasonable under § 406(b). The plaintiff’ s 22 || counsel must refund the plaintiff the EAJA fees, which results in a net (remaining) fee award of 23 $32,000.00. The net fee award is to be paid by the plaintiff’s past-due benefits in accordance with 24 || agency policy. 25 IT IS SO ORDERED. 26 Dated: March 1, 2024 LAE 27 LAUREL BEELER 28 United States Magistrate Judge