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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10

11 KAI LIU and JASON L. CARBONNEAU, Case No.: 2:25-cv-01215-MEMF-AS individually, and on behalf of all others 12 similarly situated, ORDER GRANTING REQUEST FOR 13 JUDICIAL NOTICE [ECF NO. 15-1] AND Plaintiffs, DENYING MOTION TO REMAND 14 v. [ECF NO. 10]

15 SEALY, INC.; and DOES 1 through 10, 16 inclusive,

17 Defendants. 18 19 20

21 22 Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand, ECF No. 10, and Defendants’ Request for 23 Judicial Notice, ECF No. 15-1. For the reasons stated herein, the Court hereby GRANTS the 24 Request and DENIES the Motion. 25 26 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 INTRODUCTION 2 I. Background1 3 A. Factual Allegations2 4 Plaintiffs Kai Liu and Jason Carbonneau (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) were hourly, non-exempt 5 employees for Sealy, Inc. (“Defendant” or “Sealy”; together with Does 1-10, “Defendants”) from 6 approximately September 2019 through approximately January 2024 and from approximately July 7 2021 through approximately February 2024, respectively. Compl. ¶ 9–10. Both Liu and Carbonneau 8 are California residents. Id. Defendants are business entities with their principal place of business in 9 Los Angeles, California. Id. ¶¶ 12. As Sealy employees, Liu and Carbonneau typically worked in 10 excess of eight hours in a workday and typically worked at least five days in a workweek. Id. ¶ 16. 11 Due to certain policies, practices, or procedures, Plaintiffs suffered various California Labor 12 Code (“Labor Code”) and California Business and Professional Code violations. Id. ¶¶ 17–23. 13 II. Procedural History 14 Plaintiffs filed suit in Los Angeles County Superior Court on July 24, 2024. See ECF No. 1- 15 4. Plaintiffs bring one claim under the Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”), alleging numerous 16 Labor Code violations and Industrial Welfare Commission (“IWC”) Orders. In particular, Plaintiffs 17 allege that Defendants: (1) failed to pay minimum wages; (2) failed to pay overtime compensation; 18 (3) failed to provide uninterrupted meal periods; (4) failed to authorize and permit rest breaks; (5) 19 failed to indemnify necessary business expenses; (6) failed to timely pay final wages; (7) failed to 20 provide accurate itemized wages statements; and (8) engaged in unfair business practices. See 21 generally Compl. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of other similarly situated hourly, non-exempt 22 Sealy employees. Id 23 Defendants filed an Answer to the Complaint on July 24, 2024. See ECF No. 1-7. Defendants 24 removed the action to this Court on February 12, 2025, based on

federal question 25 jurisdiction. See ECF No. 1 (“NOR”). Plaintiffs filed the instant motion to remand on March 14,

26 1 Plaintiffs filed a related lawsuit against Defendants asserting claims for identical wage and hour violations 27 alleged in the instant case. See Kai Liu et al v. Sealy Inc. et al, No. 2:24-cv-05490-MEMF-AS. 2 The following factual background is derived from the allegations in Plaintiffs’ Complaint, ECF No. 1, Ex.1 28 (“Complaint” or “Compl.”), except where otherwise indicated. The Court makes no finding on the truth of 1 2025. ECF No. 10 (“Motion” or “Mot.”). Defendants filed their opposition on March 28, 2025. ECF 2 No. 15 (“Opposition” or “Opp’n”). In support of their Opposition, Defendants filed a request for 3 judicial notice. ECF No. 15-1. Plaintiffs filed their reply on April 3, 2025. ECF No. 17 (“Reply”). 4 On May 8, 2025, the Court held a hearing on the Motion after circulating its tentative order. 5 At the hearing, counsel for the Plaintiffs indicated that Plaintiffs wished to submit on the tentative. 6 REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE [ECF NO. 15-1] 7 Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b) allows a court to take judicial notice of facts that are not 8 subject to reasonable dispute because they “(1) [are] generally known within the trial court’s 9 territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy 10 cannot be reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). Adjudicative facts that may be judicially 11 noticed include “undisputed matters of public record,” which differs from “disputed facts stated in 12 public records.” Lee v. City of Los Angeles,

(9th Cir. 2001), overruled on other 13 grounds by Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara,

, 1125–26 (9th Cir. 2002). Documents 14 on file in federal and state court are undisputed matters of public record and therefore appropriate for 15 judicial notice. Harris v. Cnty. of Orange,

(9th Cir. 2012) 16 Defendants request this Court take judicial notice of the following documents in support of 17 the Opposition: 18 1. The collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) with the Communication Workers of 19 America/ International Union of Electronic, Electrical, Salaried, Machine and Furniture 20 Workers, Furniture Workers Division, Local 262, AFL-CIO in effect for employees at 21 Sealy’s Richmond, California location from May 1, 2023, through April 30, 2026 (ECF 22 No. 1-2, Ex. A), 23 2. The CBA with the Communications Workers of America, PPMWS, IUE, TNG, AFL-CIO, 24 CLC in effect for employees at Sealy’s City of Industry, California location from October 25 16, 2022, through October 15, 2026 (ECF No. 1-2, Ex. C), 26 27 28 1 3. The 2025 Industrial Welfare Commission California Minimum Wage Order MW-2025 2 (ECF. No. 13-5),3 and 3 4. The California Commercial Driver License of Plaintiff Kai Liu [redacted] (ECF No. No. 4 13-6). 5 See ECF No. 15-1. They also request that this Court take judicial notice of the minimum wage rates 6 for the years 2023, 2024, and 2025, which are set forth within the IWC Order MW-2025.

The 7 request is unopposed. 8 The Court may take judicial notice of California IWC Wage Orders as well as Plaintiff Liu’s 9 California Commercial Driver License. See City of Sausalito v. O’Neill,

, 1223 n.2 10 (9th Cir. 2004) (“We may take judicial notice of a record of a state agency not subject to reasonable 11 dispute.”) (citations omitted). 12 Because Plaintiff neither opposes Defendants’ request nor disputes the validity of the CBAs, 13 the Court finds both documents appropriate for judicial notice. See, e.g., Morris v. Clark Pac., No. 14 2:20-CV-01291 WBS,

, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2020) (taking judicial notice of 15 CBA where plaintiff did “not dispute the authenticity of the CBA, that he was a member of the 16 Union, or that he was a covered employee according to the terms of the CBA when the allegations in 17 his complaint took place”). As such, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ request and takes judicial 18 notice of these records. 19 MOTION TO REMAND [ECF NO. 10] 20 I. Applicable Law 21 A. Timeliness of Removal under

(b) 22 Title

(b)(1) requires a defendant to file a notice of removal “within 30 days 23 after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading, 24 setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is based.” However, “if the 25 case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice of removal may be filed within 30 days 26 after receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, 27

28 3 The Court refers to the CBAs in the singular for simplicity’s sake for the remainder of this Order. 1 motion, order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or 2 has become removable.”

(b)(3).4 The removal of class actions are governed by 28

. See

(b) (“A class action may be removed to a district court of the 4 United States in accordance with section 1446.”). 5 The Ninth Circuit has clarified that “notice of removability under § 1446(b) is determined 6 through examination of the four corners of the applicable pleadings, not through subjective 7 knowledge or a duty to make further inquiry.” Harris v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co.,

, 694 8 (9th Cir. 2005). Thus, “[i]f no ground for removal is evident” in the initial pleading, “the case is not 9 removable at that stage.”

(internal quotation marks omitted). When that is the case, “the notice of 10 removal may be filed within thirty days after the defendant received an amended pleading, motion, 11 order or other paper from which it may be ascertained from the face of the document that removal is 12 proper.”

(internal quotation marks omitted). The time to remove under the second 30-day starts 13 when “a paper makes a ground for removal unequivocally clear and certain.” Dietrich v. Boeing Co., 14

(9th Cir. 2021). 15 B. Federal Question Jurisdiction Under Section 301 Complete Preemption 16 A defendant may remove a state action to federal court if the federal court would have 17 original subject matter jurisdiction over the action.

. Federal courts have original 18 jurisdiction over “all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 19 States.”

. 20 Removal of a state action may be based on diversity or federal question jurisdiction. City of 21 Chi. v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons,

(1997). A defendant who removes a case from state 22 court bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction. Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chem. Co., 23

(9th Cir. 2006). Failure to satisfy this burden militates remand. Kelton Arms 24 Condo. Owners Ass’n, Inc. v. Homestead Ins. Co.,

(9th Cir. 2003) (citation 25 omitted). 26 27

28 4 The Court refers to the subsequent removal window under § 1446(b)(3) as the “second 30-day window” for 1 When determining whether an action involves a federal question, “a [district] court applies 2 the well-pleaded complaint rule.” Moore-Thomas v. Ala. Airlines, Inc.,

(9th 3 Cir. 2009) (internal citations and quotations omitted). That rule provides that a federal question 4 exists only when a “federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded 5 complaint.” Retail Prop. Tr. v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am.,

(9th 6 Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, “a case may not be removed to federal 7 court on the basis of a federal defense, including the defense of pre-emption, even if the defense is 8 anticipated in the plaintiff’s complaint, and even if both parties concede that the federal defense is 9 the only question truly at issue’”

(quoting Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams,

, 393 10 (1987)). Therefore, a “plaintiff can generally ‘avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on 11 state law.’” City of Oakland v. BP PLC,

(9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Caterpillar, 482 12 U.S. at 392). A plaintiff may not, however, defeat removal by simply omitting necessary federal 13 questions. JustMed, Inc. v. Byce,

(9th Cir. 2010). 14 i. Complete Preemption 15 Complete preemption is an “independent corollary to the well-pleaded complaint rule.” 16 Retail Prop.,

(internal quotation marks omitted). The doctrine “posits that there are 17 some federal statutes that have such ‘extraordinary pre-emptive power’ that they ‘convert[] an 18 ordinary state common law complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the well- 19 pleaded complaint rule.’”

(quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v Taylor,

(1987)). 20 “‘When a plaintiff raises . . . a completely preempted state-law claim in his complaint, a court is 21 obligated to construe the complaint as raising a federal claim and therefore arising under federal 22 law.’”

(quoting Sullivan v. Am. Airlines, Inc.,

, 272 (2d Cir. 2005)). Like the well- 23 pleaded complaint rule, complete preemption is “applicable to removal jurisdiction only; it is not a 24 doctrine of defensive preemption.” Id. 25 To support a finding of complete preemption, the preemptive force of the federal statute at 26 issue must be “extraordinary.” Metro. Life Ins. Co.,

. For this reason, the doctrine is 27 narrowly construed. Holman v. Laulo-Rowe Agency,

(9th Cir. 1993). The 28 Supreme Court has deemed § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”),

185, which displaces any state cause of action for contracts violations between an employer and a 2 labor organization, one of the “extraordinary” statutes where Congress “has manifested an intent to 3 convert state-law claims into federal-question claims.”

(citations omitted); City of 4 Oakland,

(internal quotation marks omitted).5 5 Because Section 301’s preemptive force extends to “questions relating to what the parties to 6 a labor agreement agreed, and what legal consequences were intended to flow from breaches of that 7 agreement,” Section 301 preempts a state law claim so “inextricably intertwined” with the terms of a 8 labor contract that resolution of the claim will require judicial interpretation of those terms. Allis- 9 Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck,

, 210–11 (1985). It bears noting that “not every dispute 10 concerning employment, or tangentially involving a provision of a collective-bargaining agreement, 11 is pre-empted by § 301.” Id. at 211. When a state law provides rights that cannot be waived or 12 modified by private contract, and if the rights can be enforced without resort to the express or 13 implied terms of the contract, Section 301 preemption is inapplicable to claims brought under the 14 relevant state law. Id. at 212 (“In extending the pre-emptive effect of § 301 beyond suits for breach 15 of contract, it would be inconsistent with congressional intent under that section to preempt state 16 rules that proscribe conduct, or establish rights and obligations, independent of a labor contract”); 17 see also Miller v. AT & T Network Sys.,

, 545–46 (9th Cir. 1988). 18 The Ninth Circuit has articulated a two-part test to determine whether state law claims are 19 preempted by LMRA Section 301. Burnside v. Kiewit Pac. Corp.,

, 1059–60 (9th Cir. 20 2007). First, the Court must determine whether the claim seeks “purely to vindicate a right or duty 21 created by the CBA itself.” Curtis v. Irwin Indus., Inc.,

(9th Cir. 2019) (internal 22 quotation marks omitted). If the right exists solely under the collective bargaining agreement 23 (“CBA”), then the claim is preempted; no further analysis is required.

. But if not, the 24 Court must then assess “whether a plaintiff’s state law right is substantially dependent on analysis of 25 the CBA, which turns on whether the claim cannot be resolved by simply looking to versus 26 interpreting the CBA.”

(emphasis added). “At this second step, claims are only preempted to the 27 5 The Court notes the other two “extraordinary” statutes—§ 502(a) of the Employee Retirement Income 28 Security Act (ERISA),

(a) and §§ 85 and 86 of the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. 85, 86— 1 extent there is an active dispute over ‘the meaning of contract terms.’” Id. (quoting Livadas v. 2 Bradshaw,

(1994)). A state law claim may avoid preemption if it does not raise 3 questions about the scope, meaning, or application of the CBA. Curtis,

(citations 4 omitted). 5 ii. PAGA Penalties 6 PAGA provides for the recovery of civil penalties for violations of the Labor Code. Cal. Lab. 7 Code § 2699. In other words, PAGA claims are based on underlying Labor Code violations. The Act 8 provides in pertinent part:

9 For all provisions of this code except those for which a civil penalty is specifically provided, there is established a civil penalty for a violation of these provisions as 10 follows:

11 (1) If, at the time of the alleged violation, the person does not employ one or more employees, the civil penalty is five hundred dollars ($500). 12 (2) If, at the time of the alleged violation, the person employes one or more employees, the civil penalty is as follows: 13 (A) One hundred dollars ($100) for each aggrieved employee per pay period. 14 15

. 16 III. Discussion 17 A. Timely Notice of Removal 18 Plaintiffs argue that Defendants failed to file the NOR within the statutory deadline. More 19 specifically, they argue that Defendants were aware that the Complaint presented a potential federal 20 question yet waited over six months to remove this case. See Mot. at 13. Plaintiffs further assert that 21 even if the Complaint did not trigger the initial 30-day removal window, Defendants’ second 30-day 22 removal window was initiated by their possession or filing of other papers throughout the course of 23 litigation. See Reply at 2. They underscore Defendants’ (1) possession of the CBA at issue, (2) 24 Answer to the Complaint, and (3) Case Management Statement in the PAGA state action, indicating 25 Defendants’ belief that the Complaint is subject to preemption, all triggered the 30-day removal 26 window under § 1446(b). See Id. at 4. The Court addresses these arguments in turn. 27 The Ninth Circuit has made clear that it “will not charge defendants with notice of 28 removability until [they have] received a paper that gives them enough information to remove.” 1 Kenny v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,

(9th Cir. 2018) (emphasis added). “[N]otice of 2 removability under § 1446(b) is determined through examination of the four corners of the 3 applicable pleading[], not through subjective knowledge or a duty to make further inquiry. Harris, 4

. “If no ground for removal is evident in that pleading, … the notice of removal may 5 be filed within thirty days after the defendant receives an amended pleading, motion, order or other 6 paper from which it can be ascertained from the face of the document that removal is proper.” Id. 7 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). 8 The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ Complaint did not provide sufficient ground to trigger 9 Defendants’ first 30-day removal window. On its face, the Complaint alleges no breach of the CBA 10 or federal rights. See generally Compl. In fact, the CBA is not mentioned in the Complaint 11 whatsoever. Id. Harris dictates that “the ground for removal must be revealed affirmatively in the 12 initial pleading in order for the thirty-day clock under § 1446(b) to begin.”

. And 13 Defendants are under no obligation to inquire beyond the face of the Complaint to identify whether it 14 raised a federal question. As the Ninth Circuit has explained “even if a defendant could have 15 discovered grounds for removability through investigation, it does not lose the right to remove 16 because it did not conduct such an investigation.” Roth v. CHA Hollywood Med. Ctr., L.P.,

(9th Cir. 2013). As such, the Complaint did not provide notice of removability. 18 The Court is also unpersuaded by Plaintiffs’ arguments that Defendants received “a copy of 19 an amended pleading, motion, order, or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the 20 case is one which is or has become removable.” See

(b)(3). Defendants’ own prior 21 possession of the CBA and the Answer concern Defendants’ subjective knowledge. They do not 22 clarify whether Defendants were put on notice of removability by Plaintiffs. See Roth,

1126 (holding that a “defendant’s knowledge cannot convert a non-removable action into a 24 removable one such that the thirty-day time limit of § 1446(b)(1) or (b)(3) begins to run against the 25 defendant”); see also Dietrich,

(9th Cir. 2021) (holding defendant’s grounds for 26 removal were not “unequivocally clear and certain” until the plaintiff identified the grounds for 27 removal). Defendants’ Case Management Statement also fails to trigger the second 30-day window. 28 Plaintiffs do not assert that at the time the Case Management Statement was made, Defendants 1 received any paper, amended pleading or otherwise, that provided unequivocal notice that there was 2 a basis for removability. Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendants’ NOR was timely filed under 3 § 1446(b) and § 1446(b)(3). 4 B. Federal Question Jurisdiction 5 Plaintiffs move to remand on the ground that Defendants fail to meet their burden to establish 6 that the PAGA action is preempted under § 301 of the LMRA (“Section 301”). Plaintiffs argue that 7 removal is inappropriate here because the wage and hour violations underlying the PAGA claim 8 arise wholly under state law, and the Complaint makes no allegations whatsoever regarding 9 violations of the CBA. See Mot. at 8. Plaintiffs also argue that no interpretation of the CBA’s 10 provisions or terms is required to resolve the PAGA claim, thus the rights at issue do not 11 substantively depend on analysis of the CBAs. Id. at 9–11. Relatedly, Plaintiffs emphasize that any 12 reliance on the CBA or Labor Code exemption under Section 514 to justify preemption are, in 13 reality, affirmative defenses that do not support preemption under Section 301. Id. at 11. 14 Defendants argue that the PAGA claim is preempted under Section 301 because underlying 15 Labor Code violations are preempted. See Opp’n at 11. Defendants also assert that any portion of the 16 PAGA claim that is not preempted under Section 301 is subject to supplemental jurisdiction. Id. at 17 21–22. 18 i. Failure to Pay Overtime 19 Plaintiffs’ PAGA is predicated, in part, on their allegation that Defendants failed to pay the 20 overtime compensation to which they were entitled under Labor Code Section 510. Compl¶ 6.6 That 21 statute sets forth the requirement that overtime work be compensated at a higher rate than an 22 employee’s regular rate of pay.

. Labor Code Section 514 provides an overtime 23 exemption where a CBA “expressly provides for the wages, hours of work, and working conditions 24 of the employees, and if the agreement provides premium wage rates for all overtime hours worked 25 and regular hourly rate of pay for those employees of not less than 30 percent more than the state 26

27 6 The parties do not dispute that Plaintiffs’ PAGA claim is preempted under Section 301 when the underlying Labor Code claims are preempted. See Curtis,

n.3 (noting that the PAGA claim was 28 derivative of the predicate Labor Code violations, including an overtime claim, and could only succeed if the 1 minimum wage.”

. Defendants argue that the overtime requirements of Section 2 510 do not apply to Plaintiffs’ overtime allegation here because the criteria for the overtime 3 exemption under Labor Code Section 514 are satisfied by Plaintiffs’ CBA. Opp’n at 12–13. 4 Plaintiffs do not contest that the CBA in this case qualifies under Section 514. Rather, they argue 5 that the Complaint alleges a single cause of action based solely on violations of state law that does 6 not substantively depend on interpretating the CBA. See Mot. at 8. Plaintiffs also contend that any 7 analysis of the CBA “has no import” on whether Defendants violated state law.

. 8 The Court finds that Curtis governs here. In Curtis, the Ninth Circuit explicitly held that if a 9 plaintiff’s CBA meets the requirements of Section 514, their claim for overtime pay is controlled by 10 their CBA, and their right to overtime exists “solely as a result of the CBA.”

11 (quoting Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg'l Med. Ctr.,

(9th Cir. 2016)). Like the 12 plaintiffs in Curtis, the Plaintiffs’ CBA here meets the requirements of Section 514. The CBA 13 provided for wages hours and working conditions, ECF No. 1-2 at 5–9, 14, 22–23, 73–76, overtime 14 premium wage rates for all overtime hours worked,

at 8–9, and it prescribes regular hourly rates 15 of pay of not less than 30% more than the state minimum wage rates during the claim period, ECF 16 No 13–5. As such, Plaintiffs’ PAGA claim, as it relates to the unpaid overtime Labor Code violation, 17 is preempted under the first step of the preemption analysis because the CBA satisfies the 18 requirements of Labor Code Section 514. 19 Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish Curtis because that case concerned a motion to dismiss and 20 the plaintiff in Curtis, unlike here, conceded the applicability of the CBA. See Reply at 4–5, 8–9. 21 The Court finds such arguments unavailing. Plaintiffs offer no reason why these distinctions are 22 relevant to the preemption analysis or the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Curtis. See

23 (“Thus, if a CBA satisfies the requirements of section 514, the requirements of section 510(a) do not 24 apply.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 25 Plaintiffs also argue that Defendants have not provided any evidence of the employees’ 26 actual wage rates through pay records. See Reply at 9. The Court is unpersuaded and makes no 27 findings as to whether Plaintiffs were paid or not. Curtis clarifies that what is relevant for the 28 purposes of the Labor Code Section 514 preemption analysis is whether the CBA satisfies the 1 criteria set forth in that statutory provision. As discussed above, it is clear that CBA in this case meet 2 those requirements. 3 Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ PAGA claim arises from the CBA, not state law, and the claim is 4 therefore preempted by Section 301. As a result, this Court must construe their Complaint as having 5 raised a federal claim, providing this Court with federal question jurisdiction. See Retail Prop., 768 6 F.3d at 947 (“Once an area of state law has been completely pre-empted, any claim purportedly 7 based on that pre-empted state law is considered, from inception, a federal claim, and therefore 8 arises under federal law.”) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 9 ii. Supplemental Jurisdiction 10 Federal courts “have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to 11 claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or 12 controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.”

(a). 13 The Court finds that the remaining predicate labor violation claims derive from the same 14 common nucleus of operative fact as Plaintiffs’ unpaid overtime allegation. As such, the Court will 15 exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the entire PAGA action. Kuba v. 1-A Agr. Ass’n,

(9th Cir. 2004) (“Nonfederal claims are part of the same case as federal claims when they derive 17 from a common nucleus of operative fact and are such that a plaintiff would ordinarily be expected 18 to try them in one judicial proceeding.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).7 19 CONCLUSION 20 For the foregoing reasons, the Court ORDERS as follows: 21 1. The Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice is GRANTED; 22 2. The Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand is DENIED; 23 3. The parties are ORDERED to meet and confer with respect to Plaintiffs’ stated intention 24 to seek leave to amend their complaint; 25

26 7 At the hearing, counsel for the Plaintiffs inquired as to whether the Court would be willing to remand the matter if the unpaid overtime claim was dismissed. The Court declined to provide an advisory opinion on this 27 issue given that, as stated, the Court has not reached the question of whether the other claims are preempted by Section 301. Counsel for the Plaintiffs also asked that the Court grant Plaintiffs leave to amend the 28 complaint. The Court declined to grant leave in the absence of a stipulation or a fully briefed motion seeking 1 4. The parties are ORDERED to meet and confer with respect to whether and how the 2 Court should address the parties’ remaining disputes about Section 301 preemption with 3 respect to the other claims—either through the pending Motion for Judgment on the 4 Pleadings, ECF No. 13, or through a renewed Motion to Remand should the complaint 5 be amended, or through some other mechanism. 6 5. The parties are ORDERED to meet and confer regarding Defendants’ counsel’s conflict 7 with the current hearing date on the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, ECF No. 22; 8 and 9 6. The parties are ORDERED to submit a joint statement to the Court on the foregoing 10 issues by Friday, May 16, 2025. 1] 12 IT IS SO ORDERED.

14 Dated: May 9, 2025 15 MAAME EWUSI-MENSAH FRIMPONG 16 United States District Judge 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28