1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JASON MALLORY, No. 2:24-cv-3663 DJC AC PS 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER and 14 COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RANDHIR GANDHI, ROGER 15 LEVENSON and ALDRIDGE PITE, 16 Defendants. 17 18 Plaintiff is proceeding in this action pro se. This matter was accordingly referred to the 19 undersigned by E.D. Cal. 302(c)(21). Plaintiff previously filed a request for leave to proceed in 20 forma pauperis (“IFP”) and submitted the affidavit required by that statute. See 28 U.S.C. 21 § 1915(a)(1). The motion to proceed IFP was granted, and pursuant to the screening process 22 accompanying IFP status, the first amended complaint was rejected with leave to amend. 23 Plaintiff now filed a motion to seal the case (ECF No. 10) and a Second Amended Complaint 24 (ECF No. 12). For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends the Second 25 Amended Complaint (“SAC”) be dismissed and that this case be closed. The undersigned 26 DENIES the motion to seal. 27 //// 28 //// 1 I. SCREENING 2 A. Legal Standard 3 The federal IFP statute requires federal courts to dismiss a case if the action is legally 4 “frivolous or malicious,” fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seeks 5 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

(e)(2). 6 Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the complaint must contain (1) a “short and plain 7 statement” of the basis for federal jurisdiction (that is, the reason the case is filed in this court, 8 rather than in a state court), (2) a short and plain statement showing that plaintiff is entitled to 9 relief (that is, who harmed the plaintiff, and in what way), and (3) a demand for the relief sought. 10 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Plaintiff’s claims must be set forth simply, concisely and directly. Fed. R. 11 Civ. P. 8(d)(1). 12 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 13 Neitzke v. Williams,

(1989). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the 14 court will (1) accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint, unless they 15 are clearly baseless or fanciful, (2) construe those allegations in the light most favorable to the 16 plaintiff, and (3) resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. See Neitzke,

; Von 17 Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena,

(9th Cir. 2010), cert. 18 denied,

(2011). 19 The court applies the same rules of construction in determining whether the complaint 20 states a claim on which relief can be granted. Erickson v. Pardus,

(2007) (court 21 must accept the allegations as true); Scheuer v. Rhodes,

(1974) (court must 22 construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff). Pro se pleadings are held to a 23 less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner,

, 520 24 (1972). However, the court need not accept as true conclusory allegations, unreasonable 25 inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. Western Mining Council v. Watt,

, 26 624 (9th Cir. 1981). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action does not suffice 27 to state a claim. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 28

(2009). 1 To state a claim on which relief may be granted, the plaintiff must allege enough facts “to 2 state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly,

. “A claim has 3 facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 4 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal,

678. A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the complaint and an opportunity 6 to amend unless the complaint’s deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See Noll v. 7 Carlson,

(9th Cir. 1987), superseded on other grounds by statute as stated in 8 Lopez v. Smith,

(9th Cir. 2000)) (en banc). 9 B. Procedural Background 10 The initial complaint identified the County of Sacramento as the defendant and indicated 11 that a second defendant was “Pending Amendment.” ECF No. 1 at 2. Plaintiff filed a first 12 amended complaint (“FAC”) on January 8, 2025. ECF No. 3. The FAC listed the County of 13 Sacramento as a defendant, along with defendants Randhir Gandhi (CEO of Select Portfolio 14 Services), Roger Levenson (CEO of Wilmington Savings Fund Society/Starwood Mortgage 15 Residential Trust), and Aldridge Pite. Id. at 2-3. The FAC identified the presence of a federal 16 question as the basis for jurisdiction, and said “see original complaint” where asked to identify 17 the specific federal statutes or constitutional provisions involved. Id. at 4. The FAC’s “Statement 18 of Claim” section was blank, and the relief sought was identified as “TRO to stop/prevent 19 Default/foreclosure.” Id. at 5-6. The court rejected the FAC, explaining the requirements of Fed. 20 R. Civ. P. 8, and the fact that complaints must stand on their own without reference to other 21 pleadings. ECF No. 5 at 4-5. 22 C. The Second Amended Complaint 23 The operative second amended complaint (“SAC”) does not contain any clear causes of 24 action or set out a coherent set of facts; it is out of compliance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 for the same 25 reasons previously explained to plaintiff. Plaintiff again attempts to incorporate other filings into 26 the SAC, stating “This amendment is to documents 1, 3, and 7 and those documents are now part 27 of this Second Amended Complaint, and can be included as one.” ECF No. 12 at 1. The SAC 28 states that plaintiff is suing “to prevent foreclosure following civil right/property right violations, 1 which are cause of the mortgagee not getting what he paid for with purchase of property, and the 2 mortgage servicer has been Negligent in addressing and would be Racketeering to then foreclose 3 on and take.” Id. at 2. Plaintiff states the complaint alleges “Civil Right violations which are 4 very clear” and that the conduct “would be criminal if conducted as a Citizens Arrest under penal 5 code 837, yet the crime has not been addressed[.]” Id. Plaintiff states, “the LAWFARE 6 experienced by the plaintiff has also not been legal . . .” Id. Plaintiff alleges he was falsely 7 arrested in “an incident of political violence, which has been used to conduct lawfare[.]’” Id. at 3. 8 He makes accusations of election interference and illegal surveillance of a political candidate. Id. 9 D. Discussion 10 Plaintiff’s second amended complaint cannot be served because, like his first two 11 complaints, it does not contain a “short and plain” statement setting forth the basis for federal 12 jurisdiction, plaintiff’s entitlement to relief, or the relief that is sought, even though those things 13 are required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1) (3). The exact nature of what happened to plaintiff is 14 unclear from the first amended complaint, which does not contain any facts at all, or list any legal 15 causes of action. The second amended complaint consists of legal conclusion and allegations not 16 presented in any clear order. The court cannot tell what legal wrong was done to plaintiff, by 17 whom and when, or how any alleged harm is connected to the relief plaintiff seeks. As plaintiff 18 has previously been cautioned, the court cannot look to other documents, including the original 19 complaint or other motions filed by the plaintiff, to fill in the blanks of the operative first 20 amended complaint. Because the second amended complaint does not state any facts or causes of 21 action, it cannot be served. 22 II. LEAVE TO AMEND 23 Leave to amend should be granted if it appears possible that the defects in the complaint 24 could be corrected, especially if a plaintiff is pro se. Lopez v. Smith,

, 1130-31 25 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). However, leave to amend is not appropriate in this case because 26 amendment would be futile. See Klamath-Lake Pharm. Ass’n v. Klamath Med. Serv. Bureau, 27

(9th Cir. 1983) (while leave to amend shall be freely given, the court need 28 not allow futile amendments). It is clear from the progression of this case and plaintiff’s inability 1 to follow the court’s instructions that further amendment would not result in cognizable claims. 2 Accordingly, it is recommended that this case be dismissed without leave to amend. 3 III. MOTION TO SEAL 4 Plaintiff has filed a motion to seal the entire record of this case. ECF No. 10. Requests to 5 seal documents in this district are governed by E.D. Cal. R. (“Local Rule”) 141. In brief, Local 6 Rule 141 provides that documents may only be sealed by a written order of the court after a 7 specific request to seal has been made. Local Rule 141(a). However, a mere request to seal is not 8 enough. Local Rule 141(b) requires that “[t]he ‘Request to Seal Documents’ shall set forth the 9 statutory or other authority for sealing ...” E.D. Local Rule 141(b). 10 The court starts “‘with a strong presumption in favor of access to court records,’” Center 11 for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Group, LLC,

(9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Foltz v. 12 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,

(9th Cir. 2003)). “The presumption of 13 access is ‘based on the need for federal courts, although independent – indeed, particularly 14 because they are independent – to have a measure of accountability and for the public to have 15 confidence in the administration of justice.’”

(quoting United States v. Amodeo,

(2d Cir. 1995)). A request to seal material must normally meet the high threshold of 17 showing that “compelling reasons” support secrecy.

(citing Kamakana v. City and County of 18 Honolulu,

(9th Cir. 2006)). However, where the material is, at most, 19 “tangentially related to the merits of a case,” the request to seal may be granted on a showing of 20 “good cause.”

at 1097 1101. 21 Here, plaintiff asserts the case should be sealed “as public disclosure has been used for 22 harassment, defamation, and indirect health and safety threats.” ECF No. 10 at 1. No other 23 information is provided. Plaintiff does not provide sufficient rationale to overcome the strong 24 presumption of public access to court records. Accordingly, the motion is denied. 25 IV. PRO SE PLAINTIFF’S SUMMARY 26 The Magistrate Judge has determined that this case cannot move forward because you 27 have not stated any claims for legal relief in your second amended complaint. It is being 28 //// 1 | recommended that your case be dismissed. You have 21 days to file objections for the district 2 || judge to consider. The district judge will make the final decision. 3 IV. CONCLUSION 4 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion to seal (ECF No. 10) is 5 || DENIED. 6 It is further RECOMMENDED that the Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 12) be 7 || DISMISSED, and this case be CLOSED. 8 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 9 || assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of

(b)(1). Within twenty one days 10 || after being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiff may file written objections 11 || with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Id.; see also Local Rule 304(b). Such a document 12 | should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure 13 || to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s 14 | order. Turner v. Duncan,

(9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. YIst,

, 15 | 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991). 16 | DATED: April 1, 2025 17 ~ Ig Chthwen— Clare ALLISON CLAIRE 19 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28