White v. Sacramento Police Dept.

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA MEGAN WHITE; JERONIMO No. 2:21-cv-02211-JAM-SCR AGUILAR; LOREN WAYNE KIDD, LYRIC NASH; NICOLLETTE JONES; and ODETTE ZAPATA, 13 ORDER GRANTING IN PART Plaintiffs, DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY 14 JUDGMENT v. SACRAMENTO POLICE DEPARTMENT; THE CITY OF SACRAMENTO; DANIEL HAHN; and DOES 1-200 (the names and numbers of which are currently unknown), Defendants.

20 Before the Court is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff Loren Wayne Kidd’s claim for failure to accommodate. See Mot., ECF No. 78. The Court previously heard and ruled on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to other claims. See Minute Order, ECF No. 92. At the hearing, the Court requested supplemental briefs regarding Kidd’s claim which the parties submitted. See Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Brief, ECF No. 93; Defendants’ Supplemental Brief, ECF No. 94. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion as to Kidd’s claim.

2 Defendants argue that because Kidd’s only requested accommodation during his arrest was for marijuana, he cannot present a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). See Defendants’ Supplemental Brief at 2. Kidd presents four arguments as to why Defendants’ motion should be denied: (1) Kidd was denied access to his medication, marijuana; (2) Kidd’s restraints were not adjusted; (3) police did not expedite its review of body cam footage; and (4) police did not provide Kidd with his requested transportation upon his release from custody.

11 See Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Brief at 1-5. None of these arguments present a genuine dispute of material fact.

13 First, the Ninth Circuit has foreclosed Kidd’s claim for being denied access to marijuana. The James court concluded, “We hold that doctor-recommended marijuana use permitted by state law, but prohibited by federal law, is an illegal use of drugs for purposes of the ADA, and that the plaintiffs’ federally proscribed medical marijuana use therefore brings them within the ADA’s illegal drug exclusion.” James v. City of Costa Mesa, 700 20 F.3d 394, 405 (9th Cir. 2012). Kidd attempts to distinguish James by citing a footnote in the Court’s opinion that stated, “We do not hold, as the dissent states, that ‘medical marijuana users are not protected by the ADA in any circumstance.’ We hold instead that the ADA does not protect medical marijuana users who claim to face discrimination on the basis of their marijuana use.” Id. at 394 n.3. In this footnote, the court goes on to explain that an individual who has a disability is not denied protection under the ADA for that disability simply because they use an illegal drug. See id. Thus, Kidd argues that James is inapposite because he faced discrimination on the basis of his epilepsy, not his marijuana use. The Court disagrees.

4 Kidd does not explain how the police’s refusal to provide him access to marijuana was not based on his marijuana use. To do so, he seemingly would have to show that police provided access to marijuana to other individuals in custody. Put simply, there is no showing that police refused because Kidd is epileptic instead of the more plausible explanation that police refused because marijuana is an illegal substance under federal law. In addition to the James holding, courts across the nation that “have considered ADA claims for failure to accommodate medical marijuana use have relied on the [Controlled Substances Act’s] classification of marijuana as a Schedule I illegal substance to conclude that ‘using marijuana is not a reasonable accommodation.’” Eccleston v. City of Waterbury, No. 3:19-CV- 1614 (SRU), 2021 WL 1090754, at *8 (D. Conn. Mar. 22, 2021) (collecting cases).

19 Second, police did not fail to provide a reasonable accommodation in adjusting Kidd’s restraints. Kidd relies on two cases, both of which dealt with a motion to dismiss. See Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Brief at 3. This dispositional stage demands a higher burden. Kidd fails to explain how his complaints of shoulder pain are related to his epilepsy other than he sustained similar injuries during a prior seizure. Kidd also does not cite any caselaw explaining how adjusting his restraints was a reasonable accommodation for his epilepsy.

28 Third, police did not fail to provide a reasonable accommodation in reviewing the body cam footage. As an initial matter, Kidd fails to show that police did not expedite the review process. Instead, he simply states it took “hours.” See id. at 4. Kidd presents no evidence that allows the court to compare the review process in this case to other review procedures, which means Kidd has not raised a genuine dispute.

7 Also, Kidd presents a wide range of cases regarding matters that are not relevant to this case, such as de-escalation procedures.

9 See id. He does not present caselaw establishing that police have to expedite its review of footage for an epileptic individual.

12 Finally, police did not fail to provide a reasonable accommodation when they released Kidd from custody. The only case Kidd presents is inapposite. In Gorman, the Eighth Circuit heard a case in which the plaintiff claimed that police failed to provide reasonable accommodations after he was arrested and while being transported in custody. See Gorman v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 18 907, 910 (8th Cir. 1998) (Plaintiff “claimed that the manner of his post-arrest handling and transportation evidenced unlawful discrimination by all the defendants, including [officer] who drove the police van that took him to the station”). Here, Kidd claims that police failed to provide him “with appropriate accommodations upon his release from custody.” See Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Brief at 5 (emphasis added). Kidd does not cite any other caselaw suggesting that he can state a claim for an accommodation after his release from custody.

27 /// /// nee enn nen I EE OEE OE 1 As such, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff Kidd’s claim for failure to accommodate.

3 IT IS SO ORDERED.

4 Dated: January 7, 2025 JM fey JOHN A. MENDEZ 7 SENIOR UNITED*STATES DISTRICT JUDGE