1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 NICHOLE LEA NOYER, No. 2:21-cv-2158 AC 11 Plaintiff, 12 v. ORDER 13 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 14 15 Defendant. 16 17 Plaintiff sought judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 18 (“Commissioner”), denying his application benefits under the Social Security Act (“the Act”). 19 On March 24, 2023, the court reversed and remanded the action to the Commissioner. ECF 20 Nos. 16, 17. Now pending before the court is plaintiff’s March 26, 2025 motion for an award of 21 attorney’s fees pursuant to

(b). ECF No. 20. Defendant has not opposed the fee 22 request. For the reasons set forth below, the motion will be granted. 23 I. REASONABLENESS OF FEE REQUEST 24 At the outset of the representation, plaintiff and his counsel entered into a contingent-fee 25 agreement. ECF No. 20-3. Pursuant to that agreement plaintiff’s counsel now seeks attorney’s 26 fees in the amount of $30,354.43, which represents 25% of the retroactive disability benefits 27 received by plaintiff on remand, for 28.2 hours of attorney time expended on this matter. ECF 28 No. 20 at 5. 1 Attorneys are entitled to fees for cases in which they have successfully represented social 2 security claimants: 3 Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under this subchapter who was represented before the court by an attorney, 4 the court may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent of 5 the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment, and the Commissioner of Social Security 6 may . . . certify the amount of such fee for payment to such attorney out of, and not in addition to, the amount of such past-due benefits. 7 8

(b)(1)(A). “In contrast to fees awarded under fee-shifting provisions such as 42

, the fee is paid by the claimant out of the past-due benefits awarded; the losing 10 party is not responsible for payment.” Crawford v. Astrue,

(9th Cir. 2009) 11 (en banc) (citing Gisbrecht v. Barnhart,

(2002)). The goal of fee awards under 12 § 406(b) is “‘to protect claimants against “inordinately large fees” and also to ensure that 13 attorneys representing successful claimants would not risk “nonpayment of [appropriate] fees.”’” 14 Parrish v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,

(9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Gisbrecht, 15

). 16 The 25% statutory maximum fee is not an automatic entitlement, and the court must 17 ensure that the fee requested is reasonable. Gisbrecht,

(“406(b) does not 18 displace contingent-fee agreements within the statutory ceiling; instead, § 406(b) instructs courts 19 to review for reasonableness fees yielded by those agreements”). “Within the 25 percent 20 boundary . . . the attorney for the successful claimant must show that the fee sought is reasonable 21 for the services rendered.” Id. at 807. “[A] district court charged with determining a reasonable 22 fee award under § 406(b)(1)(A) must respect ‘the primacy of lawful attorney-client fee 23 arrangements,’ ‘looking first to the contingent-fee agreement, then testing it for reasonableness.’” 24 Crawford,

(quoting Gisbrecht,

). 25 In determining whether the requested fee is reasonable, the court considers “‘the character 26 of the representation and the results achieved by the representative.’” Crawford,

27 (quoting Gisbrecht,

). In determining whether a reduction in the fee is warranted, 28 the court considers whether the attorney provided “substandard representation or delayed the 1 case,” or obtained “benefits that are not in proportion to the time spent on the case.”

Finally, 2 the court considers the attorney’s record of hours worked and counsel’s regular hourly billing 3 charge for non-contingent cases. Crawford,

-52 (citing Gisbrecht,

808); see also, E.D. Cal. R. 293(c)(1) (in fixing attorney’s fees the court considers “the time and 5 labor required”). Below, the court will consider these factors in assessing whether the fee 6 requested by counsel in this case pursuant to

(b) is reasonable. 7 Here, plaintiff’s counsel is an experienced attorney who secured a successful result for 8 plaintiff. There is no indication that a reduction of fees is warranted due to any substandard 9 performance by counsel. There is also no evidence that plaintiff’s counsel engaged in any 10 dilatory conduct resulting in excessive delay. The court finds that the $30,354.43 fee, which does 11 not exceed 25% of the amount paid in past-due benefits paid to plaintiff, is not excessive in 12 relation to the benefits awarded. In making this determination, the court recognizes the 13 contingent fee nature of this case and counsel’s assumption of the risk of going uncompensated in 14 agreeing to represent plaintiff on such terms. See Crawford,

(“[t]he attorneys 15 assumed significant risk in accepting these cases, including the risk that no benefits would be 16 awarded or that there would be a long court or administrative delay in resolving the cases”). 17 Finally, counsel has submitted a detailed billing statement in support of the requested fee. ECF 18 No. 20-4. 19 Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, the court concludes that the fees sought by 20 counsel pursuant to § 406(b) are reasonable. 21 II. OFFSET FOR EAJA FEES 22 An award of § 406(b) fees must be offset by any prior award of attorney’s fees granted 23 under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”).

; Gisbrecht,

. 24 Here, plaintiff’s attorney was previously awarded $6,604.69 in EAJA fees. See ECF No. 19. 25 Counsel therefore must remit that amount to plaintiff. 26 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 27 1. Plaintiff’s Motion for attorney Fees under

(b) (ECF No. 20), is 28 GRANTED; 1 2. Counsel for plaintiff is awarded $30,354.43 in attorney’s fees under § 406(b); the 2 || Commissioner shall certify that amount to be paid to counsel from the funds previously withheld 3 || for the payment of such fees; and 4 3. Counsel for plaintiff is directed to remit to plaintiff the amount of $6,604.69 for EAJA 5 || fees previously paid to counsel by the Commissioner. 6 || DATED: April 30, 2025 ~ 7 Lhar—e_ ALLISON CLAIRE 8 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 9 10 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28