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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DAWN M. ERICKSON, Case No. 2:20-cv-2123-JDP (SS) 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 LELAND DUDEK, Commissioner of 15 Social Security, 16 Defendant. 17 Plaintiff’s counsel seeks an award of attorney fees under

(b).1 ECF No. 18 23. Plaintiff entered into a contingent fee agreement providing that she would pay counsel 19 twenty-five percent of any award of past-due benefits. ECF No. 23-4 at 1-2. After this court 20 remanded for further proceedings, plaintiff was found disabled and awarded $197,538.70 in past- 21 due benefits.2 ECF No. 23-3 at 3. Plaintiff’s counsel requests $45,250 in attorney fees, which is 22 less than the statutory maximum, and which equate to an effective hourly rate of $1,714.50. 23

24 1 Although the motion for fees was filed under plaintiff’s name, plaintiff’s counsel is the real party in interest. See Gisbrecht v. Barnhart,

, 798 n.6 (2002). 25 2 The Social Security Administration awarded plaintiff $197,538.70 past-due benefits from March 2016 through September 2024. ECF No. 23-3 at 3. However, plaintiff’s retroactive 26 period ended in March 2024 (when the ALJ found plaintiff disabled and entitled to disability 27 benefits). ECF No. 23-1 at 2; ECF No. 23-1 at 8. In light of this discrepancy, plaintiff’s counsel calculated his fees through March 2024. ECF No. 23-1 at 2. The Commissioner acknowledges 28 this inconsistency and takes no issue with counsel reducing his fee request accordingly. ECF No. 1 An attorney is entitled to reasonable fees for successfully representing social security 2 claimants in district court. 3 Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under this subchapter who was represented before the court by an 4 attorney, the court may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent 5 of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment. 6 7

(b)(1)(A). Rather than being paid by the government, fees under section 406(b) 8 are paid by the claimant from the awarded past-due benefits. Crawford v. Astrue,

, 9 1147 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (citing Gisbrecht,

). The twenty-five percent 10 statutory maximum fee is not an automatic entitlement; the court must ensure that the requested 11 fee is reasonable. Gisbrecht,

(“We hold that § 406(b) does not displace 12 contingent-fee agreements within the statutory ceiling; instead, § 406(b) instructs courts to review 13 for reasonableness fees yielded by those agreements.”). In assessing whether a fee is reasonable, 14 the court should consider “the character of the representation and the results the representative 15 achieved.” Id. at 808. A “court may properly reduce the fee for substandard performance, delay, 16 or benefits that are not in proportion to the time spent on the case.” Crawford,

. 17 The court finds that the requested fees are reasonable. Counsel’s billing records reflect a 18 total of 26.55 hours of attorney time on this case. ECF No. 23-5 at 1. Counsel’s request for 19 $45,250, which is the equivalent to less than the statutory maximum, would constitute an hourly 20 rate of approximately $1,714.50 for attorney services. Counsel did not engage in dilatory conduct 21 or perform in a substandard manner. Indeed, counsel’s representation resulted in this matter 22 being remanded for further proceedings, which resulted in a favorable decision and an award of 23 benefits. See ECF Nos. 19 & 23-2 at 8. Given counsel’s experience, the result obtained in this 24 case, and the risk of loss in representing plaintiff, the court finds the hourly rate reasonable. See, 25 e.g., De Vivo v. Berryhill,

(E.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2018) (awarding fees at an 26 effective hourly rate of $1,116.26); White v. Berryhill, No. cv 04-00331-AS,

, 27 24 at 2. Therefore, plaintiff’s counsel calculated his fees based on an award of $184,128.70. 28 ECF No. 23-1 at 2. The court will do so as well. 1 | at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 7, 2017) (awarding fees at an effective hourly rate of $1,612); Monica H. v. 2 | Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 3:16-cv-2111-JR (D. Or. Jan. 25, 2021) (awarding fees at an 3 || effective hourly rate of $2,000); Kelly Kay M. v. O'Malley, No. 22-cv-1969-DDL,

| 4536462, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2024) (awarding fees at an effective hourly rate of $1,923.07). 5 Counsel concedes that the $5,250 award should be offset by the fees previously awarded 6 | under the under the Equal Access to Justice Act (““EAJA”). ECF No. 23-1 at 12; see ECF No. 22. 7 | He also indicates that he will reimburse plaintiff the amount previously awarded under the EAJA. 8 | See Gisbrecht v. Barnhart,

(2002) (holding that where attorney’s fees are 9 | awarded under both EAJA and § 406(b), the attorney must refund the smaller of the two awards 10 | to the plaintiff). 11 Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that: 12 1. The motion for attorney fees, ECF No. 23, is GRANTED. 13 2. Plaintiffs counsel is awarded $45,250 in fees pursuant to

(b). 14 3. Upon receipt of the $45,250 award, counsel shall refund to plaintiff the sum of $5,250 15 | previously awarded under the EAJA. 16 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. 18 ( q oy — Dated: _ April 14, 2025 q_—— 19 JEREMY D. PETERSON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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