1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 A.S., Case No. 24-cv-04579-TLT

8 Plaintiff, REVISED ORDER REMANDING CASE 9 v. Re: Dkt. No. 15 10 MICHELLE KING, 11 Defendant.

12 The Code of Federal Regulations requires the Defendant Michelle King, Acting 13 Commissioner of Social Security, to how consider and then articulate persuasive Defendant finds 14 all medical opinions received.

.1520c(a), (b). Defendant failed to do so here. 15 Before the Court is Plaintiff A.S.’s opening brief seeking remand of Defendant’s denial of 16 Plaintiff’s application for child insurance benefits. See Plaintiff’s Opening Brief, ECF 15. 17 Defendant timely filed a response brief, ECF 18, and Plaintiff filed a timely reply brief, ECF 19. 18 Having considered the parties’ briefs, administrative record (“AR”), relevant legal 19 authority, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s request to remand, 20 REVERSES the Commissioner’s final decision, and REMANDS for further proceedings 21 consistent with this Order. 22 This matter is REMANDED for further proceedings with the following instructions: the 23 ALJ shall (1) specifically address Dr. Carraway’s medical opinion at step two of the five step 24 sequential evaluation process and (2) consider the other issues raised in Plaintiff’s briefing 25 regarding the sufficiency of the record and modify any ensuing ALJ decision as appropriate. 26 I. BACKGROUND 27 Plaintiff was born on July 31, 1985, and claims that she had a disability between July 31, 1 16. 2 Prior to the disability period, while in high school, Plaintiff was diagnosed with bipolar 3 disorder and suffered from aches, pains, coordination problems, and giant cell tumors. AR 744. 4 Because of these conditions, Plaintiff was given access to the school elevator, excused from gym 5 classes, had an emergency evacuation plan, given extra time between classes, given access to a 6 computer to complete written assignments, extended time on tests and quizzes, and content and 7 format of tests and quizzes were modified. AR 239, 244, 261. 8 During the disability period, hospital records indicate that Plaintiff suffered from a sore 9 throat secondary to sinusitis, tonsilitis, a stuffy nose, and hair loss. AR 472–88. In a November 10 30, 2005 report, Dr. Karen G. Harrington noted that Plaintiff was diagnosed with bipolar disorder, 11 cystic acne, tonsillar hypertrophy, nasal obstruction, hair loss secondary to alopecia. AR 732. 12 In a May 4, 2009 report by Dr. Kristen Carraway—a licensed psychologist who treated 13 Plaintiff from April 1, 2008 to August 5, 2008—Plaintiff apparently demonstrated symptoms of 14 obsessive-compulsive disorder, which “seem[ed] to interfere with [Plaintiff’s] daily living skills 15 and ability to complete tasks.” AR 332. Dr. Carraway also noted anxiety as “something that 16 [Plaintiff] has experienced chronically throughout her lifetime, though specific incidents seem to 17 have manifested in specific compulsions and fears.” AR 332. Moreover, Dr. Carraway stated: 18 Plaintiff’s “physiological symptoms have increased gradually over time”; Plaintiff’s “daily 19 functioning demonstrate[d] a discrepancy between intellect and ability to function”; “perhaps due 20 to a number of factors including the intrusive nature of obsessions and compulsions secondary to 21 OCD, mood liability secondary to Bipolar Disorder”; and Plaintiff suffered from a “discrepancy 22 between intellect and ability to function.” AR 332–33. “Most noteworthy [was] [Plaintiff’s] 23 extreme difficulty with task completion.” AR 333. Dr. Carraway diagnosed Plaintiff with 24 somatization disorder and obsessive-compulsive disorder with an axis II indication of cluster B 25 features. AR 334. 26 In addition to Dr. Carraway’s report, a June 1, 2009 medical report by Dr. Clark Gable 27 stated that Plaintiff could sit up to 6 hours a day with standing and walking limited to 2 hours or 1 June 1, 2009, diagnosed Plaintiff with anxiety disorder, depressive disorder, and somatoform 2 disorder. AR 492–95. According to Dr. Marinos, Plaintiff “would likely have difficulty 3 functioning effectively in a competitive work setting because of her chronic and seemingly severe 4 psychiatric problems.” AR 495. A February 17, 2023 report by Dr. Patricia Salmon, Plaintiff’s 5 endocrinologist, stated that Plaintiff was diagnosed with acromegaly in July 2013. AR 740. 6 II. LEGAL STANDARD 7 A court may reverse the Commissioner’s denial of disability benefits only when the 8 Commissioner's findings are 1) based on legal error or 2) are not supported by substantial 9 evidence in the record as a whole.

(g); Tackett v. Apfel,

, 1097 10 (9th Cir. 1999). Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla but less than a 11 preponderance”; it is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 12 support a conclusion.”

; Smolen v. Chater,

(9th Cir. 1996). In 13 determining whether the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence, the 14 Court must consider the evidence as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and the 15 evidence that detracts from the Commissioner's conclusion.

“Where evidence is susceptible 16 to more than one rational interpretation, the ALJ’s decision should be upheld.” Ryan v. Comm'r 17 of Soc. Sec.,

(9th Cir. 2008). 18 Under Social Security Administration (“SSA”) regulations, disability claims are evaluated 19 according to a five-step sequential evaluation. Reddick v. Chater,

(9th Cir. 20 1998). At step one, the Commissioner determines whether a claimant is currently engaged in 21 substantial gainful activity.

If so, the claimant is not disabled.

(b). At 22 step two, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant has a “medically severe impairment 23 or combination of impairments,” as defined in

(c). Reddick,

at 24 721. If the answer is no, the claimant is not disabled.

If the answer is yes, the Commissioner 25 proceeds to step three and determines whether the impairment meets or equals a listed impairment 26 under

, Subpart P, Appendix 1.

(d). If this requirement is 27 met, the claimant is disabled. Reddick,

. 1 fourth step in the sequential evaluation process is to determine the claimant's residual functional 2 capacity (“RFC”) or what work, if any, the claimant is capable of performing on a sustained basis, 3 despite the claimant’s impairment or impairments.

(e). If the claimant can 4 perform such work, he is not disabled.

(f). RFC is the application of a legal 5 standard to the medical facts concerning the claimant's physical capacity.

404.1545(a). If the claimant meets the burden of establishing an inability to perform prior work, 7 the Commissioner must show, at step five, that the claimant can perform other substantial gainful 8 work that exists in the national economy. Reddick,

at 721. The claimant bears the 9 burden of proof at steps one through four. Bustamante v. Massanari,

, 953–54 (9th 10 Cir. 2001). The burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five.

. 11 III. THE ALJ’S DECISION 12 On April 12, 2019, Plaintiff filed an application for child insurance benefits, alleging 13 disability during July 31, 2003 and July 31, 2007. AR 13. The claim was initially denied on 14 October 31, 2019.

On June 17, 2020, the claim was again denied upon reconsidered. On 15 September 10, 2020, Plaintiff filed a written request for a hearing.

On June 6, 2023, the ALJ 16 held an in-person hearing and Plaintiff was represented by attorney Joanna Xing.

17 On August 25, 2023, the ALJ issued her decision denying plaintiff’s application and 18 finding Plaintiff was not disabled. AR 25. At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not 19 engaged in substantial gainful activity since July 31, 2003. AR 15. At step two, the ALJ found 20 that Plaintiff did not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments. AR 17–24. The 21 ALJ stopped her analysis at step two. 22 On May 29, 2024, the ALJ’s decision became final when the Appeals Council declined to 23 disturb the ALJ’s decision. AR 1. On July 29, 2024, Plaintiff filed this action seeking judicial 24 review of Defendant’s decision. ECF 1. 25 IV. DISCUSSION 26 A. The ALJ Failed to Address Dr. Carraway’s Report. 27 Plaintiff seeks remand because the ALJ failed to consider Dr. Carraway’s report. ECF 15 1 report only opined on Plaintiff’s current mental impairments, was vague, and is not probative to 2 Plaintiff’s disability. ECF 18 at 6–7. 3 Pursuant to

.1520c(a), “[w]hen a medical source provides one or more 4 medical opinions or prior administrative medical findings, [an ALJ] will consider those medical 5 opinions or prior administrative medical findings from that medical source together using the 6 factors listed in paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(5) of this section, as appropriate.” These factors 7 include supportability, consistency, relationship with the claimant, and other factors that tend to 8 support or contradict a medical opinion.

.1520c(c). The ALJ “will articulate in 9 [her or his] determination or decision how persuasive [she or he] find[s] all of the medical 10 opinions and all of the prior administrative medical findings in [the] case record.”

404.1520c(b); see Nguyen v. Chater,

(9th Cir. 1996) (“Where an ALJ does 12 not explicitly reject a medical opinion or set forth specific, legitimate reasons for crediting one 13 medical opinion over another, he [or she] errs.”). 14 Here, Dr. Carraway is an “acceptable medical source” because she is a licensed 15 psychologist who treated Plaintiff from April 1, 2008 to August 5, 2008. AR 335; see

404.1502(a)(2) (defining “acceptable medical source” as a “licensed psychologist” who is 17 “licensed or certified psychologist at the independent practice level” or “licensed or certified 18 school psychologist, or other licensed or certified individual with another title who performs the 19 same function as a school psychologist in a school setting.”); Svaldi v. Berryhill, 720 F. App’x. 20 342, 344 (9th Cir. 2017) (“The ALJ also erred in giving little weight to the opinion of Svaldi’s 21 therapist . . . .”). 22 The ALJ was thus required to address Dr. Carraway’s medical opinion in her decision. See 23 Brancaccio v. Saul, 788 F. App’x. 561, 562 (9th Cir. 2019) (“[T]he ALJ erred in failing to 24 evaluate every medical opinion received.”) (internal quotations omitted). Although the ALJ 25 mentioned some information that is consistent with Dr. Carraway’s report, see AR 19 (discussing 26 Plaintiff’s somatization disorder and GAF score of 45), the ALJ still did not explicitly reject or 27 credit Dr. Carraway medical opinion. Failing to do so was in error. See Garrison v. Colvin, 759 1 forth specific, legitimate reasons for crediting one medical opinion over another, he [or she] 2 errs.”). 3 Defendant fails to provide any caselaw or persuasive argument establishing that the ALJ 4 did not need to explicitly consider Dr. Carraway’s medical opinion. Although Defendant attempts 5 to portray Dr. Carraway’s medical opinion as vague and only relevant to Plaintiff’s “current” level 6 of functioning, the administrative record does not support Defendant’s portrayal. See AR 332–33 7 (Dr. Carraway discussion of Plaintiff’s “[p]ast history of mental disorder”); Cereo v. 8 Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 473 F.App’x 536, 537 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Conclusory 9 statements that a treating doctor's opinion is “vague” falls short of the clear and convincing 10 standard for ignoring a treating doctor's opinion.”); cf. Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1017 (“As we have 11 emphasized while discussing mental health issues, it is error to reject a claimant’s testimony 12 merely because symptoms wax and wane in the course of treatment. Cycles of improvement and 13 debilitating symptoms are a common occurrence.”). The Court finds Dr. Carraway’s medical 14 opinion to be relevant to Plaintiff’s overall disability. See Smith v. Bowen,

, 1225 15 (9th Cir. 1988) (“We think it is clear that reports containing observations made after the period for 16 disability are relevant to assess the claimant’s disability.”); Svaldi, 720 F. App’x. at 344 (“[T]he 17 fact that those opinions were issued significantly after Svaldi’s DLI does not undercut the weight 18 those opinions are due.”). 19 Defendant’s citation to Valentine v. Comm’r. Soc. Sec. Admin,

(9th Cir. 2009) 20 does not save her argument. In Valentine, the Ninth Circuit held that a ALJ did not err by 21 excluding a doctor’s “[r]ecommendation[]” for a plaintiff to perform “highly routinized, 22 overlearned tasks with low cognitive demand” because the recommendation was neither a 23 diagnosis nor a statement of the plaintiff’s functional capacity. 574 F.3d at 691–92. Valentine, 24 however, is inapposite here; Dr. Carraway’s medical opinion discusses Plaintiff’s diagnoses and 25 impairments. See AR 332–33; see also Mercado v. Berryhill, No. 16-cv-4200,

, 26 at *6 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (finding report that stated Plaintiff “appeared to be a reliable historian,” 27 “suffered from a complex cognitive disorder that appears to not fit any clear potential organic B. The ALJ’s Failure to Address Dr. Carraway’s Medical Opinion Was Not 1 Harmless. 2 Because the ALJ failed to explicitly address Dr. Carraway’s medical opinion, the Court 3 “reviews the omission for harmless error.” Nadon v. Saul, 851 F. App’x. 24, 26 (9th Cir. 2021). 4 “ALJ errors in social security cases are harmless if they are inconsequential to the ultimate 5 nondisability determination.” Marsh v. Colvin,

(9th Cir. 2015) (cleaned up). 6 The Court cannot consider an error harmless “unless it can confidently conclude that no 7 reasonable ALJ, when fully crediting the testimony, could have reached a different disability 8 determination.”

9 Here, as discussed above, Dr. Carraway’s medical opinion discussed Plaintiff’s diagnoses, 10 such as obsessive-compulsive disorder, and how various symptoms affected Plaintiff’s abilities. 11 See AR 332–35. The Court cannot find that consideration of Dr. Carraway’s opinion would be 12 inconsequential. See Flaten v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs.,

(9th Cir. 1995) 13 (“Retrospective diagnoses by treating physicians and medical experts, contemporaneous medical 14 records, and testimony from family, friends, and neighbors are all relevant to the determination of 15 a continuously existing disability with onset prior to expiration of insured status.”); Nadon,

App’x. at 28 (“[T]he ALJ’s failure to address Dr. Newman’s medical opinion generally, and 17 specifically with respect to the PTSD diagnosis, was legal error that was not harmless.”); Marsh, 18

(“In the circumstances of this case, where the ALJ did not even mention Dr. 19 Betat's opinion that Marsh's chronic bursitis rendered her “pretty much nonfunctional,” we cannot 20 “confidently conclude” that the error was harmless.”). 21 C. Instructions on Remand 22 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s request, REVERSES the Commissioner’s 23 final decision, and REMANDS this case to the ALJ for further proceedings. Because the case will 24 be remanded for further proceedings, the Court need not address Plaintiff’s remaining arguments 25 regarding the sufficiency of the administrative record. See Hiler v. Astrue,

, 1212 26 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Because we remand the case to the ALJ for the reasons stated, we decline to 27 reach [plaintiff’s] alternative ground for remand.”). 1 On remand, the ALJ shall specifically address Dr. Carraway’s medical opinion at step two 2 || of the five step sequential evaluation process. See Marsh,

(“In the circumstances 3 of this case, where the ALJ did not even mention Dr. Betat’s opinion... We think it is most 4 || appropriate to vacate the district court's opinion, remand with instructions to the district court to 5 || remand to the ALJ, and specifically to invite the ALJ to comment on Dr. Betat’s medical opinions 6 || and records.”). 7 The ALJ is also instructed to consider the other issues raised in Plaintiffs briefing and 8 || modify any ensuing ALJ decision as appropriate. 9 V. CONCLUSION 10 For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs motion for remand is GRANTED, the 11 Commissioner’s final decision is REVERSED, and the above-entitled matter is hereby 12 || REMANDED to the ALJ for further proceedings consistent with this Order. 13 The case will be terminated upon resolution of attorney’s fees, if any. If no attorney’s fees 14 request is received by March 10, 2025, the Clerk of Court shall terminate the case. 3 15 IT IS SO ORDERED. a 16 || Dated: February 25, 2025

12 United States District Judge 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28