1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 BETHANY K.,1 Case No.: 24cv710-LR

12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING JOINT 13 v. MOTION FOR THE AWARD AND PAYMENT OF ATTORNEY FEES 14 MICHELLE KING, Acting Commissioner PURSUANT TO THE EQUAL of Social Security,2 15 ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT,

, 2412(d) 16 Defendant. 17 [ECF No. 18]

18 On April 19, 2024, Plaintiff Brian O. filed a complaint against the Commissioner 19 of the Social Security Administration (“Defendant”), seeking judicial review of 20 Defendant’s decision to deny Plaintiff disability insurance benefits. (See Compl., ECF 21 No. 1.) On November 5, 2024, the Court issued an order granting the parties’ joint 22 23

24 25 1 In the interest of privacy, this Order uses only the first name and initial of the last name of the non- government party or parties in this case. See S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 7.1(e)(6)(b). 26 2 Plaintiff named Martin O’Malley, who was the Commissioner of Social Security when Plaintiff filed 27 her complaint on April 19, 2024, as a Defendant in this action. (See ECF No. 1 at 1.) Michelle King is now the Acting Commissioner of Social Security, and she is automatically substituted as a party 28 1 motion for voluntary remand and remanding for further administrative proceedings. (See 2 ECF No. 16.) 3 Now pending before the Court is a joint motion to award Plaintiff attorney fees in 4 the amount of $9,750 under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”),

, 5 (“Joint Motion”) and costs in the amount of $405.00 under 28 U.S.C § 1920 and 6 supplemental briefing regarding the Joint Motion. (See ECF Nos. 18 (“Joint Mot.”), 20 7 (“Suppl. Br.”).) The Joint Motion is a stipulation between the parties with respect to 8 Plaintiff’s attorney fees, and is unopposed. (See Suppl. Br. at 1.) For the reasons stated 9 below, the Court GRANTS the Joint Motion and awards Plaintiff attorney fees of 10 $9,750.00 and costs in the amount of $405.00. 11 I. DISCUSSION 12 A. Applicable Law 13 A litigant is entitled to attorney fees and costs under the EAJA if: “(1) he is the 14 prevailing party; (2) the government fails to show that its position was substantially 15 justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust; and (3) the requested fees 16 and costs are reasonable.” Carbonell v. I.N.S.,

(9th Cir. 2005); see 17 also

(a), (d). The Court addresses these elements in turn below. 18 B. Prevailing Party 19 A plaintiff is a prevailing party if he or she “has ‘succeeded on any significant 20 issue in litigation which achieve[d] some of the benefit . . . sought in bringing suit.’” 21 Ulugalu v. Berryhill, Case No. 3:17-cv-01087-GPC-JLB,

, at *2 (S.D. 22 Cal. Apr. 30, 2018) (quoting Shalala v. Schaefer,

(1993)). Under 23 Ninth Circuit precedent, “[a] plaintiff who obtains a sentence four remand is considered a 24 prevailing party for attorney’s fees.” Akopyan v. Barnhart,

(9th Cir. 25 2002). Plaintiff has obtain a sentence four remand and therefore is considered a 26 prevailing party for purposes of the instant motion. (ECF No. 16 at 1.) 27 C. Substantial Justification and Special Circumstances 28 The government bears the burden of proving that its position, both in the 1 underlying administrative proceedings and in the subsequent litigation, was substantially 2 justified under

(d)(1)(A). See Meier v. Colvin,

(9th 3 Cir. 2013). The Supreme Court has held that a position may be substantially justified “if 4 it has a reasonable basis in law and fact.” Pierce v. Underwood,

, 566 n.2 5 (1988). When determining whether the government’s position was substantially justified, 6 the court considered “both the government’s litigation position and the underlying agency 7 action giving rise to the civil action.” Meier v. Colvin,

(9th Cir. 2013). 8 The government’s position must be “as a whole, substantially justified.” Gutierrez v. 9 Barnhart,

(9th Cir. 2001) (emphasis omitted). “[D]istrict courts 10 should focus on whether the government’s position on the particular issue on which the 11 claimant earned remand was substantially justified, not on whether the government’s 12 ultimate disability determination was substantially justified.” Hardisty v. Astrue, 592

(9th Cir. 2010) (citing Flores v. Shalala,

(9th Cir. 14 1990)). 15 Defendant has not carried the burden of demonstrating that the Government’s 16 position was substantially justified or that an award of attorney fees under the 17 circumstances would be unjust. See

Defendant effectively concedes that the 18 Government’s litigation position had no reasonable basis in law or fact, and that there are 19 no special circumstances that would make the award of attorney fees here unjust. 20 Accordingly, the Court finds no basis to deny the EAJA fee request pursuant to § 21 2412(d)(1)(A). 22 D. Whether the Amount Sought is Reasonable 23 The EAJA provides that courts may award reasonable attorney fees “based upon 24 prevailing market rates for the kind and quality of the services furnished.”

2412(d)(2)(A). Additionally, courts generally defer to the winning lawyer’s professional 26 judgment as to how much time was required to complete the litigation. See, e.g., Costa v. 27 Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,

(9th Cir. 2012) (“‘lawyers are not 28 likely to spend unnecessary time on contingency fee cases in the hope of inflating their 1 fees’ because ‘the payoff is too uncertain.’ []As a result, courts should generally defer to 2 the ‘winning lawyer’s professional judgment as to how much time he was required to 3 spend on the case.’”) (quoting Moreno v. City of Sacramento,

, 1112-13 4 (9th Cir. 2008)); see also

(“[m]any district courts have noted that twenty to 5 forty hours is the range most often requested and granted in social security cases”); Krebs 6 v. Berryhill, No. 16-cv-3096-JLS-BGS,

, at *2 (S.D. Cal. June 21, 7 2018) (finding that 21.7 hours billed by plaintiff’s counsel and 3.5 hours billed by a 8 paralegal a reasonable number of hours). 9 Here, the parties have reached an agreement as to the amount of fees, and 10 presumably stipulate to their reasonableness. (See Joint Motion at 1-2.) The Court 11 concurs with this stipulation.3 The joint motion stipulates to making the fees payable to 12 Plaintiff to be assigned to his attorney and addresses offsets allowed under the US 13 Department of the Treasury’s Offset Program (see Joint Mot. at 2), as well as that “Fees 14 and expenses shall be made payable to Plaintiff, but if the Department of the Treasury 15 determines that Plaintiff does not owe a federal debt, then the government shall cause the 16 payment of fees and expenses to be made directly to Counsel pursuant to the assignment 17 executed by Plaintiff.” (Id.) Given that the parties have compromised to these additional 18 terms, the Court concludes that they are also reasonable. 19 / / / 20 / / / 21 / / / 22 / / / 23 / / / 24 / / / 25 26 27 3 The itemized list of fees from Plaintiff’s counsel, which notes 41 hours of billed attorney time, totaling $10,029.34, is reasonable when compared with the hourly rates listed by Plaintiff’s attorney. (See ECF 28 1 2 3 I. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 4 The Court concludes that Plaintiff is entitled to fees in this case and the parties’ 5 requested fees and terms are reasonable. The Court accordingly GRANTS the joint 6 ||motion (ECF No. 18), and awards Plaintiff attorney fees in the amount of nine thousand, 7 ||seven hundred and fifty dollars ($9,750.00), as authorized by

(d), and 8 || costs in the amount of four hundred and five dollars ($405.00), as authorized by 28 9 || U.S.C. § 1920 subject to the terms of the Joint Motion. 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. 11 ||Dated: January 31, 2025 12 13 / L 14 Honorable Lupe Rodriguez, Jr. 15 United States Magistrate Judge 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28