1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 HARLENE KAUR GREWAL, Case No. 5:23-cv-00802-PCP

8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 9 v. DISMISS

10 CITY OF PALO ALTO, et al., Re: Dkt. No. 69 Defendants. 11

12 Pro se plaintiff Harlene Grewal brings claims against Rodora Amat and Candelaria 13 Venegas for allegedly denying her adequate medical care while she was in the custody of Santa 14 County Clara Jail, where Amat and Venegas are employed as a nurse and sheriff’s deputy, 15 respectively. Amat and Venegas move to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 16 12(b)(6). For the following reasons, the Court grants the motion to dismiss. 17 BACKGROUND 18 Early in the morning of October 16, 2021, Grewal was arrested after leaving the Patio @ 19 Rudy’s, a restaurant and music venue. Grewal alleges that she suffered several injuries during the 20 arrest as a result of the arresting officers’ excessive roughness, including a torn ACL and 21 meniscus, bruising to several areas of her body, a shoulder injury, and injuries to her wrist and 22 hand.1 23 After her arrest, Grewal was transported to the Santa Clara County Jail where she was 24 medically screened by Amat prior to booking. Grewal alleges that she told Amat about her knee 25 and wrist pain and that her knee was visibly red and swollen. Amat offered her no medical 26 treatment. 27 1 While in custody, Grewal’s pain continued to worsen, and she asked Venegas to see the 2 nurse again. Despite obvious signs of distress, Grewal was provided no further medical attention. 3 Grewal first filed a claim with the County of Santa Clara on March 4, 2022. That claim 4 was rejected on April 11, 2022. Grewal then filed this lawsuit on November 23, 2022. She initially 5 brought claims against the City of Palo Alto, the Palo Alto Police Department, the two officers 6 involved in her arrest, and Doe defendants 1–10. At that time, Grewal’s claims were limited to the 7 officers’ alleged misconduct during the arrest. She did not assert any causes of action related to the 8 alleged denial of medical treatment at the Santa Clara County Jail. 9 Grewal filed a first amended complaint on February 13, 2024, asserting claims against 10 Santa Clara County for the first time based on Amat and Venegas’s alleged misconduct at the jail. 11 Two weeks later, Grewal and Santa Clara County met and conferred and they jointly stipulated to 12 dismiss Santa Clara County from this action. 13 On July 28, 2024, Grewal sought leave to file a second amended complaint, which the 14 Court granted, deeming that second amended complaint filed as of September 4, 2024. In the 15 second amended complaint, Grewal added Amat and Venegas as defendants. She asserts two 16 causes of action against them: (1) medical negligence in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment 17 and (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress. 18 Amat and Venegas now move to dismiss the second amended complaint for failure to state 19 a claim. 20 LEGAL STANDARD 21 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a complaint to include a “short and plain 22 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” If the complaint fails to state a 23 claim, the defendant may move for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 24 Dismissal is required if the plaintiff fails to allege facts allowing the Court to “draw the reasonable 25 inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

, 26 678 (2009). “Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate only where the complaint lacks a 27 cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.” Mendiondo v. 1 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff need only plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible 2 on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007). 3 In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must “accept all factual allegations in the 4 complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable” to the non-moving 5 party. Rowe v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp.,

, 1029–30 (9th Cir. 2009). While legal 6 conclusions “can provide the [complaint’s] framework,” the Court will not assume they are correct 7 unless adequately “supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal,

. Courts do not “accept 8 as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable 9 inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Secs. Litig.,

(9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Sprewell 10 v. Golden State Warriors,

(9th Cir. 2001)). 11 ANALYSIS 12 I. Medical negligence claim 13 Grewal brings a claim against Amat and Venegas for medical negligence in violation of the 14 Fourteenth Amendment, pursuant to

. Amat and Venegas contend that the statute 15 of limitations has expired and the claim is time-barred. 16 State law governs the statute of limitations for section 1983 claims. Butler v. National 17 Community Renaissance of California,

(9th Cir. 2014). In California, the 18 statute of limitations for section 1983 claims is two years.

Grewal’s claim arises from events 19 that took place on October 16, 2021. The statute of limitations thus expired October 16, 2023. 20 Grewal filed her original complaint on November 23, 2022. She first added claims related 21 to medical treatment at the jail in her first amended complaint, which was filed February 13, 2024. 22 She first brought claims against Amat and Venegas in her second amended complaint, which she 23 attempted to file July 28, 2024 and which was deemed filed September 4, 2024. Both the first 24 amended complaint and second amended complaint were filed after the statute of limitations on 25 Grewal’s claims against Amat and Venegas had expired. 26 The parties agree that Grewal’s section 1983 claims against Amat and Venegas were 27 brought after the statute of limitations had expired. Grewal contends, however, that her claims 1 original complaint. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1) permits the relation back of section 2 1983 claims to the original pleading if either the federal or state law standard for relation back is 3 met. Butler,

. 4 A. Federal standard 5 Under Rule 15(c)(1)(C), an amended pleading relates back to an original pleading if the 6 following conditions are met: “(1) the basic claim must have arisen out of the conduct set forth in 7 the original pleading; (2) the party to be brought in must have received such notice that it will not 8 be prejudiced in maintaining its defense; (3) that party must or should have known that, but for a 9 mistake concerning identity, the action would have been brought against it.” Butler,

1202 (cleaned up). The second and third requirements must have been met within 90 days of the 11 filing of the original pleading. James v. Sabella, No. 22-cv-05939,

, at *2 & n.3 12 (N.D. Cal., June 11, 2024). 13 In determining whether a claim arises out of the same conduct set forth in another 14 pleading, courts look to whether the facts “differ in both time and type,” Lee v. Thornell,

(9th Cir. 2024), as well as whether the new claim “will likely be proved by the same kind 16 of evidence offered in support of the original pleading,” In re Dominguez,

(9th 17 Cir. 1995) (cleaned up). Generally, new claims arise out of the same conduct set forth in earlier 18 pleadings where the two claims are based on the same core of operative facts and differ only in the 19 legal theory applied to those common facts. See, e.g., Santana v. Holiday Inns, Inc.,

(9th Cir. 1982); Hernandez v. Warden, Salinas Valley State Prison, No. 1:11-CV-00231-LJO, 21

(E.D. Cal. June 15, 2012), report and recommendation adopted sub 22 nom. Hernandez v. Warden, No. 1:11-CV-00231-LJO,

(E.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 23 2012); see also Williams v. Boeing Co.,

(9th Cir. 2008) (holding that a new 24 claim did not relate back to an earlier claim where the plaintiff “had to include additional facts to 25 support the [new] claim,” and “different statistical evidence and witnesses would be used to 26 prove” the claims). 27 The claims in Grewal’s original complaint all arose out of the Palo Alto police officers’ 1 The operative facts included Grewal’s departure from a music venue, her questioning by Officer 2 Enberg, the use of force against her by Officers Enberg and Johnson, and the application of 3 excessively tight handcuffs to her wrists. 4 The claims that Grewal introduced against Amat and Venegas in her second amended 5 complaint arise out of the events that followed the incident described in the original complaint. 6 After she was handcuffed, Grewal was arrested and transported first to the Palo Alto Police 7 Department jail and then to the Santa Clara County jail, where Amat and Venegas allegedly 8 denied her appropriate medical attention. 9 There is no question that Grewal’s claims against Amat and Venegas concern conduct that 10 was related to the conduct described in the original complaint. The alleged denial of medical 11 treatment at the jail occurred immediately after Grewal’s arrest, and but for the arresting officers’ 12 alleged excessive use of force, Grewal would not have needed medical attention at the jail. On this 13 basis, Grewal contends that her arrest and the denial of medical treatment were “part of a 14 continuous occurrence, and … born of the same incident and injury.” Dkt. No. 70, at 9. 15 Grewal’s argument fails because the conduct set forth in the original and second amended 16 complaints is not the same. Grewal does not offer two different legal theories concerning the same 17 events; she offers different legal theories concerning different, though related, events. The 18 operative facts mostly differ in time and type, despite some overlap, and proving the claims would 19 require substantially different evidence. Accordingly, the claims against Amat and Venegas do not 20 meet the Rule 15(c)(1)(C) standard for relation back to the original complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 21 15(c)(1)(C). 22 B. California standard 23 California law does not permit “the addition of a party for the first time whom the plaintiff 24 failed to name in the first instance” unless the amendment “does not add a ‘new’ defendant, but 25 simply corrects a misnomer by which an ‘old’ defendant was sued.” Butler,

. 26 Grewal asserts that her second amended complaint, which names Amat and Venegas as 27 defendants for the first time, does not add new defendants but merely corrects the name by which 1 defendants included in her original complaint. Grewal explains that “the only reason the nurse and 2 deputy were not listed by name in the original complaint was because the plaintiff was unable to 3 obtain their names due to the county’s refusal to cooperate and provide their names.” Dkt. No. 70, 4 at 10. 5 This argument fails because the original complaint did not describe any conduct that 6 occurred at the Santa Clara County Jail. Amat and Venegas thus could not have been among the 7 Doe defendants included in that complaint. The second amended complaint therefore cannot be 8 construed to merely substitute the correct names of previous Doe defendants. 9 *** 10 As neither the federal nor state standard for relation back is met here, Grewal’s claim 11 against Amat and Venegas for medical negligence pursuant to section 1983 does not relate back to 12 her original complaint and is time-barred. 13 II. Intentional infliction of emotional distress claim 14 Grewal also brings a claim against Amat and Venegas for intentional infliction of 15 emotional distress.2 Amat and Venegas contend that this claim is time-barred under the California 16 Government Claims Act.

et seq. 17 Under the California Government Claims Act, a claim against a public entity or its 18 employees must first be filed with the public entity. Cal. Gov. Code, §§ 905, 950; Watson v. State 19 of California,

(1993) (“It is well settled that a government claim must 20 be filed with the public entity before a tort action is brought against the public entity or public 21 employee.”). If that claim is filed and rejected, an individual has six months from the date that the 22 rejection is mailed to file a lawsuit. Cal. Gov. Code, § 945.6. Compliance with or excusal from the 23 filing requirement is an element of the plaintiff’s cause of action, so if a complaint fails to plead 24 compliance or excusal it is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim. State of California v. 25 Superior Court,

(2004). 26 27 1 Grewal filed a complaint with County of Santa Clara on March 4, 2022.3 That claim was 2 || rejected on April 11, 2022. Grewal was thus required to file any lawsuit by October 11, 2022. She 3 || did not file her original complaint until November 23, 2022 and she did not add Amat and 4 || Venegas as defendants until her second amended complaint, filed on July 28, 2024. Grewal has 5 not pleaded any basis for being excused from the filing requirement or the six-month deadline for 6 || pursuing a lawsuit thereafter. 7 Accordingly, Grewal’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is time-barred. 8 CONCLUSION 9 For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Amat and Venegas’s motion to dismiss. 10 || Dismissal is without leave to amend because the Court has already given Grewal an opportunity to 11 amend the allegations in her complaint and further amendment would almost certainly be futile. a 12 || See Lewis v. DiPonzio,

(9th Cir. 2013).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

v 14 || Dated: March 4, 2025

15 Za. 16 a Coy

P. Casey Fitts 17 United States District Judge 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 3 The Court grants defendants’ request that it take judicial notice of the date of Grewal’s claim and its rejection by Santa Clara County. Generally, “courts may not consider material outside the 95 || pleadings when assessing the sufficiency of a complaint.” Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc.,

(9th Cir. 2018). But Federal Rule of Evidence 201 permits judicial notice of “a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute” because the fact is “generally known” or “can be 26 : accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. 97 || Fed. R. Evid. 201. A court may take notice of “undisputed matters of public record” Lee v. City of L.A.,

, 690 (9th Cir. 2001). “Courts routinely conclude that ... government claims 28 [pursuant to the California Government Claims Act] are proper subjects of judicial notice.” Ahmed v. County of Santa Clara, No. 20-cv-05498,

, at *3 (N.D. Cal., May 26, 2021).