1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10

11 AMADOR LUIS MARTINEZ, III, Case No. 1:24-cv-01256-CDB (SS)

12 Plaintiff, ORDER ON STIPULATION FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES PURSUANT TO THE 13 v. EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT,

(d) 14 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, (Doc. 14) 15 Defendant.

16 17 18 Pending before the Court is the stipulated request of Plaintiff Amador Luis Martinez, III 19 (“Plaintiff”) for the award of attorney’s fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act 20 (“EAJA”),

(d), in the amount of $2,000.00 to counsel for Plaintiff, Steven 21 Gilbert Rosales.1 (Doc. 14). 22 The parties agree that an award of attorney’s fees to counsel for Plaintiff should be made 23 payable to Plaintiff, but if the Department of the Treasury determines that Plaintiff does not 24 owe a federal debt, then the Commissioner shall cause the payment of fees, expenses, and costs 25 to be made directly to Plaintiff’s counsel, Steven Gilbert Rosales.

. 26 On December 18, 2024, the Court granted the parties’ stipulated motion for voluntary 27

1 Both parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a U.S. magistrate judge for all 1 remand and remanded the case pursuant to sentence four of

(g) to the 2 Commissioner for further proceedings. (Doc. 12). Judgment was entered the same day. (Doc. 3 13). On March 7, 2025, Plaintiff filed the pending stipulation for attorney fees as a prevailing 4 party. (Doc. 14). See Shalala v. Schaefer,

(1993) (concluding that a 5 party who prevails with a sentence-four remand order under

(g) is a prevailing 6 party). Plaintiff’s filing is timely. Van v. Barnhart,

(9th Cir. 2007). The 7 Commissioner does not oppose the requested relief.

8 The EAJA provides for an award of attorney fees to private litigants who both prevail in 9 civil actions (other than tort) against the United States and timely file a petition for fees. 28

(d)(1)(A). Under the EAJA, a court shall award attorney fees to the prevailing 11 party unless it finds the government’s position was “substantially justified or that special 12 circumstances make such an award unjust.”

Here, the government did not show its position 13 was substantially justified and the Court finds there are not special circumstances that would 14 make an award unjust. Moreover, the government does not oppose Plaintiff’s stipulated 15 request. See Sanchez v. Berryhill, No. 1:16-cv-01081-SKO,

, at *2 (E.D. Cal. 16 Jan. 23, 2018) (finding position of the government was not substantially justified in view of the 17 Commissioner’s assent to remand); Knyazhina v. Colvin, No. 2:12–cv–2726 DAD,

5324302, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2014) (same). 19 Plaintiff requests an award of $2,000.00 in EAJA fees. (Doc. 14). The Ninth Circuit 20 maintains a list of the statutory maximum hourly rates authorized by the EAJA, adjusted for 21 increases in the cost of living, on its website. See Thangaraja v. Gonzales,

, 876- 22 77 (9th Cir. 2005). Even assuming Plaintiff’s counsel seeks the most recent published 23 maximum rate,2 the requested award would amount to approximately eight hours of attorney 24 time (not accounting for any paralegal time expended). The Court finds this reasonable and 25 commensurate with the number of hours an attorney would need to have spent reviewing the 26 certified administrative record in this case (approximately 1,659 pages; Doc. 10) and obtaining

27 2 Statutory Maximum Rates Under the Equal Access to Justice, available at https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/attorneys/statutory-maximum-rates/ (last visited March 10, 1 | stipulations for voluntary remand and for the award of EAJA fees. (Docs. 11, 14). With 2 respect to the results obtained, Plaintiffs counsel obtained a favorable judgment remanding the case for further proceedings. (Docs. 12, 13). 4 EAJA fees, expenses, and costs are subject to any offsets allowed under the Treasury 5 | Offset Program (“TOP”), as discussed in Astrue v. Ratliff,

(2010). If the 6 | Commissioner determines upon effectuation of this order that Plaintiff's EAJA fees are not 7 | subject to any offset allowed under the TOP, the fees shall be delivered or otherwise 8 | transmitted to Plaintiff's counsel.? 9 Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED: 10 1. Plaintiff's stipulated request for attorney’s fees pursuant to the EAJA (Doc. 14) is 11 GRANTED; and 12 2. The Commissioner is directed to pay to Plaintiff as the prevailing party attorney’s fees 13 in the amount of $2,000.00, pursuant to the terms set forth in the parties’ stipulation. 14 (Doc. 14). Fees shall be made payable to Plaintiff, but if the Department of the 15 Treasury determines that Plaintiff does not owe a federal debt, then the government 16 shall cause the payment of fees, expenses, and costs to be made directly to Plaintiff's 17 counsel, as set forth in the stipulation. 18 | IT IS SO ORDERED. | Dated: _ March 10, 2025 | br Pr 20 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 3 The parties’ stipulation provides that they do not stipulate whether “counsel for the by 2g | [Client-Last Name] has a cognizable lien” in this respect (Doc. 14 at n.1); the Court presumes this language constitutes an inadvertent drafting error.