Elghembri v. Doe, Dentist
Elghembri v. Doe, Dentist
Trial Court Opinion
1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 AHMED MOHAMED ELGHEMBRI, Case No. 24-cv-02771-WHO (PR)
Plaintiff, 8 ORDER OF DISMISSAL v. 9
10 JANE DOE, DENTIST, et al., Defendants. 11
12 13 INTRODUCTION 14 Plaintiff Ahmed Mohamed Elghembri alleges that the refusal of unnamed dentists at 15 San Quentin State Prison to give him a filling constituted deliberate indifference under the 16 Eighth Amendment. His first amended
42 U.S.C. § 1983complaint containing these 17 allegations is now before me for review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 18 Elghembri has failed to state any claim for relief. He thought that he should have 19 his tooth filled; the dentists’ opinion was that the tooth had to be pulled rather than filled 20 and offered to perform that procedure. Elghembri refused the offer. At most, this amounts 21 to a difference of medical opinion concerning the need to pursue one course of treatment 22 over another, which is insufficient as a matter of law to establish deliberate indifference. 23 This civil rights action is DISMISSED. 24 DISCUSSION 25 A. Standard of Review 26 A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a 27 prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a 1 cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim 2 upon which relief may be granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune 3 from such relief. See id. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. 4 See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t,
901 F.2d 696, 699(9th Cir. 1988). 5 A “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 6 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678(2009) 7 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570(2007)). “A claim has facial 8 plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 9 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id.(quoting 10 Twombly,
550 U.S. at 556). Furthermore, a court “is not required to accept legal 11 conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably 12 be drawn from the facts alleged.” Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network,
18 F.3d 752, 754–55 13 (9th Cir. 1994). 14 To state a claim under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential 15 elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was 16 violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the 17 color of state law. See West v. Atkins,
487 U.S. 42, 48(1988). 18 B. Legal Claims 19 i. Original Complaint 20 In the original complaint, Elghembri alleged that the refusal of unnamed dentists 21 (John and Jane Doe) in March 2023 to give a broken tooth a filling constituted deliberate 22 indifference under the Eighth Amendment. (Compl., Dkt. No. 1 at 6-7.) The dentists 23 insisted that the only treatment was extraction of the tooth, a procedure they offered to 24 perform, but Elghembri refused. (Id. at 6.) He alleged that in April 2023 another dentist, 25 Dr. Herrera, gave the same diagnosis. (Id. at 7.) Elghembri did not list Herrera as a 26 defendant. He did name the supervising dentist, Theodore Ng, as a defendant, but alleged 27 no specific facts against him. (Id. at 1-2.) 1 I dismissed the complaint with leave to amend because these allegations amounted 2 || to at most a difference of medical opinion on the need to pursue one course of treatment 3 over another. This is insufficient, as a matter of law, to establish deliberate indifference. 4 || Toguchi v. Chung,
391 F.3d 1051, 1058, 1059-60(9th Cir. 2004). It is not that the dentists 5 refused to treat his painful tooth; rather, Elghembri disliked and refused the treatment they 6 || offered. 7 I also explained that Ng cannot be held responsible merely for being the supervisory 8 || dentist, as there is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983, see Taylor v. List, 9 ||
880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). To show that Ng was liable, Elghembri had to allege 10 || facts showing that Ng was an integral participant in the allegedly unlawful conduct. 11 || Keates vy. Koile,
883 F.3d 1228, 1241(9th Cir. 2018). ii. First Amended Complaint 5 13 The first amended complaint also fails to state any claim for relief. Elghembri S 14 || restates the same facts, which still amount to at most a difference of medical opinion about 3 15 || the need to pursue one course of treatment over another. This is insufficient, as a matter of a 16 || law, to establish deliberate indifference. Toguchi,
391 F.3d at 1058, 1059-60. He 3 17 || mentions Herrera but specifically states that he is not a defendant in this action. (First Am. 18 Compl., Dkt. No. 16.) Even if Herrera were a defendant, it is clear that no claim has been 19 || stated against him. The same holds true for Elghembri’s repeated allegations against 20 || unnamed supervisory defendants. 21 CONCLUSION 22 This federal civil rights action is DISMISSED for failure to state a claim for relief. 23 || The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of defendants and close the file. 24 IT IS SO ORDERED. 25 Dated: June 4, 2025 . \f *6 27 United States District Judge 28
Reference
- Status
- Unknown