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4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 6 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 RATANA HAMILTON, Case No. 1:21-cv-01337-SAB 8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER’S 9 MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES v. PURSUANT TO

(b) 10 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, (ECF Nos. 32, 33) 11 Defendant. 12 13 Petitioner Bryan Konoski (“Petitioner”), attorney for Ratana Hamilton (“Plaintiff”), filed 14 the instant motion for attorney fees on April 29, 2025. Petitioner requests fees in the amount of 15 $27,330.80 pursuant to

(b)(1). Plaintiff did not file an opposition, or otherwise 16 respond to the motion, and the time to do so has passed. On May 1, 2025, Defendant Social 17 Security Commissioner, as a de facto trustee for Plaintiff, filed a response to Petitioner’s motion 18 providing an analysis of the fee request. 19 I. 20 BACKGROUND 21 Plaintiff filed a complaint challenging the denial of social security benefits on September 22 7, 2021. (ECF No. 1.) On January 6, 2023, a stipulation for voluntary remand was filed. (ECF 23 No. 25.) The Court entered judgment in Plaintiff’s favor and the action was remanded the same 24 day. (ECF Nos. 26, 27.) On April 20, 2023, Plaintiff was awarded attorney fees pursuant to the 25 Equal Access to Justice Act,

(d) (“EAJA”) in the amount of $10,000 at the 26 stipulation of the parties. (ECF No. 31.) 27 On remand, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was disabled as of January 1, 2015, and Plaintiff was awarded benefits in the amount of $131,695.00. (ECF No. 32-2 at 4-5.) The Commissioner 1 withheld $32,923.75 from the past-due benefits for attorney fees. This amount equals 25 percent 2 of the retroactive benefit award. (Id. at 5.) Petitioner has previously received payment of 3 $10,000 in EAJA fees. (ECF No. 32.) In the instant motion, Petitioner seeks an award of 4 attorney’s fees in the amount of $27,330.80, reduced by $10,000.00, for a net total fee of 5 $17,330.80. (ECF No. 32.) 6 II. 7 LEGAL STANDARD 8 In relevant part,

(b)(1)(A) provides that when a federal court “renders a 9 judgment favorable to a claimant . . . who was represented before the court by an attorney,” the 10 court may allow reasonable attorney fees “not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due 11 benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment.” The payment of such 12 award comes directly from the claimant’s benefits.

(b)(1)(A). 13 The Supreme Court has explained that a district court reviews a petition for section 14 406(b) fees “as an independent check” to assure that the contingency fee agreements between the 15 claimant and the attorney will “yield reasonable results in particular cases.” Gisbrecht v. 16 Barnhart,

(2002). The district court must respect “the primacy of lawful 17 attorney-client fee agreements,” and is to look first at the contingent-fee agreement, and then test 18 it for reasonableness.” Crawford v. Astrue,

(9th Cir. 2009). The twenty- 19 five percent maximum fee is not an automatic entitlement, and courts are required to ensure that 20 the requested fee is reasonable. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808–09 (“§ 406(b) does not displace 21 contingent-fee agreements within the statutory ceiling; instead, § 406(b) instructs courts to 22 review for reasonableness fees yielded by those agreements”). Agreements seeking fees in 23 excess of twenty-five percent of the past-due benefits awarded are not enforceable. Crawford, 24

. The attorney has the burden of demonstrating that the fees requested are 25 reasonable. Gisbrecht,

; Crawford,

. 26 In determining the reasonableness of an award, the district court should consider the 27 character of the representation and the results achieved. Gisbrecht,

. Ultimately, 1

. The Ninth Circuit has identified several factors that a district court can examine under 2 Gisbrecht in determining whether the fee was reasonable. In determining whether counsel met 3 his burden to demonstrate that the requested fees are reasonable, the court may consider (1) the 4 standard of performance of the attorney in representing the claimant; (2) whether the attorney 5 exhibited dilatory conduct or caused excessive delay which resulted in an undue accumulation of 6 past-due benefits; and (3) whether the requested fees are excessively large in relation to the 7 benefits achieved when taking into consideration the risk assumed in these cases. Crawford, 586 8 F.3d at 1151. 9 III. 10 DISCUSSION 11 The Court has conducted an independent check to insure the reasonableness of the 12 requested fees in relation to this action. Gisbrecht,

. Here, the fee agreement 13 between Plaintiff and Petitioner provides for an attorney fee for “equal to twenty-five percent 14 (25%) of the past-due benefits that are awarded… for work performed in connection with federal 15 court litigation.” (Fee Agreement, ECF No. 32-2 at 10.) Plaintiff has been awarded benefits 16 from March 2018 through January 2025 in the amount of $131,695.00. (ECF No. 32-2 at 5.) In 17 determining the reasonableness of the fees requested, the Court is to apply the test mandated by 18 Gisbrecht. 19 There is no indication that a reduction of fees is warranted for substandard performance. 20 Petitioner is an experienced, competent attorney who secured a successful result for Plaintiff. 21 Although this action does involve nearly seven years of backpay, there is no indication that 22 Petitioner was responsible for any substantial delay in the court proceedings. Plaintiff agreed to 23 a 25 percent fee at the outset of the representation and Petitioner seeks $27,330.80,1 which is 24 approximately 21 percent of the backpay award. The $27,330.80 fee is not excessively large in 25 relation to the past-due award of $131,695.00. In making this determination, the Court 26 1 The Court notes Petitioner repeatedly requests $27,330.80, reduced by $10,000.00, for a net total fee of 27 $17,330.80. However, the Court agrees with Defendant that the Court should follow the proper practice of awarding Petitioner the total requested fee and ordering that Petitioner reimburse Plaintiff with the $10,000 that she received 1 recognizes the contingent nature of this case and Petitioner’s assumption of the risk of going 2 uncompensated. Hearn v. Barnhart,

(N.D. Cal. 2003). 3 In support of the motion, Petitioner submits a log of the time spent in prosecuting this 4 action. (Time Sheet for Bryan Konoski (BK); Rachel Thomasson (RT), ECF No. 32-2 at 13.) 5 The log demonstrates that Petitioner spent 63.9 hours on this action. (Id.) When considering the 6 total amount requested by Petitioner, the fee request translates to approximately $427.71 per 7 hour for Petitioner’s services in this action. Recently, this Court approved a comparable hourly 8 rate for work completed before this court in a Social Security appeal. See Clark v. Comm'r of 9 Soc. Sec., No. 1:22-CV-01139-SAB,

, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2024) 10 (awarding fee request that translated to $509.09 per hour); Kelton v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 11 1:21-CV-00917-SAB,

, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2024) (awarding fee request 12 that translated to $500 per hour). Further, in Crawford, the appellate court found that fees nearly 13 twice as much—$875 and $902 per hour for time of both attorneys and paralegals—were not 14 excessive. Crawford, 486 F.3d at 1152 (dissenting opinion). Since Gisbrecht, courts note that 15 reducing a fee request is dicey business and find fee awards much higher than that instantly 16 requested by Petitioner to be reasonable. Williams v. Berryhill, No. EDCV 15-919-KK, 2018

, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2018) (awarding fee request that provides an hourly rate 18 of $1,553.36 per hour); Coles v. Berryhill, No. EDCV 14-1488-KK,

, at *3 19 (C.D. Cal. June 21, 2018) (effective hourly rate of $1,431.94 reasonable under the 20 circumstances); Palos v. Colvin, No. CV 15-04261-DTB,

, at *2 (C.D. Cal. 21 Sept. 20, 2016) (fees sought translate to $1,546.39 per hour for attorney and paralegal services); 22 see also Villa v. Astrue, No. CIVS-06-0846 GGH,

, at *1, n.1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 23 2010) (“In practice, the more efficient counsel is in court, the higher will be the hourly fee 24 amount represented in a § 406 fee award.”) 25 The Court finds that the requested fees are reasonable when compared to the amount of 26 work Petitioner performed in representing Plaintiff in court. Petitioner’s representation of the 27 claimant resulted in the action being remanded for further proceedings and ultimately benefits 1 The award of Section 406(b) fees is offset by any prior award of attorney fees granted 2 | under the EAJA.

; Gisbrecht,

. In this instance, Petitioner has 3 | previously been awarded $10,000.00 in EAJA fees and the award of fees under Section 406(b) 4 | must be offset in that amount. The Court does not, as Petitioner requests, award Counsel a net 5 | fee of $17,330.80. Petitioner is awarded attorney’s fees in the amount of $27,330.80 and shall be 6 | ordered to reimburse Plaintiff the $10,000 in fees she previously received under the EAJA. 7 VI. 8 CONCLUSION AND ORDER 9 For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that the fees sought by Petitioner pursuant to 10 | Section 406(b) are reasonable. Gisbrecht,

. However, an award of Section 11 | 406(b) fees must be offset by any prior award of attorneys’ fees granted under the EAJA. 28 12 | U.S.C. § 2412(d); Gisbrecht,

. Because Plaintiff was previously awarded 13 | $10,000.00 in fees pursuant to the EAJA, Counsel shall refund this amount to Plaintiff. 14 | Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 15 1. Petitioner’s motion for an award of attorney fees pursuant to

(b) 16 in the amount of $27,330.80 (ECF No. 32) is GRANTED; 17 2. The funds SHALL be paid to Petitioner out of the funds withheld by the Social 18 Security Administration; 19 3. After payment of fees, any remaining funds being held by the Administration 20 SHALL be released to Plaintiff Ratana Hamilton; and 21 4. Petitioner is ordered to refund $10,000 to Plaintiff Ratana Hamilton as an offset 22 for EAJA fees previously awarded pursuant to

(d). 23 24 IT IS SO ORDERED. F- 2 ee 25 | Dated: _ May 21, 2025 " STANLEY A. BOONE 26 United States Magistrate Judge 27 28