1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8

9 SERGEY FIRSOV, Case No. 25-cv-02841 NC 10 Plaintiff, ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE: 11 v. FEDERAL SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 12 ALASKA AIRLINES, INC., RE: ECF 1 13 Defendant. 14 15 In this civil case, Plaintiff Sergey Firsov seeks reimbursement of a $100 pet fee he 16 paid to defendant Alaska Airlines in connection with a multi-leg international airplane trip 17 he took in March 2025. ECF 1 (Complaint). The Alaska Airlines flight, from Los Angeles 18 to San Jose, was the last leg of the trip. ECF 1. The Complaint asserts two causes of 19 action: (1) “Montreal Convention”; and (2) breach of contract. Firsov pursues his case 20 without an attorney. 21 In an earlier Order the Court denied Firsov’s application to proceed without paying 22 the Court filing fee. ECF 6. A further hearing on Firsov’s fee waiver application is set for 23 April 23, 2025, at 11:00 a.m. in San Jose courtroom number 5. 24 This Order discusses a second procedural hurdle for Firsov’s case: federal subject 25 matter jurisdiction. Federal law requires the Court to ensure it has subject matter 26 jurisdiction before it hears the case, even if the parties do not raise the issue. Here, as 27 explained further below, it does not appear that the allegations in the Complaint are 1 address this by filing a first amended complaint (or, if he believes the Court’s analysis to 2 be incorrect, by filing supplemental briefing) by May 16, 2025. 3 “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. 4 Co. of Am.,

(1994). A federal court has an independent duty to 5 determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over a case. Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 6

(2006). The parties cannot waive or forfeit this requirement.

The 7 party bringing the case in federal court (here, Plaintiff Firsov) has the responsibility of 8 proving that there is subject matter jurisdiction. See Leite v. Crane Co.,

, 9 1121 (9th Cir. 2014). If a federal court determines that it does not have subject matter 10 jurisdiction, it must dismiss the case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); Brooks v. Geico Ins., No. 11 23-cv-05085 RFL,

, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2023). 12 There are two common ways to establish federal subject matter jurisdiction under 13 statute: (1) diversity jurisdiction,

, and (2) federal question jurisdiction, 14

. In this case, Firsov’s Complaint indicates that subject matter jurisdiction 15 is satisfied by a federal question. ECF 1. “Federal district courts have original federal 16 question jurisdiction of actions ‘arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the 17 United States.’” Sullivan v. First Affiliated Securities, Inc.,

(9th Cir.) 18 (quoting

). Generally, under the “well-pleaded complaint rule,” a claim 19 “arises under” federal law only if a federal question appears on the face of Plaintiff's 20 complaint. See ARCO Environmental Remediation, L.L.C. v. Department of Health & 21 Environmental Quality of Montana,

(9th Cir. 2000); see also 22 Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams,

(1987) (“The party who brings the suit is 23 master to decide what law he will rely upon”); Franchise Tax Board v. Construction 24 Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern California,

, (1983) (“federal 25 courts have jurisdiction to hear, originally or by removal, only those cases in which a well- 26 pleaded complaint establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the 27 plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of 1 The specific “federal question” that Firsov asserts is under the Montreal 2 || Convention, Article 1, Paragraph 3. ECF 1. The “Montreal Convention” is an 3 || international treaty also known as the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for 4 International Carriage by Air, May 28, 1999, S. Treaty Doc. No. 106-45 (2000),

|| 33292734 (2000); see Nankin v. Continental Airlines, Inc., No. 09-cv-7861 MMM (RZx), 6

, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2010). Article I, Paragraph 3 of the Montreal 7 || Convention provides that “This paragraph establishes that carriage to be performed by 8 several successive carriers (i.e., inter-line operations), even if performed under multiple 9 || contracts (tickets or air waybills), is treated as undivided carriage if the carrier and the 10 || passenger or consignor considered it as such. Therefore, if in international carriage, even a 11 |} segment performed exclusively within the same State would fall within the scope of the 12 |} Convention.” But what Firsov’s complaint does not explain is how the failure to 13 || reimburse a $100 pet fee by Alaska Airlines violates the Montreal Convention. In his 14 || second claim, Firsov asserts that the Montreal Convention requires Alaska to “accept dog 15 |} in cabin without any charge” but does not explain where the Montreal Convention creates Z 16 |} this right and gives him a remedy for the alleged violation. 5 17 In conclusion, Plaintiff Firsov is ordered to file a first amended complaint or a 5 18 || writing explaining how federal subject matter is satisfied. The first amended complaint or 19 || written response to this Order must be filed by May 16, 2025. Firsov is cautioned that if 20 || he does not timely respond the Court will recommend the dismissal of his case. Firsov is 21 || guided to the free legal resources available for self-represented litigants at the Federal Pro 22 || Se Help Desk, telephone 408.297.1480. 23 IT IS SO ORDERED. 24 25 || Dated: April 18, 2025 NATHANAEL M. COUSINS 26 United States Magistrate Judge 27 28