1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 RAYMOND ALFORD BRADFORD, Case No. 1:24-cv-00047-KES-EPG (PC) 11 Plaintiff, ORDER ADOPTING FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 12 v. TO REQUIRE THAT PLAINTIFF PAY FILING FEE IN ORDER TO PROCEED WITH 13 J. USHER, et al., THIS ACTION 14 Defendants. Doc. 4 15 16 Plaintiff Raymond Bradford is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil rights action 17 pursuant to

. The matter was referred to a United States magistrate judge 18 pursuant to

(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302. 19 On January 10, 2024, plaintiff filed his initial complaint. Doc. 1. On January 11, 2024, 20 the assigned magistrate issued findings and recommendations recommending that plaintiff be 21 required to pay the filing fee to proceed with this action. Doc. 4. Specifically, the findings and 22 recommendations find that plaintiff has at least three strikes under

(g) and that 23 the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint do not satisfy section 1915(g)’s imminent danger 24 exception.

. Plaintiff timely filed objections on January 22, 2024. Doc. 5. 25 Plaintiff’s objections first request that the Court take judicial notice of several documents: 26 two letters from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) responding to plaintiff’s inquiries in 2021 27 and 2023, and an excerpt from plaintiff’s medical grievance from 2021.

at 2–7. Plaintiff 28 1 argues that the IRS letters show that his economic impact payments were “stolen by the guards” 2 to prevent him from using these funds to pay the filing fees and that the medical grievance shows 3 he suffers from Valley fever and other serious medial ailments.

. 4 The Court may take judicial notice of a fact that “is not subject to reasonable dispute 5 because it (1) is generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be 6 accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 7 questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201. Although a court “may take judicial notice of a record of a state 8 agency not subject to reasonable dispute,” City of Sausalito v. O’Neill,

, 1223 n.2 9 (9th Cir. 2004), and it may “take judicial notice of undisputed matters of public record,” it may 10 not, however, take judicial notice of reasonably disputed facts simply because they are “stated in 11 [a] public record[ ].” Lee v. City of Los Angeles,

, 689–90 (9th Cir. 2001). 12 The unauthenticated IRS letters and an excerpt from plaintiff’s medical record are not 13 “sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably questioned” and do not meet Rule 201 criteria for 14 taking judicial notice. Even if the Court were to consider them as records of a federal or state 15 agency, the facts that plaintiff seeks to establish through judicial notice of these documents are 16 not ones that are “generally known,” and they are not ones that “can be accurately and readily 17 determined” from the documents. Nothing in the IRS letters suggests that plaintiff’s tax rebates 18 were “stolen by the guards . . . to prevent him from using his (IRS) funds to pay the filing fees.” 19 Doc. 5 at 2. Similarly, nothing in the medical grievance from 2021 suggests that plaintiff is 20 currently in imminent danger of serious physical injury. Id. at 3. Accordingly, the Court declines 21 to take judicial notice of the documents proffered by plaintiff. 22 Plaintiff’s objections also assert that he meets the imminent danger exception because he 23 suffers from disseminated coccidioidomycosis (Valley fever) and suffers daily due to denial of 24 treatment, chest pain, weight loss, and pneumonia in his lungs. Id. at 1. As the findings and 25 recommendations correctly note, the relevant inquiry is whether plaintiff faced imminent danger 26 at the time that he filed his complaint. See Doc. 4 at 5 (citing Andrews v. Cervantes,

1047, 1053 (9th Cir. 2007)). “The [imminent danger] exception's use of the present tense, 28 combined with its concern only with the initial act of ‘bring[ing]’ the lawsuit, indicates to us that 1 | the exception applies if the danger existed at the time the prisoner filed the complaint.” Andrews, 2 | 493 F.3d at 1053. In the instant case, the unlawful conduct alleged concerns denial of treatment 3 | from September 2015 to August 2017, while plaintiff was incarcerated at Kern Valley State 4 | Prison. Doc. 1 at 1-3. At the time the initial complaint was filed, however, plaintiff was housed 5 | ata different location, at California State Prison, Sacramento. /d. at 1. Nothing in plaintiff's 6 | complaint alleged misconduct at his current location of incarceration. See Doc. 1. Accordingly, 7 | plaintiff does not satisfy the nexus requirement between the alleged imminent danger and the 8 || stated claims, and therefore does not qualify for the § 1915(g) imminent danger exception. 9 Pursuant to

(b)(1), this Court conducted a de novo review of this case. 10 | Having carefully reviewed the matter, the Court concludes the findings and recommendations are 11 | supported by the record and proper analysis. Thus, plaintiff is required to pay the filing fee in full 12 | before proceeding any further with this action. 13 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 14 1. The findings and recommendations issued on January 11, 2024, Doc. 4, are 15 ADOPTED in full; 16 2. Plaintiff SHALL pay the $405.00 filing fee within thirty (30) days if he wishes to 17 proceed with his action; and, 18 3. Failure to pay the required filing fee will result in the dismissal of this action without 19 further notice. 20 21 92 | IT IS SO ORDERED. _ 23 Dated: _ January 14, 2025 4h UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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