1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 SANDRA WRIGHT, Case No.: 24-cv-404-CAB-MSB

9 Plaintiff, ORDER: 10 v. 1) DENYING MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 11 SAN DIEGO GAS AND ELECTRIC et [Doc. No. 2]; and al., 12 Defendants. 2) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION 13 PURSUANT TO

1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).

15 [Doc. Nos. 2, 3] 16 17

18 On February 29, 2024, Plaintiff Sandra Wright filed this civil action pro se against 19 San Diego Gas and Electric and the City of San Diego. [Doc. No. 1.] She did not prepay 20 the civil filing fees required by

(a) at the time of filing; instead, she filed 21 a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to

(a). [Doc. 22 No. 2.] She also filed a request for appointment of counsel. [Doc. No. 3.] 23 I. Motion to Proceed IFP 24 Generally, all parties instituting a civil action in this court must pay a filing fee. See 25

(a); CivLR 4.5(a). However, under

(a), the court may 26 authorize the commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit without payment of fees 27 if the plaintiff submits an affidavit, including a statement of all his or her assets, showing 28 1 that he or she is unable to pay filing fees or costs. “An affidavit in support of an IFP 2 application is sufficient where it alleges that the affiant cannot pay the court costs and still 3 afford the necessities of life.” Escobedo v. Applebees,

(9th Cir. 2015). 4 “[A] plaintiff seeking IFP status must allege poverty with some particularity, definiteness 5 and certainty.”

(internal quotation marks omitted). The granting or denial of leave to 6 proceed IFP in civil cases is within the sound discretion of the district court. Venerable v. 7 Meyers,

(9th Cir. 1974) (citations omitted). 8 Here, the Court cannot determine Plaintiff’s assets, debts, and expenses based on the 9 information provided in Plaintiff’s application. The application lists income and assets of 10 a spouse that far exceed Plaintiff’s monthly expenses and would indicate that Plaintiff can 11 pay the court costs and still afford the necessities of life. On the other hand, the application 12 appears to indicate that Plaintiff is recently divorced, meaning that her ex-spouse’s assets 13 and income do not support Plaintiff’s living expenses. In light of the foregoing, Plaintiff’s 14 IFP application lacks the “particularity, definiteness and certainty” required to support a 15 request to proceed IFP. See Escobedo,

. 16 II. Screening Pursuant to

(e)(2)(B) 17 Regardless of the adequacy of Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP, a complaint filed 18 by any person seeking to proceed IFP pursuant to

(a) is subject to sua 19 sponte dismissal if it is “frivolous or malicious; fails to state a claim upon which relief may 20 be granted; or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 21

(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl,

(9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he 22 provisions of

(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”); see also Chavez v.

F.3d 1162, 1167-68 (9th Cir. 2016) (noting that § 1915(e)(2)(B) “mandates 24 dismissal—even if dismissal comes before the defendants are served”). Congress enacted 25 this safeguard because “a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the 26 public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, 27 malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.” Denton v. Hernandez,

(1992) (quoting 28 Neitzke v. Williams,

(1989)). 1 Here, the complaint is largely unintelligible. There do not appear to be any 2 || allegations against the listed defendants. Moreover, Plaintiff appears to be alleging that 3 ||she did not receive a judgment in a state court case from more than fifteen years ago, 4 ||meaning her claims are likely outside of this Court’s jurisdiction and possibly barred by 5 applicable statutes of limitations. In any event, the Court cannot discern any factual 6 || allegations that could support a plausible claim for relief over which this Court would have 7 subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, even if Plaintiff is entitled to proceed IFP, her 8 ||complaint is subject to sua sponte dismissal. 9 II. Conclusion 10 For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED the complaint is DISMISSED 11 |}pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B). Plaintiff's IFP application and request for 12 || appointment of counsel are DENIED AS MOOT. 13 Itis SO ORDERED. 14 ||Dated: March 4, 2024 (GR 15 Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo 16 United States District Judge 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28