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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10

11 Case No.: 2:24-cv-10134-MEMF-MARx ANGEL GARCIA,

12 Plaintiff, ORDER DECLINING TO EXERCISE 13 SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION OVER v. PLAINTIFF’S STATE LAW CLAIMS 14

15 JAY RAMDEV PIR, CORP; and DOES 1 16 TO 10, 17 Defendants. 18 19

20 Before the Court is the Response to the Court’s Order to Show Cause Regarding 21 Supplemental Jurisdiction filed by Angel Garcia (“Garcia). ECF No. 14. For the reasons stated 22 herein, the Court DECLINES to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Garcia’s state law claims 23 and DISMISSES the claims. 24

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26 / / / 27 / / / 28 1 I. Background 2 A. Factual Background1 3 Plaintiff Angel Garcia suffers from paraplegia and requires a wheelchair while traveling in 4 public. Compl. ¶ 1. Defendants Jay Ramedv Pir, Corp, (“Business”) and Does 1 to 10 are, or were 5 the owners of a motel located at or about 401 W. Chevy Chase Dr., Glendale, California. Id. ¶ 2. 6 In or about August 2024, Garcia went to the Business. Id. ¶ 10. The Business is a motel 7 business establishment, and it is a place of public accommodation that affects commerce through its 8 operation. Id. ¶ 11. Garcia encountered barriers while attempting to enter the Business during each 9 visit. Id. ¶ 12. Those barriers interfered with his ability to use and enjoy the goods, services, 10 privileges, and accommodations offered at the Business. Id. ¶ 12. Specifically, although the Business 11 provides parking spaces for customers, id. ¶ 11, it does not have a parking space designated for 12 persons with disabilities, nor does it have signage indicating such a space with the International 13 Symbol of Accessibility, signage warning others not to park in the designated space, proper paint on 14 the ground for such a space, or proper van accessibility for such a space. Id. ¶ 13. These issues deny 15 Garcia the full and equal access to the Business and deter him from visiting the business. Id. ¶ 14. 16 B. Procedural History 17 On November 22, 2024, Garcia filed a complaint against the Business and Does 1-10, 18 asserting: (1) a claim for injunctive relief arising out of an alleged violation of the Americans with 19 Disabilities Act (“ADA”),

, et seq.; (2) a claim for damages pursuant to 20 California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act (“Unruh Act”), Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51–53, et seq.; (3) a claim for 21 damages pursuant to the California Disabled Persons Act,

, et seq.; (4) a claim 22 for damages and injunctive relief based on California Health and Safety Code § 19955, et seq.; (5) a 23 claim for damages for negligence. See generally Compl. On January 22, 2025, the Court ordered 24 Garcia to show cause as to why the Court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state 25 law claims. ECF No. 13 (“OSC”). Garcia filed a response on February 5, 2025. Response, ECF No. 26 14 (“Resp.”). 27 28 1 The factual allegations included in this section are taken from the Complaint. ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”). The 1 II. Applicable Law 2 A. Supplemental Jurisdiction 3

“reflects the understanding that, when deciding whether to exercise 4 supplemental jurisdiction, ‘a federal court should consider and weigh in each case, and at every 5 stage of the litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.’” City of 6 Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons,

(1997) (emphasis added) (quoting Carnegie- 7 Mellon Univ. v. Cohill,

(1988)). A district court has supplemental jurisdiction 8 over “all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that 9 they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 10

(a). However, district courts have the discretion to decline to exercise supplemental 11 jurisdiction if: 12 (1) The claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law; (2) The claim substantially predominates over the claim over which the district 13 court has original jurisdiction; (3) The district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original 14 jurisdiction; or (4) In exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for 15 declining jurisdiction. 16

§ 1367(c). A district court declining supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to the section 17 1367(c)(4)’s “exceptional circumstances” provision must satisfy a two-part inquiry: (1) the “district 18 court must articulate why the circumstances of the case are exceptional within the meaning of § 19 1367(c)(4)”; and (2) “in determining whether there are compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction 20 . . . the court should consider what best serves the principles of economy, convenience, fairness, and 21 comity which underlie the pendent jurisdiction doctrine.” Vo v. Choi,

, 1171 (9th Cir. 22 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Arroyo v. Rosas,

(9th Cir. 23 2021) (describing the inquiry). 24 25 26 27 28 1 B. The ADA and Unruh Act 2 The ADA prohibits discrimination “on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment 3 of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public 4 accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public 5 accommodation.”

(a). Only injunctive relief is available under the ADA. See 6 Wander v. Kaus,

(9th Cir. 2002). 7 The Unruh Act entitles all people within California, regardless of their disability “to the full 8 and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business 9 establishments of every kind whatsoever.”

(b). Under the Unruh Act, a violation 10 of the ADA constitutes a violation of § 51 of the Unruh Act. See id. § 51(f). And although the Unruh 11 Act also permits injunctive relief, unlike the ADA, it also allows for recovery of monetary damages. 12 It entitles plaintiffs to actual damages for each offense “up to a maximum of three times the amount 13 of actual damage but in no case less than four thousand dollars.” Id. § 52(a). “The litigant need not 14 prove she suffered actual damages to recover the independent statutory damages of $4,000.” Molski 15 v. M.J. Cable, Inc.,

(9th Cir. 2007). 16 Under the Unruh Act, all persons in California, “no matter what their . . . disability . . . are 17 entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all 18 business establishments of every kind whatsoever.”

(b). The Unruh Act and the 19 ADA go hand-in-hand—a violation of the ADA is automatically a violation of the Unruh Act. Vo, 49 20 F.4th at 1169 (citing Arroyo,

). However, unlike the ADA, the Unruh Act allows for 21 recovery of monetary damages for every offense “up to a maximum of three times the amount of 22 actual damage but in no case less than four thousand dollars ($4,000).”

(a). 23 Further, California law sets forth a heightened pleading standard for lawsuits brought under 24 the Unruh Act. See

(a)(2) & (3). The stricter pleading standard 25 requires certain plaintiffs bringing construction-access claims like the one in the instant case to file a 26 verified complaint alleging specific facts concerning the plaintiff’s claim, including the specific 27 barriers encountered or how the plaintiff was deterred and each date on which the plaintiff 28 encountered each barrier or was deterred. See

§ 425.50(a). A “high-frequency litigant fee” of 1 $1,000 is also imposed on certain plaintiffs and law firms bringing these claims. See Cal. Gov’t 2 Code § 70616.5. A “high-frequency litigant” is “a plaintiff who has filed 10 or more complaints 3 alleging a construction-related accessibility violation within the 12-month period immediately 4 preceding the filing of the current complaint alleging a construction-related accessibility violation” 5 and “an attorney who has represented as attorney of record 10 or more high-frequency litigant 6 plaintiffs in actions that were resolved within the 12-month period immediately preceding the filing 7 of the current complaint alleging a construction-related accessibility violation.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 8 §§ 425.55(b)(1) & (2). High frequency litigants are also required to state: (1) whether the complaint 9 is filed by, or on behalf of, a high-frequency litigant; (2) in the case of a high-frequency litigant who 10 is a plaintiff, the number of complaints alleging construction-related accessibility claim filed by the 11 high-frequency litigant during the 12 months prior to filing the instant complaint; (3) the reason the 12 individual was in the geographic area of the defendant’s business; and (4) the reason why the 13 individual desired to access the defendant’s business.” See id. § 425.50(a)(4)(A). 14 III. Discussion 15 In the Order to Show Cause, the Court ordered Garcia to show cause in writing why the 16 Court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his Unruh Act claim, California Disabled 17 Persons Act claim, California Health and Safety Code claim, and negligence claim. See

1367(c). Further, the Court ordered Garcia to identify the amount of statutory damages he seeks to 19 recover and provide all facts necessary for the Court to determine if Garcia and Garcia’s counsel 20 satisfy the definition of a “high-frequency litigants” as provided by California Code of Civil 21 Procedure §§ 425.55(b)(1) & (2). The Court finds Garcia’s state law claims unsuitable for 22 supplemental jurisdiction within the meaning of section 1367(c)(4). 23 A. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law 24 claims. 25 In the OSC, the Court ordered Garcia to “identify the amount of statutory damages” sought 26 under the Unruh Act and include declarations “providing all facts necessary” for the Court to 27 determine whether Garcia and Garcia’s counsel satisfy the definition of a “high-frequency litigant” 28 1 i. Garcia qualifies as a high frequency litigant. 2 In the response to the Court’s OSC, Garcia admits that he has filed more than ten complaints 3 alleging a construction-related accessibility violation within the 12-month period immediately 4 preceding the instant complaint. ECF No. 14-2. Correspondingly, Garcia’s counsel conceded that 5 their law firm “likely” qualifies as a high-frequency litigant but failed to provide any facts from 6 which the Court could determine whether Garcia’s counsel satisfies the definition of a high- 7 frequency litigant under

(b)(2); see ECF No. 14-1. Therefore, in state 8 court, Garcia would not only be obligated to pay the $1,000 high-frequency litigant fee but would 9 also be required to meet the heightened pleading standard and allege specific facts relating to his 10 claim. Although Garcia alleges that he “is deterred from visiting the Business,” he has not set forth 11 the allegations required by the heightened pleading standard—namely, he fails to disclose in his 12 complaint that the complaint was filed by or on behalf of a high-frequency litigant, state the number 13 of construction-related accessibility complaints he filed within the 12 months prior to filing the 14 instant complaint, or explain why he was in the geographic area of the Business. See Compl. 15 The California legislature has determined that requiring Garcia and other high frequency 16 litigants to meet this heightened pleading standard would serve California’s interest in preventing 17 continued abuse of the Unruh Act by high-frequency litigants. Arroyo, 19 F.4th at 1206–07. It is 18 therefore appropriate in view of the Gibbs values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness to 19 litigants, and comity to decline supplemental jurisdiction so that Garcia may comply with the 20 requirements and California’s interest in curtailing abuse can be vindicated. See United Mine 21 Workers of Am. v. Gibbs,

, 726–27 (1966). 22 ii. Garcia’s state law claims predominate over the federal ADA claim. 23 Garcia asserts five claims: one federal law claim and four state law claims. See generally 24 Compl. ECF. No.1. Of these four claims, Garcia seeks damages and injunctive relief in connection 25 with his state law claims and, as prescribed by statute, only seeks an injunction in connection with 26 his ADA claim. See

27 A district court may dismiss state law claims without prejudice if a state law claim 28 “substantially predominates” over a federal claim “in terms of proof, of the scope of the issues raised 1 or of the comprehensiveness of the remedy sought.” Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726–27. Indeed, the Unruh 2 Act entitles plaintiffs to a minimum award of $4,000 for each violation of the Act.

52(a). 4 The Court finds that Garcia’s state law claims predominate over the federal law ADA claim. 5 Garcia seeks “all appropriate damages, including but not limited to statutory damages, general 6 damages and treble damages in amounts, according to proof,” and as such, any potential monetary 7 damages awarded predominate over the injunctive relief sought on the ADA claim. Compl. at 8 Prayer. 9 iii. Given the comity concerns expressed by the Ninth Circuit, exceptional 10 circumstances exist to justify declining exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. 11 In the Ninth Circuit, to qualify as “exceptional circumstances” under section 1367(c)(4), the 12 circumstances at hand “should be ‘quite unusual’ and should not rest ‘solely’ on routinely occurring 13 conditions such as ‘docket congestion.’” Arroyo,

(quoting Ex. Software N. Am., Inc. 14 v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for Cent. Dist. of Cal.,

, 1558, 1560 n.15 (9th Cir. 1994)). The Ninth 15 Circuit has held that in the context of joint ADA-Unruh Act claims, the specific legislative apparatus 16 surrounding the Unruh Act and the ADA meets the “exceptional circumstances” threshold. Vo, 49 17 F.4th at 1170 (citing Arroyo,

). Specifically, the California Legislature created the 18 Unruh Act to give plaintiffs seeking an injunction under the ADA the additional option of pursuing 19 monetary damages. Arroyo, 19 F.4th at 1211–12. The Unruh Act “relies dispositively on the ADA’s 20 substantive rules [and] expands the remedies available in a private action” to include monetary 21 damages.

. The California legislature became concerned that “high-frequency litigants 22 may be using the statute to obtain monetary relief for themselves without accompanying adjustments 23 to locations to assure accessibility to others.”

But rather than adjust the language of the statute, 24 the California Legislature opted to impose filing restrictions on potential litigants, making it “very 25 unattractive” for litigants seeking monetary relief to file joint ADA-Unruh Act claims in state court.” 26

at 1211–12. However, as these restrictions do not apply in federal court, they have been rendered 27 “largely toothless,” causing a “wholesale shifting of Unruh Act/ADA cases into the U.S. District 28 1 Court for the Central District of California.”

As the Ninth Circuit concluded, because this evasion 2 of the Legislature’s limitations would both be unfair to defendants and constitute “an affront to the 3 comity between federal and state courts,” it rises to the level of “exceptional circumstances” under 4 section 1367(c)(4). Vo, 49 F.4th at 1171. The plaintiff asserts that “there is nothing unique in the 5 state court procedures that are not replicated in some fashion in the federal system,” Response at 10, 6 but the Ninth Circuit considered both systems and determined otherwise. See Vo, 49 F.4th at 1170- 7 1171. 8 Here, the circumstances in this case meet the “exceptional” threshold. As previously 9 discussed, Garcia and/or his counsel qualify as high-frequency litigants. Further, given the “unique 10 configuration of laws in this area” that have given rise to concerns regarding fairness and the comity 11 between federal and state courts, exercising supplemental jurisdiction over Garcia’s Unruh Act claim 12 results in the same evasion of the California state legislature’s filing restrictions. Id. 13 Moreover, as discussed above, Garcia’s four state law claims predominate over the single 14 federal law claim. Thus, extending supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act would run afoul of 15 principles of federal-state comity. 16 iv. As this case is in its nascent stages, there are compelling reasons for declining 17 supplemental jurisdiction. 18 Given that the first prong is satisfied, this Court must proceed to the second prong and 19 consider “what best serves the principles of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity which 20 underlie the pendent jurisdiction doctrine.” Id. at 1171 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 21 Arroyo,

). 22 This case is still in its early stages—although the initial complaint was filed on November 22, 23 2024, Defendant has not appeared (nor has Garcia sought default), the parties have yet to engage in 24 any discovery, and the Court has yet to fully adjudicate this action. Accordingly, Vo does not dictate 25 that the Court retain jurisdiction. Compare id. at 1172 (concluding that because “[t]he district court 26 here declined supplemental jurisdiction over Vo’s Unruh Act claim well before it ruled on the merits 27 of the ADA claim,” there is “no reason to hold that the district court abused its discretion in 28 determining there were compelling reasons to decline jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim”), with 1 || Arroyo,

(“If the district court had declined supplemental jurisdiction over 2 | Arroyo’s Unruh Act claim at the outset of the litigation, it might then still have been possible to 3 | further California’s interest in cabining Unruh Act damages claims through the imposition of 4 | heightened pleading requirements and a substantial up-front filing fee.”). 5 Accordingly, the Court DECLINES to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Garcia’s state 6 | law claims. The Court therefore DISMISSES the Unruh Act claim, California Disabled Persons Act 7 | claim, the California Health and Safety Code, and the negligence claim WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 8 9 IT IS SO ORDERED. ° Uf 11 Dated: March 4, 2025 D MAAME EWUSI-MENSAH FRIMPONG B United States District Judge 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28