1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 11 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 12 13 PAMELA BENNETT; JAMES Case No. 23-cv-01140-BAS-BLM BENNETT, 14 ORDER: Plaintiffs, 15 (1) DENYING EX PARTE v. 16 APPLICATION FOR UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., RECONSIDERATION 17 (ECF No. 117); AND Defendants. 18 (2) DENYING MOTION FOR 19 RECUSAL (ECF No. 124) 20

21 22 Presently before the Court are Plaintiffs Pamela and James Bennett’s Ex Parte 23 Application for Reconsideration (ECF No. 117) and Motion for Recusal (ECF No. 124). 24 Defendants oppose the Ex Parte Application. (ECF Nos. 118–20.) No additional briefing 25 on the Motion for Recusal is necessary. Further, the Court finds these matters suitable for 26 determination on the papers submitted and without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 27 78(b); Civ. L. R. 7.1(d)(1). For the following reasons, the Court denies Plaintiffs’ Ex Parte 28 Application for Reconsideration and denies their Motion for Recusal. 1 I. Background 2 Plaintiffs Pamela and James Bennett are self-represented. This action is the latest in 3 a series of proceedings arising from a foreclosure of Plaintiffs’ San Diego residence. Since 4 the foreclosure, Plaintiffs have been embroiled in a variety of state and federal court 5 proceedings, including an unlawful detainer action and lawsuits claiming financial 6 institutions engaged in unlawful conduct concerning the foreclosure. 7 This action follows that trend. The gravamen of Plaintiffs’ Complaint is their 8 allegation that “a consortium” of attorneys and “unlawful judicial participants” worked 9 together to violate the law in Plaintiffs’ prior proceedings. Plaintiffs sought to bring claims 10 against the United States, various state court judges, a state court clerk, a homeowner’s 11 association, and attorneys who were involved in the proceedings. 12 Previously, this Court granted five motions to dismiss, dismissed the remaining 13 defendant, and denied Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file an amended complaint 14 (“Dismissal Order”). (ECF No. 114.) Ultimately, the Court directed the Clerk of Court 15 to enter a judgment of dismissal in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiffs, resolving 16 this case. (Id.) 17 Before the Court entered its Dismissal Order, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal to 18 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. (ECF No. 113.) Plaintiffs were seeking 19 review of a decision by the Hon. William Q. Hayes to construe their proposed Third 20 Amended Complaint as a Motion for Leave to File Third Amended Complaint.1 (Id.) The 21 Court addressed the Notice of Appeal in its Dismissal Order, concluding Plaintiffs’ attempt 22 to appeal a non-final order did not deprive the Court of the power to resolve the pending 23 motions to dismiss. (ECF No. 114.) 24 Following the Dismissal Order, Plaintiffs filed their Ex Parte Application for the 25 Court to reconsider its Order. (ECF No. 117.) Plaintiffs also amended their Notice of 26 27 1 Judge Hayes recused after Plaintiffs named him as a defendant in their amended pleading, and 28 1 Appeal to seek review of the Court’s Dismissal Order and the Clerk’s Judgment. (ECF 2 No. 121.) 3 While this Ex Parte Application was pending, the Federal Circuit issued an order 4 noting Plaintiffs’ request for reconsideration meant their Notice of Appeal was not yet 5 effective. (ECF No. 123.) Hence, the Federal Circuit deactivated the appeal until this 6 Court could resolve the application for reconsideration. (Id.) Finally, most recently, 7 Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Recusal, asking the undersigned to recuse from this matter. 8 (ECF No. 124.) 9 II. Recusal 10 The Court first addresses the 169-page Motion for Recusal to explain why it is 11 appropriate for the undersigned to resolve the Ex Parte Application for Reconsideration. 12 The standard for recusal is “whether a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts 13 would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” United 14 States v. Hernandez,

(9th Cir. 1997) (per curiam). Ordinarily, the 15 alleged bias must stem from an “extrajudicial source.” Liteky v. United States,

, 553–55 (1994). 17 A court’s “rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality 18 motion.” Id. at 555. Moreover, “opinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts 19 introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior 20 proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a 21 deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” Id. 22 Plaintiffs contend the undersigned should recuse because of the Court’s Dismissal 23 Order. (ECF No. 124.) Plaintiffs argue the Court incorrectly applied Federal Rule of Civil 24 Procedure 15, made various other errors, and misconstrued the record. (Id.) Further, 25 Plaintiffs contend the undersigned is biased due to prior employment—from over a decade 26 ago—with the Superior Court of California and the Department of Justice. (Id.) As 27 explained by the Supreme Court, however, Plaintiffs’ disagreement with the Dismissal 28 Order does not show bias or a lack of impartiality on the part of the undersigned. See 1 Liteky,

. Nor do any of the other allegations show “the judge’s impartiality 2 might reasonably be questioned.” See Hernandez,

. Plaintiffs sought 3 recusal only after receiving the unfavorable rulings in the Dismissal Order. However, a 4 motion for recusal is not the appropriate vehicle to relitigate the Dismissal Order. Plaintiffs 5 can raise their disagreements with the Court’s rulings on appeal. Consequently, the Court 6 DENIES the Motion for Recusal. (ECF No. 124.) 7 III. Reconsideration 8 Reconsideration is an “extraordinary remedy.” Kona Enters., Inc. v. Est. of Bishop, 9

, 890 (9th Cir. 2000). It should be used sparingly in the interests of finality 10 and conserving judicial resources. Id. 11 Reconsideration is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) if: 12 (1) the court “is presented with newly discovered evidence,” (2) the court “committed clear 13 error or the initial decision was manifestly unjust,” or (3) “there is an intervening change 14 in controlling law.” Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty. v. ACandS, Inc.,

, 1263 15 (9th Cir. 1993); see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Herron,

(9th Cir. 2011). 16 “A Rule 59(e) motion may not be used to raise arguments or present evidence for the first 17 time when they could reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation.” Kona,

. 19 Plaintiffs’ 230-page Ex Parte Application for Reconsideration is not persuasive. 20 Plaintiffs’ application does not present “newly discovered evidence.” See ACandS,

at 1263. Nor does it apprise the Court of “an intervening change in controlling law.” See 22

23 Instead, Plaintiffs’ Application argues with the determinations made in the Dismissal 24 Order, including this Court’s analysis of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 and the 25 underlying claims. The Application also addresses issues that are not germane to this 26 dispute, including Dred Scott v. Sandford,

(1857), and an alleged spoofing 27 email from the Clerk’s Office. None of these arguments show the Court “committed clear 28 error” or that the Dismissal Order “was manifestly unjust.” See ACandS, 5 F.3d at 1263. I Accordingly, Plaintiffs do not demonstrate the extraordinary remedy of 2 ||reconsideration is appropriate. The Court therefore denies their Ex Parte Application to 3 Reconsider the Dismissal Order. (ECF No. 117.) Conclusion 5 For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ Ex Parte Application for 6 || Reconsideration. (ECF No. 117.) The Court also DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion for Recusal. 7 ||(ECF No. 124.) 8 Further, judgment has been entered, the Court has resolved a Rule 59(e) request, and 9 case is closed. Therefore, the Clerk of Court shall accept no further filings in this 10 || matter, except a Notice of Appeal. 11 IT IS SO ORDERED. 12 13 || DATED: February 13, 2025 yatta Bahar 14 H n. Cynthia Bashant, Chief Judge United States District Court 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 _&_