Firsov, minor, by & through parent Sergey Firsov v. Church of Scientology of Silicon Valley

3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 SAN JOSE DIVISION LEONID FIRSOV, MINOR, BY & Case No. 5:25-cv-03265-SVK THROUGH PARENT SERGEY FIRSOV, Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 9 MOTION TO WITHDRAW CONSENT v. 10 [Re: ECF No. 17] CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY OF 11 SILICON VALLEY, et al., 12 Defendants.

14 Plaintiff Leonid Firsov is proceeding in this matter pro se by and through his parent Sergey Firsov. Plaintiff has moved to withdraw consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction. Dkt. No. 17 (“Mot.”). For the following reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to withdraw consent.

17 I. BACKGROUND 18 Minor Plaintiff Leonid Firsov filed this action on April 11, 2025 against Defendants Church of Scientology of Silicon Valley and Church of Scientology Mission of Silicon Valley.

20 Dkt. No. 1 (“Compl.”). On the same day, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis (“IFP”), Dkt. No. 4, and a document consenting to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge, Dkt. No. 5.

23 Magistrate Judge Susan van Keulen denied Plaintiff’s IFP motion on April 29, 2025, explaining that “where leave to proceed in forma pauperis is sought to vindicate the alleged substantive rights of a minor, the financial resources of both the minor and the volunteer parent, next friend, or guardian at litem should be considered in determining ability to pay the costs of litigation.” Dkt. No. 12 at 2 (quoting Cottingham for Washington v. Bd. of Educ. of Emery Unified IFP application contained information only for himself, the Court denied the application without prejudice to Plaintiff renewing the application with an attached affidavit regarding the financial information of his parent/asserted guardian ad litem Sergey Firsov. Id. 4 Plaintiff submitted the required financial information and also moved to disqualify Judge van Keulen. Dkt. Nos. 13, 14, 15. Thereafter, Judge van Keulen again denied Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis because the supplemental financial information indicated that Plaintiff was not qualified to proceed IFP. Dkt. No. 16 at 6–7. Judge van Keulen also denied his motion to disqualify her. Id. at 2–5. A few days later, Plaintiff filed the present motion to withdraw consent. Dkt. No. 17.

10 II. LEGAL STANDARD 11 A magistrate judge may conduct all proceedings upon the consent of all the parties in a civil action. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). “There is no absolute right, in a civil case, to withdraw consent to trial and other proceedings before a magistrate judge.” Dixon v. Ylst, 990 F.2d 478, 480 (9th Cir. 1993). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73 provides that only “the district judge may vacate a referral to a magistrate judge.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 73(b)(3). “The court may, for good cause shown on its own motion, or under extraordinary circumstances shown by any party, vacate a reference of a civil matter to a magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(4); accord Branch v. Umphenour, 936 F.3d 994, 1001–02 (9th Cir. 2019).

19 III. DISCUSSION 20 Plaintiff argues that his income and expenses should be kept under seal. Mot. at 2.

21 Plaintiff further argues that a summons should be issued. See id. 22 The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to show good cause or extraordinary circumstances that warrant his withdrawal of consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction. Plaintiff’s request is based on (1) his disagreement with the denial of his IFP application, (2) his disagreement with the unsealing of his IFP application, and (3) the magistrate judge’s order requiring him to pay the filing fee before issuing summons. First, as Judge van Keulen explained in her Order Denying Motion to Disqualify; Unsealing and Denying Renewed Application to Proceed in Forma issuance of the summons unless and until he pays the filing fee. Jd. at 6-7. Second, Plaintiff may || disagree with the magistrate judge’s rulings regarding his IFP applications, but such disagreement || is insufficient to show “extraordinary circumstances” justifying withdrawal of consent. See || Branch, 936 F.3d at 1004 (noting that “[nJeither mere dissatisfaction with a magistrate judge’s decision, nor unadorned accusations that such decisions reflect judicial bias, will suffice” to meet || the requirement for withdrawal of magistrate judge jurisdiction). Further, the Court notes that || Plaintiff neither filed a motion to seal his IFP applications under Civil Local Rule 79-5 nor demonstrated that the standards for sealing have been met. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to show how || the magistrate judge “violated Plaintiff]’]s privacy” by not keeping the applications under seal.

10 || See Mot. at 2.

11 || Iv. ORDER 12 For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion to Withdraw 13 the Consent to Magistrate Judge (Dkt. No. 17) is DENIED. The Court returns this case to Judge || van Keulen for further proceedings. a 16 IT IS SO ORDERED.

|| Datea: July 7, 2025 TH LABSON FREEMAN, as Duty Judge 20 United States District Judge