1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 PARKER DUANE DONAHUE, Case No.: 19-CV-1818 W (AHG)

12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 13 v. ATTORNEY’S FEES UNDER

(b) [DOC. 31] 14 FRANK BISIGNANO, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 15 SECURITY,1 16 Defendant. 17

18 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff counsel’s, Eddy Pierre Pierre of Pierre Pierre 19 Law, PC (“Counsel”), motion for attorney’s fees under

(b). Counsel 20 requests $22,432.25 in fees, representing 25% of his client’s past due benefits. (Notice of 21 Mtn. [Doc. 31] at 2:1–9.) On May 16, 2025, Defendant filed a response taking no 22 position on the request. (See Def’s Response [Doc. 32].) 23 24

25 26 1 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), Frank Bisignano is automatically substituted as 1 The Court decides the matter on the papers submitted, and without oral argument. 2 See CivLR 7(1)(d). For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion [Doc. 31]. 3 4 I. LEGAL STANDARD 5 Section 406(b) provides, in relevant part: 6 Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under this subchapter who was represented before the court by an attorney, the court may 7 determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such 8 representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment . . . . 9

10

“In contrast to fees awarded under fee-shifting provisions such as

, 11 the fee is paid by the claimant out of the past-due benefits awarded; the losing party is not 12 responsible for payment.” Crawford v. Astrue,

(9th Cir. 2009) (en 13 banc) (citing Gisbrecht v. Barnhart,

, (2002)). “The goal of fee awards 14 under section 460(b) is to provide adequate incentive to represent claimants while 15 ensuring that the usually meager disability benefits received are not greatly depleted.” 16 Thomas v. Colvin, No. 1:11-cv-1291,

, *1 (E.D. Cal. 2015) (citing 17 Cotter v. Bowen,

(8th Cir. 1989), abrogated on other grounds in 18 Gisbrecht,

). 19 In evaluating an attorney’s fee request, courts “must respect ‘the primacy of lawful 20 attorney-client fee arrangements,’ . . . ‘looking first to the contingent-fee agreement, then 21 testing for reasonableness.’” Crawford,

(quoting Gilbrecht,

793, 808). Factors courts may consider in evaluating the reasonableness of the attorney 23 fee award are: (1) the character of the representation; (2) the results achieved; (3) whether 24 the attorney engaged in dilatory conduct; (4) whether the benefits are large in comparison 25 to the amount of time counsel spent on the case; and (5) the attorney’s record of hours 26 1 worked and counsel’s regular hourly billing charge for non-contingent cases. Thomas, 2

, *2 (citing Crawford,

). 3 II. DISCUSSION 4 Here, Plaintiff entered into a contingency-fee agreement (the “Agreement”) with 5 Counsel. (See Agreement [Doc. 31-3].) The Agreement provides that Plaintiff agrees 6 “that my attorney shall charge and receive as the fee an amount equal to twenty-five 7 percent (25%) of the past-due benefits that are awarded . . . .” 8 There is no dispute that Counsel was successful in obtaining a favorable result for 9 Plaintiff in this case by securing a remand to the Commissioner to hold a new hearing and 10 issue a new decision. (Order [Doc. 24] 9–10.) On remand, the Commissioner granted 11 Plaintiff’s application for benefits. (P. Decl. [Doc. 31-2] at 3, ¶ 11.) Based on these 12 facts, there is no indication of substandard performance or dilatory conduct by counsel. 13 Additionally, Counsel has persuasively argued that her de facto hourly rate of 14 $370.87, while on the high end, nevertheless compares favorably with rates awarded by 15 other courts in this District. See Watkins v. O’Malley,

, * 2 (S.D. Cal., 16 May 24, 2024) (citations omitted) (collecting cases) (approving effective hourly rate of 17 $1,566.00 and noting that “several cases have found rates of $1,300 to $1,600 to be 18 appropriate, including cases in this district.”). 19 For these reasons, the Court will grant the motion. 20 /// 21 /// 22 /// 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 1 CONCLUSION & ORDER 2 For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Petitioner Eddy Pierre Pierre’s 3 ||motion for attorney’s fees under

(b) [Doc. 31]. Defendant is ORDERED 4 || to pay $22,432.25 directly to Pierre Pierre Law, P.C., to be paid from Plaintiff's past due 5 || benefits, within 90 days from the date of this order. Counsel is ORDERED to reimburse 6 || any fees previously received under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. 8 Dated: June 13, 2025 \ 9

Hn. 7 omas J. Whelan 1] United States District Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27