1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 11

12 KYLE ROGER HARRISON, Case No.: 24-cv-2369-BEN 13 Plaintiff,

14 v. 15 ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 16 FLOYD M. WILLOUGHBY, et al., AND DISMISSING COMPLAINT 17 PURSUANT TO

(e) Defendants. 18 19 20 21 Plaintiff, a non-prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a proposed Complaint and a 22 motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), rather than paying the regular 23 filing fee as required by

(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s 24 failure to prepay the entire fee only if the plaintiff is granted leave to proceed IFP 25 pursuant to

(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook,

(9th Cir. 26 1999). This Court finds Plaintiff’s affidavit of no assets is sufficient to show he is unable 27 to pay the fees or post securities required to maintain this action. Accordingly, the Court 28 grants Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP. 1 Sua Sponte Screening per

(e)(2) 2 A complaint filed by any person proceeding IFP pursuant to

(a) is 3 subject to a mandatory and sua sponte review and dismissal by the court to the extent it is 4 frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks 5 monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. Lopez v. Smith,

(9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Prior to its amendment by the Prison Litigation 7 Reform Act, the former

(d) permitted sua sponte dismissal of only 8 frivolous and malicious claims.

. The newly enacted

(e)(2), 9 however, mandates that the court reviewing a complaint filed pursuant to the IFP 10 provisions of section 1915 make and rule on its own motion to dismiss before directing 11 that the complaint be served by the U.S. Marshal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2). 12 Lopez,

(“[S]ection 1915(e) not only permits, but requires a district court to 13 dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim.”); see also Barren v.

F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting the “the language of § 15 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).”). 16 Plaintiff says that he is a resident of Manitowoc, Wisconsin. Plaintiff’s new 414- 17 page Complaint is a rehash of his 2018 lawsuit filed in the United States District Court 18 for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. In that case, Plaintiff alleged a wide-ranging 19 conspiracy among various family members, companies, and Illinois state court judges 20 and lawyers to steal his farmland, pocket his trust income, and threaten him into silence 21 through a “sham” criminal prosecution. The district court dismissed the case based on a 22 frivolity review under

(e) finding the claims barred by the Rooker- 23 Feldman doctrine. See Harrison v. Moultrie County Illinois, slip op., Case No. 18-C- 24 0957 (E.D. Wisc. Nov. 12, 2018). On appeal, the case was mostly affirmed, remanding 25 only the claim for malicious prosecution to be stayed while the state prosecution case 26 continued -- based on the Younger v. Harris abstention doctrine. See Harrison v. 27 Moultrie County, Illinois, Appeal No. 18-3694 (7th Cir. May 20, 2019) (unpublished). In 28 2024, the Eastern District of Wisconsin noted that the Illinois criminal case remained 1 open – primarily because Plaintiff Harrison remains a fugitive with an Illinois state 2 warrant for his arrest outstanding. Consequently, the Eastern District Court continued to 3 stay his civil case under Younger. See Harrison v. Moultrie County Illinois, slip op., 4 Case No. 18-C-0957 (E.D. Wisc. May 30, 2024). Recently, that decision was also upheld 5 on appeal. See Harrison v. Moultrie County, Illinois, Appeal No. 24-2074 (7th Cir. Oct. 6 21, 2024) (unpublished). In affirming, the appeals court surmised that Plaintiff may be 7 trying to improperly manipulate the federal courts. The Seventh Circuit observed, “[b]y 8 placing himself outside of Illinois’s reach in the state criminal case, Harrison may be 9 attempting to manipulate that proceeding through this federal litigation . . . [and] 10 Harrison is now forcing the federal courts to stay on the sidelines indefinitely.”

. 11 It concluded that “[u]nder these circumstances, the district court need not keep this case 12 lingering on its docket. . . .”

. 13 In passing § 1915(e), Congress was well aware that “a litigant whose filing fees 14 and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic 15 incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.” Denton v. 16 Hernandez,

(1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams,

, 324 17 (1989)). Consequently, Congress included subsection (e), which allows the courts to 18 dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint if the action is frivolous, or malicious, or fails to 19 state a claim for relief.

Denton recognized that “the statute’s instruction that an 20 action may be dismissed if the court is “satisfied” that it is frivolous indicates that 21 frivolousness is a decision entrusted to the discretion of the court entertaining the in 22 forma pauperis petition.” Id. at 33. 23 The doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, bars the re-litigation of “any 24 claims that were raised or could have been raised” in a prior action. Owens v. Kaiser 25 Found. Health Plan, Inc.,

(9th Cir. 2001). The doctrine applies to in 26 forma pauperis decisions as well as others. Denton,

(a §1915 dismissal 27 “could, however, have a res judicata effect on frivolousness determinations for future in 28 forma pauperis petitions.”) (citation omitted). The decision to dismiss and stay Plaintiff’s 1 claims in the Eastern District of Wisconsin, affirmed on appeal, has res judicata effect on 2 many, if not all, of the same claims Plaintiff brings here. 3 Consequently, in this case, Plaintiff’s claims are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a 4 claim, are barred by the doctrine of res judicata, or would be barred by the Rooker- 5 Feldman doctrine. Moreover, any claim that survived would be indefinitely stayed 6 pursuant to the Younger abstention doctrine until Plaintiff submits himself to the 7 jurisdiction of the Illinois criminal courts. 8 Given these circumstances, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint should be 9 dismissed under §1915(e)(2). 10 Conclusion 11 For these reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed 12 IFP is granted. The Complaint is dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend. 13 See Lopez v. Smith,

(9th Cir. 2000) (“When a case may be 14 classified as frivolous or malicious, there is, by definition, no merit to the underlying 15 action and so no reason to grant leave to amend.”). The Clerk of Court shall enter 16 judgment accordingly and close this case. 17 IT IS SO ORDERED. 18 DATED: May 2, 2025 ___________________________________ Hon. Roger T. Benitez 19 United States District Judge 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28