1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SHELLY LEANN HALL, No. 2:20-cv-02036-EFB 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 15 Defendants. 16 17 Pursuant to

(b), counsel for plaintiff in the above-entitled action seeks an 18 award of attorney fees in the amount of $29,976.18. ECF No. 30. Neither defendant nor plaintiff 19 have filed any response. For the reasons set forth below, the court grants the motion. 20 The uncontested record before the court demonstrates that plaintiff entered into a retainer 21 agreement with her attorney that provided that she would pay counsel 25 percent of any past-due 22 benefits won as a result of the appeal in this case. ECF No. 30-2 at 1. In October 2020, plaintiff, 23 through counsel, filed a complaint in this court seeking review of defendant’s adverse decision 24 against her. ECF No. 1. Ultimately, this court granted summary judgment in plaintiff’s favor, 25 ECF No. 25, and, on remand, plaintiff was awarded $119,904.70 in past-due benefits. ECF No. 26 30-4 at 3. Plaintiff’s counsel spent 59.30 hours of attorney time and 16.80 hours of paralegal / 27 law clerk time litigating the case. ECF No. 30-1 ¶¶ 6-9; ECF No. 30-5 at 5. 28

(b)(1)(A) provides, in relevant part: 1 Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under this subchapter who was represented before the court by an attorney, 2 the court may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent of 3 the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment. 4 5 Rather than being paid by the government, fees under the Social Security Act are awarded out of 6 the claimant’s disability benefits. Russell v. Sullivan,

(9th Cir. 1991), 7 receded from on other grounds, Sorenson v. Mink,

, 1149 (9th Cir. 1991). The 25 8 percent statutory maximum fee is not an automatic entitlement, however; the court also must 9 ensure that the requested fee is reasonable. Gisbrecht v. Barnhart,

(2002) 10 (“We hold that § 406(b) does not displace contingent-fee agreements within the statutory ceiling; 11 instead, § 406(b) instructs courts to review for reasonableness fees yielded by those 12 agreements.”). “Within the 25 percent boundary . . . the attorney for the successful claimant must 13 show that the fee sought is reasonable for the services rendered.” Id. at 807. A “court may 14 properly reduce the fee for substandard performance, delay, or benefits that are not in proportion 15 to the time spent on the case.” Crawford v. Astrue,

(9th Cir. 2009) (en 16 banc). 17 The amount sought by plaintiff’s counsel is reasonable and should be awarded. The 18 amount requested reflects 25 percent of the amount of past-due benefits that plaintiff was 19 awarded. See ECF No. 30-4 at 3-4. Plaintiff’s counsel is an experienced attorney who secured a 20 successful result for Plaintiff in this action. See ECF No. 30-1 ¶ 11; see also id. ¶¶ 6-9; ECF No. 21 30-3; ECF No. 30-4 at 4. There is no indication that a reduction of fees is warranted due to any 22 substandard performance by counsel. There also is no evidence that Plaintiff’s counsel engaged 23 in any dilatory conduct resulting in excessive delay. 24 The total amount sought does not appear to be disproportionate to the amount of time 25 plaintiff’s counsel spent on the case. Counsel’s billing statements indicate that he expended 26 59.30 hours of attorney time and was assisted by 16.8 hours of law clerk / paralegal time. ECF 27 No. 30-5 at 5. If only attorney time is considered, then counsel for plaintiff requests the 28 equivalent of approximately $505.50 per hour for his work on this case. If attorney and paralegal 1 time is considered equivalently, then the amount sought would reflect plaintiff’s attorney and 2 paralegal / law clerk being awarded approximately $393.90 per hour; if, instead, the paralegal / 3 law clerk is reimbursed at what counsel represent to be the market rate—$180 per hour—then the 4 attorney’s reimbursement would increase to approximately $454.51 per hour. See ECF No. 30 at 5 11; ECF No. 30-1 ¶ 10; ECF No. 30-5 at 5. Under any of these approaches, the hourly rate 6 awarded to counsel does not reflect a windfall and is consistent with awards found reasonable in 7 similar cases. See Crawford,

(approving awards of attorneys fees that 8 included paralegal time);

(J. Clifton, concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting 9 that the majority opinion found reasonable effective hourly rates equaling $519, $875, and $902 10 per hour); see, e.g., Lowery v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:22-CV-01979-EFB (SS),

417985, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2025) (awarding attorneys fees at effective hourly rate of $863); 12 Knight v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:21-CV-00208-CBD,

, at *2-3 (E.D. Cal. 13 Apr. 14, 2023) (finding attorney’s hourly rate equivalent of $663.59 to be reasonable); Snell v. 14 Kijakazi, No. 2:18-CV-02719-EFB,

, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2022) (awarding 15 fees at effective hourly rate of $900); Mayfield v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:16-cv-01084-SAB, 16 ECF No. 24, at 5 (E.D. Cal. March 19, 2020) (approving hours rate of $1,025.22 for paralegal and 17 attorney time); Biggerstaff v. Saul, 840 Fed. App’x 69, 71 (9th Cir. 2020) (affirming $1,400.00 18 per hour for combined attorney and paralegal work). 19 Finally, Plaintiff’s counsel assumed the risk of receiving no compensation. See ECF No. 20 30-1 ¶ 4; ECF No. 30-6. In the Ninth Circuit, it is common that a contingency fee may far exceed 21 the market value of the services rendered, due to the financial risks to counsel intrinsic in the 22 arrangement. In re Washington Public Power Supply Sys. Lit.,

(9th Cir. 23 1994). 24 Accordingly, undersigned finds the fee amount requested reasonable in light of the 25 counsel’s experience in the field of Social Security law, the time counsel spent litigating the case, 26 the risk incurred, the result achieved, and the absence of any indication of dilatory conduct or a 27 windfall to counsel. See Gisbrecht,

; Crawford,

. 28 ] Counsel acknowledges that the award must be offset by the fees previously awarded under 2 || the Equal Access to Justice Act (““EAJA”). ECF No. 30; see Gisbrecht,

. On 3 | August 14, 2022, this court awarded counsel $10,000 under the EAJA pursuant to the parties’ 4 | stipulation. ECF No. 29. Accordingly, once counsel receives the fee award under § 406(b), 5 || counsel must refund to plaintiff the amount of the prior award under the EAJA, see Gisbrecht, 6 | 535 US. at 796, resulting in a net award of $19,976.18. 7 Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that: 8 1. Plaintiffs counsel’s motion for attorney’s fees (ECF No. 30) is granted. 9 2. Plaintiffs counsel is awarded a total of the $29,976.18 in fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 10 | § 406(b). 11 3. Upon receipt of the fee award, counsel shall refund to plaintiff the sum of $10,000.00, 12 || previously awarded under the EAJA. 13 14 | Dated: February 20, 2025 Zot! 7 LHECA?b 15 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28