1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RAGHAV RAGHAV, No. 2:25-cv-00408-DJC-JDP 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 14 TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER UR M. JADDOU, 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 Plaintiff Raghav Raghav seeks a temporary restraining order staying his 19 deportation until his U Visa application is adjudicated or a bona fide determination is 20 made regarding his application. Plaintiff claims that he applied for a U nonimmigrant 21 visa on July 13, 2023, but he has not received any further decision or adjudication 22 from U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”). On January 26, 2025, 23 Plaintiff states that he was arrested by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 24 (“ICE”) and that he now faces imminent deportation. 25 While it is true that Plaintiff likely faces irreparable harm in the form of removal 26 from the United States and while the Court is sympathetic to the tremendous impacts 27 that deportation has on an individual and those around them, the Court denies 28 Plaintiff’s request for temporary restraining order. Plaintiff has not shown that he has a 1 likelihood of success on the merits. For this reason and the reasons stated below, 2 Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 4) is denied. 3 I. Legal Standard 4 The purpose of a temporary restraining order is to preserve the status quo and 5 prevent irreparable harm “just so long as is necessary to hold a hearing, and no 6 longer.” Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. Of Teamsters,

(1974). 7 The standards for issuing a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction 8 are “substantially similar.” See Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Bush & Co.,

832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). To obtain preliminary injunctive relief, Plaintiff must show 10 (1) likelihood of success on the merits; (2) likelihood of irreparable harm in the 11 absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in his favor; and (4) 12 that an injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555

, 20 (2008). Alternatively, courts within the Ninth Circuit may consider a request 14 for a temporary restraining order using a “sliding scale” test in which “a stronger 15 showing of one element may offset a weaker showing of another.” All. for the Wild 16 Rockies v. Cottrell,

(9th Cir. 2011). 17 II. Discussion 18 Plaintiff fails to satisfy the first Winter factor necessary to obtain preliminary 19 injunctive relief: likelihood of success on the merits. In his Complaint, Plaintiff seeks 20 relief under the Mandamus Act and the APA. (Compl. (ECF No. 1) ¶¶ 61–91.) He asks 21 that the Court compel USCIS to either adjudicate Plaintiff’s I-918 application for U 22 Nonimmigrant Status or determine whether Plaintiff’s application is a bona fide 23 application (referred to as a “Bona Fide Determination” or “BFD”). (Compl. at 19.) 24 Plaintiff claims that USCIS has failed to take either action and that the delay in 25 adjudicating his application or making a BFD is unreasonable. 26 Taking all of Plaintiff’s allegations as true, Plaintiff’s application has been 27 pending less than eighteen months. Courts in this circuit have regularly held that, as a 28 matter of law, a two-year delay in not an unreasonable delay. See Liu v. Denayer, 2022

, at *4 (C.D. Cal. July 18, 2022) (collecting cases). Many courts have 2 found even longer delays to not be unreasonable.

Given the delay alleged by 3 Plaintiff is presently less than 18 months, Plaintiff cannot succeed on the merits of his 4 claims and cannot meet each of the Winter factors.1 5 Even if Plaintiff could show he were likely to succeed in obtaining adjudication 6 of his application or a determination of whether his application is bona fide, the relief 7 Plaintiff seeks in his motion — a stay of the removal proceedings — lack a sufficient 8 nexus to the claims Plaintiff raises in the Complaint. The scope of the claim properly 9 before this Court concern the reasonableness of the delay. This is limited inquiry that 10 does not involve any determination of whether Plaintiff’s application should be 11 granted or denied or if it is a bona fide application. Whether an individual has filed an 12 application for a U-Visa does not preclude their removal from the United States by ICE 13 pursuant to a final order.

(c)(1)(ii). Plaintiff’s request that the Court 14 stay removal proceedings until his application is adjudicated or until a Bona Fide 15 Determination is made is beyond the scope of what is requested in the Complaint. 16 Were Plaintiff were granted the full relief sought in the Complaint, such relief 17 would not invalidate or prevent the present the finalization of the removal 18 proceedings against Plaintiff. Further, regardless of whether Plaintiff ultimately 19 obtains an order directing the adjudication of his application, USCIS may still deny 20 Plaintiff’s request for a U-Visa. Plaintiff admits that he is not presently admissible to the 21 United States and must qualify for a waiver of inadmissibility to obtain U nonimmigrant 22 status. (Mot. at 7; see ECF No. 1-2, Tab E at 4.) The Attorney General expressly has 23 sole discretion to grant a U-visa applicant a waiver of inadmissibility. 8 U.S.C. 24 § 1182(d)(1) (“The Attorney General, in the Attorney General's discretion, may waive 25 the application of subsection (a) . . . .”)

26 1 Given that Courts have consistently ruled that a delay of under two years is not unreasonable as a 27 matter of law, Plaintiff cannot meet the first Winter factor even when the sliding scale approach is used to reduce the showing to one of requiring there be “serious questions.” See All. for Wild Rockies v. 28 Cottrell,

(9th Cir. 2011). 1 Similarly, Plaintiff obtaining a BFD in his favor would not prevent his removal. 2 While a BFD may satisfy the initial prima facie requirement for an administrative stay of 3 removal under

(d)(1), the prima facie showing is only the first step in 4 obtaining a stay of proceedings.2 The decision to grant or deny a stay after the prima 5 facie determination is made is solely in the discretion of the Secretary of Homeland 6 security.

(d)(1); see Jimenez v. Dept. of Homeland Sec., No. 2:22-cv- 7 00967-SSS-JPRx,

, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2022) (“[T]he Secretary 8 has the discretion to grant or deny a request for an administrative stay.”). 9 In short, Plaintiff would still be subject to removal regardless of the ultimate 10 result of the underlying action unless the Attorney General exercised his discretion to 11 waive of Plaintiff’s inadmissibility or if the Secretary of Homeland Security exercised his 12 discretion to grant an administrative stay under section 1227(d)(1). Thus, the stay 13 requested is not of the same character as what could be granted in the underlying 14 action. Pac. Radiation Oncology, LLC v. Queen's Med. Ctr.,

(9th Cir. 15 2015). The requested stay pushes the relief sought by Plaintiff from a request 16 regarding the reasonableness of a delay towards a determination of the merit of 17 Plaintiff’s application or whether an administrative stay is warranted. This relief lacks a 18 sufficient nexus or relationship to the relief sought in the underlying Complaint. It may 19 even extend outside the jurisdiction of this Court, though the Court need not reach 20 this issue here. See

; see also Balogun v. Sessions,

1211, 1215 (C.D. Cal. 2018) (“Section 1252(g) of the INA removes the Court's 22 jurisdiction to review [ICE's refusal to grant a discretionary stay of removal].”) 23 Accordingly, because Plaintiff cannot show a likelihood of success on the merits 24 and because the relief sought in Plaintiff’s Motion is not of the same character as what 25 could be granted via the underlying Complaint, Plaintiff’s Motion is denied.

26 2 As a BFD is made by USCIS and the prima facie determination is made by ICE, the two are not 27 synonymous, though, as USCIS’s policy manual recognizes, the BFD process satisfies the prima facie requirement. See https://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual/volume-3-part-c-chapter-5 28 [https://perma.cc/R4EH-LCFK]. 1 Ill. Conclusion 2 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary 3 | Restraining Order (ECF No. 4) is DENIED. 4 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 | Dated: _ February 3, 2025 “Darel A CDbnetto Hon. Daniel alabretta / UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28