Black v. City of San Diego

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA LANCE BLACK, Case No.: 21-cv-01990-RBM-JLB 12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART v. PLAINTIFF LANCE BLACK’S MOTION TO COMPEL CITY OF SAN DIEGO, et al., SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSES TO 15 Defendants. DISCOVERY [ECF No. 109] 18 Before the Court is a motion to compel filed by Plaintiff Lance Black (“Plaintiff”).

19 (ECF No. 109.) Plaintiff moves the court to compel the City of San Diego (the “City”) and Officers Ryan Poole, Elizabeth Ortiz, Christina Berg, Amy Buell, Jardin Killinger, Austin Fowler, Kyle Valente, Jonathan Wells, Katherine Jennings, Diego Usma, Jose Rodriguez, and David Burns (collectively, “Police Officer Defendants”) (collectively, “Defendants”) to provide or to supplement their responses to Requests for Production (“RFP”) Nos. 18, 19, 22, 26, 33–37, 71–73, and 75–76, propounded to the City; Interrogatory No. 3 propounded to the City; and Requests for Admission (“RFA”) Nos. 13 and 14 propounded to all Police Officer Defendants. (Id. at 2.) Defendants filed an opposition (ECF No. 118), and Plaintiff filed a reply (ECF No. 122). For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff’s motion to compel is GRANTED IN PART.

1 I. BACKGROUND 2 A. Factual Background 3 On November 27, 2021, Plaintiff commenced this civil rights action against the City of San Diego, the San Diego Police Department, San Diego County, the San Diego Sherriff’s Department, and the Police Officer Defendants. (ECF No. 1.) On March 5, 2024, Plaintiff filed the Third Amended Complaint, the operative complaint, against the City of San Diego and the Police Officer Defendants. (ECF No. 76 (“TAC”).) The following allegations are taken from the Third Amended Complaint: 9 Plaintiff alleges that two police officers stopped him because he is a black man who was driving an expensive car and wearing a nice watch. (TAC ¶¶ 4, 10–13.) Plaintiff alleges the officers then retaliated against him because he demanded to know why he had been stopped. (TAC ¶¶ 14–18.) Many additional officers were called to the scene, who taunted Plaintiff, surrounded his car, forcefully removed Plaintiff from the car, violently threw him to the ground, searched the car, and deleted the cell phone video he took of his interaction with officers. (TAC ¶¶ 21–23, 26–32, 34–36.)

16 Plaintiff asserts that when Sergeant Berg arrived, she and numerous other officers concocted false charges against Plaintiff to cover up their racially motivated misconduct, including an officer being directed by another officer to shut off their body camera to avoid the officers’ meeting being recorded. (TAC ¶¶ 38–40, 49–52.) Plaintiff alleges that officers continued to act with racial animus in commenting on his “attitude,” saying he was “lippy,” tightening his handcuffs when he complained about his treatment, and falsely stating the handcuffs were stuck and would have to be cut off. (TAC ¶¶ 41–45, 49–50, 60.) Plaintiff was then detained in a police car for three hours while two officers wrote and rewrote their false reports to support charges against Plaintiff and ensure he was not released after booking. (TAC ¶¶ 46–47, 53–55, 59, 62.) Plaintiff was not prosecuted.

26 (TAC ¶¶ 63, 67.)

27 /// 1 Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff brings the following causes of action: assault, battery, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, trespass to chattels, invasion of privacy, computer fraud and abuse, negligence, violation of Cal. Civil Code § 52.1(a), violation of Cal. Civil Code § 51.7, and violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including false arrest, equal protection and due process violations, excessive force, unreasonable search, retaliation, and Monell claims based on official policy and custom and failure to train. (TAC at 46–95.)

8 B. Background of the Instant Discovery Disputes 9 On September 20, 2024, the parties raised two discovery disputes pursuant to Section V.B. of Judge Burkhardt’s Civil Chambers Rules. (ECF No. 102.) The Court held an informal Discovery Conference on October 2, 2024, and issued a follow-up minute order summarizing the discussion. (ECF Nos. 103, 104.) At the Discovery Conference, the Court expressed concern about the overbreadth and other deficiencies of certain discovery requests and offered an additional opportunity for the parties to further meet and confer about, inter alia, possible modifications to those requests still in dispute. The Court held a follow-up Status Conference on November 22, 2024. (ECF Nos. 104, 106, 107.) The Court thereafter set a briefing schedule for motions seeking to resolve the remaining disputes. (ECF No. 108.)

19 Plaintiff timely filed the instant motion to compel on December 11, 2024. (ECF No. 109.) Defendants timely filed an opposition on January 3, 2025. (ECF No. 118.) On January 10, 2025, Plaintiff timely filed a reply. (ECF No. 122.)

22 II. LEGAL STANDARD 23 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorize parties to obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, “considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). “Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).

3 Rule 26(b) requires a district court to “limit the frequency or extent of discovery” if it determines that “(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C). “Courts must consider both relevance and proportionality in determining whether the scope of discovery that a party seeks is appropriate.” BlackBerry Ltd. v. Facebook, Inc., Case No. CV 18-1844-GW (KSx) 2019 9 WL 4544425, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2019). “District courts have broad discretion in determining relevancy for discovery purposes.” Surfvivor Media, Inc. v. Survivor Prods., 406 F.3d 625, 635 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002)).

13 On a motion to compel, the moving party bears the burden of demonstrating relevance, proportionality and other Rule 26 requirements. Shared P’ship v. Meta Platforms, Inc., Case No. 22-cv-02366-RS (RMI), 2023 WL 2526645, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 16 Mar. 14, 2023) (citation omitted). The party resisting discovery “has the burden to show that discovery should not be allowed, and has the burden of clarifying, explaining, and supporting its objections.” Weinstein v. Katapult Grp., Inc., No. 21-CV-05175-PJH, 2022 19 WL 4548798, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted); Doutherd v. Montesdeoca, No. 2:17-cv-2225-MCE-EFB, 2018 WL 3008867, at *2 (E.D.

21 Cal. June 15, 2018).

22 Federal courts recognize a constitutionally based right of privacy that may be asserted in response to discovery requests. See Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 616 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 1995); Medina v. Cnty. of San Diego, No. 08CV1252 BAS RBB, 2014 WL 4793026, at *3–4 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2014). In resolving privacy objections, courts balance the need for the requested information against the asserted privacy right.

27 See Soto, 162 F.R.D. at 616. “In the context of the disclosure of police files, courts have recognized that privacy rights are not inconsequential.” Id.; see also Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 653, 660 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 1987). “However, these privacy interests must be balanced against the great weight afforded to federal law in civil rights cases against police departments.” Soto, 162 F.R.D. at 616. “Current case law suggests the privacy interests police officers have in their personnel files do not outweigh plaintiff's interests in civil rights cases.” Dowell v. Griffin, 275 F.R.D. 613, 617 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2011) (citing Soto, 162 F.R.D. at 617; Hampton v. City of San Diego, 147 F.R.D. 227, 230 (S.D. Cal. 1993); Miller v. Pancucci, 141 F.R.D. 292 (C.D. Cal. 1992)). Further, privacy rights can be adequately protected by a “tightly drawn” protective order. See Kelly, 114 F.R.D. at 662, 666, 671; Hampton, 147 F.R.D. at 231.

10 “Federal common law recognizes a qualified privilege for official information.”

11 Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana, 936 F.2d 1027, 1033 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Kerr v. United States Dist. Ct. for N.D. Cal., 511 F.2d 192, 198 (9th Cir. 1975), aff'd, 426 U.S. 394 13 (1976)). To determine whether information in government personnel files is subject to the official information privilege, federal courts weigh the potential benefits of disclosure against the potential disadvantages. Id. at 1033–34.

16 The deliberative process privilege protects “documents that reflect advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which government decisions and policies are formulated. It was developed to promote frank and independent discussion among those responsible for making governmental decisions, and also to protect against premature disclosure of proposed agency policies or decisions.”

21 F.T.C. v. Warner Commc'ns Inc., 742 F.2d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 1984) (internal citations omitted); see also Lahr v. Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., 569 F.3d 964, 979 (9th Cir. 2009) (the purpose of the deliberative process privilege is to allow agencies to freely “explore possibilities, engage in internal debates, or play devil's advocate without fear of public scrutiny.”). In order to assert the privilege, an agency must show that the information sought is both (1) pre-decisional, and (2) deliberative. Carter v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 307 F.3d 1084, 1089 (9th Cir. 2002). The deliberative process privilege is not absolute, and even if the privilege applies, “[a] litigant may obtain deliberative materials if his or her 1 for the materials and the need for accurate fact-finding override the government's ||interest in non-disclosure.” Warner, 742 F.2d at 1161.

3 DISCUSSION 4 A. Requests for Production to the City 5 Plaintiff seeks an order compelling the City to respond or to provide a supplemental ||response to RFP Nos. 18, 19, 22, 26, 33-37, 71-73, and 75—76, as well as interrogatory ||No. 3. (ECF No. 109 at 2.) The City did not produce any documents responsive to RFP || Nos. 18, 19, 22, 26, 33-35, 37, 71-73, and 75—76. (id. at 4.) The City produced a privilege || log appearing to contain documents responsive RFP Nos. 33, 35, 71, 73, and 76. Ud.) The || Court has considered the parties’ arguments and addresses each individual request in the ||chart below. A more detailed assessment of the official information privilege, where || applicable, is set forth in the discussion following the chart.

1s |Report ||| No. 18: Verdicts, settlements, | Objection. This request is The Court sustains the City’s and results of litigation impermissibly overbroad, objection. This RFP is 15 involving the San Diego oppressive, and unduly impermissibly overbroad, ||| Police Department for 2016- | burdensome. This request unduly burdensome, and calls 2021. calls for information that is for information that is not 17 irrelevant to the subject relevant and is not 18 matter of this action and is proportional to the needs of proportional to the needs of | the case. This request is not 19 the case. This request calls limited to similar excessive for information that is equally | force cases, or even civil 20 rights cases more broadly, but 71 instead encompasses all 22, 23 i Any objections not addressed in Defendants’ oppositions are considered 5A waived and will not be addressed. See SolarCity Corp. v. Doria, No. 16cv3085-JAH (RBB), 2018 WL 467898, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2018) (“If a party fails to continue to ||assert an objection in opposition to a motion to compel, courts deem the objection waived.”). Conversely, any objections argued in the opposition but not raised in the discovery responses have been waived and will not be addressed. See Richmark Corp. v. || Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1473 (9th Cir. 1992) (“It is well established that a failure to object to discovery requests within the time required constitutes a waiver of any objection.”). || eae inne Tere ng 2 available to the requesting litigation to include such party.” things as employment law 3 and workers compensation 4 matters. A narrower version of this request might be 5 appropriate, but that request 6 is not before the Court.* The Court need not reach the issue 7 of privilege. DENIED.

No. 19: Documents of Objection. This request is The Court sustains the City’s training and communications | impermissibly overbroad, objection. This RFP is g ||) resulting from verdicts, oppressive, and unduly impermissibly overbroad, settlements, and results of burdensome. This request unduly burdensome, and calls 10 litigation involving the San calls for information that is for information that is not Diego Police Department for | irrelevant to the subject relevant and is not 11 2016-2021. matter of this action and is proportional to the needs of 12 not proportional to the needs | the case. Like No. 18, it is of the case. This request is not limited to similar 13 incomprehensible as phrased. | excessive force cases. It is 14 This request is vague and also overbroad and ambiguous as to “resulting burdensome 1n that it 15 from’. This request seeks requests, without limitation or documents protected by the clarification, all 16 Deliberative Process “communications” “resulting 17 privilege*. This request from” all litigation involving 4 Where, as here, the propounding party chose not to narrow the discovery requests after an informal discovery conference where the Court expressed concern about || overbreadth, the Court declines to then rewrite the requests for the propounding party rather than sustaining the objection in toto. “It is within the discretion of a court ruling on a || motion to compel to narrow the requests rather than sustain the responding party’s || objections to them in toto.” Green v. Baca, 219 F.R.D. 485, 490 (C.D. Cal. 2003); see also Univ. of Pittsburgh of Commonwealth Sys. of Higher Educ. v. Hedrick, No. 06cv881 IEG (POR), 2006 WL 8455613, at *1 (S.D. Cal. July 26, 2006) (finding the magistrate judge || was not required to narrow an overbroad discovery request); Borenstein v. Animal Found., No. 2:19-cv-00985-CDS-NJK, 2022 WL 3647910, at *3 (D. Nev. Aug. 24, 2022) 26 we ke □□ - (declining “‘to act as [p]laintiff’s counsel to draft an appropriately tailored interrogatory for || him”).

4 In their discovery responses and in their opposition, Defendants assert the || deliberative process privilege as to RFP Nos. 19, 22, and 26 propounded to the City and ry eer pet Peonretng 2 invades the attorney client the police department. A and attorney work product narrower version of this 3 privileges. request might be appropriate, 4 but that request is not before the Court. The Court need 5 not reach the issue of 6 privilege. DENIED.

No. 22: All communications | Objection. This request is The Court sustains the City’s ||| from the San Diego Police impermissibly overbroad, objection. For reasons Department from 2016-2021 | oppressive, and unduly similar to Nos. 18 and 19, this concerning outstanding burdensome. This request RFP is impermissibly g ||| litigation, the results of such | calls for information that is overbroad, unduly litigation, and training irrelevant to the subject burdensome, and calls for ||| following such litigation. matter of this action and is information that is not not proportional to the needs | relevant and is not 11 “Communications” means of the case. This request is proportional to the needs of ||| text message, letter, email, incomprehensible as phrased. | the case. A narrower version direct message, social media _ | This request invades the of this request might be 13 post, video recording, audio | attorney client and attorney appropriate, but that request 14 recording or other writing, work product privileges. This | is not before the Court. The recording, or photograph request seeks documents Court need not reach the issue ||| intended to communicate a protected by the of privilege. DENTED. message, thought, idea, Deliberative Process ||| directive or other privilege. This request ||| communicative message. invades the personal and “Writing,” “recording,” and | fundamental right of privacy ||| “photograph,” are defined of individuals not parties or 19 according to Evid. 1001. witnesses to the present lawsuit in contravention of 20 the Federal right to privacy (5 U.S.C. § 552), the United 21 States Constitution, and 27 Section | of Article I of the || RFP Nos. 71-73 propounded to Defendant Killinger. (ECF No. 118 at 8.) Defendants also argue in their opposition that the deliberative process privilege applies to RFP No. 18, but |I the City did not make this objection in its discovery response, and therefore it has been || waived. (ECF No. 109 at 67.)) Because the Court sustains the City’s other objections as to RFP Nos. 19, 22, 26, and 71-73, the Court need not analyze the deliberative process privilege in this Order. oO eer set Ponre □□□ ee ee § 1798.1.

3 No. 26: Training programs Objection. This request is The City responded that after ||| developed based on the impermissibly overbroad, a diligent search and verdicts and case resolutions | oppressive, and unduly reasonable inquiry, it has no ||| of litigation, including those | burdensome. This request responsive documents in its specified in TAC, para. 137, | seeks documents protected by | possession, custody, or including course syllabus, the Deliberative Process control. Therefore, there is ||| attendance logs, training privilege. This request calls nothing to compel. The material, and test results for information that is Court need not reach the issue following such training. irrelevant to the subject of privilege. DENIED.

9 matter of this action and is not proportional to the needs 10 of the case. This request is incomprehensible as phrased.

11 unduly burdensome. This 12 request calls for information that is irrelevant to the subject 13 matter of this action and is 14 not proportional to the needs of the case. Subject to and 15 without waiving the 16 foregoing objections, Defendant responds: After a diligent search and reasonable inquiry, Defendant 18 has no responsive documents 19 in its possession, custody, or control.

20 ||| No. 33: Personnel files of all | Objection. This request is Plaintiff argues that these DEFENDANT POLICE vague and ambiguous as to documents are relevant to his ||| OFFICERS “personnel files.” This Monell claims. (ECF No. 22 request seeks documents 109 at 3.) In his TAC, protected by the Deliberative | Plaintiff brings a Monell 23 Process privilege and the claim based on allegations 4 Executive and Official that the City “had Information Privileges. This | longstanding official policies 25 request also seeks to ascertain | and customs” that could be protected information from reasonably interpreted to 26 police files in violation of authorize and approve the 07 state law, California Penal allegedly wrongful conduct of Code sections 832.5 and the Defendant Police 28 832.7 and California Vehicle | Officers. (TAC § 226. || Tai Ree evar 2 Code section 1808.2. Please | Plaintiff also brings a Monell see the attached Declarations. | claim based on the City’s 3 This request seeks to invade _| failure to train, alleging that 4 the nght to privacy of the City “has a training individuals under the Federal | program inadequate to train 5 right to privacy (5 U.S.C. its employees.” (TAC § 235.)

6 section 552) and the Plaintiff alleges the City was California Constitution, Art. | aware of its failure “because 7 I, section 1. This request is of a pattern of similar impermissibly overbroad, violations, the prior lawsuits 8 oppressive, and unduly and sustained Internal Affairs 9 burdensome. This request investigations.” (TAC § calls for information that is 236.)

10 irrelevant to the subject matter of this action and is Defendant argues that the 11 not proportional to the needs | request is not limited in time 12 of the case. and the personnel files are protected by the official 13 Subject to and without information privilege and 14 waiving the foregoing contain private information. objections, Defendant (ECF No. 118 at 3.) The City 15 responds: Defendant will produced certain categories of produce performance records? of Officers Poole, 16 evaluations from 2016-2021, | Ortiz, Killinger, Wells, 17 Formal discipline, Valente, and Fowler due to 19 a Specifically, for all Police Officer Defendants, the City has produced all training records, including their POST trainings and SDPD trainings. (ECF No. 118-1 at 2-3.) For six of the Police Officer Defendants, the City has produced performance |/evaluations from 2016-2021, formal discipline, reprimands/suspensions, disciplinary transfers, findings of the Civil Service Commission, certificates and awards, formal commendations, and terminations (to the extent any of those exist). (/d.) Plaintiff does ||not argue that additional portions of these personnel files should have been produced (other than the application and hiring materials for Officer Jardin Killinger specifically requested in RFP Nos. 72, 73, and 75). Rather, Plaintiff asserts the personnel file materials of the 25 other officers should also be produced. ECF No. 109 at 8 (“In response to RFP 33, the City produced personnel files for only stx of the Police Officer Defendants, Poole, Ortiz, Killinger, Wells, Valente, and Fowler. Based on the foregoing, the City should produce 27 personnel files requested.”) Therefore, the Court limits its analysis to whether the same categories of documents from the personnel files should be produced as to the remaining 28 officers.

Wh | eee ene ewes a 2 Reprimands/Suspension, their specific involvement in Disciplinary transfers, the incident. (/d. at 5.) The 3 Findings of the Civil Service | City also produced all 4 Commission, Certificates and | officers’ POST and SDPD awards, Formal training records. (/d.)

5 Commendations, and 6 Terminations with supporting | The Court has considered the documents (to the extent any | official information privilege 7 of those records exist) (see below). The Court finds for Officers Poole, Ortiz, that Plaintiff has established 8 Killinger, Wells, Valente, and | the relevance of the personnel 9 Fowler. records of the Police Officer Defendants to his Monell 10 claims. The City has not adequately justified the 11 distinction it draws between 12 producing documents from the personnel files of the six 13 identified Police Officer 14 Defendants and the others.

Balancing the interests at 15 issue, including relevant privileges and privacy issues, 16 the Court overrules the 17 objections and finds that the City must produce the same 18 categories of personnel 19 records from for the remaining Police Officer 20 Defendants. The City may redact personal information, 21 including home addresses, 72 phone numbers, personal and family data, emergency 23 contacts, and DMV records, as well as any health-related 24 information. Further, these 5 documents may be designated For Counsel Only. (See 26 discussion of modification to 7 Protective Order below.)

GRANTED IN PART.

Teirpset Ponre tng ||| No. 34: Use of force incident | Objection. This request seeks | Plaintiff argues that this reports for all DEFENDANT | to invade the mght to privacy | request is relevant to his |!| POLICE OFFICERS. of individuals under the Monell claims, as well as 4 Federal right to privacy (5 towards the Police Officer U.S.C. section 552) and the Defendants’ motive, 5 California Constitution, Art. | opportunity, intent, 6 I, section 1. This request is preparation, plan, knowledge, vague and ambiguous as to identity, absence of mistake, 7 “use of force incident or lack of accident admissible reports.” This request is under Fed. R. Evid. 8 impermissibly overbroad, 404(b)(2). (ECF No. 109 at 9 oppressive, and unduly 3.) burdensome. This request 10 calls for information that is The City argues that the irrelevant to the subject request is not limited in time, 11 matter of this action and is multiple named officers did 12 not proportional to the needs _ | not use any force against of the case. This request Plaintiff and have been with 13 seeks documents, the release | the SDPD for over 10 years, 14 of which, may violate and that the definition of “use Government Code sections of force” includes many types LS 6254, 7923.600, 7927.200, of force irrelevant to this 7922.000, 7927.700. case. (ECF No. 118 at 5-6.)

16 The City does not address 17 how many documents are responsive or how 18 burdensome it would be to 19 find and produce them.

20 The Court finds use of force incident reports from 2016- 21 2021 for the Police Officer 72 Defendants to be relevant and proportional to the needs of 23 the case and must be produced. The Court finds 24 that privacy concerns can be 5 adequately protected by designating them For Counsel 26 Only (see discussion of 7 modification to Protective Order below) and redacting non-pa personal 119% eer set Pere ng 2 information. GRANTED IN PART. The City must 3 produce responsive 4 documents for the time period 2016-2021.

6 No. 35: Prior Complaints Objection. This request seeks | Plaintiff argues that this against all DEFENDANT documents protected by the request is relevant to notice of ||| POLICE OFFICERS, Executive and Official policies giving rise to his whether citizen initiated or Information Privileges and Monell claims, as well as ||| officer initiated from 2016- will not be produced. Please | towards the individual g ||) 2021. see Declaration of Captain Defendants’ motive, Peterson. This request also opportunity, intent, 10 seeks to ascertain protected | preparation, plan, knowledge, information from police files | identity, absence of mistake, I in violation of state law, or lack of accident admissible 12 California Penal Code under Fed. R. Evid. sections 832.5 and 832.7 and _ | 404(b)(2). (ECF No. 109 at 13 California Vehicle Code 3.)

14 section 1808.2. This request seeks to invade the right to The City acknowledges that 15 privacy of individuals under | internal affairs investigations the Federal right to privacy (5 | involving claims of 16 U.S.C. section 552) and the sufficiently similar California Constitution, Art. | misconduct may be relevant, I, section 1. This request is but argues that the request is 18 impermissibly overbroad, overbroad. (ECF No. 118 at 19 oppressive, and unduly 6.) The City reviewed all burdensome. This request internal affairs complaints 20 calls for information that is and investigations for all irrelevant to the subject named officers from 2016 to 21 matter of this action and is 2021 and produced only one 27 not proportional to the needs | that it determined was of the case. relevant. (ECF Nos. 109 at 8, 23 118-1 4 8.)

24 The Court has considered the 25 official information privilege (see below) and reviewed the 26 summaries of the complaints identified by the City and finds that the City shall 28 produce, to the extent it has eer set Yeon tng 2 not already, the following complaints, which involve 3 allegations of excessive use 4 of force, racial discrimination/profiling, or 5 dishonesty (1) COSD 1659- 6 1736, a San Diego Police Department Investigator’s 7 Report, Internal Affairs Investigation #2019-0778; (2) 8 COSD 1818-1867, a San 9 Diego Police Department Investigator’s Report, Internal 10 Affairs Investigation #2021- 0469; (3) COSD 1868-1897, 11 a San Diego Police 12 Department Investigator’s Report, Internal Affairs 13 Investigation #2021-0146; (4) 14 COSD 1900-1901, a City of San Diego Memorandum re 15 Informal Complaint, Internal Affairs Investigation #2020- 16 0155: (5) COSD 1902, a City 17 of San Diego Memorandum re Informal Complaint, 18 Internal Affairs Investigation 19 #2018-0313; (6) COSD 1954- 1979 is a San Diego Police 20 Department Investigator’s Report, Internal Affairs 21 Investigation #2018-0050; (7) COSD 1982-2008 is a City of San Diego Memorandum re 23 Informal Complaint, Internal Affairs Investigation #2018- 24 0312: and (8) COSD 2013- 5 2040 is a San Diego Police Department Investigator’s 26 Report, Internal Affairs 7 Investigation #2021-0545.

eer pet Pere tng 2 The City may designate these documents For Counsel Only 3 (see discussion of 4 modification to Protective Order below) and may redact 5 the documents to protect the 6 privacy of non-patties.

GRANTED IN PART.

7 ||| No. 36: DOCUMENTS Objection. This request seeks | The Court has considered the memorializing Internal documents protected by the official information privilege ||| Affairs investigations as to Executive and Official (see below) and reviewed the g ||| the DEFENDANT POLICE __| Information Privileges and summaries of the Internal OFFICERS from 2016-2021. | will not be produced. Please | Affairs investigations® 10 see Declaration of Captain identified by the City and Peterson. This request also finds that the City shall 11 seeks to ascertain protected produce, to the extent it has 12 information from police files | not already, documents in violation of state law, memorializing the following 13 California Penal Code Internal Affairs 14 sections 832.5 and 832.7 and | investigations, which involve California Vehicle Code allegations of excessive use 15 section 1808.2. This request | of force, racial seeks to invade the right to discrimination/profiling, or 16 privacy of individuals under | dishonesty (1) COSD 1659- the Federal right to privacy (5 | 1736, a San Diego Police U.S.C. section 552) Department Investigator’s 18 and the California Report, Internal Affairs 19 Constitution, Art. I, section 1. | Investigation #2019-0778; (2) This request is impermissibly | COSD 1818-1867, a San 20 overbroad, oppressive, and Diego Police Department unduly burdensome. This Investigator’s Report, Internal 21 request calls for information | Affairs Investigation #2021- 27 that is irrelevant to the subject | 0469; (3) COSD 1868-1897, matter of this action and is a San Diego Police 25 not proportional to the Department Investigator’s Report, Internal Affairs 24 Investigation #2021-0146: (4 27 5 The City does not distinguish between the request for prior complaints (RFP No. 35) and the request for documents memorializing Internal Affairs investigations (RFP 28 36). (ECF No. 118 at 3.) Therefore, the Court analyzes them the same.

eer pet Pere tng 2 needs of the case. Subject to | COSD 1900-1901, a City of and without waiving the San Diego Memorandum re 3 foregoing objections, Informal Complaint, Internal 4 Defendant responds: Affairs Investigation #2020- Defendant will produce only | 0155; (5) COSD 1902, a City 5 IA investigation 2020-478. of San Diego Memorandum 6 re Informal Complaint, Internal Affairs Investigation 7 #2018-0313; (6) COSD 1954- 1979 is a San Diego Police 8 Department Investigator’s 9 Report, Internal Affairs Investigation #2018-0050; (7) 10 COSD 1982-2008 is a City of San Diego Memorandum re 11 Informal Complaint, Internal 12 Affairs Investigation #2018- 0312; and (8) COSD 2013- 13 2040 is a San Diego Police 14 Department Investigator’s Report, Internal Affairs 15 Investigation #2021-0545.

16 The City may designate these 17 documents For Counsel Only (see discussion of 18 modification to Protective 19 Order below) and may redact the documents to protect the 20 privacy of non-patties.

GRANTED IN PART.

21 || No. 37: Claims submitted to Objection. This request is Plaintiff argues that this ||| the City of San Diego impermissibly overbroad, request is relevant to notice of involving the DEFENDANT | oppressive, and unduly policies giving rise to his ||| POLICE OFFICERS from burdensome. This request Monell claims, as well as 2016-2021. calls for information that is towards the individual 24 irrelevant to the subject Defendants’ motive, 25 matter of this action and is opportunity, intent, not proportional to the needs _ | preparation, plan, knowledge, 26 of the case. identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident □□□□□□□□□□ under Fed. R. Evid.

| |e pet Yeon tng 2 404(b)(2). (ECF No. 109 at a.)

4 The City argues that the request is vastly overbroad 5 and that claims submitted to 6 the City’s Risk Management Department are not 7 categorized by individual employee. (ECF No. 118 at 8 6.)

The Court sustains the City’s 10 objection. This request is not limited to similar excessive 1] force cases, or even civil 12 rights cases more broadly, but instead encompasses all 13 claims to include such things 14 as car accidents or property damage resulting from the 15 execution of a search warrant.

This RFP is impermissibly 16 overbroad, unduly 17 burdensome, and calls for information that is not 18 relevant and is not proportional to the needs of 19 . the case. A narrower version 20 of this request might be appropriate, but that request 21 is not before the Court.

DENIED.

No. 71: Jardin Killinger’s Objection. This request is Plaintiff argues this request is ||| application material for vague and ambiguous as to relevant to his Monell claims, employment with the San “application material”. particularly with respect to 24 Diego Police Department, This request seeks documents | Jardin Killinger, citing TAC § 25 protected by the Deliberative | 153. (ECF No. 109 at 3.) In Process Privilege and his reply, Plaintiff clarifies 26 Executive and Official this request is relevant to the Information Privileges and City’s “policy or custom of will not be produced. Please | hiring unqualified individuals 28 see the attached Declarations. | as police officers, and once eer pet Pere tng 2 This request also seeks to hired, fail[ing] to adequately ascertain protected train them, despite knowledge 3 information from police files | of their lack of qualifications 4 in violation of state law, or existence of only marginal California Penal Code qualifications.” (ECF No. 5 sections 832.5 and 832.7 and | 122 at 4.)

6 California Vehicle Code section 1808.2. This request | The City argues that 7 seeks to invade the right to application material and privacy of individuals under | background records may be 8 the Federal right to privacy (5 | relevant to a Monell claim for 9 U.S.C. section 552) and the inadequate screening and California Constitution, Art. | hiring, but Plaintiff's Monell 10 I, section 1. This request is claims are not based on impermissibly overbroad, screening and hiring. (ECF 11 oppressive, and unduly No. 118 at 6—7.)

12 burdensome. This request calls for information that is The Court sustains the City’s 13 irrelevant to the subject objection. Plaintiff has not 14 matter of this action and is established the relevance of not proportional to the needs | the requested information.

15 of the case. Plaintiff initially cites ¢ 153 of the TAC which relates to a 16 dismissed cause of action and 17 has not established that this request is relevant to his other 18 Monell claims. The Court 19 need not reach the issues of privacy and privilege.

20 DENIED.

No. 72: The reports regarding | Objection. This request is For the reasons set forth as to 21 Jardin Killinger’s vague and ambiguous as to RFP No. 71, DENIED.

72 ||| psychological evaluation “application material”. This conducted according to 11 request seeks documents ||| CCR 1955. protected by the Deliberative Process Privilege and 24 Executive and Official 25 Information Privileges and will not be produced. Please 26 see the attached Declarations.

This request also seeks to ascertain protected 28 information from police files

| eee ene ewer 2 in violation of state law, California Penal Code 3 sections 832.5 and 832.7 and 4 California Vehicle Code section 1808.2. This request 5 seeks to invade the right to 6 privacy of individuals under the Federal right to privacy (5 7 U.S.C. section 552) and the California Constitution, Art. 8 I, section 1. This request is 9 impermissibly overbroad, oppressive, and unduly 10 burdensome. This request calls for information that is 11 irrelevant to the subject 12 matter of this action and is not proportional to the needs 13 of the case. This request 14 seeks documents protected by the psychotherapist-patient 15 privilege.

No. 73: The reports regarding | Objection. This request is For the reasons set forth as to ||| Jardin Killinger’s background | vague and ambiguous as to RFP No. 71, DENIED.

17 ||| evaluation conducted “application material”. This according to 11CCR 1953. request seeks documents 18 protected by the Deliberative 19 Process Privilege and Executive and Official 20 Information Privileges and will not be produced. Please 21 see the attached Declarations.

27 This request also seeks to ascertain protected 25 information from police files in violation of state law, California Penal Code 25 sections 832.5 and 832.7 and California Vehicle Code 26 section 1808.2. This request seeks to invade the right to privacy of individuals under 28 the Federal right to privacy (5

|| Ta Ree eras 2 U.S.C. section 552) and the California Constitution, Art. 3 I, section 1. This request is 4 impermissibly overbroad, oppressive, and unduly 5 burdensome. This request 6 calls for information that is irrelevant to the subject 7 matter of this action and is not proportional to the needs 8 of the case. g ||| No. 75: All use of force Objection. This request is For the reasons set forth as to reports executed by Officer vague and ambiguous as to RFP No. 34,7 GRANTED IN ||| Jardin Killinger. the term “use of force”. This | PART. The City must request is umpermissibly produce responsive 11 overbroad, oppressive, and documents for 2016-2021.

12 unduly burdensome. This The City may designate these request calls for information | documents For Counsel Only 13 that is irrelevant to the subject | (see discussion of 14 matter of this action and is modification to Protective not proportional to the needs_ | Order below) and may redact 15 of the case. This request the documents to protect the invades the personal and privacy of non-parties.

16 fundamental right of privacy of individuals not parties or witnesses to the present The City lists RFP No. 75, along with others, as being protected by the official || information privilege and deliberative process privilege in the section of its opposition ||captioned “Discovery Requests at Issue,” but does not include this RFP in the sections specifically addressing the official information privilege or deliberative process privilege.

22 (ECF No. 118 at 3-4, 7-8.) While the declarations of Captain Anthony Dupree regarding || officer backgrounds (ECF No. 109, Ex. D), Captain Jeffrey Peterson regarding Internal Affairs records (id., Ex. C), and Sylvia Satrom regarding officer personnel files (id., Ex. B) list specific RFPs, none of them reference RFP No. 75. Most importantly, however, || the City did not object to RFP No. 75 on the bases of the official information privilege or deliberative process privilege in its response to the RFP. (ECF No. 109 at 77.) Therefore, |I the objections are waived. See Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 653, 669 (“A party || that receives a discovery request that would reach material that it believes is covered by the official information privilege must, within the time permitted by rule to respond or object, serve and file an objection that invokes the official privilege by name.”).

eer pet Pure tng 2 lawsuit in contravention of the Federal right to privacy (5 3 U.S.C. § 552), the United 4 States Constitution, and Section | of Article I of the 5 California Constitution. C.C.

6 § 1798.1. This request seeks documents, the release of 7 which, may violate Government Code sections 8 6254, 7923.600, 7927.200, 9 7922.000, 7927.700.

No. 76: All body worn Objection. This request is Plaintiff argues this request is ||| camera video footage related | impermissibly overbroad, relevant to his Monell claims, to the matter of Hussein v. oppressive, and unduly particularly with respect to 11 City of San Diego, et al., burdensome. This request Jardin Killinger, citing TAC § ||| 23CV0520 TWR DEB (filed | calls for information that is 153. Plaintiff argues that 3/23/23 in the Southern irrelevant to the subject Defendant Killinger was the ||| District) matter of this action and is primary antagonist in the 14 not proportional to the needs _ | incident involved in that of the case. This request lawsuit, which alleged he 15 invades the personal and pointed a firearm at a fundamental right of privacy | pedestrian.

16 of individuals not parties or witnesses to the present The City argues this was a lawsuit in contravention of dissimilar incident occurring 18 the Federal right to privacy (5 | over a year after the subject 19 U.S.C. § 552), the United incident. (ECF No. 118 at 4.)

States Constitution, and 20 Section 1 of Article I of the The Court sustains the City’s California Constitution. C.C. | objection. Plaintiff has not 21 § 1798.1. addressed why an incident 27 that occurred-one-and-a-half years after the event at issue 25 in this litigation is material to the adequacy of the City’s 24 policies and training that 25 resulted in the officers conducting themselves as 26 they did with Plaintiff.

Moreover, the Hussein matter is factually dissimilar from 28 the instant case. For these || ene ne ra 2 reasons, the Court finds the privacy interests of Defendant 3 and third parties outweigh 4 Plaintiff's need for the ; discovery. DENIED.

6 | I. Official Information Privilege 9 The City asserts in its response to the requests for production of documents and its opposition to this motion the official information privilege as to the following RFPs.

RFP No. 33: Personnel files of all DEFENDANT POLICE OFFICERS 12 RFP No. 35: Prior Complaints against all DEFENDANT POLICE B OFFICERS, whether citizen initiated or officer initiated from 2016-2021.

14 RFP No. 36: DOCUMENTS memorializing Internal Affairs investigations as 15 to the DEFENDANT POLICE OFFICERS from 2016-2021.

16 || (ECF Nos. 109 at 71-74; 118 at 7-8.)

17 “Federal common law recognizes a qualified privilege for official information.”

18 || Sanchez, 936 F.2d , at 1033 (citing Kerr , 511 F.2d , atl98) The party asserting the || privilege has the initial burden of proving the applicability of the privilege. See Kelly, 114 ||F.R_D. at 669-71; see also Hampton, 147 F.R.D. at 230 (“Through this opinion, this court 21 hereby joining the Northern District’s and Central District’s procedures outlined in Kelly 22 Miller for invoking the official information privilege”); Stewart v. City of San Diego, || No. 09CV844-IEG WMC, 2010 WL 4909630, at *1—2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2010)(applying || Kelly).

25 “In determining what level of protection should be afforded by this privilege, courts ||conduct a case by case balancing analysis, in which the interests of the party seeking 27 discovery are weighed against the interests of the governmental entity asserting the || privilege.” Soto, 162 F.R.D., at 613 (citing Kel/y , 114 F.R.D. at 660). However, before a court engages in this balancing of interests, the party asserting the privilege must first make a “substantial threshold showing.” Id. (quoting Kelly, 114 F.R.D. at 669).

3 Specifically, the party asserting the privilege must provide a declaration or affidavit including: 5 “(1) an affirmation that the agency generated or collected the material in issue and has in fact maintained its confidentiality, (2) a statement that the official has personally reviewed the material in question, (3) a specific identification 7 of the governmental or privacy interests that would be threatened by disclosure of the material to plaintiff and/or his lawyer, (4) a description of how disclosure subject to a carefully crafted protective order would create a 9 substantial risk of harm to significant governmental or privacy interests, (5) and a projection of how much harm would be done to the threatened interests if the disclosure were made.” Id. (quoting Kelly, 114 F.R.D. at 670).

In its opposition, the City argues that it has met the requisite threshold showing through the declarations of Captain Anthony Dupree, Captain Jeffrey, and Sylvia Satrom, which were attached to its discovery responses. (ECF No. 118 at 7 (citing ECF No. 109, Exs. B, C, D).) Ms. Satrom, the Deputy Director of Police Human Resources, addresses the personnel files responsive to RFP No. 33, (ECF No. 109 at 42–45), Captain Peterson, the Captain overseeing the Internal Affairs Unit, addresses the Internal Affairs records responsive to RFP Nos. 35 and 36, (Id. at 47–54), and Captain Dupree, the Captain overseeing the Backgrounds and Recruiting Unit, addresses officer job applications and background investigation records responsive to RFP Nos. 71–73 (Id. at 57–59). In his reply, Plaintiff argues that the declarations do not include required information such as (1) an affirmation that the “SDPD ‘generated or collected’ the material requested”; (2) a description of how disclosure subject to a carefully crafted protective order would create a substantial risk of harm and instead “describe[s] why the existing protective order may be inadequate”; and (3) a projection of how much harm would be done to the threatened interests if disclosure were made. (ECF No. 122 at 3.) /// In her declaration, Ms. Satrom states: 2 I personally reviewed the protective order entered in this case.

Disclosure of the records identified above pursuant to the protective order would still create a substantial risk of harm to the significant governmental 4 and privacy interests identified above. First, members of the public may be less forthcoming and willing to provide information to investigating officers conducting background checks if they know they may be contacted by 6 attorneys and investigators for any Plaintiff involved in a lawsuit. In addition, disclosure pursuant to a protective order is the first step toward public disclosure. I have been informed that Plaintiff Lance Black and his counsel 8 have been in contact with media outlets related to this case and have regularly expressed an intent to dissolve the protective order or ask the Court to order documents subject to the protective order released from the order. (ECF No. 109 at 45.)

12 Captain Peterson similarly states in his declaration: 13 I personally reviewed the protective order entered in this case.

Disclosure of the records identified above pursuant to the protective order 14 would still create a substantial risk of harm to the significant governmental 15 and privacy interests identified above. First, police officers and members of the public may be less forthcoming and willing to report misconduct if they 16 know they may be contacted by attorneys and investigators for any Plaintiff 17 involved in a lawsuit. In addition, disclosure pursuant to a protective order is the first step toward public disclosure. I have been informed that Plaintiff 18 Lance Black and his counsel have been in contact with media outlets related 19 to this case and have regularly expressed an intent to dissolve the protective order or ask the Court to order documents subject to the protective order 20 released from the order. (Id. at 53.)

Captain Dupree further similarly asserts in his declaration: I personally reviewed the protective order entered in this case.

24 Disclosure of the records identified above pursuant to the protective order would still create a substantial risk of harm to the significant governmental and privacy interests identified above. First, members of the public may be 26 less forthcoming and willing to provide information to investigating officers conducting background checks if they know they may be contacted by attorneys and investigators for any Plaintiff involved in a lawsuit. In addition, 28 disclosure pursuant to a protective order is the first step toward public 1 disclosure. I have been informed that Plaintiff Lance Black and his counsel have been in contact with media outlets related to this case and have regularly expressed an intent to dissolve the protective order or ask the Court to order 3 documents subject to the protective order released from the order.

(Id. at 59.)

6 The Court finds that the declarations do not meet the fourth threshold factor set forth in Kelly, which requires a party asserting the privilege to describe how disclosure subject to a carefully crafted protective order would create a substantial risk of harm to significant governmental or privacy interests. 114 F.R.D. at 613. Courts have found that declarations that lack case-specific information and amount to only general assertions do not meet the fourth factor under Kelly. See Soto, 162 F.R.D. at 621; Miller, 141 F.R.D. at 300–01; Kelly, 114 F.R.D. at 672; see also Villa v. Cnty. of San Diego, No. 20cv537-CAB (NLS), 2021 13 WL 242981, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2021) (“The identified interests and harms are ones that apply to disclosure of any Internal Affairs or personnel files. There is nothing specific as to the information in any of [the officer’s] specific files.”). The declarations assert that members of the public and police officers may be less forthcoming but do not explain why those privacy concerns cannot be addressed with a protective order. The use of a carefully drafted protective order is a tool often employed by courts in these types of cases and would substantially reduce Defendants’ confidentiality concerns. See Soto, 162 F.R.D. at 614.

20 The declarations also state that Ms. Satrom, Captain Dupree, and Captain Peterson, “have been informed that Plaintiff Lance Black and his counsel have been in contact with media outlets related to this case and have regularly expressed an intent to dissolve the protective order or ask the Court to order documents subject to the protective order released from the order.” (ECF No. 109 at 45, 53, 59.) Again, this is a concern that the Court finds can be adequately addressed by redaction of personal information and a robust protective order.

27 The current Protective Order in this case does not provide for designating documents “For Counsel Only.” In consideration of the privilege and privacy issues identified by Defendants and supported by declarations, the Court modifies the Protective Order in the case to provide for a “Confidential – For Counsel Only” designation. A modified Protective Order will be docketed along with this Order.

4 Even had the City met its burden as to official information privilege, the Court would still find, balancing the interests at issue, that the documents should be produced as set forth in the chart above. Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES Defendants’ objections based on official information privilege as to RFP Nos. 33, 35, and 36.

8 B. Interrogatory No. 3 to the City 9 Next, Plaintiff seeks an order compelling the City to respond to interrogatory No. 3.

10 (ECF No. 109 at 2.) Interrogatory No. 3 states: List all arrests made by Defendant Jardin Killinger from 2016-202[1]8 by 12 name of person arrested, race of person arrested, jurisdiction, date, offense, 13 CAD Event No., and Case No. (Id. at 82.) The City responded as follows: Objection. This interrogatory is vague and ambiguous as to the timeframe 16 “2016-202”, as it requires responding party to speculate regarding what the 17 end date of the requested time frame is. This interrogatory is impermissibly overbroad, oppressive, and unduly burdensome. In addition, this 18 interrogatory calls for information that is irrelevant to the subject matter of 19 this action and is not proportional to the needs of the case. This interrogatory invades the personal and fundamental right of privacy of individuals not 20 parties or witnesses to the present lawsuit in contravention of the Federal right 21 to privacy (5 U.S.C. § 552), the United States Constitution, and Section 1 of Article I of the California Constitution. C.C. § 1798.1.

23 (Id.) 24 Plaintiff argues that this interrogatory is relevant to his Monell claims and Defendant Killinger in particular, citing paragraph 153 of the TAC. (Id. at 3.) As previously stated, Plaintiff clarified for the City during the informal discovery conference that paragraph 153 relates to a dismissed Monell claim. Moreover, Defendant Killinger is not the arresting officer in this case. (See ECF No. 118 at 7.) The Court sustains the City’s objection. Plaintiff has not established the relevance of the interrogatory. Moreover, the interrogatory is overbroad and not proportional to the needs of this case. A narrower version of this request might be appropriate, but that request is not before the Court. The Court need not reach the issue of privacy. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to compel the City to respond to interrogatory No. 3 is DENIED.

8 C. Request for Admission Nos. 13 and 14 to the Police Officer Defendants 9 Plaintiff further seeks an order compelling the Police Officer Defendants to respond to RFA Nos. 13 and 14. (ECF No. 109 at 2.) RFA Nos. 13 and 14 state: No. 13: Admit that you have never been investigated by internal affairs or 12 their chain of command for any use of force incident.

No. 14: Admit that you have never received any formal or informal discipline, 14 reprimand, suspension, or additional training for any use of force incident.

15 (See id. at 85–143.) The Police Officer Defendants did not answer the RFAs and asserted the following objection: Objection. This request is vague and ambiguous as to the terms “you” and “force” and the phrase “for any use of force incident” which are not defined.

19 This request calls for information protected under California Penal Code § 832.7(a). Litigants may not obtain information that is in a police officer’s personnel records except through the method provided for in Evidence Code 21 § 1043. This request seeks information protected by the Executive and Official Information Privileges. This request is impermissibly overbroad, oppressive, and unduly burdensome. This request calls for information that 23 is irrelevant to the subject matter of this action and is not proportional to the needs of this case. This request seeks private personnel information.

25 (See id.) 26 Plaintiff argues that these RFAs are relevant to his Monell claims against the City.

27 (Id. at 4.) He further argues that “[t]here are no standards imposed and enforced by the City . . . as to abuses of use of force.” (Id.) In response, Defendants argue that these RFAs are not limited by time or by the definition of “force.” (ECF No. 118 at 4.) Defendants further argue the RFAs seek information protected by the official information privilege and contain private information. (Id.) The City also notes that it produced personnel files, including discipline records, of multiple officers. (Id.) 5 The Court finds that RFA Nos. 13 and 14 seek relevant information and are proportional to the needs of the case. The RFAs are not overly broad because the requests are limited to the official actions of Internal Affairs or the City. The official information privilege objection is overruled for the reasons set forth above in addressing RFP Nos. 33, 35, and 36. In addition, “The contention that the doctrine of governmental privilege precludes disclosure of personnel records, whether or not established in California state courts, is not the law of this circuit.” Green v. Baca, 226 F.R.D. 624, 643–644 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (citation omitted); see also Breed v. United States District Court, 542 F.2d 1114, 1115 (9th Cir. 1976) (“The scope of an evidentiary privilege in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action is a question of federal law. [Citation.] State law may provide a useful referent, but it is not controlling.”) The Court finds that there are no overriding privacy concerns implicated in admitting or denying whether the Police Officer Defendants have been investigated by internal affairs or their chain of command for any use of force incidence, or whether the Police Officer Defendants have received any formal or informal discipline, reprimand, suspension, or additional training for any use of force incident. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to compel the Police Officer Defendants to amend their responses to RFA Nos. 13 and 14 is GRANTED.

22 /// /// /// /// /// /// /// |}IV. CONCLUSION 2 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART Plaintiffs motion to ||compel. Defendants shall provide supplemental responses, as set forth above, within fourteen days of the date of this Order.

5 IT IS SO ORDERED.

6 Dated: March 28, 2025 - n. Jill L. Burkhardt 8 ited States Magistrate Judge