1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 POUPAK BAREKAT, an individual, Case No. 8:24-cv-02485-JWH-KES

12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 13 v. MOTION TO REMAND [ECF No. 11] 14 CANCILLA ENTERPRISES LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, 15 and DOES 1-10, inclusive, 16 Defendants. 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 1 Before the Court is the motion of Plaintiff Poupak Barekat to remand this 2 action to Orange County Superior Court.1 The Court concludes that this matter 3 is appropriate for resolution without a hearing. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; L.R. 7-15. 4 After considering the papers filed in support and in opposition,2 the Court 5 DENIES the Motion. 6 I. BACKGROUND 7 Barekat, a California resident with physical disabilities, commenced this 8 action against Defendant Cancilla Enterprises, LLC in Orange County Superior 9 Court in October 2024.3 Barekat asserts two claims for relief: (1) a violation of 10 the Americans with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”),

; 11 and (2) a violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code. §§ 51-53.4 12 Both claims arise out of a visit that Barekat made to property owned by Cancilla 13 on October 5, 2024.5 During that visit, Barekat discovered “[a]n accessible 14 parking area whose slope exceeds [ADA] specifications” and “[a]n access aisle 15 that is inadequately marked.”6 Because of those barriers, Barekat—who “uses 16 mobility aids to safely ambulate”—has been “deterred from patronizing” 17 Cancilla’s property.7 18 1 Pl.’s Mot. to Remand Action to Superior Court of California (the 19 “Motion”) [ECF No. 11]. 20 2 The Court has considered the documents of record in this action, 21 including the following papers: (1) Notice of Removal [ECF No. 1]; (2) Compl. (the “Complaint”) [ECF No. 1-1]; (3) Motion; (4) Def.’s Opp’n to the Motion 22 (the “Opposition”) [ECF No. 14]; and (5) Pl.’s Reply in Support of the Motion 23 [ECF No. 16]. 24 3 See generally Complaint. 25 4 See generally id. 26 5 See id. at ¶ 5. 27 6 Id. at ¶¶ 30 & 31. 1 In November 2024, Cancilla removed this action to federal court on the 2 basis of federal question jurisdiction.8 Barekat then filed the instant Motion, in 3 which she argues that although her ADA claim arises under federal law, the 4 action must be remanded because she lacks Article III standing.9 5 II. LEGAL STANDARD 6 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Accordingly, “[t]hey 7 possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. 8 Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,

(1994). In every federal case, the 9 basis for federal jurisdiction must appear affirmatively from the record. See 10 DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno,

, 342 n.3 (2006). “The right of 11 removal is entirely a creature of statute and a suit commenced in a state court 12 must remain there until cause is shown for its transfer under some act of 13 Congress.” Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson,

(2002) (internal 14 quotation marks omitted). When Congress has acted to create a right of 15 removal, those statutes, unless otherwise stated, are strictly construed against 16 removal jurisdiction. See

17 To remove an action to federal court under

, the 18 removing defendant “must demonstrate that original subject-matter jurisdiction 19 lies in the federal courts.” Syngenta,

. As such, a defendant may 20 remove civil actions in which either (1) a federal question exists; or (2) complete 21 diversity of citizenship between the parties exists and the amount in controversy 22 exceeds $75,000. See

& 1332. 23 The right to remove is not absolute, even when original jurisdiction exists. 24 The removing defendant bears the burden of establishing that removal is proper. 25 See Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co.,

(9th Cir. 2006) (noting 26

27 8 See Notice of Removal. 1 the “longstanding, near-canonical rule that the burden on removal rests with the 2 removing defendant”); Gaus v. Miles, Inc.,

(9th Cir. 1992) 3 (“The strong presumption against removal jurisdiction means that the 4 defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.”) 5 (quotation marks omitted). Any doubts regarding the existence of subject 6 matter jurisdiction must be resolved in favor of remand. See

(“Federal 7 jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the 8 first instance.”). 9 III. ANALYSIS 10 Barekat argues that, although her ADA claim arises under federal law, this 11 action must be remanded to state court because she lacks Article III standing to 12 pursue the ADA claim in federal court.10 In opposition, Cancilla responds that 13 Barekat has Article III standing and that remanding this action would improperly 14 allow Barekat to circumvent federal jurisdiction.11 15 Before a federal court may exercise jurisdiction over a claim, the plaintiff 16 must demonstrate that she has Article III standing. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 17

(1992). To do so, the plaintiff must establish that she has 18 “suffered an injury in fact—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is 19 (a) concrete and particularized . . . and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or 20 hypothetical.”

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The 21 burden to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement is particularly demanding for a 22 plaintiff who seeks injunctive relief—such a plaintiff “must demonstrate a ‘real 23 and immediate threat of repeated injury’ in the future.” Chapman v. Pier 1 24 Imports (U.S.) Inc.,

(9th Cir. 2011). Additionally, the plaintiff 25 26

27 10 See

1 must demonstrate that the injury is traceable to the defendant’s conduct and 2 that it is “likely” that “the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.”

3 Under the ADA, an individual plaintiff, such as Barekat, may seek only 4 injunctive relief, so, to pursue her claims in federal court, she must demonstrate 5 a “real and immediate” threat of future harm. Chapman,

. The 6 Ninth Circuit has recognized two ways that an ADA plaintiff can satisfy that 7 standard. First, a plaintiff can allege that she “intends to return to a 8 noncompliant accommodation and is therefore likely to reencounter a 9 discriminatory architectural barrier.”

. Second, a plaintiff can allege 10 that “discriminatory architectural barriers deter [her] from returning to a 11 noncompliant accommodation.”

Either way, a plaintiff must also “identify[] 12 which barriers [she] had encountered” and explain how those barriers “affected 13 [her] specific disability.” Oliver v. Ralphs Grocery Co.,

(9th 14 Cir. 2011). 15 Here, Barekat has not explicitly alleged that she intends to return to 16 Cancilla,12 and she asserts that the absence of such an allegation deprives the 17 Court of federal jurisdiction.13 But Barekat also avers that she “is being deterred 18 from patronizing the accommodations provided for public use at [Cancilla] due 19 to [Barekat’s] knowledge of the ongoing existence of discriminatory ADA 20 violations.”14 Barekat further alleges that the noncompliant parking space and 21 inadequately marked aisle that she encountered at Cancilla’s property affected 22 her because she is “substantially limited in performing one or more major life 23 activities, including but not limited to walking, standing, ambulating, and 24 sitting” and that she “uses mobility aids to safely ambulate, including a cane and 25

26 12 See generally Complaint. 27 13 See generally Motion. 1}| Rollator walker.” At this stage of the litigation, those allegations satisfy 2|| Barekat’s burden to establish that she has Article III standing. See Chapman, 631 3|| F.3d at 950. 4 IV. DISPOSITION 5 For the foregoing reasons, Barekat’s instant Motion to remand [ECF 6|| No. 11] is DENIED. 7 IT ISSO ORDERED. MULE 9|| Dated:___April 9, 2025 10 {SNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 &

at J 3 &4.