1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 LEILA CRUZ MCCOY, Case No.: 24cv0080-LL-BGS

12 Plaintiff, ORDER: 13 v. (1) GRANTING APPLICATION TO 14 SAN DIEGO COUNTY HHS, et al., PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 15 Defendants. [ECF No. 2]; AND

16 (2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT 17 WITHOUT PREJUDICE

18 Before the Court is Plaintiff Leila Cruz McCoy’s (“Plaintiff”) Application to 19 Proceed in Forma Pauperis (“IFP”). ECF No. 2. Plaintiff, an individual proceeding pro se, 20 filed a Complaint against Defendants San Diego County Health and Human Services, San 21 Diego County Child Welfare Services, Kimberly Giardina, Christopher Hines, Lynette 22 Miller, Tien Nguyen, and Nick Macchione (collectively “Defendants”) in the United States 23 District Court for the Eastern District of California. ECF No. 1. On January 9, 2024, the 24 United States District Court for the Eastern District of California transferred this action to 25 this Court to cure the defect in venue. See ECF Nos. 4, 5. For the following reasons, the 26 Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed IFP and DISMISSES WITHOUT 27 PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s Complaint. 28 1 I. MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 2 All parties instituting any civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the 3 United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee. See 4

(a); S.D. Cal. CivLR 4.5(a). A court may authorize the action to proceed 5 despite a plaintiff’s failure to prepay the entire fee if the plaintiff submits an affidavit, 6 including a statement of all their assets, showing that they are unable to pay filing fees. See 7

(a); Andrews v. Cervantes,

, 1051–52 (9th Cir. 2007). “An 8 affidavit in support of an IFP application is sufficient where it alleges that the affiant cannot 9 pay the court costs and still afford the necessities of life.” Escobedo v. Applebees,

(9th Cir. 2015) (citing Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.,

, 11 339 (1948)). The facts as to an affiant’s poverty must be stated “with some particularity, 12 definiteness, and certainty.” United States v. McQuade,

(9th Cir. 1981). 13 Here, Plaintiff filed an affidavit1 indicating she is “blind, mobility impaired and has 14 [a] terminal chronic illness” and that she is receiving Social Security benefits. See ECF No. 15 2 at 1. She has three children who are dependent on her for support. See id. at 2. She pays 16 $350.00 a month for “[h]ome health aide,” pays $50.00 a month or $500.00 total for her 17 “Elan Credit Card,” and spends money for food and a phone. Id. Additionally, Plaintiff 18 states that she “cannot go to [the] shelter due to needing [a] caretaker” for her disabled 19 children and for herself. Id. Under these circumstances, the Court finds that requiring 20 Plaintiff to pay the filing fee would impair her ability to obtain the necessities of life. See 21 Escobedo,

. Therefore, the Court grants Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed 22 IFP. 23 / / / 24

25 1 In this district, pro se litigants seeking IFP status are required to use the long form 26 application (AO 239). Here, Plaintiff submitted the short form application (AO 240) 27 seeking leave to proceed IFP. However, in the Eastern District of California, or the district that Plaintiff originally filed this action in, pro se litigants seeking IFP status may submit 28 1 II. SCREENING PURSUANT TO

(e)(2) 2 A complaint filed by a plaintiff proceeding IFP is subject to mandatory screening by 3 the court in which the complaint is brought. See

(e)(2)(B); see also 4 Calhoun v. Stahl,

(9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions of

1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”). Under

(e)(2), the court must 6 dismiss a case if the court determines that the action: (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails 7 to state a claim, or (iii) seeks monetary relief against persons immune from suit. See 28

(e)(2). 9 To determine whether the action must be dismissed under the second ground, a 10 failure to state a claim, the court applies “the familiar standard of Federal Rule of Civil 11 Procedure 12(b)(6).” Rosati v. Igbinoso,

(9th Cir. 2015). Under this 12 standard, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 13 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Akhtar v. Mesa,

(9th Cir. 14 2012) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009)). Further, the court has an 15 obligation where the plaintiff “is pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the 16 pleadings liberally and to afford the [plaintiff] the benefit of any doubt.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 17

, 342 n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Bretz v. Kelman,

, 1027 n.1 18 (9th Cir. 1985)). The court, however, “may not supply essential elements of the claim that 19 were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska,

, 268 20 (9th Cir. 1982). Moreover, “[v]ague and conclusory allegations of official participation in 21 civil rights violations are not sufficient.”

22 Additionally, complaints must comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, 23 which requires that “a pleading that states a claim for relief must contain: (1) a short and 24 plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction . . .; (2) a short and plain statement 25 of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief 26 sought[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Rule 8 ensures that each defendant has “fair notice of what 27 the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 28

(2005). 1 Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint does not contain sufficient factual matter to state a claim 2 for relief that is plausible on its face. Plaintiff alleges Defendants caused her damages in 3 violation of the First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and Section 1983, but Plaintiff 4 does not state facts as to how these laws or rights were violated. ECF No. 1 at 4. According 5 to Plaintiff, Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff and excluded Plaintiff from 6 programs, services, and facilities due to her disability, religion, and race. Id. at 5. 7 Additionally, Plaintiff states that she was “falsely accused of child abuse and neglect” due 8 to her religious practices and “falsely accused of being mentally ill” because she requested 9 reasonable accommodations. Id. at 6. Plaintiff, however, provides no further support or 10 facts for these allegations. Plaintiff’s Complaint is comprised of incoherent assertions that 11 fail to allege her entitlement to relief and her allegations are too limited for the Court to 12 infer a cognizable legal basis, even under the liberal pleading standard afforded to a pro se 13 plaintiff. See id. at 5–6; Hebbe v. Pliler,

n.7. Plaintiff’s mostly 14 unintelligible Complaint is not enough, and this Court may not supply essential elements 15 of a claim that Plaintiff has not pled. See Ivey,

. 16 Further, Plaintiff’s Complaint does not comply with Rule 8, since it is ambiguous 17 and does not provide Defendants adequate notice of the legal theory Plaintiff is advancing. 18 Plaintiff seeks relief in the form of “40 million dollars and punitive damages,” “Unruh Act 19 and ADA violations compensation,” “[r]estoration of underpayment in benefits for 20 CalWorks, CalFresh, CalWorks Housing and Homeless Assistance, IHSS Payments, P- 21 EBT benefits,” but Plaintiff has not explained the grounds on which she is entitled to this 22 relief from the Court.

Ultimately, Plaintiff’s allegations in the Complaint are vague, 23 conclusory, or both. Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s Complaint for failing to 24 state a claim upon which relief may be granted and failure to comply with Rule 8. 25 III. CONCLUSION 26 Based on the foregoing, the Court: 27 1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed IFP; and 28 2. DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s Complaint. 1 Plaintiff may file an amended complaint by February 29, 2024. If Plaintiff files an 2 ||amended complaint, she must state causes of action and present facts sufficient to plausibly 3 || allege those causes of action.” See Akhtar,

. The Court advises Plaintiff 4 ||that any amended complaint she files will be subject to another mandatory screening. 5 || Should Plaintiff fail to file an amended complaint within the time provided, the Court may 6 || enter a final order dismissing this civil action with prejudice. 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. 8 ||Dated: January 18, 2024 NO ? nF) 10 Honorable Linda Lopez United States District Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 IIo Plaintiff and her claims are not new to this Court, and this Court again cautions Plaintiff 21 ||‘to file an amended complaint rather than filing a new civil case as she has a history of repeatedly filing new complaints without heeding the courts’ instructions informing her of deficiencies in many of her prior lawsuits.” See Cruz v. San Diego Cnty. CWS,

||5490137, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2023). Plaintiff has brought multiple actions with 74 similar claims in the Southern District of California, and these actions have been repeatedly dismissed for failure to state a cause of action and failure to comply with Rule 8. See, e.g., 25 |\id.; McCoy v. California Civ. Rights Dept.,

, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 6 2023) (dismissing complaint for failure to state a claim); McCoy v. Rady Children’s Hosp.,

, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2023) (same); McCoy v. San Diego Cnty. 27 || Child Welfare Servs.,

, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2023) (same); McCoy ag ||: San Diego Cnty. Dept. Health and Human Servs., No. 20-cv-1980-TWR-BGS (S.D. Cal. 2020) (same).