1 2 3 4 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 ARASH FERDOWSI, et al., Case No. 24-cv-04644-MMC

8 Plaintiffs, ORDER DISMISSING ACTION 9 v. WITHOUT PREJUDICE

10 JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., et al., Defendants. 11

12 13 The above-titled action consists of (1) plaintiffs Arash Ferdowsi and Arash 14 Ferdowsi Revocable Trust's (collectively, "Ferdowsi") complaint against JPMorgan

Bank, N.A. ("Chase Bank") and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"), as 16 Receiver for First Republic Bank ("FDIC-R"), and (2) the FDIC-R's counterclaims against 17 Ferdowsi. By order filed March 26, 2025 ("March 26 Order"), the Court directed the 18 parties to show cause why said action should not be dismissed in its entirety for lack of 19 subject matter jurisdiction. Now before the Court are the responses to the March 26 20 Order, filed by, respectively, Ferdowsi, Chase Bank, and the FDIC-R. Having read and 21 considered the parties' responses, the Court rules as follows. 22 As set forth in greater detail in the March 26 Order, Ferdowsi instituted with the 23 Financial Industry Regulatory Authority ("FINRA") an arbitration proceeding against 24 JPMorgan Private Wealth Advisors LLC ("JPMPWA") and JPMorgan Securities LLC 25 ("JPMS") (collectively, "JPM Wealth"), as well as against Arif Ahmed ("Ahmed"), based 26 on Ferdowsi's claims that said respondents, unbeknownst to Ferdowsi, placed him into 27 investments that allowed them to collect excessive fees. 1 Republic Bank, which bank was placed into receivership, and Ahmed was, at least 2 according to the FDIC-R, an employee of First Republic Bank. The FDIC-R asserts, and 3 Ferdowsi has not disagreed, that claims against First Republic Bank must be pursued by 4 way of an administrative claim against the FDIC-R. The parties dispute, however, 5 whether Ferdowsi's claims against JPW Wealth and Ahmed, which are based in part on 6 conduct that occurred prior to the date on which First Republic Bank was placed into 7 receivership, can only be made against the FDIC-R. In that regard, Ferdowsi, in his 8 complaint, seeks a finding that his claims need not be brought against the FDIC-R, 9 whereas the FDIC-R, in its counterclaims, seeks a finding that Ferdowsi's claims can only 10 be brought against the FDIC-R. 11 In its March 26 Order, the Court directed the parties to show cause why the instant 12 action should not be dismissed, given that the arbitration hearing is set to begin in 13 December 2025, the arbitrator has yet to decide whether the claims asserted against 14 JPM Wealth and Ahmed can only be asserted against the FDIC-R, and Ninth Circuit 15 authority strongly counsels against court intervention in ongoing arbitration proceedings. 16 See, e.g., In re Sussex,

(9th Cir. 2015) (noting Ninth Circuit has 17 "never" approved of district court intervention in ongoing arbitration proceedings). 18 In his response to the March 26 Order, Ferdowsi does not express any 19 disagreement with the analysis set forth in said Order. Indeed, Ferdowsi agrees that his 20 complaint can be dismissed without prejudice, so long as the counterclaims likewise are 21 dismissed. The Court thus turns to the responses by Chase Bank and the FDIC-R, each 22 of which objects to dismissal of the counterclaims. 23 Chase Bank and the FDIC-R, each citing a number of cases, rely on the general 24 principle that district courts have the authority to determine whether an arbitration has 25 been properly instituted. The issues raised in the cited cases, however, concern whether 26 a party named in an arbitration proceeding is, in fact, a party to an arbitration agreement 27 or, alternatively, whether a claim asserted in an arbitration proceeding is outside the 1 3721197, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 22, 2014) (enjoining defendant from pursuing arbitration 2 where contract signed by parties did not contain arbitration clause); AT&T Mobility LLC v. 3 Bernardi,

, at *4, *8-*11 (N.D. Cal. October 26, 2011) (enjoining 4 defendant from continuing to pursue arbitration where claims asserted therein were 5 outside scope of agreement and agreement gave court, rather than arbitrator, authority to 6 decide whether dispute fell within scope of arbitration agreement). Here, by contrast, 7 there is no contention that either JPM Wealth or Ahmed is not subject to an arbitration 8 agreement or that the claims raised before FINRA, i.e., claims arising from asserted 9 mismanagement of Ferdowsi's investments, do not fall within the language of the 10 arbitration agreement. 11 Chase Bank and the FDIC-R next cite cases in which the question of whether an 12 asserted claim could only be brought against the FDIC was heard by a federal court. In 13 particular, Chase Bank and the FDIC-R rely primarily on Benson v. JPMorgan

Bank, N.A.,

(9th Cir. 2012), in which the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district 15 court's dismissal of claims asserted against a bank that, under the circumstances 16 presented therein, could only be brought against the FDIC. See

. In Benson, 17 however, the decision to dismiss the claims was made in the only forum in which the 18 claims were pending and, consequently, no issue as to standing and/or ripeness existed. 19 Other cases in which the Ninth Circuit has determined whether a claim asserted against a 20 defendant other than the FDIC could only be asserted against the FDIC likewise involved 21 a defendant that was responding to claims the plaintiff was exclusively asserting in district 22 court. See, e.g., West Park Associates v. Butterfield Savings & Loan Ass'n,

(9th Cir. 1995) (holding, under circumstances presented therein, district 24 court erred in finding plaintiffs' claims against subsidiaries of failed bank were claims 25 plaintiff was required to bring against FDIC); Shaw v. Bank of America,

, 26 538-41 (9th Cir. 2019) (affirming dismissal of claims against trustee of loan; holding, 27 under circumstances presented therein, district court properly found plaintiff was required 1 arbitrator may not resolve such question when it is raised as a defense in an arbitration 2 || proceeding, and, as noted, the Ninth Circuit has "never" found it appropriate for a district 3 || court to "intervenf[e] in an ongoing arbitration" for purposes of deciding an issue pending 4 || therein. See Sussex,

. 5 Accordingly, for the reasons stated in the March 26 Order and above, the instant 6 || action is hereby DISMISSED, without prejudice. 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. 8 9 || Dated: April 24, 2025 : INE M. CHESNEY 10 United States District Judge 11 12

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