1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 ROSALYN ANGELA WINDHAM EL, Case No. 25-cv-04241-DMR

8 Plaintiff, ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE: 9 v. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

10 CRISTENE C. SCHONEFELD, et al., 11 Defendants.

12 Self-represented Plaintiff Rosalyn Angela Windham El (“Windham”) filed a complaint and 13 an application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) on May 16, 2025. [Docket Nos. 1 14 (Compl.), 2 (IFP).] Windham alleges that she is a Moorish American National and “ancient 15 American Inhabitant Executor Fiduciary and Successor Trustee of [a] Trust in Fee Simple 16 Absolute” of a property with address 7361 Claremont Ave, Oakland CA 94705. Compl. ECF 8. 17 The complaint seeks the ejection from this property of “all squatter persons, principle, agents, 18 heirs and assign named on the grant deed and all current improvements.” Id. The complaint is 19 brought against Cristene C. Schonefeld and Robert S. Schonefeld (“Defendants”). Id. at 2.1 20 The court considers Windham’s complaint and IFP application pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 21 § 1915(a). A court may allow a plaintiff to prosecute an action in federal court without 22 prepayment of fees or security if the plaintiff submits an affidavit showing that he or she is unable 23 to pay such fees or provide such security. See

(a). Having evaluated Plaintiff’s 24 financial affidavit, the court finds that Plaintiff has satisfied the economic eligibility requirement 25 of

(a) and grants the application to proceed IFP. 26 1 The court notes that Windham brought a similar complaint seeking the ejection of people from a 27 property with address 2943 Chestnut St, Emeryville CA 94608, which the court recommended for 1 The court’s grant of Plaintiff’s application to proceed IFP, however, does not mean that 2 they may continue to prosecute the complaint. A court is under a continuing duty to dismiss a 3 case filed without the payment of the filing fee whenever it determines that the action “(i) is 4 frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks 5 monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.”

1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). If the court dismisses a case pursuant to Section 1915(e)(2)(B), the plaintiff 7 may still file the same complaint by paying the filing fee. This is because the court’s section 8 1915(e)(2)(B) dismissal is not on the merits, but rather an exercise of the court’s discretion under 9 the IFP statute. Denton v. Hernandez,

(1992). 10 To make the determination under

(e)(2)(B), courts assess whether there is 11 an arguable factual and legal basis for the asserted wrong, “however inartfully pleaded.” Franklin 12 v. Murphy,

(9th Cir. 1984). Courts have the authority to dismiss 13 complaints founded on “wholly fanciful” factual allegations for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 14

. A court can also dismiss a complaint where it is based solely on conclusory 15 statements, naked assertions without any factual basis, or allegations that are not plausible on their 16 face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009); see also Erickson v. Pardus,

(2007) (per curiam). 18 The court finds that Plaintiff has not pleaded subject matter jurisdiction. 19 I. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 20 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and a “federal court is presumed to lack 21 jurisdiction in a particular case unless the contrary affirmatively appears.” Stock W., Inc. v. 22 Confederated Tribes,

, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted). Pursuant to 28

, “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United 24 States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or other defendants, to the 25 district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such 26 action is pending.”

(a). Federal subject matter jurisdiction under

1331 requires a civil action to arise under the constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 1 complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is 2 presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint.” Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., 3

(1998) (quoting Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams,

(1987)). A 4 district court has diversity jurisdiction where the parties are diverse and “the matter in controversy 5 exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interests and costs.”

. 6 Plaintiff alleges that there is federal question jurisdiction under “Article I Section 10 7 Clause 1: No State shall make any thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts.” 8 Compl. 3. Plaintiff cannot bring a claim under this clause against two private individuals.2 The 9 court is not able to identify a provision under the constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States 10 which provides for the relief sought by Plaintiff. As such, Plaintiff has failed to plead federal 11 question jurisdiction. 12 Plaintiff also alleges that there is diversity jurisdiction, which requires that the parties are 13 citizens of different states. Compl. 3; see

(a). A natural person’s state of 14 citizenship is determined by the state of domicile. See Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co.,

853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001). “A person’s domicile is her permanent home, where she resides with the 16 intention to remain or to which she intends to return.” Id. Plaintiff lists her own address and the 17 addresses of both Defendants as in California. Compl. 1-2. Later, Plaintiff states that she is a 18 citizen of the “Kingdom of California,” and that Defendants are citizens of “California 19 Corporation 1850.” Id. at 3-4. All three parties appear to be residents of California.3 The court 20 finds that Plaintiff has not demonstrated complete diversity, and the court lacks diversity 21

22 2 The U.S. Constitution generally does not provide a remedy for constitutional violations against private individuals. “With a few exceptions, such as the provisions of the Thirteenth Amendment, 23 constitutional guarantees of individual liberty and equal protection do not apply to the actions of private entities.” Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,

(1991). Rather, these 24 protections “apply in general only to action by the government.”

25 3 To the extent Windham may seek to rely on her Moorish citizenship to bypass the diversity requirement, courts have not been receptive to such arguments. See, e.g., Ingram El v. Crail, No. 26 18-cv-1976-MCE-EFB PS,

, (E.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2019) (“Plaintiff’s Moorish citizenship argument is a frivolous attempt to establish diversity jurisdiction where none exists, 27 and the ploy is not new.” (collecting cases)). 1 jurisdiction. 2 As it is does not appear that the court has jurisdiction over this action, by no later than July 3 29, 2025, Windham shall explain in writing why this case should not be dismissed for lack of 4 subject matter jurisdiction. If Windham fails to respond by that date or her response fails to 5 establish a basis for subject matter jurisdiction, the court may prepare a report and 6 recommendation for dismissal of the case. The Initial Case Management Conference set for 7 August 20, 2025 is VACATED and will be re-set by the court as necessary. 8 The court refers Windham to the section “Representing Yourself” on the Court’s website, 9 located at https://cand.uscourts.gov/pro-se-litigants/, as well as the Court’s Legal Help Centers for 10 unrepresented parties. Parties may schedule an appointment by calling 415-782-8982 or emailing 11 [email protected]. 12 13 14 IT IS SO ORDERED. 15 Dated: July 8, 2025 16 ______________________________________ DONNA M. RYU 17 Chief Magistrate Judge 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27