1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 SAN JOSE DIVISION 7 8 MARTIN GUAPO-VILLEGAS, Case No. 24-cv-00575-VKD

9 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 10 v. MOTION TO DISMISS, WITH LIMITED LEAVE TO AMEND 11 CITY OF SOLEDAD, et al., Re: Dkt. No. 36 Defendants. 12

13 14 Plaintiff Martin Guapo-Villegas brings this action against defendants the City of Soledad 15 (“City”) and Officers Alejandro Castillo and Mustafa Yasin.1 Dkt. No. 1. On September 4, 2024, 16 the Court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint but gave Mr. Villegas2 leave to 17 amend. Dkt. No. 33. Mr. Villegas filed an amended complaint on October 4, 2024, reasserting 18 violations of his civil rights under federal and state law. Dkt. No. 35. Defendants moved to 19 dismiss the claims once more under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for 20 failure to state a claim and moved to strike Mr. Villegas’s request for punitive damages under Rule 21 12(f). Dkt. No. 36. Mr. Villegas opposed the motion. Dkt. No. 37. The Court found the matter 22 suitable for decision without oral argument. Civil L.R. 7-1(b). On January 13, 2025, the Court 23 dismissed the majority of Mr. Villegas’s federal claims without leave to amend but deferred ruling 24 on his federal claims of “wrongful initiation of process” pending further briefing. Dkt. No. 42. 25 Pursuant to this order, both parties filed supplemental briefs. Dkt. Nos. 43, 44. 26 1 All named parties have expressly consented that all proceedings in this matter may be heard and 27 finally adjudicated by a magistrate judge.

(c); Fed. R. Civ. P. 73; Dkt. Nos. 6, 13. 1 Having reviewed the parties’ supplemental briefs, the Court grants defendants’ motion to 2 dismiss, denies defendants’ motion to strike without prejudice, and grants plaintiff limited leave to 3 amend. 4 I. BACKGROUND 5 The allegations underlying the claims in this matter are described in detail in the Court’s 6 prior orders, and the Court will not repeat them here. Dkt. No. 33 at 2-3; Dkt. No. 42 at 2. In his 7 amended complaint filed on October 4, 2024, Mr. Villegas asserted the following federal claims: 8 unlawful arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment under

against Officer 9 Yasin (claim 5); unlawful search in violation of the Fourth Amendment under

10 against Officer Yasin (claim 6); seizure by wrongful process in violation of the Fourth 11 Amendment under

against Officer Yasin (claim 7(a)); wrongful initiation of 12 process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment under

against Officer Yasin 13 (claim 7(b)); seizure by wrongful process in violation of the Fourth Amendment under 42 U.S.C. 14 § 1983 against Officer Castillo (claim 8(a)); wrongful initiation of process in violation of the 15 Fourteenth Amendment under

against Officer Castillo (claim 8(b)); and Monell 16 liability against the City for unlawful arrest (claim 9). He also asserted the following state claims: 17 false arrest under California law against Officer Castillo, Officer Yasin, and the City (claim 1); 18 interference with the exercise or enjoyment of constitutional rights, under California Civil Code 19 § 52.1 (“the Bane Act”) against Officer Yasin and the City (claim 2); and intrusion into private 20 affairs under California law against Officer Castillo, Officer Yasin, and the City (claim 4). 21 In its January 13, 2025 order, the Court dismissed claims 5, 6, 7(a), 8(a), and 9 without 22 leave to amend. Dkt. No. 42. The Court ordered supplemental briefing on claims 7(b) and 8(b), 23 and deferred ruling on defendants’ motion to dismiss the state claims pending a determination that 24 a federal claim remained in the case. Id. The Court also deferred consideration of defendants’ 25 motion to strike Mr. Villegas’s request for punitive damages against the individual officer 26 defendants pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f). Id. 27 II. LEGAL STANDARD 1 sufficiency of the claims in the complaint. Navarro v. Block,

(9th Cir. 2001). 2 Dismissal is appropriate where there is no cognizable legal theory or an absence of sufficient facts 3 alleged to support a cognizable legal theory.

(citing Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901

(9th Cir. 1990)). In such a motion, all material allegations in the complaint must be 5 taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the claimant.

6 However, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 7 conclusory statements, do not suffice,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009), and “[f]actual 8 allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 9 Twombly,

(2007) (citations omitted). Moreover, the Court is not required to 10 “‘assume the truth of legal conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of factual 11 allegations.’” Prager Univ. v. Google LLC (“Prager I”), No. 17-cv-06064-LHK,

1471939, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2018) (quoting Fayer v. Vaughn,

(9th 13 Cir. 2011) (per curiam)). Nor does the Court accept “allegations that are merely conclusory, 14 unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536

, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008). 16 Rule 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 17 pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This means that the “[f]actual allegations 18 must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly,

19 (citations omitted). However, only plausible claims for relief will survive a motion to dismiss. 20 Iqbal,

. A claim is plausible if the facts pled permit the court to draw a reasonable 21 inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct.

A plaintiff does not have to 22 provide detailed facts, but the pleading must include “more than an unadorned, the-defendant- 23 unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”

. 24 Under Rule 12(f), “[t]he court may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any 25 redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Striking is appropriate where “it is 26 clear that the matter to be stricken could have no possible bearing on the subject matter of the 27 litigation.” Thornton v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, No. 21-cv-02938-SI,

, 1 830 (N.D. Cal. 1992)). 2 III. DISCUSSION 3 A. Federal Claims 4 In support of his two remaining federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983—claims 7(b) and 5 8(b)—Mr. Villegas alleges that Officers Castillo and Yasin included false information in their 6 police reports and that, as a result, prosecutors wrongfully filed criminal charges against him for 7 violations of California Vehicle Code § 23152(a)-(b). Dkt. No. 35 at 12-14. In his prior briefing, 8 Mr. Villegas characterized claims 7(b) and 8(b) as claims for “malicious prosecution,” while 9 asserting that the officers violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights. See Dkt. No. 37 at 8 10 (“Plaintiff properly alleges malicious prosecution . . . .”). The Court construed these claims 11 accordingly, and considered whether Mr. Villegas had stated claims for malicious prosecution 12 based on a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. 13 In its January 13, 2025 order, the Court directed the parties to brief two questions 14 regarding claims 7(b) and 8(b): (1) whether plaintiff is seeking vindication of a procedural or 15 substantive due process right under the Fourteenth Amendment; and (2) “whether plaintiff’s 16 Fourteenth Amendment malicious prosecution claims are cognizable under current Supreme Court 17 and Ninth Circuit precedent; the elements of such a claim; and how the allegations in the amended 18 complaint support or do not support such a claim.” Dkt. No. 42 at 12. 19 1. Substantive or Procedural Due Process? 20 In his supplemental brief, Mr. Villegas asserts that claims 7(b) and 8(b) are based on a 21 procedural due process right “to not have police submit false reports and fabrications of evidence 22 so that . . . a prosecutor [may] use independent discretion on whether or not to bring charges.” 23 Dkt. No. 43 at 1. In Devereaux v. Abbey, the Ninth Circuit recognized a “constitutional due 24 process right not to be subjected to criminal charges on the basis of false evidence that was 25 deliberately fabricated by the government.”

, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2001). The right 26 described in Devereaux is similar to the right Mr. Villegas says he is attempting to vindicate 27 here—i.e., “the right against deliberate fabrication.” Dkt. No. 43 at 2. However, the Ninth Circuit 1 procedural due process. Miranda v. City of Casa Grande,

, 1228 (9th Cir. 2021) 2 (citing Hall v. City of Los Angeles,

(9th Cir. 2012) and Gantt v. City of 3 Los Angeles,

(9th Cir. 2013)) (emphasis added). Mr. Villegas neither cites nor 4 addresses this authority. 5 As defendants observe in their supplemental brief, Mr. Villegas cites no authority to 6 support any claim for malicious prosecution based on a Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural 7 due process. See Dkt. No. 44 at 1-3. 8 2. Does Mr. Villegas State a Cognizable Fourteenth Amendment Claim? 9 In his supplemental brief, Mr. Villegas argues that to state a claim for a violation of “the 10 right against deliberate fabrication,” he must show that: “a state official (1) either misrepresented 11 or omitted the truth; (2) either deliberately or with reckless disregard for the truth; (3) on a matter 12 that was material to the prosecutorial decision.” Dkt. No. 43 at 2 (citing to Spencer v. Peters, 857

(9th Cir. 2017) and an unpublished Ninth Circuit decision, Kando v. City of Long 14 Beach, No. 21-56199,

, at *2 (9th Cir. Apr. 26, 2023)). In response, defendants 15 argue generally that to show a violation of procedural due process, Mr. Villegas must establish 16 “(1) a deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest, and (2) a denial of 17 adequate procedural protections.” Dkt. No. 44 at 1 (quoting U.S. v. 101 Houseco, LLC,

843, 851 (9th Cir. 2022)). They contend that Mr. Villegas has not plausibly alleged the existence 19 of a procedural due process violation based on malicious prosecution.3 20 The Court agrees with defendants that Mr. Villegas has not stated a claim for “malicious 21 prosecution” based on a violation of the procedural due process protections of the Fourteenth 22 Amendment. However, the Court cannot say that Mr. Villegas has not stated any claim at all 23 3 Defendants also cite to Justice Gorsuch’s dissent in Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, Ohio, 602

(2024) for the proposition that due process malicious prosecution claims may be limited by the fact that “when a State provides exactly the tort claim the plaintiff seeks, it provides him 25 with all the process he is due.” Dkt. No. 44 at 2 (quoting Chiaverini, 602 U.S. at 570). Observing that California state law provides a remedy for malicious prosecution, defendants contend that Mr. 26 Villegas should not be permitted to assert the same claims as federal law violations. Id. However, as defendants themselves argued previously, malicious prosecution claims against state officials 27 are barred by California Gov. Code § 821.6, and so state law provides no remedy here. See Dkt. 1 based on a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. On the one hand, it appears 2 that Mr. Villegas is attempting to assert a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim, 3 in view of his reliance on Spencer and repeated references to “fabrication of evidence.” Dkt. No. 4 43 at 2. On the other hand, Mr. Villegas also refers to the elements of a different claim for relief 5 known as “judicial deception.,” which he characterizes as a procedural due process claim. See id. 6 (“The Ninth Circuit on the other hand has considered the question of procedural due process in the 7 form of what they cognize as ‘judicial deception’.”). The elements of a claim for “judicial 8 deception” are: “(1) a misrepresentation or omission (2) made deliberately or with a reckless 9 disregard for the truth, that was (3) material to the judicial decision.” Benavidez v. Cnty. of San 10 Diego,

, 1147 (9th Cir. 2021). 11 In short, even after one opportunity to amend his pleading and another for supplemental 12 briefing, Mr. Villegas has not clearly explained the factual and legal bases for claims 7(b) and 13 8(b). In these circumstances, the amended complaint does not comply in the first instance with 14 Rule 8(a), which requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 15 entitled to relief.” As currently pled, claims 7(b) and 8(b) do not state any claim on which relief 16 may be granted and are dismissed on that basis. As explained below, the Court will give Mr. 17 Villegas one more opportunity to amend these claims. 18 B. State Claims 19 Mr. Villegas asserts three claims under California law in his amended complaint: false 20 arrest, intrusion into private affairs, and violation of the Bane Act, California Civil Code § 52.1. 21 In its prior order dismissing the original complaint, the Court determined that Mr. Villegas failed 22 to state a claim on any of these three bases but granted him leave to amend. Dkt. No. 33 at 14-18, 23 20. The Court deferred consideration of these amended claims in its January 13, 2025 order on 24 defendants’ motion to dismiss the amended complaint. Dkt. No. 42. As the Court has determined 25 that Mr. Villegas should have the opportunity to amend his remaining federal claims, the Court 26 now considers the sufficiency of the remaining state law claims. 27 1. Claim 1: False Arrest 1 arrested him under California law and that Officer Castillo aided and abetted this unlawful arrest. 2 Dkt. No. 35 at 8-9. He asserts that the City is vicariously liable for the officers’ conduct. Id. In 3 its order on defendants’ original motion to dismiss, the Court found that the state law false arrest 4 claim failed for the same reasons his federal law unlawful arrest claim also failed: the facts alleged 5 by Mr. Villegas support the existence of probable cause for the arrest on the face of the complaint. 6 Dkt. No. 33 at 14-15. 7 In its January 13, 2025 order, the Court determined that the amended complaint did not 8 cure these deficiencies and dismissed Mr. Villegas’s federal unlawful arrest claim without leave to 9 amend. Dkt. No. 42 at 4-6. With respect to his federal unlawful arrest claim, the Court observed:

10 Mr. Villegas does not explain why the additional allegations regarding details of his interactions with the officers, including his 11 refusal to perform any field sobriety tests, require a different result. 12 Even assuming he was less intoxicated and his motor skills were less impaired than the defendant in Lively, see Dkt. No. 37 at 4, 5-6, 13 probable cause to arrest exists when a reasonable officer in the position of Officer Yasin could have determined there was a fair 14 probability of a violation of § 647(f). Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty.,

(9th Cir. 2012). At the time of Mr. Villegas’s arrest, 15 Officer Yasin observed that Mr. Villegas appeared to be intoxicated 16 and was behind the wheel of a vehicle with its engine running. These observations, coupled with Mr. Villegas’s admission that he 17 was too drunk to drive, clearly support a finding of probable cause to conclude Mr. Villegas was unable to exercise due care for others’ 18 safety, if not his own, and was in violation of § 647(f). Thus, Mr. Villegas fails to plausibly allege that he was unlawfully arrested. 19 20 Id. at 6. 21 Mr. Villegas contends that under California state law, the elements of false arrest are 22 simply: (1) Mr. Villegas was arrested without a warrant, (2) Mr. Villegas suffered harm, and (3) 23 defendants’ conduct was a substantial factor in causing that harm. Dkt. No. 35 at 8 (citing 24 California Civil Jury Instructions (CACI) 1401). In California, it is true that “[i]n a civil action for 25 false arrest, once a plaintiff establishes an arrest without a warrant, followed by imprisonment and 26 damages, the burden shifts to the defendant to show a justification for the arrest.” Levin v. United 27 Air Lines, Inc.,

(2008), as modified (Jan. 14, 2008); see also CACI 1 appropriate for consideration at the motion to dismiss stage, such defenses are appropriately raised 2 when “obvious on the face of a complaint.” Rivera v. Peri & Sons Farms, Inc.,

, 902 3 (9th Cir. 2013). Here, there is no factual dispute as to the circumstances known to the officers at 4 the time of the arrest: the officers found Mr. Villegas asleep in his car with the engine running and, 5 upon awakening, Mr. Villegas showed signs of intoxication and acknowledged being too drunk to 6 drive. See Levin,

(“If the facts that gave rise to the arrest are 7 undisputed, the issue of probable cause is a question of law for the trial court.”). The 8 circumstances demonstrating probable cause are thus apparent from the face of the amended 9 complaint and may be considered by the Court in resolving defendants’ motion to dismiss. 10 The Court concludes that Mr. Villegas has not cured the deficiencies in his claim of false 11 arrest under California law. As Mr. Villegas has already been afforded an opportunity to amend 12 this claim, the Court determines that further amendment would be futile. Claim 1 is therefore 13 dismissed with prejudice. 14 2. Claim 2: Bane Act 15 In his amended complaint, Mr. Villegas again asserts that the officers4 interfered with his 16 right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment by falsely 17 arresting him and compelling him to submit to a breath test by threatening “long term revocation 18 of his license.” Dkt. No. 35 at 9-10. He asserts that such interference is prohibited by California 19 Civil Code § 52.1, the Bane Act. Id. 20 As discussed supra, Mr. Villegas fails to state a claim for false arrest; therefore, to the 21 extent his Bane Act claim is premised on an alleged false arrest, this claim fails. See Dkt. No. 33 22 at 16. Regarding the allegations of an unlawful search, as the Court previously found, requiring a 23 suspect to submit to a breath test as a search incident to a lawful arrest in the circumstances 24 presented here does not violate the Fourth Amendment, in view of the Supreme Court’s decision 25 in Birchfield v. North Dakota,

(2016). Id.; see also People v. Macabeo,

27 4 Claim 2 names Officer Yasin and the City but Officer Castillo is also included in the allegations. 1 1206, 1218 (Cal. 2016) (“If an actual arrest takes place, a search incident to that arrest is allowed 2 if it is supported by federal Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, more restrictive state law 3 notwithstanding.”). Because Mr. Villegas has not pled a cognizable violation of his Fourth 4 Amendment rights, any Bane Act claim premised on such a violation fails. 5 Mr. Villegas has already been afforded an opportunity to amend this claim, and the Court 6 determines that further amendment would be futile. Claim 2 is therefore dismissed with prejudice. 7 3. Claim 4: Invasion of Privacy 8 In his amended complaint, Mr. Villegas once again alleges that Officers Castillo and Yasin 9 intruded on his “reasonable expectation of privacy in his blood alcohol level” when they 10 “intentionally arrested [Mr. Villegas] without probable cause for the purpose of using California’s 11 implied consent statute to obtain access [to that information].” Dkt. No. 35 at 11.5 Mr. Villegas 12 does not offer any argument in support of this claim in his opposition to defendants’ motion to 13 dismiss. See generally Dkt. No. 37. As the Court previously concluded, “the California 14 Constitution does not appear to supply a basis for an independent claim for ‘invasion of privacy’,” 15 i.e. it does not provide for protections beyond what is protected by the Fourth Amendment in the 16 search and seizure context. Dkt. No. 33 at 18 (citing In re York,

(1995)). 17 Because Mr. Villegas has failed to state a claim for false arrest and unlawful search, Mr. Villegas 18 similarly has failed to state a claim that the breath test administered by the officers was in 19 violation of his privacy rights. 20 As Mr. Villegas has already been given leave to amend, the Court concludes that further 21 amendment would be futile. Claim 4 is dismissed with prejudice. 22 C. Punitive Damages 23 In his amended complaint, Mr. Villegas seeks an award of punitive damages against 24 Officers Castillo and Yasin. Dkt. No. 35 at 15-16. Defendants argue that Mr. Villegas’s amended 25 complaint fails to state facts showing oppression, fraud, or malice, and seeks an order striking his 26 request for punitive damages on this basis. Dkt. No. 36 at 25. 27 1 Punitive damages are available for claims asserted under

where “the 2 defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves 3 reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.” Smith v. Wade, 461

(1983). Under California law, punitive damages may be available under California 5 Civil Code § 3294 where “there is clear and convincing evidence that the defendant was guilty of 6 oppression, fraud, or malice.” Murphy v. Boehm, No. C 13-02406 WHA,

, at 7 *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2013); see

(c)(1)-(3) (defining “malice,” “fraud,” 8 and “oppression”). 9 Here, Mr. Villegas alleges that both Officer Castillo and Officer Yasin engaged in acts of 10 fraud or deception with respect to claims 7(b) and 8(b). While the Court grants defendants’ 11 motion to dismiss these claims, Mr. Villegas will be permitted to amend them. If Mr. Villegas can 12 assert viable claims for relief based on the existing factual allegations, he may also be able to 13 assert a basis for punitive damages. The Court declines to strike the request for punitive damages 14 at this time. Mr. Villegas may amend and reassert this request if he chooses to assert claims 7(b) 15 and 8(b) in a second amended complaint. 16 D. Leave to Amend 17 Rule 15(a) provides that leave to amend “should be freely given when justice so requires,” 18 and “the court must remain guided by the underlying purpose of Rule 15 . . . to facilitate decision 19 on the merits, rather than on the pleadings or technicalities.” Lopez v. Smith,

, 1127 20 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quotations and citations omitted). “The decision of whether to grant 21 leave to amend nevertheless remains within the discretion of the district court,” which may deny 22 leave to amend if allowing amendment would unduly prejudice the opposing party, cause undue 23 delay, or be futile, or if the party seeking amendment has acted in bad faith. Leadsinger, Inc. v. 24 BMG Music Publ’g,

(9th Cir. 2008) (citing Foman v. Davis,

, 182 25 (1962)). 26 Because it is possible that Mr. Villegas may be able to amend his claims 7(b) and 8(b) to 27 plead plausible claims for relief, the Court will permit him to amend those claims, and only those 1 factual allegations that support the claims and the legal theory on which he relies.° Neither the 2 Court nor defendants should have to speculate about what Mr. Villegas’s claims are. 3 || IV. CONCLUSION 4 For the reasons stated above, the Court grants in part and denies in part defendants’ motion 5 to dismiss and motion to strike as follows: 6 1. Claims 7(b) and 8(b) are dismissed with leave to amend. 7 2. Claims 1, 2, and 4 are dismissed with prejudice. 8 3. The Court denies defendants’ motion to strike Mr. Villegas’s request for punitive 9 damages, without prejudice. 10 If Mr. Villegas chooses to amend claim 7(b) or claim 8(b), he must file a second amended 11 complaint no later than May 9, 2025. a 12 IT IS SO ORDERED.

13 || Dated: April 18, 2025

© 2 &

Virgirffa K. DeMarchi A 16 United States Magistrate Judge

17

Z 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 © A further amended complaint may not include legal argument.