Donna Lynn Hull Anderson v. Commissioner of Social Security

United States District Court for the Central District of California

Donna Lynn Hull Anderson v. Commissioner of Social Security

Trial Court Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DONNA A., Case No. 5:23-cv-00606-MEMF (DFM)

12 Plaintiff, ORDER ACCEPTING FINDINGS AND 13 v. RECOMMENDATIONS OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 14 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 15 16 Defendant. 17

18 Pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636

, the Court has reviewed the Complaint, the 19 records on file, and the Report and Recommendation of the United States 20 Magistrate Judge (“Report”). Further, the Court has engaged in a de novo review of 21 those portions of the Report to which objections have been made. 22 The Report recommends that the decision of the Administrative Law Judge 23 (“ALJ”) be affirmed and that this action be dismissed with prejudice. (ECF No. 24 29.) Plaintiff’s objections to the Report (ECF No. 30) do not warrant a change to 25 the Magistrate Judge’s findings or recommendations. 26 Plaintiff objects that the ALJ failed to properly account for Plaintiff’s 27 irritable bowel syndrome (“IBS”) despite finding the condition severe. (ECF No. 28 30 at 2.) As a preliminary matter, a finding at step two that a condition is “severe” 1 does not establish that the requirements of step three are met; otherwise, they would 2 not be two separate steps. And Plaintiff cites no authority suggesting that finding a 3 condition “severe” at step two necessarily precludes a determination that the 4 claimant has residual functional capacity or that the claimant has the residual 5 functional capacity to perform the requirements of her past relevant work 6 (step four). Those arguments are therefore rejected. 7 Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ set no limitation in the residual functional 8 capacity due to IBS, despite Plaintiff’s testimony about needing frequent bathroom 9 breaks and the possibility of accidents. (See

id. at 5-6

.) The Plaintiff explicitly 10 points to the alleged “absence of any limitation for IBS despite finding it to be [the 11 Plaintiff’s] ‘most severe condition,’” and states that the RFC is “devoid of any 12 limitation that would reflect what the record provides regarding Plaintiff’s IBS.” 13 (Id. at 2 (emphasis added), 5 (emphasis added).) But the ALJ specifically spoke 14 about the limitations, finding “to the extent the claimant’s IBS affected her 15 functionality during the relevant period, the residual functioning capacity identified 16 above reasonably considers those limitations.” (ECF No. 16-3 at 13.) It is therefore 17 inaccurate that the ALJ set no limitation. As the ALJ found, Plaintiff testified at the 18 hearing that, for these episodes, the “restroom breaks are typically only a few 19 minutes each time.” (ECF No. 16-3 at 14; see also ECF No. 16-3 at 35.) Thus, 20 substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s determination that, despite these episodes, 21 Plaintiff had a residual functional capacity for light work with “regular breaks” 22 throughout the workday. (ECF No. 16-3 at 11.) Given the standard that applies to 23 this Court’s review of the ALJ decision, this Court finds that the ALJ’s 24 determinations are adequately supported and explained. 25 Similarly, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s decision is unsupported in light of 26 her testimony about her symptoms and actually characterizes the ALJ’s decision as 27 “making speculative assumptions regarding improvement.” (ECF No. 30 at 5.) As 28 the Report found, however, the ALJ reasonably declined to credit Plaintiff’s 1 testimony in part because it was inconsistent with Plaintiff’s conservative treatment 2 and effective management of symptoms with medication, as well as her daily 3 activities. (ECF No. 29 at 6.) This speaks to whether the ALJ was required to 4 credit her testimony about the impairment that her need for bathroom breaks or the 5 possibility of accidents caused; the ALJ was not. 6 Plaintiff objects that her “testimony at the hearing does not reflect the 7 improvement relied upon in the Magistrate Judge’s finding.” (ECF No. 30 at 3.) 8 But the finding of improvement was not based on the testimony at the hearing, but 9 by the medical evidence that showed a “multi-year period to establish that 10 Plaintiff’s treatment was effective in improving her IBS symptoms,” which the ALJ 11 was entitled to rely upon and which provides a sufficient basis for this Court to 12 affirm the ALJ’s findings. (ECF No. 29 at 7.) Plaintiff suggests that the fact that 13 the evidence of improvement was from March 2022 makes it irrelevant given her 14 alleged onset date, but the case law seems to be to the contrary, as cited in the 15 Report, and Plaintiff has not pointed to any authority in support of this objection. 16 Finally, Plaintiff objects that the ALJ’s residual functional capacity finding 17 reflects a person who is unimpaired by IBS. (ECF No. 30 at 7.) But as the Report 18 found, the ALJ determined Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity after consulting 19 medical opinions such as those from state agency consultants who assessed 20 Plaintiff’s IBS. (ECF No. 29 at 12.) Plaintiff has not shown that the ALJ erred in 21 determining, upon consideration of the medical evidence, that Plaintiff had a 22 residual functional capacity for light work with regular breaks. See Vertigan v. 23 Halter,

260 F.3d 1044, 1049

(9th Cir. 2011) (“It is clear that it is the responsibility 24 of the ALJ, not the claimant’s physician, to determine residual functional 25 capacity”). 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 1 ORDER 2 It is ordered that (1) the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge 3 || 1s accepted and adopted; and (2) Judgment shall be entered affirming the decision 4 || of the Commissioner. 5 6 | DATED: March 4, 2025 MAAME EWUSLMENSAH FRIMPONG 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

Reference

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