1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 Case No.: 25-cv-00055-DMS-VET ZINIA EZZET BOUTROS,

12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 13 v. MOTION TO DISMISS AND DISMISSING CASE 14 NADA ASHOO ADIADI,

15 Defendant. 16 17 18 Pending before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint 19 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6).1 (Defendant’s Motion 20 (“Def.’s Mot.”), ECF No. 4). Plaintiff has not filed an Opposition.2 For the following 21

22 1 The Court has opted to resolve this Motion in Defendant’s favor based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 12(b)(6), not 12(b)(1). However, Defendant’s jurisdictional argument also has merit. See Neitzke v. Williams,

, 327 n.6 (1989) (“A patently insubstantial complaint may be dismissed . . . for 24 want of subject-matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).”); see also Rice v. U.S. 25 Supreme Ct.,

, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2003) (dismissing complaint with prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because plaintiff failed to state “coherent claim” against defendants). 26 2 Civil Local Rule 7.1(f)(3)(c) states that if an opposing party fails to file a response in opposition to a motion, that failure may constitute consent to the granting of a motion. While a district court may grant 27 an unopposed motion pursuant to a local rule which permits as much, Ghazali v. Moran,

(9th Cir. 1995), the Court DECLINES to grant Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss on procedural grounds 28 1 reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. 2 I. LEGAL STANDARD 3 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may file a motion to dismiss 4 on the grounds that a complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted”. 5 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) “tests the legal 6 sufficiency of a claim.” Navarro v. Block,

(9th Cir. 2001). To survive 7 a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, 8 to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

, 9 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007)). “A claim 10 has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 11 the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

12 “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context- 13 specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and 14 common sense.”

. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief 15 above the speculative level.” Twombly,

. If the plaintiff “ha[s] not nudged 16 their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible,” the complaint “must be 17 dismissed.”

. 18 In reviewing the plausibility of a complaint on a motion to dismiss, a court must 19 “accept factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light 20 most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 21

(9th Cir. 2008). But courts are not “required to accept as true 22 allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable 23 inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Secs. Litig.,

(9th Cir. 2008) (quoting 24 Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors,

(9th Cir. 2001)). 25 II. DISCUSSION 26 As best as the Court can decipher, Plaintiff sues Defendant for allegedly 27 participating in an “illegal force” that has harmed her. (Plaintiff’s Complaint (“Compl.”), 28 ECF No. 1). According to Plaintiff, this “illegal force” involves the radio station of Jeff 1 Detrow and Jerry Cesak. (Id. at 2). She claims that the “illegal force” has forbiddingly 2 “read[] . . . the nook of [her] private brain” to “rob [her] control” of her “image of leading 3 [the] USA and the world.” (Id. at 4–5). 4 Plaintiff’s Complaint does not allege any cause of action and fails to “plausibly 5 allege facts to support the elements of any cause of action.” Rashidiasl v. MEP,

3728685 (S.D. Cal. May 30, 2023); see also Bautista v. Los Angeles County,

, 7 840 (9th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff alleges only in a conclusory manner that a “force” is out to 8 get her. The Court is left guessing about the nature of this “force” and the role of Defendant 9 in harming Plaintiff. In short, Plaintiff’s Complaint is confusing and nonsensical. It does 10 not afford Defendant a fair opportunity to defend herself. Accordingly, Defendant’s 11 Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. 12 III. LEAVE TO AMEND 13 When a court grants a motion to dismiss a complaint, it must then decide whether to 14 grant leave to amend. Leave to amend “shall be freely given when justice so requires”. 15 Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). “[T]his policy is to be applied with extreme liberality.” Morongo 16 Band of Mission Indians v. Rose,

(9th Cir. 1990). A court should not 17 grant leave to amend if there is (1) “undue delay”, (2) “bad faith or dilatory motive”, (3) 18 “undue prejudice to the opposing party” if amendment were allowed, or (4) “futility” in 19 allowing amendment. Foman v. Davis,

(1962). Dismissal without leave 20 to amend is proper if it is clear that “the complaint could not be saved by any amendment.” 21 Intri-Plex Techs. v. Crest Grp., Inc.,

(9th Cir. 2007). 22 The Court DENIES Plaintiff leave to amend because it would be futile. Plaintiff’s 23 allegations appear delusional and therefore frivolous. A “court may dismiss a claim as 24 factually frivolous . . . when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly 25 incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them.” 26 Denton v. Hernandez,

, 32–33 (1992). Plaintiff speaks of an “illegal force”, 27 “psychic readings”, and “soul robbers”. (See generally Compl.). The Court fails to see 28 how these allegations are realistic. “Because Plaintiff’s allegations are fanciful and 1 || delusional, it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the Complaint could not be cured 2 ||by amendment.” Diggs v. Gallucci Shiomoto,

, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 3 2024) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court GRANTS Defendant’s 4 Motion without leave to amend. See Kabbe v. City of San Diego,

(9th Cir. 5 || 1998) (“The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Kabbe’s action because 6 ||her claims are fanciful, delusional and legally frivolous.”’). 7 IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 8 For the reasons explained above, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to 9 || Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint without leave to amend. The Clerk of Court is directed to 10 close this case. 11 IT IS SO ORDERED. 12 13 |} Dated: March 3, 2025 2» 14 rr bn yn. 15 Hon. Dana M. Sabraw, District Judge 16 United States District Court 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28