Brown v. Jenkins

United States District Court for the Northern District of California

Brown v. Jenkins

Trial Court Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 ANDRE VINCENT BROWN, 10 Case No. 24-cv-00317-RS (PR) Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER OF DISMISSAL 12 BROOKE JENKINS, et al., 13 Defendants. 14

15 16 INTRODUCTION 17 Plaintiff alleges district attorneys and public defenders violated his constitutional 18 rights in various ways during his state criminal proceedings. His

42 U.S.C. § 1983

19 complaint containing these allegations is now before the Court for review pursuant to 20 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). District attorneys and public defenders are immune from suit under 21 § 1983. Accordingly, the complaint is DISMISSED. 22 DISCUSSION 23 A. Standard of Review 24 A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a 25 prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a 26 governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, a court must identify any 27 cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim 1 from such relief. See id. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. 2 See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t,

901 F.2d 696, 699

(9th Cir. 1988). 3 A “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 4 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) 5 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007)). “A claim has facial 6 plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 7 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Id.

(quoting 8 Twombly,

550 U.S. at 556

). Furthermore, a court “is not required to accept legal 9 conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably 10 be drawn from the facts alleged.” Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network,

18 F.3d 752

, 754-55 11 (9th Cir. 1994). To state a claim under

42 U.S.C. § 1983

, a plaintiff must allege two 12 essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States 13 was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the 14 color of state law. See West v. Atkins,

487 U.S. 42, 48

(1988). 15 B. Legal Claims 16 Plaintiff alleges Brooke Jenkins, a district attorney; Diego Lopez, a district attorney; 17 Manohar Raju, a public defender; and Stephen Olmo, a deputy public defender violated his 18 constitutional rights during his state criminal proceedings. (Compl., Dkt. No. 1 at 2-3.) 19 District attorneys are immune from suit under these circumstances. A state prosecuting 20 attorney enjoys absolute immunity from damages liability under

42 U.S.C. § 1983

for his 21 conduct in “pursuing a criminal prosecution” insofar as he acts within his role as an 22 “advocate for the State” and his actions are “intimately associated with the judicial phase 23 of the criminal process.” Imbler v. Pachtman,

424 U.S. 409, 430-31

(1976). Accordingly, 24 plaintiff’s claims against Jenkins and Lopez are DISMSSED. 25 Public defenders are immune also under these circumstances. An essential element 26 of an action under

42 U.S.C. § 1983

is that the defendant act under color of state law, and a 27 public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s 1 traditional functions. Polk County v. Dodson,

454 U.S. 312, 318-19

(1981). Accordingly, 2 plaintiff’s claims against Raju and Olmo are DISMISSED. 3 CONCLUSION 4 This federal civil rights action is DISMISSED. The Clerk shall enter judgment in 5 favor of defendants, and close the file. 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. 7 Dated: May 22, 2024 8 _________________________ 9 RICHARD SEEBORG Chief United States District Judge 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27

Reference

Status
Unknown