1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 ADRIENNE THOMAS, Case No. 24-cv-09046-JSW

8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 9 v. REMAND AND DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE 10 PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY, Re: Dkt. Nos. 12-13 11 Defendant.

12 13 Now before the Court for consideration are: (1) the motion to remand filed by Plaintiff 14 Adrienne Thomas (“Ms. Thomas”); and (2) the motion to dismiss filed by Defendant Pacific Gas 15 and Electric Company (“PG&E”). The Court has considered the parties’ papers, including the 16 supplemental briefing on the motion to remand, relevant legal authority, and the record in this 17 case, and it finds the motions suitable for disposition without oral argument. See N.D. Civ. L.R. 18 7-1(d). The Court VACATES the hearings scheduled for March 7, 2025 and HEREBY 19 REMANDS this case to Contra Costa County Superior Court. 20 BACKGROUND 21 On January 5, 2022, PG&E terminated Ms. Thomas. On January 5, 2023, she filed a 22 complaint in this Court alleging claims for whistleblower retaliation in violation of the Dodd 23 Frank Act, retaliation in violation of California Labor Code section 1102.5, wrongful termination 24 in violation of public policy, violations of California Business and Professions Code sections 25 17200, et seq., breach of a union contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 26 dealing, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and declaratory relief. (See 23-cv- 27 65-JSW, Thomas v. PG&E (“Thomas I”), Dkt. No. 1.) 1 First Amended Complaint, which added a claim for violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. 2 PG&E moved to dismiss and argued, inter alia, that Ms. Thomas’ claims were preempted by 3 Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”). 4 The Court granted that motion. The Court dismissed the Dodd-Frank Claim with prejudice 5 and dismissed the Title VII claim with leave to amend. Thomas I,

, at *2-*3 6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2023). It then addressed the state law claims and determined Ms. Thomas’ 7 claims for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant, and the Labor Code claim were 8 preempted under Section 301. The Court dismissed those claims with prejudice. The Court 9 dismissed the remaining state law claims with leave to amend.

at *3-*4. Ms. Thomas missed 10 the deadline to file an amended complaint, and the Court dismissed the case without prejudice. 11 Thomas I,

(N.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2023). Ms. Thomas then moved for an extension 12 of time to file an amended complaint, which the Court construed as a motion to vacate the 13 judgment. On November 9, 2023, the Court denied the motion to vacate and granted PG&E’s 14 motion for entry of judgment. Thomas I,

, at 2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2023). 15 On April 9, 2024, Ms. Thomas filed a complaint before the California Civil Rights 16 Department alleging that PG&E harassed her, retaliated against her, and wrongfully terminated 17 her. After receiving a right to sue letter, she filed a complaint in Contra Costa County Superior 18 Court using a form complaint for breach of contract. PG&E removed to this Court, and the Court 19 subsequently related the cases. See Thomas v. PG&E, No. 24-cv-06469-JSW (“Thomas II”). 20 When PG&E removed the case, it asserted the Court had jurisdiction pursuant to Section 21 301 of the LMRA and asserted the Court would have supplemental jurisdiction over any other 22 claims asserted. (Thomas II, Dkt. No. 1, Notice of Removal at 1:9-12, 4:6-5:1.) Although Ms. 23 Thomas used the form complaint for breach of contract, she did not specify the nature of the 24 contract at issue. Ms. Thomas filed a motion to remand. PG&E moved for judgment on the 25 pleadings based on the Court’s rulings in Thomas I. The Court granted Ms. Thomas’s motion 26 because it concluded that “Ms. Thomas’ complaint [was] devoid of any facts, let alone any facts 27 that suggest she is pursuing a breach of contract claim.” Thomas II,

, at *2 1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2024).1 2 After the Court remanded Thomas II, PG&E communicated with Ms. Thomas about its 3 intent to move for judgment on the pleadings. It also advised her that if she wanted to file an 4 amended complaint, it wanted to review a copy to determine whether it would stipulate to a 5 request. (Thomas v. PG&E, No. 24-9046-JSW, Dkt. No. 1-2, Declaration of Olivia Florio in 6 Support of Removal (“Florio Decl.”), ¶ 11; Dkt. No. 1-15, Florio Decl., Ex. 14 (Email 7 correspondence).)2 On November 13, 2024, Ms. Thomas sent PG&E a copy of an amended 8 complaint, which had not been accepted for filing in Contra Costa Superior Court. (Florio Decl., ¶ 9 11; Dkt. No. 1-14, Florio Decl., Ex. 13 (First Amended Complaint).) 10 On December 13, 2024, PG&E filed a notice of removal and again asserted the Court had 11 federal jurisdiction based on Section 301 preemption and asserted the Court had supplemental 12 jurisdiction over any claims that were not preempted. On December 20, 2024, PG&E filed its 13 motion to dismiss, and on December 31, 2024, Ms. Thomas filed her motion to remand.3 14 ANALYSIS 15 Pursuant to

(a), a defendant may remove any civil action brought in 16 a state court to the district court where such action is pending so long as the court to which the 17 case is removed has “original jurisdiction” over the case. Matheson v. Progressive Specialty Ins. 18 Co.,

(9th Cir. 2003). The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the principle 19 1 In its Notice of Removal, PG&E states that the Court agreed with its argument that the 20 complaint was purely a breach of contract action. That is not an accurate characterization of the Court’s Order. PG&E removed based on the fact that Ms. Thomas used the form breach of 21 contract complaint and argued the only contract that could be at issue would be the CBA. The Court concluded that assertion elevated form over substance because the complaint was devoid of 22 facts that suggested she was asserting a breach of contract claim. Thomas II,

, at *2. The Court’s ruling was informed by the exhibits to the Notice of Removal, which also did 23 not suggest Ms. Thomas’ claims were based on breach of contract. See

(“It is true that Ms. Thomas did not incorporate the attachments to her state court complaint by reference into the form 24 complaint. Those exhibits are not lengthy. Therefore, this is not a situation where the Court is required to “sift through” voluminous materials to evaluate the nature of her claims.) (quoting 25 Fishman v. Williams, No. CV 14-4823 MWF(JC),

, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2016)). 26

2 All additional references to docket entries refer to the docket in this case. 27 1 that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Royal Canin, U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, 2

(2025) (citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America,

, 377 3 (1994)). The party seeking removal has the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction, and the 4 removal statute is strictly construed against removal jurisdiction. Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 372

, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004). 6 PG&E argues that it was required to file a notice of removal once it received Ms. 7 Thomas’s proposed amended complaint and cites

(b)(1). That section 8 applies to “initial” pleadings, which the FAC is not. Therefore, removal in this case is governed 9 by Section 1146(b)(3), which provides that “a notice of removal may be filed within 30 days after 10 receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, 11 order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has 12 become removable.” 13 The Court concludes this case should be remanded. First, the Court does find the removal 14 premature. PG&E removes on the basis of federal jurisdiction. As the court noted in Jian-Ming 15 Zhao v. RelayRides, Inc., a case on which it relies, “there is no contingent federal jurisdiction and 16 thus, a plaintiff's intention of adding a claim that will create federal jurisdiction is not a sufficient 17 basis for removal where the state court has not yet granted leave to add such a claim.” No. 17-cv- 18 04099-JCS,

, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2017).4 19 Second, and assuming solely for the sake of argument the proposed FAC operates as an 20 “other paper,” the Court would still remand. The Court dismissed Ms. Thomas’s claims breach of 21 contract, breach of implied covenant claims, and a portion of her claim for retaliation under Labor 22 Code 1102.5 with prejudice on the basis that they were preempted. Ms. Thomas does not include 23 Title VII claims in her FAC. Instead, she makes clear that she is intending to pursue claims under 24 California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act. There are no federal claims that give this Court 25 jurisdiction. Without a federal claim, the Court cannot exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the 26

27 4 PG&E also relies on Jones v. G2 Secure Staff, LLC, No. CV 17–00061 SJO (SSx), 2017 1 state law claims. Royal Canin, 602 U.S. at 25-26, 43-44. 2 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Ms. Thomas’s motion to remand this matter to Contra 3 Costa County Superior Court and DENIES PG&E’s motion to dismiss without prejudice. The 4 || Clerk shall close the file. 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. a | 6 Dated: February 28, 2025 | f Ne / ! i JEPFREY)S / WHIT 8 United 9 □□□ Distrygt Judge 9 Lf 10 1] as 12

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