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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ARGELIA REYES-ZAMUDIO, ) Case No. 5:24-cv-01705-CAS-GJS ) 12 ) Petitioner, ) ORDER DISMISSING CASE FOR 13 ) ) MOOTNESS 14 v. ) )

) 15 ELISEO RICOLCOL, Warden, ) 16 ) ) Respondent. ) 17 18 19 I. INTRODUCTION 20 Pursuant to

, the Court has reviewed the Petition for Writ of 21 Habeas Corpus (dkt. 1), all documents filed and lodged in this action, the Report 22 and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge (dkt. 15, “Report”), and 23 Petitioner’s Objections to the Report (dkt. 17). 24 Pursuant to

(b)(1)(C) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), the Court 25 has conducted a de novo review of those portions of the Report to which objections 26 have been stated. Having completed its review, the Court finds that Petitioner’s 27 / / / 1 claims have been mooted by her release from custody on December 5, 2024, 2 warranting dismissal of this action. 3 II. BACKGROUND 4 This case arises out of claims pursuant to the First Step Act (“FSA”), 18

, 3624, and 3632, as well as the Second Chance Act (“SCA”), 18

. On August 9, 2024, Petitioner Argelia Reyes-Zamudio 7 (“Petitioner”) filed a

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus against 8 Eliseo Ricolcol, Warden of the Satellite Prison Camp in Victorville, California 9 (“Respondent”), where Petitioner was incarcerated. Dkt. 1. Petitioner sought “2 10 months of Second Chance Act, for my immediate release.”

. In a 11 “Supplement[al]” Petition, Petitioner sought “90 days of FSA ETC [Earned Time 12 Credits] from January 25, 2024-August 8, 2024… for my immediate release.” Dkt. 13 2. Further, in her Opposition, Petitioner asserted that she “should have been 14 released on July 20, 2024 with all credits applied,” and in her Surreply, that FSA 15 and SCA credits entitled her to “immediate release.” Dkt. 10 at 2; dkt. 13 at 2. 16 On September 4, 2024, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the Petition, 17 arguing, among other grounds, that Petitioner failed to exhaust administrative 18 remedies. Dkt. 7 at 10. On October 15, 2024, the Honorable Magistrate Judge 19 Gail J. Standish issued a Report and Recommendation, recommending that the 20 Court grant Respondent’s motion and dismiss the Petition for failure to exhaust 21 available administrative remedies. Dkt. 15. On October 23, 2024, Petitioner filed 22 her objections. Dkt. 17. Petitioner appears to argue that the Report declined to 23 consider (i) that from January 25, 2024 to May 10, 2024, she participated in 24 “productive” activities that are eligible for ETCs, including exercise fitness 25 programs, active reading, and college courses for restaurant entrepreneurship; and 26 (ii) that administrative remedies were unavailable to her, because after she was 27 denied a BP-8 form, which is used to make an informal complaint in prison, she 1 was also denied a BP-9 form, which is used to make a formal complaint if the BP-8 2 form does not resolve the issue.

. 3 III. DISCUSSION 4 “As a prudential matter, courts require that habeas petitioners exhaust all 5 available judicial and administrative remedies before seeking relief under § 2241.” 6 Ward v. Chavez,

(9th Cir. 2012). Accepting plaintiff’s 7 allegation about the denied BP-9 form as true, the Court finds that Magistrate 8 Judge Standish is still correct in her analysis that Petitioner failed to exhaust 9 administrative remedies. See Sare v. United States, No. CV 22-07207-DSF, 2022

, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2022) (finding that the petitioner’s failure 11 to exhaust could not be excused by his assertion that a unit manager denied his 12 request for a BP-9 form); McKinney v. Shinn, No. CV-17-00648,

2312826, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2017), adopted by

(May 26, 14 2017) (“Petitioner’s assertion that he requested an appeal form but never received 15 one and therefore is being denied his administrative review also is insufficient to 16 excuse the exhaustion requirement.”). 17 Nevertheless, on December 5, 2024, after the issuance of Magistrate Judge 18 Standish’s Report, Petitioner was released from custody. See BOP Inmate 19 Locator, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last visited on February 20, 2025); 20 United States v. Basher,

, 1165 n.2 (9th Cir. 2011) (taking judicial 21 notice of BOP Inmate Locator). Because Petitioner only challenged her immediate 22 custody, see dkts. 1, 2, 10, 13, and because Petitioner is no longer in custody, there 23 is no relief that the Court can give to Petitioner. Therefore, her claims have been 24 mooted, depriving this Court of jurisdiction. See Spencer v. Kemna,

, 7 25 (1998) (“The parties must continue to have a personal stake in the outcome of the 26 lawsuit. This means that, throughout the litigation, the plaintiff must have 27 suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and 1 || likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.”) (citations and quotations 2 || omitted); North Carolina v. Rice,

(1971) (federal courts do not 3 || have jurisdiction to consider moot claims). See also Sila v. Warden, No. EDCV 4 || 22-1632-RSWL-AS,

, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2023), adopted 5 || by

(Mar. 13, 2023) (dismissing petition for writ of habeas 6 || corpus based on FSA credits given that “Petitioner has now been released from 7 || BOP custody, the relief sought in the Petition is moot, and no further relief remains 8 || to be granted in this case.”’). 9 IV. CONCLUSION 10 Having completed its review, the Court accepts the findings and 11 ||recommendations set forth in the Report. However, in light of Petitioner’s 12 subsequent release from custody, the Court dismisses the Petition as moot. 13 || Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the Petition is DISMISSED. 14 huts Uh bryde 15 Dated: March 3, 2025 _ CHRISTINA A. SNYDER 16 United States District Judge 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27