1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DAVID PIERRE-JONES, Case No.: 1:24-cv-00904-KES-CDB (PC) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 13 v. (Doc. 33) 14 JEREMY DEFRANCO, 15 Defendant.

16 17 Plaintiff David Pierre-Jones (“Plaintiff”) is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this 18 civil rights action pursuant to

. This action proceeds on Plaintiff’s Eighth 19 Amendment deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claim against Defendant Jeremy 20 DeFranco. (Doc. 5). 21 I. BACKGROUND 22 On December 30, 2024, the Court issued its Discovery and Scheduling Order. (Doc. 23). 23 On May 5, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion for appointment of counsel. (Doc. 33). The Court deems 24 a response by Defendant to be unnecessary before ruling on the motion. 25 II. DISCUSSION 26 A. Applicable Legal Standards 27 Plaintiffs do not have a constitutional right to appointed counsel in section 1983 actions. Rand v. Rowland,

(9th Cir. 1997), rev’d in part on other grounds,

, 954 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998). Nor can the Court require an attorney to represent a party under 28

(e)(1). See Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Ct.,

(1989). However, in 3 “exceptional circumstances,” the Court may request the voluntary assistance of counsel pursuant 4 to section 1915(e)(1). Rand,

. 5 Given that the Court has no reasonable method of securing and compensating counsel, the 6 Court will seek volunteer counsel only in extraordinary cases. In determining whether “exceptional 7 circumstances exist, a district court must evaluate both the likelihood of success on the merits [and] 8 the ability of the [plaintiff] to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal 9 issues involved.” Rand,

(internal quotation marks & citations omitted). 10 B. Analysis 11 First, the Court must evaluate the likelihood of Plaintiff’s success on the merits of his 12 claims. Rand,

. Although Plaintiff’s complaint was screened and Defendant has 13 filed an answer to the complaint, a likelihood of success on the merits determination is not the same 14 as that required at screening. At screening, the Court is tasked with determining whether a plaintiff 15 has sufficiently and plausibly alleged a cause of action or claim entitling the plaintiff to relief. 16 Further, the merits of the allegations are not tested, for the Court is to consider factual allegations 17 to be true for purposes of screening. A merits-based determination largely is premature as 18 discovery is ongoing in this action, particularly given Plaintiff’s conclusory argument that his 19 “allegations, if proved, could clearly establish a constitutional violation.” (Doc. 33 at 6). 20 Next, the Court must also evaluate Plaintiff’s ability to articulate his claims pro se in light 21 of the complexity of the legal issues involved. Rand,

. In this case, the Court 22 notes that Plaintiff’s filings reflect he is logical and articulate. (See, e.g., Docs. 1, 33); see LaMere 23 v. Risley,

(9th Cir. 1987) (affirming district court’s denial of request for 24 appointment of counsel, where pleadings demonstrated petitioner had “a good understanding of the 25 issues and the ability to present forcefully and coherently his contentions”). Further, neither the 26 claims asserted nor the relevant events and transactions are complex. See Bonin v. Vasquez, 999

, 428–29 (9th Cir. 1993) (while Plaintiff may have limited knowledge of the law, the Court 1 presence of counsel”); Wilborn v. Escalderon,

(9th Cir. 1986) (explaining that 2 “[a]lthough discovery was essential … the need for such discovery does not necessarily qualify the 3 issues involved as ‘complex’”). Indeed, an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious 4 medical needs claim such as that presented here is not complex. See Maldanado v. Merritt, No. 5 1:23-cv-00482-JLT-SKO (PC),

, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2023) (“Eighth 6 Amendment deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claims are not complex”); Lane v. 7 Beach, No. 1:20-cv-00147-JLT-GSA (PC),

, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2023) 8 (same); Ireland v. Solano Cnty. Jail, No. CV-08-2707-LRS,

, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 9 26, 2010) (same). In short, the Court finds Plaintiff able to articulate his claims in light of their 10 complexity. 11 To the extent Plaintiff relies upon his indigency and incarceration to support his motion, 12 those circumstances do not qualify as exceptional circumstances warranting the appointment of 13 counsel. See Dijkstra v. Campos, No. 1:21-cv-01223-HBK,

, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 14 25, 2022) (“Plaintiff’s indigence does not qualify ‘as an exceptional circumstance in a prisoner civil 15 rights case’”); Gipbsin v. Kernan, No. 2:12-cv-0556 KJM DB P,

, at *2 (E.D. Cal. 16 Jan. 25, 2021) (“Plaintiff’s inability to afford counsel has no bearing on either his likelihood of 17 success on the merits or his ability to articulate his claims pro se”); Robinson v. Cryer, No. 1:20- 18 cv-00622-HBK (PC),

, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2021) (“Although Plaintiff is 19 proceeding pro se and is incarcerated, he faces the same obstacles all pro se prisoners face”). 20 Callender v. Ramm, No. 2:16-cv-0694 JAM AC P,

, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 21 2018) (“The law is clear: neither plaintiff’s indigence, nor his lack of education, nor his lack of 22 legal expertise warrant the appointment of counsel”); Galvan v. Fox, No. 2:15-CV-01798-KJM 23 (DB),

, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2017) (same). 24 Further, Plaintiff is advised the fact an attorney may be better able to perform research, 25 investigate, and represent Plaintiff during trial does not amount to an exceptional circumstance. 26 Rand,

(finding no abuse of discretion under

(e) when district 27 court denied appointment of counsel despite fact that pro se prisoner “may well have fared better- 1 | Escalderon,

(9th Cir. 1986) (same); Ricks v. Austria, No. 1:15-cv-01147- 2 | BAM (POC),

, at *2 (E.D. Cal. May 2, 2016) (while a pro se litigant may be better 3 | served with the assistance of counsel were the case to proceed to trial, the court need not appoint 4 | counsel if plaintiff can articulate his claims and exceptional circumstances do not exist); Thornton 5 | v. Schwarzenegger, No. 1OCV01583 BTM RBB,

, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2011) 6 | (explaining that “[fJactual disputes and anticipated cross-examination of witnesses do not indicate 7 | the presence of complex legal issues warranting a finding of exceptional circumstances”). 8 The test is not whether Plaintiff would benefit from the appointment of counsel; the test is 9 | whether exceptional circumstances exist. Here, no exceptional circumstances exist warranting the 10 || appointment of counsel. 11 | IN. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 12 Accordingly, for the reasons given above, it is HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs 13 | motion for appointment of counsel (Doc. 33) is DENIED. 14 | IT IS SO ORDERED. ' | Dated: _May 12, 2025 | Wr bo 16 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28