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8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 STELLA K., NO. EDCV 24-0119-AGR 12 Plaintiff, MEMORAN DUM OPINION AND 13 ORDER v. 14 15 FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner of Social Security, 16 Defendant. 17

18 19 Plaintiff1 filed this action on January 18, 2024. The parties filed briefs on 20 the disputed issues. The court has taken the matter under submission without 21 oral argument.2 22 Having reviewed the entire file, the court affirms the decision of the 23 Commissioner. 24 1 Plaintiff’s name has been partially redacted in compliance with Fed. R. Civ.

.2(c)(2)(B) and the recommendation of the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the Judicial Conference of the United 26 States. 27 2 Pursuant to

(c), the parties consented to proceed before the magistrate judge. (Dkt. Nos. 6, 7.) 28 1 I.

2 PROCEDURAL HISTORY

3 On July 30, 2021, Plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance

4 benefits and alleged an onset date of November 24, 2020. Administrative Record 5 (“AR”) 16. The application was denied initially and upon reconsideration. AR 16, 186-90, 198-204. Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law 6 Judge (“ALJ”). On January 17, 2023, the ALJ conducted a hearing at which 7 Plaintiff and a vocational expert testified. AR 79-117. On March 15, 2023, the 8 ALJ issued a decision denying benefits. AR 13-33. The Appeals Council denied 9 review on December 1, 2023. AR 1-7. This action followed. 10 II. 11 STANDARD OF REVIEW 12 Pursuant to

(g), this court has authority to review the

13 Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits. Smith v. Berryhill,

, 474 14 (2019). The decision will be disturbed only if it is not supported by substantial 15 evidence, or if it is based upon the application of improper legal standards. 16 Moncada v. Chater,

(9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). 17 “Substantial evidence” means “‘more than a mere scintilla.’” Biestek v. 18 Berryhill,

(2019) (citation omitted). “It means – and means only 19 – ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 20 support a conclusion.’”

(citation omitted). In determining whether substantial 21 evidence exists to support the Commissioner’s decision, the court examines the 22 administrative record as a whole, considering adverse as well as supporting 23 evidence. When the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the court must defer to the Commissioner’s decision. Attmore v. 24 Colvin,

(9th Cir. 2016). 25

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28 1 III.

2 DISCUSSION

3 A. Disability

4 A person qualifies as disabled, and thereby eligible for such benefits, “only

5 if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is

6 not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age,

7 education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful

8 work which exists in the national economy.” Barnhart v. Thomas,

,

9 21-22 (2003) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

10 B. The ALJ’s Findings

11 The ALJ found that Plaintiff last met the insured status requirements on 12 December 31, 2021. AR 19. Following the five-step s equential analysis 13 applicable to disability determinations, Lounsburry v. Barnhart,

, 14 1114 (9th Cir. 2006),3 the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the severe impairments of 15 multiple sclerosis (“MS”), status post anterior cervical discectomy and fusion, 16 obstructive sleep apnea, obesity, major depressive disorder, generalized anxiety 17 disorder, and posttraumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”). AR 19. Plaintiff’s 18 impairments did not meet or medically equal the severity of a listed impairment. 19 AR 20. 20 The ALJ found that, through the date last insured, Plaintiff had the residual 21 functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work except that she could lift/carry 22 twenty pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; push/pull occasionally with 23 the arms; stand/walk for six hours of an eight-hour workday with standard breaks, 24 for thirty minutes at a time, with the option to sit at the work station for ten minutes and continue working after thirty minutes of standing or walking; sit for six hours 25

26 3 The five-step sequential analysis examines whether the claimant engaged in substantial gainful activity, whether the claimant’s impairment is 27 severe, whether the impairment meets or equals a listed impairment, whether the claimant is able to do his or her past relevant work, and whether the claimant is 28 able to do any other work. Lounsburry,

. 1 of an eight-hour workday with standard breaks; occasionally stoop, climb ramps

2 and stairs, kneel, crawl, and crouch; never climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds or

3 balance; and frequently reach to the front and sides and occasionally reach

4 overhead. She must avoid concentrated exposure to extreme heat, extreme cold, 5 and vibrations and must never be exposed to unprotected heights and dangerous, unprotected machinery. She could understand, remember, and carry out simple 6 tasks but not at an assembly line rate, and she could make simple work-related 7 decisions. AR 22. 8 The ALJ determined that Plaintiff could not perform her past relevant work, 9 but there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy 10 that she could perform. AR 27-28. Plaintiff, therefore, was not under a disability 11 within the meaning of the Social Security Act from the alleged onset date of 12 November 24, 2020, through December 31, 2021, the last date insured. AR 28-

13 29. 14 C. Subjective Allegations 15 Plaintiff asserts a single claim for relief, alleging that the ALJ erred by failing 16 to articulate legally sufficient reasons for discounting her subjective symptom 17 complaints. 18 “‘An ALJ engages in a two-step analysis to determine whether a claimant’s 19 testimony regarding subjective pain or symptoms is credible. First, the ALJ must 20 determine whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an 21 underlying impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or 22 other symptoms alleged.’” Smith v. Kijakazi,

(9th Cir. 2021) 23 (citation omitted). “At this step, the medical evidence need not corroborate the severity of the alleged symptoms; the medical evidence need only establish that 24 the impairment could reasonably be expected to cause some degree of the 25 alleged symptoms.”

26 “Then, provided ‘there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ can reject the 27 claimant’s testimony about the severity of her symptoms only by offering specific, 28 1 clear and convincing reasons for doing so.’”

(citation omitted). The

2 Ninth Circuit requires that the ALJ “‘specify which testimony she finds not

3 credible, and then provide clear and convincing reasons, supported by evidence

4 in the record, to support that credibility determination.’”

(citation omitted). 5 ““[A]n ALJ cannot be required to believe every allegation of disabling pain, or else disability benefits would be available for the asking.’” Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. 6 Sec. Admin.,

(9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). 7 Plaintiff contends that she was unable to work due to a combination of 8 physical and mental impairments, including MS, degenerative disc disease, 9 obstructive sleep apnea, major depressive disorder, and PTSD. AR 101, 320. 10 She reported that she underwent cervical spinal fusion surgery in 2015, but that 11 the procedure did not eliminate her symptoms and that she continued to 12 experience chronic neck pain. AR 92, 319-20. As a result of her MS, Plaintiff

13 described persistent symptoms, including numbness and tingling sensations, 14 tremors in her hands, sensitivity to extreme temperatures, visual disturbances, 15 and balance issues that required her to use a cane for ambulation. AR 87, 91, 16 93-95, 319-20, 327. She also reported experiencing severe fatigue, which 17 necessitated daily rest and frequent naps. AR 87, 91, 105, 319-20. In addition to 18 her physical impairments, Plaintiff described significant cognitive and 19 psychological difficulties, such as memory problems, difficulty concentrating, 20 racing thoughts, anxiety, and trouble finding words. AR 92, 97-98, 319-20, 325. 21 She estimated that she could stand or walk for no more than twenty minutes 22 before becoming unsteady and at risk of falling, and that she could sit for no more 23 than twenty minutes at a time due to stiffness and discomfort. AR 95-96, 101-02. She further reported difficulty bending, climbing stairs, and walking without 24 assistance, often needing to hold onto walls for support. AR 95-96. Although she 25 was able to perform some household chores and other activities of daily living, 26 Plaintiff stated that she had to take frequent breaks and lie down multiple times 27 per day to manage her symptoms. AR 102-05. 28 1 In his decision, the ALJ acknowledged that Plaintiff’s “medically

2 determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged

3 symptoms,” but concluded that Plaintiff’s statements “concerning the intensity,

4 persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms [were] not entirely consistent 5 with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record.” AR 23. The ALJ identified several reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s subjective symptom 6 testimony: (1) the objective medical evidence did not fully support her claims; (2) 7 she made inconsistent statements about her symptoms to her medical providers, 8 and (3) her treatment history reflected generally conservative and/or effective 9 care. AR 23-27. As discussed below, these justifications are clear and 10 convincing reasons, supported by substantial evidence, for rejecting Plaintiff’s 11 subjective symptom complaints. 12 First, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s subjective complaints were not

13 supported by the objective medical evidence. AR 23-27. Although a claimant’s 14 statements cannot be rejected solely due to a lack of objective support, the 15 absence of corroborating medical evidence is a relevant factor in assessing the 16 credibility of symptom allegations.

(c)(4) (an ALJ evaluates 17 a claimant’s statements in light of the objective medical evidence and other 18 evidence in the record). Plaintiff was diagnosed with relapsing-remitting MS4 in 19 2015. AR 700. A 2018 MRI of her brain showed white matter disease consistent 20 with MS, but follow-up MRIs conducted in February 2019, April 2020, August 21 2021, and September 2022 revealed no new lesions or enhancement, indicating 22 disease stability. AR 502, 620, 632, 634-35, 1064, 1085. Neurological 23 examinations during the relevant period showed a normal gait, generally full muscle strength, and intact sensation. AR 579-80, 584, 594, 620, 624, 630, 659- 24

25 4 Relapsing-remitting MS is the most common form of the disease, characterized by periods of new symptoms (relapses) followed by periods of 26 partial or complete recovery (remissions), which can last for months or even years. Multiple Sclerosis, Mayo Clinic, https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases- 27 conditions/multiple-sclerosis/symptoms-causes/syc-20350269 (last visited May 28, 2025). 28 1 60, 999-1000, 1004-5, 1063-64, 1078, 1104. In January 2022, Plaintiff’s treating

2 neurologist observed some decreased strength and difficulty with walking, but no

3 signs of ataxia or imbalance. AR 1078. He noted that her MS was “not active”

4 and remained stable on her current medication regimen with Copaxone. AR 5 1077, 1120. He assigned her an Expanded Disability Status Scale (“EDSS”) score of 2.5, indicating minimal functional impairment. AR 1065, 1073, 1079. 6 Additionally, the State Agency medical consultants -- whose assessments were 7 the only medical opinions in the record -- reviewed the evidence and concluded 8 that Plaintiff’s physical impairments did not preclude her from working. AR 126- 9 28, 154. 10 Regarding Plaintiff’s mental impairments, she reported symptoms including 11 difficulty concentrating, memory problems, racing thoughts, depression, and 12 anxiety. AR 92, 97-98, 319-20, 325. However, the medical evidence indicated

13 that these symptoms were generally well controlled with adherence to prescribed 14 medications. Aside from intermittent reports of anxious or depressed mood, her 15 mental status examinations were largely unremarkable, consistently reflecting 16 normal thought processes, intact cognition, appropriate judgment, and good 17 insight. AR 541-42, 826, 922, 935, 1104, 1118, 1124, 1129. The State Agency 18 psychological consultants who reviewed the record assessed only mild mental 19 functional limitations. AR 124, 155. Taken together, this evidence supports the 20 ALJ’s conclusion that the objective medical evidence did not substantiate the level 21 of limitation Plaintiff alleged. 22 Second, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s symptom allegations were 23 inconsistent with statements she made to her treating providers. AR 23-27. An ALJ may properly reject a claimant’s symptom testimony when she makes 24 inconsistent statements concerning her symptoms. See Tommasetti v. Astrue, 25

(9th Cir. 2008). While Plaintiff alleged that she was unable 26 to work due to extreme fatigue, neck pain, hand tremors, balance problems, and 27 mental health issues, she made contrary statements to her medical providers. 28 1 For example, in October 2020, she reported doing well with no complaints. AR

2 583. She stated that she was walking one mile a few times per week and that her

3 hand issues had resolved. AR 579, 583, 621, 943, 999. She also reported using

4 her CPAP machine for her obstructive sleep apnea and waking up more 5 refreshed. AR 619. Regarding her neck pain, she stated that it was well controlled with medication and declined further evaluation or treatment. AR 1130. 6 As for her mental health, Plaintiff consistently reported a stable mood, except 7 during periods of family-related stress, particularly while caring for her four young 8 grandchildren. AR 937, 939, 941, 945, 947, 949, 953, 955, 959, 961, 974, 1243, 9 1245, 1251-52, 1254. She also told her treating provider that she felt “fine” 10 mentally when she adhered to her prescribed medications.5 AR 883. These 11 statements undermined her hearing testimony and supported the ALJ’s 12 conclusion that her symptom allegations were not fully credible or consistent with

13 the overall record. 14 Finally, the ALJ cited Plaintiff’s effective treatment as a basis for 15 discounting her subjective complaints. AR 23-27. In assessing a claimant’s 16 subjective symptoms, an ALJ may properly consider the “type, dosage, 17 effectiveness, and side effects of any medication” a claimant has taken to 18 alleviate pain or other symptoms.

(c)(3)(iv); see also Warre 19 v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,

(9th Cir. 2006) 20 (“Impairments that can be controlled effectively with medication are not 21 disabling”). Here, as previously noted, Plaintiff’s medication regimen was 22 effective in controlling her MS symptoms and her mental health issues. She also 23 declined further treatment and evaluation for her neck pain, suggesting that it was adequately controlled. AR 1130. As for her obstructive sleep apnea, she stated 24 that her CPAP machine helped with her sleep, and she did not seek any further 25

26 5 Additionally, although not specifically cited in the ALJ’s decision, the record reflects that Plaintiff reported going to a theme park with her family in 27 October 2021 and stated that she had a nice time. AR 1243. She was also able to go on vacation. AR 1257. 28 1 | treatment for this condition. AR 619, 1063. Accordingly, the ALJ’s rationale that 2 || treatment had been relatively effective in controlling Plaintiffs symptoms 3 | constituted a specific, clear, and convincing reason to discredit her symptom 4 | testimony.® 5 In sum, the ALJ articulated specific, clear, and convincing reasons, 6 supported by substantial evidence in the record, for discounting Plaintiff's 7 subjective symptom testimony. g IV. 9 ORDER

10 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner is affirmed. 11 : Keambig 13 | DATED: July 9, 2025 . 14 ALICIA G. ROSENBERG United States Magistrate Judge 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 ° To the extent Plaintiff is arguing that the ALJ erred by failing to consider her husband’s statements, any error was harmless. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 26 | F.3d 1104, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[A]n ALJ’s failure to comment upon lay witness testimony is harmless where the same evidence that the ALJ referred to in 27 discrediting [the Claimant’s claims] also discredits [the lay witness’s] claims.”); see 28 also Metcalf v. Kijakazi,

, at *2 (9th Cir. 2022) (same).