1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 CHYANN FINE BRATCHER, Case No. 23-cv-02929-JSC

8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 9 v. DISMISS

10 JUSINO, Re: Dkt. No. 8 Defendant. 11

12 INTRODUCTION 13 Petitioner, a federal prisoner at the Federal Correctional Institute (“FCI”) in Dublin, 14 California, proceeding without representation by an attorney, filed a petition for a writ of habeas 15 corpus under

challenging the conditions of her confinement. Respondent filed a 16 motion to dismiss, and in response Petitioner filed a letter requesting the motion be granted. (ECF 17 Nos. 7, 8.) For the reasons discussed below, motion to dismiss is granted, and the case is 18 dismissed without prejudice. 19 BACKGROUND 20 Petitioner was convicted in the United States District Court for the Northern District of 21 Texas in 1995 and sentenced to a term of life in prison. (ECF No. 1 at 1.) She was housed at FCI 22 Dublin from 1995-1996, at FCI Tallahassee from 1996-98, at FCI Carswell from 1998-2015, and 23 again at FCI Dublin since 2016. (ECF No. 2 at 1-2.) She claims there is “sexual misconduct” by 24 prison officials “throughout the Federal Bureau of Prisons,” (“BOP”) and she alleges officials 25 have sexually assaulted and harassed her and other inmates at FCI Dublin and other federal 26 prisons. (ECF No. 1 at 6; ECF No. 2 at 1-2.) She further alleges prison officials have 27 “retaliate[d]” and “intimidate[d]” her due to her cooperation with law enforcement officials and 1 there is a “toxic environment [of] mold and asbestos” that exacerbate her respiratory and other 2 medical problems. (ECF No. 1 at 6; see also ECF No. 2 at 3.) Petitioner requests release from 3 custody to a “halfway house” or “home confinement.” (ECF No. 1 at 7.) 4 DISCUSSION 5 Respondent argues Petitioner may not bring her claims in a petition for writ of habeas 6 corpus because she is challenging the conditions of her confinement, not her conviction or 7 sentence. (ECF No. 7 at 4-6.) Petitioner asks the Court to grant the motion to dismiss because she 8 “made [a] mistake and used the inappropriate vehicle to support her claims.” (ECF No. 8 at 1.) 9 Federal law “opens two main avenues to relief on complaints related to imprisonment:” a 10 petition for habeas corpus and a civil rights complaint. Muhammad v. Close,

, 750 11 (2004). Habeas petitions are “the exclusive vehicle” for claims challenging “the fact or duration 12 of the conviction or sentence.” Nettles v. Grounds,

(9th Cir. 2016). By 13 contrast, a civil rights action is the “proper remedy” for a claimant asserting “a constitutional 14 challenge to the conditions of his prison life, but not to the fact or length of his custody.” See 15 Preiser v. Rodriguez,

(1973). If success on petitioner’s claim would not 16 “necessarily lead to immediate or speedier release,” the claim may not be brought in a habeas 17 petition. Nettles,

. 18 In Pinson v. Carvajal,

(9th Cir. 2023), the Ninth Circuit addressed the 19 circumstances in which a prisoner can challenge the conditions of confinement in a habeas petition 20 and seek release from custody based upon those conditions.

. The court sated 21 “the relevant question is whether, based on the allegations in the petition, release is legally 22 required irrespective of the relief requested . . . [o]r stated differently, a successful claim sounding 23 in habeas necessarily results in release, but a claim seeking release does not necessarily sound in 24 habeas.”

(emphasis in original). The court affirmed the dismissal for lack of 25 jurisdiction of a habeas petition under

claiming federal prison officials failed to 26 implement adequate safety protocols in response to COVID-19.

. The court held 27 the petition did not allege facts to support the contention that no set of conditions would cure the 1 could remedy the allegedly unsafe conditions, the claims must be brought in a civil rights case.

2 at 1075. 3 Here, as in Pinson, the court lacks jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s claims regarding 4 sexual misconduct by prison officials and the exacerbation of her medical issues by toxic 5 conditions. She does not allege facts, when liberally construed, showing that no relief short of 6 release is adequate to the cure these alleged constitutional violations. Accordingly, under Pinson, 7 a habeas petition is not the appropriate remedy for her claims, and she must instead bring them in 8 civil rights action. Petitioner’s concession on this issue and request to grant the motion to dismiss 9 supports drawing this conclusion.1 10 Petitioner states she is “at a loss of where to turn.” (ECF No. 8.) Plaintiff appears to be a 11 member of the Plaintiffs’ class in the pending class action against FCI Dublin officials for sexual 12 misconduct. See California Coalition for Women Prisoners, et al., v. United States Federal 13 Bureau of Prisons, et al., No. C 23-4155-YGR (PR) (ECF No. 142 at ¶ 246 (identifying class 14 members “all persons incarcerated at FCI Dublin currently and in the future”); see, e.g.,

at ¶¶ 15 253-267 (claiming constitutional violations based upon sexual misconduct)). Plaintiff may contact 16 class counsel about her sexual misconduct claims.2 To the extent she has claims not covered by 17 that class action (such as her claims that her medical condition was worsened by toxic mold and 18 asbestos), she may pursue such claims in a civil rights complaint in a new case. See, e.g., Bivens 19 v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents,

(1971) (finding a private right of 20 action for damages implied from the Constitution for constitutional violations by federal 21 employees or their agents); Carlson v. Green,

(1980) (allowing Bivens claims 22 for prisoner’s inadequate medical care).3 Accordingly, the dismissal of this petition will be 23 without prejudice to Petitioner bringing her claims in a civil rights complaint.4 24 1In light of this conclusion, the Court does not address Respondent’s alternative argument in their 25 motion to dismiss that Petitioner did not exhaust her claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1997e. 2 Class counsel is Rosen Bien Galvan & Grunfeld LLP, 101 Mission Street, Sixth Floor, San 26 Francisco, CA 94105, (415) 433-6830. 3This order only addresses the appropriate remedy for Petitioner’s claims and does not reach a 27 conclusion as to which claims, if any, are capable of judicial review and decision. 1 CONCLUSION 2 For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED, and this case is 3 DISMISSED without prejudice. 4 The clerk shall enter judgment and close the file. 5 This order disposes of docket number 7. 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. 7 Dated: April 16, 2024 8 9 ne JAQGQUELINE S. CORLEY 10 United States District Judge 11 a 12

15 16

= 17

Z 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 |) 2g || forma pauperis (“IFP”), she will still have to pay the $350 filing fee, albeit in monthly installments. See

(b)(1), 1914 (a).