1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 SAN JOSE DIVISION 6 7 LINDA MIRANDA, Case No. 22-cv-00404-BLF

8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 9 v. ATTORNEYS’ FEES

10 KILOLO KIJAKAZI, [Re: ECF No. 23] 11 Defendant.

12 13 Plaintiff Linda Miranda’s counsel Katherine Siegfried (“Counsel”) moves for attorneys’ 14 fees pursuant to

(b) following Plaintiff’s successful appeal of the denial of Social 15 Security benefits. See ECF No. 23 (“Mot.”). Counsel seeks an award of $18,606.25, which is 25% 16 of the past-due benefits awarded to Plaintiff. Counsel’s motion is GRANTED for the reasons 17 discussed below. 18 I. BACKGROUND 19 Plaintiff filed this action on January 21, 2022, seeking review of the denial of her 20 application for Disability Benefits. See ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”). The Court approved the parties’ 21 stipulation to voluntary remand on August 22, 2022. ECF No. 19. Plaintiff obtained a favorable 22 result on remand, receiving awards of past-due benefits. See Mot.; ECF No. 23-4 (“Notice of 23 Award”), at 2. Pursuant to

(b) and a written contingent-fee agreement between 24 Plaintiff and Counsel, Counsel is entitled to a maximum of 25% of past-due benefits awarded to 25 Plaintiff. See ECF No. 23-2 (“Fee Agreement”). 26 On remand, Plaintiff was awarded past-due Disability Insurance Benefits in the amount of 27 $74,425. Mot. at 1; Notice of Award. As is standard, the Social Security Administration withheld 1 Notice of Award at 2. The Court also previously granted $6,800 in attorneys’ fees to Plaintiff 2 under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”),

(d). Mot. at 1; ECF No. 22. 3 Counsel seeks a “gross fee” of $18,606.25, which would equate to a “net fee” of $11,806.25 after 4 reimbursing Plaintiff $6,800 for EAJA fees. Mot. at 1. 5 II. LEGAL STANDARD 6 Section 406(b) of the Social Security Act governs Counsel's request for fees. Under that 7 provision, “[w]henever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under this subchapter 8 who was represented before the court by an attorney, the court may determine and allow as part of 9 its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the 10 past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment.”

406(b)(1)(A). “A court may award such a fee even if the court's judgment did not immediately 12 result in an award of past-due benefits; where the court has rendered a judgment favorable to a 13 claimant by reversing an earlier determination by an ALJ and remanding for further consideration, 14 the court may calculate the 25% fee based upon any past-due benefits awarded on remand.” 15 Butler v. Colvin, No. 3:14-CV-02050-LB,

, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2017). 16 “[T]he fee is paid by the claimant out of the past-due benefits awarded; the losing party is not 17 responsible for payment.” Crawford v. Astrue,

(9th Cir. 2009). 18 Attorneys specializing in social security work “routinely enter into contingent-fee 19 agreements specifying that the fee will be 25% of any past-due benefits recovered, thus providing 20 the attorney the statutory maximum of fees if the representation is successful.” Crawford, 586 21 F.3d at 1147. The Supreme Court has held that “§ 406(b) does not displace contingent-fee 22 agreements as the primary means by which fees are set for successfully representing Social 23 Security benefits claimants in court.” Gisbrecht v. Barnhart,

(2002). However, 24 the district court must review contingent-fee agreements “as an independent check, to assure that 25 they yield reasonable results in particular cases.”

“[T]he district court must first look to the 26 fee agreement and then adjust downward if the attorney provided substandard representation or 27 delayed the case, or if the requested fee would result in a windfall.” Crawford,

. 1 offset against any fees awarded under § 406(b). Gisbrecht,

(citing

2412). “Under EAJA, a party prevailing against the United States in court, including a successful 3 Social Security benefits claimant, may be awarded fees payable by the United States if the 4 Government's position in the litigation was not ‘substantially justified.’”

(quoting

2412). “Congress harmonized fees payable by the Government under EAJA with fees payable 6 under § 406(b) out of the claimant's past-due Social Security benefits in this manner: Fee awards 7 may be made under both prescriptions, but the claimant's attorney must refund to the claimant the 8 amount of the smaller fee.” Id. (internal quotation marks, citation, and alterations omitted). 9 III. DISCUSSION 10 Pursuant to the standards set forth above, the Court begins its analysis by looking to the 11 contingent-fee agreement between Counsel and Plaintiff. The Court has conducted an 12 “independent check” of the parties’ contingent-fee agreement to assure that the agreed-upon 25% 13 of past-due benefits is reasonable in this case. Gisbrecht,

. Counsel obtained a 14 fully favorable benefits award, resulting in an award of past-due benefits in the amount of $74,425 15 to Plaintiff. Nothing in the record suggests that Counsel's performance was substandard or that 16 Counsel delayed proceedings to increase the amount of fees awarded. 17 The requested fees award of $18,606.25 for 32.6 hours of work results in an effective 18 hourly rate of $571. Courts in the Ninth Circuit have approved contingent-fee agreements 19 resulting in much higher hourly rates in Social Security cases. See Brazile v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 20 No. C18-5914JLR,

, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 18, 2022) (collecting cases); 21 Harrell v. Berryhill, No. 16-CV-02428-TSH,

, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2018) 22 (“The Court finds that a de facto hourly rate of $1,213.83 is reasonable.”). Both the Government 23 and Plaintiff were given notice of Counsel's motion for attorneys’ fees, and while the Government 24 filed a response, they did not object to awarding attorneys’ fees in accordance with Plaintiff’s 25 motion. See ECF No. 25 (“Resp.”). Having considered the record in this case and the applicable 26 law, the Court is satisfied that Counsel's request for attorneys’ fees in the amount of $18,606.25 27 under § 406(b) is reasonable. 1 fees must be offset against any fees awarded under § 406(b). Gisbrecht,

(citing 28 2 || U.S.C. § 2412). Defendant notes that this offset would be proper, stating that if the Court awards 3 § 406(b) attorneys’ fees, it should also order that counsel pay Plaintiff the fees already awarded 4 || under the EAJA. Resp at 2. The Court agrees that Plaintiff should be refunded the $6,800 in 5 EAJA fees previously awarded. 6 || IV. ORDER 7 For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 8 1. Counsel’s motion for attorneys’ fees under § 406(b) is GRANTED in the amount of 9 $18,606.25; and 10 2. Plaintiff SHALL be refunded the $6,800 in EAJA fees previously awarded. 11 12 Dated: March 7, 2024 _ fogifaccian BEVH LABSON FREEMAN 14 United States District Judge

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